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
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INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS BEFORE A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H. Res. 282

TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND
OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN
THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROP-
AGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES
OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY
OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN
RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY
NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

VOLUME 16

NOVEMBER 29, 30; DECEMBER 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 1943

Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities



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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1944

SWORN STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN THOMAS MASON

Mr. COSTELLO. Kindly state your name to the reporter.

Dr. MASON. John Thomas Mason.

Mr. STRIPLING. And your address, Dr. Mason.

Dr. MASON. At present, Cookeville, Tenn.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state the place and State of your birth?

Dr. MASON. June 3, 1908; Sparta, White County, Tenn.

Mr. STRIPLING. And what is your profession?

Dr. MASON. Doctor of medicine, physician.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you give the committee a brief outline of your educational background?

Dr. MASON. Elementary school education, McMinnville, Tenn.; high school, McMinnville, Tenn., High School; bachelor of arts, Vanderbilt University, Nashville.

Mr. STRIPLING. What year did you graduate from Vanderbilt University?

Dr. MASON. As bachelor of arts?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Dr. MASON. 1930; doctor of medicine, Vanderbilt University Medical School, 1933.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following your graduation in 1933, will you also outline your professional career up to the present time?

Dr. MASON. Internship, St. Thomas Hospital, Nashville, Tenn.; private practice of medicine and surgery, McMinnville, Tenn., up until June 1, 1940; director of a four-county rural health department under the Tennessee State Department of Public Health from June 1, 1940, until June 15, 1943. On that date I left for Klamath Falls, Oreg., on assignment at Tule Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, at that time, Doctor, did you take a Civil Service Commission examination?

Dr. MASON. No, sir. Some years previously I had filled in the un-assembly forms, just as a matter of general interest, for no particular reason.

Mr. STRIPLING. Speak up, please.

Dr. MASON. I had a rating with Civil Service and this offer was sent to me just at a time when this health department was being closed because of lack of personnel. I was declared available by the State chairman of the medical procurement and assignment division of Tennessee and made available to the War Relocation Authority, and was assigned to this center by telegram.

Mr. STRIPLING. On what date did you leave Tennessee for Klamath Falls?

Dr. MASON. I left Nashville, Tenn., at 7:40 on October 15.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you proceed directly to Klamath Falls?

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you notify Mr. Best, of Tule Lake relocation center, of your departure and time of arrival?

Dr. MASON. I notified Dr. Carlisle Thompson of my departure, and he had instructed me to notify Mr. Best the exact time of arrival, which I did, in Chicago.

Mr. STRIPLING. You wired Mr. Best at Chicago the time you would arrive at Klamath Falls?

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. On what date did you arrive at Klamath Falls?

Dr. MASON. I arrived on the night of October 19.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Best, or anyone connected with W. R. A., communicate with you on October 19?

Dr. MASON. There was a penciled message at the railroad station directing me to go to the Willard Hotel in Klamath Falls; that I would be called for at 8 o'clock on the following morning.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you go to the Willard Hotel?

Dr. MASON. I went to the Willard Hotel and found that the hotel was full; they had no rooms. Through the kindness of the manager there, they finally obtained me a room—I might say, by way of explanation, it was the duck-hunting season, and the hotels were well filled—in a little hotel in another part of the city and left a message there to tell whoever came for me that I had been, of necessity, required to get a room in another hotel, and gave the name.

Mr. STRIPLING. The following morning did anyone from W. R. A. come in to get you, or did they get in touch with you?

Dr. MASON. No. I waited until afternoon. Then I felt I should do something, so I called W. R. A. by long distance.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, the Tule Lake relocation center is how far from Klamath Falls?

Dr. MASON. It is said to be approximately 35 miles.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you wait all the following day for someone to get in touch with you from Tule Lake?

Dr. MASON. I got Mr. Best by long-distance telephone and told him of my presence and where I was. He said, "Wait there."

Mr. STRIPLING. And how long did you wait?

Dr. MASON. I waited the remainder of that day and through that night and the following morning; in about midmorning a car came by.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, you spent 2 days in Klamath Falls waiting for someone from the Tule Lake center to come 35 miles to get you.

Dr. MASON. Two nights and one day.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you arrived at the Tule Lake relocation center, to whom did you report?

Dr. MASON. I went to Mr. Best's office. He was busy at the time, and then I went directly to the hospital to Dr. Pedicord.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state for the record who Dr. Pedicord is?

Dr. MASON. Dr. Reese Pedicord is the chief medical officer of the relocation base hospital at Tule Lake, or was, I might say.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Best?

Dr. MASON. Mr. Best is the director of the relocation center at Tule Lake. I might say Mr. Best and Dr. Pedicord were the only two names I knew at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know Dr. Pedicord's first name?

Dr. MASON. Reese M. Pedicord, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. And Mr. Best's first name?

Dr. MASON. Ray R. Best, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you endeavor to see Mr. Best after you arrived at the Tule Lake center?

Dr. MASON. I made a number of visits to his office, simply to report, as a matter of form, to let him know that I was there. He was busy

each time, and I left word with the secretary each time that I had called. I reported four to six times; I forget exactly how many.

Mr. STRIPLING. And the position you accepted with the War Relocation Authority had a rating of P-5; is that correct?

Dr. MASON. That is right; senior medical officer, P-5.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is a professional rating, Mr. Chairman.

What was the salary accompanying that rating?

Dr. MASON. It was 46, plus 6, \$5,200.

Mr. STRIPLING. After you reported to Dr. Pedicord what assignment did he give you relative to your work at the hospital?

Dr. MASON. May I make an explanatory remark?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Dr. MASON. There had recently three other Caucasian physicians come, within a period of approximately 3 weeks, so Dr. Pedicord had a staff of Caucasian physicians for the first time in a short period of time. I was the last to arrive of a group of four who had arrived recently.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state the names of the four for the record?

Dr. MASON. I am sorry; I do not know the first names of all of them, but I know some of them. I am not sure of the order of their arrival. I think it was in this order: A Dr. Marks, and I do not know his first name; a Dr. Loebman; and a Dr. Dan F. Noonan; and I.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was Dr. Loebman a refugee from Germany?

Dr. MASON. That was the general impression. That is what I heard.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know where he was stationed before he came to the Tule Lake relocation center?

Dr. MASON. I believe he was in some hospital in Toledo or Akron—I am not sure—Ohio; one or the other.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, Doctor, if you will give the committee a statement as to the set-up and conditions at the hospital when you arrived there, and also your opinion of the administration under Dr. Pedicord, what he was endeavoring to do, and so forth.

Dr. MASON. Shortly after my arrival, since there was now a staff of Caucasian physicians of some size, we organized according to the various abilities that we presumably had, and each of the four physicians, with the exception of Dr. Pedicord, who assumed only an administrative position, were assigned to certain services as their responsibility. My particular responsibility was surgery.

Do you care about the other responsibilities?

Mr. STRIPLING. No. I think the committee would only be concerned chiefly with your duties.

Now, then, give us some idea as to the size of the hospital.

Dr. MASON. I might state, by way of explanation, of course, this responsibility was during the hours of 8 to 5; that is, the immediate responsibility. And, of course, by alternation, one man served as officer of the day from 8 to 8, 8 a. m. to 8 a. m. the following day; his responsibility being for the entire hospital from the 5 o'clock hour until 8 o'clock of the following morning. That was by rotation.

As to the hospital, I never counted the beds, but the hospital was presumed to be about 250 beds. It was a typical Army-style base hospital, which I presume describes it well enough, with wards ranging from A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H.

Mr. COSTELLO. How were the wards situated; each in a separate wing of a building?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But all connected together?

Dr. MASON. Yes; by covered passageways.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it was a wooden building?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it your understanding when you arrived, Dr. Mason, that before the arrival of the first four doctors which you mentioned—the Caucasian doctors—that Dr. Pedicord was the only Caucasian?

Dr. MASON. That was my understanding.

Mr. STRIPLING. And the others on the staff were Japanese, interned Japanese?

Dr. MASON. That was my understanding.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the purpose of bringing in Caucasian doctors?

Dr. MASON. Well, I can hardly say. I do not know, officially, just what the purpose was. I presume it was for the purpose of reorganizing and making the administration more efficient. I had been led to believe that was the reason. I had been led to believe there was some effort to get Caucasian physicians. I believe so.

Mr. STRIPLING. In any of your discussions with Dr. Pedicord, did you get the impression that he was seeking to set up an administration which would save the Government money?

Dr. MASON. I very definitely got that impression. I was told that there were considerable extravagances that had existed previous to his arrival, and I can say, according to his statement, he had been able to effect considerable savings, reductions in both personnel and expenditures.

Mr. COSTELLO. How large a Japanese staff was there in the hospital?

Dr. MASON. There were, in all, I should say, about 10 Japanese physicians. During my short stay there, there were only 4 who were actively engaged in practice; two arresting, and 4 others were just in and out, more or less, apparently, for curiosity. I do not know why they were working, or assigned.

Mr. COSTELLO. How about the nurses' staff?

Dr. MASON. I do not know the exact size of the Japanese nursing personnel. As I recall, there were eight Caucasian nurses.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were those new arrivals?

Dr. MASON. Some of them were new arrivals; recent arrivals, I might say.

Mr. STRIPLING. At the time you arrived at the Tule Lake relocation center, Dr. Mason, was there a strike in progress on the part of the internees who were working on the farms and in the packing sheds?

Dr. MASON. That was the general impression. I heard there was a strike. I was not particularly concerned, but I was told soon after my arrival that there was a strike; that the workers refused to harvest the crops which were ready to be harvested at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was there a definite resentment on the part of the Japanese doctors in the hospital as well as the evacuees, generally, against the Caucasian doctors and Caucasian administration of the hospital?

Dr. MASON. I gradually learned that there was. I did not know at the time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you state for the information of the committee the general attitude and actions of the evacuees who would come to the hospital for treatment?

Dr. MASON. Well, some of the activities were rather confusing. I had been led to expect some activities that would be confusing.

And I might give one particular instance, if you think it would be of any interest.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right.

Dr. MASON. We had clinics every day, divided into various subjects such as surgical, medical, obstetrical, pediatric, and other clinics, and we were assigned not necessarily according to our service, because there were not enough of us to strictly limit ourselves to our particular service for which we were responsible in the in-patient department.

But in the clinics we found many patients who presumably could not speak English.

On one or more occasions I had a little Japanese girl who interpreted for me, and was very agreeable. I remember one instance in particular where I worked at some length to determine the ailment or complaint of a patient, and I found, as was frequently true, the purpose of coming to the hospital apparently was to obtain more or better food or special diets.

I was presented with this request, after a long discussion, by interpretation, and for reasons which were professional and for which I did not consider the necessity, I refused.

And on more than one occasion I was immediately assailed by a barrage of English words from the individual who could not speak English.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know of instances in the hospital where Japanese doctors admitted patients with some slight injury or minor illness or ailment which would not require hospitalization?

Dr. MASON. One effort Dr. Pedicord had made, in some of his instructions—

Would this be of interest to you?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Dr. MASON. He had instructed us in a few things particularly. He had told us that there would be confusion; that every effort would be made to confuse us. That example I gave was one.

He also told us there were many, many requests, and he told us, in general, our answer would be, "No." He also told us there were too many admissions to the hospital; that we were doctors; that he knew we would know the necessity for admittance and that he expected us to limit those admittances to those really necessary cases.

I remember one admission being made by a Japanese physician without consulting me. It was so arranged that the hospital service should be consulted concerning the admission of a patient.

I found the man had a sty on his eye, which commonly is known as hordeolum. He had been admitted by a Japanese physician with a diagnosis of cellulose of the orbit, and hordeolum.

I did not judge he needed hospitalization. To be careful, I allowed that patient to remain a full day and I dismissed him only after consulting with the Japanese physician who had admitted him and got his agreement, which I thought was wholehearted, that he should be dismissed.

Of course, we understood and were told, that we were all professional men, and that we must act with each other as professional men. And it is more or less second nature with a physician to do that, I might say, a physician who wants to do what is correct, by proper medical courtesy.

Mr. COSTELLO. Speak a little louder, Doctor; it is a little difficult to hear.

Dr. MASON. I am sorry. That is one instance.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, could you give us some idea of what transpired at the staff meetings of the hospital, by physicians of both Caucasian and Japanese?

Dr. MASON. We had, on several occasions, I do not remember just how many—but on several occasions semiprivate Caucasian staff meetings, and we had two or three combined staff meetings, including both the Caucasian and the Japanese physicians.

All of these staff meetings were quite agreeable, with the exception of the last, which was held on Saturday morning, October 30. I believe.

At that time we had a combined staff meeting which was duly called by a memorandum to each physician, both Japanese and Caucasian, and some discussions arose which caused some heated arguments between Dr. Pedicord and one or more of the Japanese physicians.

Specifically, he had indicated very courteously, and without pointing to anyone present, the necessity for improving the records of the hospital, the charts which I can say, as a matter of opinion, certainly needed improvement.

One young Japanese man, who, I have heard, was not a graduate—I do not say that as a matter of fact; I heard that he was not—strenuously objected.

Mr. MUNDT. You said he was not what?

Dr. MASON. I said I have heard that he was not a graduate; he was merely a medical-school student. I do not know that for a fact. But he had been, apparently, busily engaged in preparing a number of these charts and he, I think, took it as a personal indictment.

He resented it heatedly. He resented the implication that the charts were not correct in every detail, or what not.

Dr. Pedicord answered him by saying, "I can prove what I say. You cannot prove what you say. You will be embarrassed and I will not. Shall I go further?"

That closed the discussion.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were there Japanese physicians on the staff whom Dr. Pedicord considered to be strictly disloyal to the United States Government?

Dr. MASON. I do not know that I heard any remark as to disloyalty. I heard the remark on a number of occasions that there was one physician who was troublesome—I will use that word.

Mr. STRIPLING. Dr. Mason, were you present on November 1, at the so-called riot at Tule Lake?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you go to this blackboard, please, and draw a diagram, and in your own words, describe to the committee just what happened, beginning with 12:45 on the morning of November 1?

(Whereupon Dr. Mason drew a sketch on blackboard.)

Dr. MASON. The general outline of the geography of the situation in the area concerned in this discussion was approximately this:

This represents the Japanese colony.

This area is the firebreak in the Japanese colony between the buildings, a separation of buildings for the purpose of preventing the spread of fire, should fire occur.

Mr. STRIPLING. How wide were those firebreaks, approximately?

Dr. MASON. I do not know the exact width of these cross firebreaks or the exact width of any of them. I would judge this was approximately 200 feet; purely a matter of estimate. Of course, that just represents the colony.

There were a great number of different barracks in rows with firebreaks between.

But, at any rate, at the end of the Japanese colony, and separated, more or less, from the Caucasian area, was a large cross firebreak approximately in proportion about that size. I would judge it was a thousand feet, roughly, making a T or vertical lines from this break.

The base hospital was approximately in this position, just over this open area. There was no fence, no barricade at all, between the Japanese colony and the Caucasian area.

This will represent the hospital and the various wards. There is some detail about the front of the hospital that might be interesting.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right. Just go right ahead, if you will, Doctor.

Dr. MASON. I cannot very well draw this to scale, but there is something of interest here. This is not an actual diagram except for the area that I want to show.

This is a front screened porch with the entrance hall here.

This is Dr. Pedicord's office, in this position; the information desk in approximately this position; the head nurse's office here, and the administration building approximately 500 feet from the hospital, roughly, in this position.

That is the general diagram.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, will you begin at 12:45, when this crowd began to move on the administration building and the hospital on November 1, and describe what you saw and know, of your own knowledge?

Dr. MASON. Well, I happen to know the time very well, because I had just returned from lunch, and I was about 15 minutes early. I went to my office in one of the wards.

We had arranged little offices in the first room of the ward for each of us, and I was not engaged at the time.

But across the hall from each of these offices, or some of them, at least, there was a chart room, record room, where a varying number of Japanese girls, nonprofessional personnel, but little girls who were being treated as ward aids, kept the records, and attended to the different functions of the ordinary routine of the wards.

Mr. COSTELLO. Doctor, about how many Japanese were employed altogether in the hospital?

Dr. MASON. I think there were about between 100 and 150 at the time I arrived. There had been a great number more previously.

Mr. COSTELLO. What pay were they given?

Dr. MASON. I am sorry; I do not know. I never inquired into that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what pay the Japanese doctors were receiving?

Dr. MASON. I do not know that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you hear the statement made prior to Dr. Pedicord's effort to reduce the personnel expenditure that at one time there were 800 Japanese employed in the hospital?

Dr. MASON. I was told that there were approximately 800 such employees in the hospital at one time previous to his arrival; that is hearsay.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right, sir.

Dr. MASON. About 12:45 I noticed these little girls were becoming restless. I did not pay so much attention to them, but they did get up and start looking out of the windows, of which there were a great number.

Of course, that drew my attention to the windows and I looked out.

I saw, about in this position, a great mass of humanity, just emerging from the main firebreak into and onto the large cross firebreak. They were massed together. They did not run. They walked steadily, men, women, and children, mothers with babes in arms. They were coming directly toward the Caucasian area.

Somewhere in this area, approximately this position, the crowd divided and advanced in those general directions.

I wondered what it was, but I was not particularly concerned immediately.

Upon the division of the crowd, however, and the fact that they began to appear on the sides of the hospital in large numbers, I did become concerned. I did not speak to the Japanese, however, because I had just about learned that the information you received was not necessarily correct.

So I proceeded to the front of the building to see if I could find out from Dr. Pedicord, or some person, just what was going on. I found Dr. Pedicord standing at the screen door on the front porch, the entrance south, which was a screen porch with a screen door. He was in the position of arms on the sides, legs spread apart, with his back toward me.

The crowd by this time was in front of the hospital. They were surrounding this building. They were now dispersed, roughly, in that general position, with a scattering of people along in this area; going back and forth.

And I touched him on the shoulder and asked him what was up, or something to that effect. And he turned and told me to stand at the door and not let anybody in or anybody out.

He said, "The Japanese are trying to leave the hospital."

The little girls were, by this time, making some effort to get out and scurrying to and fro.

He then turned and went back toward his office, and almost immediately upon his departure, two Japanese boys detached themselves from a group of people in this general area, came to the door and pushed on it. I put my hands on it and said, "You can't come in."

They turned and rejoined their group, or at least, left.

About that time I heard considerable noise in the corridors of the hospital, which attracted my attention, and I turned to see, and saw numbers of Japanese men coming into the different corridors, which you could see through this general areaway here, coming in from almost all sides.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there other entrances to the hospital?

Dr. MASON. Numerous entrances. Dr. Pedicord, incidently told me he stationed one of the other doctors at another door.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that Dr. Marks?

Dr. MASON. Dr. Marks had been stationed at another door, somewhere in this general direction. I do not know just where he was.

My attention was called to something behind me and when I turned a group of young men, young Japanese men—by “young” I mean men who were approximately 18 to 30 years of age, we will say; I do not know exactly, but they were virile, strong, young men—approached the door in the same manner as the two had a short interval previously, and tried the same tactics.

I said, “You cannot come in.”

They brushed me aside without much ado and said, “Ya, ya, ya, ya,” and rushed right on into the hall.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of door was there in the front of the hospital; a screen door?

Dr. MASON. This porch had a screen door, yes; that is, the porch where I was standing, where I was brushed aside.

And they crowded by me, and went into the double wooden doors of this building, which were open at the time.

Just at this area here was a wooden barricade which had been built with an areaway for the purpose of approaching the information desk, where someone was stationed at all hours, to determine the reason for the entrance into the hospital.

There was a considerable amount of people roaming back and forth in the hospital, which was confusing and disagreeable to all of us, certainly. It was our business inasmuch as the barricade was placed there in such a way to more or less weed out the many visitors except at certain hours, to find out their business; that is, except for the people who had permission to come in there; and had been erected there a few days previously.

That was torn down as the men went in, and they went directly into Dr. Pedicord's office.

Mr. COSTELLO. What sort of a railing was there around it?

Dr. MASON. It was built of 2 by 4's; it went up to the ceiling, a single upright to the ceiling, and sort of a barricade of a sort. It had not been completed. It was in the process of construction.

That was pushed down, back, and they went into the doctor's office, and by the time I had recovered myself and rushed back in, the first I saw was the doctor. His office was divided into his secretary's office here and his private office here, with the door approximately in this position, just across the barricade, and he was being held by one Japanese who was behind him, with his arms around his neck, and a great number of others, or as many as could get around him, were flailing and beating at him, and he was kicking at that time, making some effort to get away, I presume.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately, Doctor, how many Japanese would you say were in the room fighting with Dr. Pedicord?

Mr. MASON. I would say there were 10 or 15. There was quite a group, a larger group than first approached me.

At that time 2 or 3 or a smaller number of Caucasian nurses had come into the area and saw what was going on, and it occurred to me that perhaps I had better get them into their rooms, not knowing just

what might happen. And I got them in this room and locked the door.

There was a door here that went out into the information desk.

And after we stood there for a second or two, I went out this door and back around. This all occurred in a matter of seconds, of course, you understand.

By that time Dr. Pedicord had been brought back into his office, after having been dragged out of the hospital by these men. I saw through the window, as I was getting the nurses in this room, him being dragged out the front door, down the steps, and approximately here, he was down, and later told me he did not remember. He was unconscious. And I saw him being kicked and stepped on there.

Mr. STRIPLING. By this same group of Japanese?

Dr. MASON. By this same group.

Mr. STRIPLING. Of approximately 10 or 15?

Dr. MASON. Approximately. By that time there was considerable confusion, of course, in the hospital. It was full of Japanese people, mostly men. I do not remember seeing any women at all at this time; I would say mostly men.

And just at that time the other doctor, who had been stationed at another door, and whom I had not seen since before lunch, came through the hallway rather excitedly and said that they had pushed him out. I told him that I had also been pushed out.

And we went into the room and this doctor immediately took the telephone and called the administration building, specifically calling for Mr. Best.

Mr. STRIPLING. Just a moment, Doctor.

In the meantime, had Dr. Pedicord returned?

Dr. MASON. He had been brought back.

Mr. STRIPLING. By the nurses?

Dr. MASON. One of his nurses, a nurse that he had brought with him, who was a brave person. But the Japanese had already disbanded, more or less. She simply shooed them off. I did not actually see that occurrence, but by the time I got back in here, he had been brought back in.

He was in a condition at that time that I might describe as mild shock. His blood pressure was lower than it should have been; I do not remember his exact beat, but his pulse was slow. However, he was not unconscious at the time. We were considerably disturbed about him. We did not know just what his condition was. We were not in a position to get him supplies or first-aid equipment from the rest of the hospital, because this was purely an administrative area.

And as I say, the doctor called and asked for M. P.'s or soldiers for help.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he show any physical signs of injury? Was he bleeding, or did he show signs of violence?

Dr. MASON. He had what is commonly known as a black eye and he had a hemorrhage of the entire area of the eye.

The cornea and sclera were red, that is, hemorrhage between the tissues. He had a bruise on his cheek. He complained of his arm hurting, his abdomen, and his chest and leg.

We managed to get a few bandages and some methyolate or some other antiseptic and dressed his leg and watched him closely. But

in the meantime, this doctor had made from three to five calls, and he called for help.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was the doctor?

Dr. MASON. Dr. Marks. He was the doctor who had been stationed at some other door. I could not now account for some other physician. There was still one other who on Saturday before this occurrence had been officially transferred to another area, that is, another center, Dr. Noonan. He had been sent to Granada, in Colorado, so he was not present during this particular disturbance.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, coming back to the call to Mr. Best, you say Dr. Marks called Mr. Best from Dr. Pedicord's office?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. After Dr. Pedicord had been brought back and you had examined him?

Dr. MASON. He was put on a little table here and we were all around him.

Mr. STRIPLING. When Dr. Marks called, did he ask for Mr. Best?

Dr. MASON. He called for Mr. Best's office, and asked for Mr. Best.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was said, to the best of your knowledge, in that conversation? What did he ask for? What did he say, in other words?

Dr. MASON. Well, the call was essentially this: Send somebody, M. P.s or soldiers or help. The hospital is being overrun and Dr. Pedicord has been badly beaten.

That is essentially what he said. I do not know what the answer was.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. MUNDT. How fast did the M. P.s get there?

Dr. MASON. They did not get there.

Mr. STRIPLING. How soon was it before he called again?

Dr. MASON. He called, as a matter of seconds, probably. We were considerably excited, as you can well imagine. We were anxious to get some sort of help over there.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many times do you think he called?

Dr. MASON. He called from three to five times.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did anyone come?

Dr. MASON. No one came.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long did you wait for help?

Dr. MASON. After his last call, which I judge was from 5 to 15 minutes—I have to be rather wide in my estimate of time, because you are not much in a position to judge time under such circumstances, but it was a short while that I said I would try to get to the administration building and find out why we could not get some help and see if I could get some.

There was some woman who had come into the room, who was a member of the W. R. A. visiting personnel from Washington, I believe—

Mr. STRIPLING. What was her name, Doctor?

Dr. MASON. Her name was Shipps.

Mr. STRIPLING. Miss Shipps?

Dr. MASON. I think it was Mrs. Shipps. She was a social welfare worker, and had gone out in the same car I had gone out, and I talked with her on our trip out to the center. I think she had just arrived on an official or routine visit, I presume.

Well, when I suggested that I go to the administration building, she said, "I will go with you." And we started out together. We were not molested, and there were over 1,000 people in this area at the time.

It had more or less quieted. We could hear them back in these hallways, but we were not accosted by anybody on leaving the hospital.

Just about the same position where the doctor had been down and beaten or stepped on, a Japanese man approached from the crowd and said, "I am in charge here."

I do not recall exactly what the conversation was, but I do remember Miss Shipps more or less berating the man, and telling him he was doing a poor job; that the hospital was being overrun by Japanese, and what was he doing about it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Could Miss Shipps speak Japanese?

Dr. MASON. Yes. She spoke Japanese and wrote Japanese, I am told she could, fluently. He smiled and repeated his statement that he was in charge there.

We proceeded without being further detained by this particular man.

Along about here is a small fence, approximately this position; I do not have my distances accurately placed, but there is a small frame fence with a number of gates in it which is more or less enclosing this area of the hospital grounds, and we were approaching the gate to get out and the crowd was roughly in this position.

Just about when we reached the gate, a Caucasian woman rushed over from this direction, which was in the direction of the Caucasian apartments, screaming that those people had stolen her car and screaming for somebody to do something. That was, essentially, what she said.

Miss Shipps left me and rushed over in this direction, and just about that time a car came around, about the parking area along here, and stopped with a Japanese boy in it; just stopped there abruptly. And that was as much as I saw of that particular incident.

I continued on my way. She found the nerve to investigate this particular affair, and I think felt that she could determine something from these people because she did speak the language, and, apparently, was confident of her ability to do that.

I made an effort to get to the administration building, but the crowd managed to keep me in more or less of a straight path. Every time I managed to get by, I was approached by a group and just more or less kept from going in the direction I wanted to go.

That continued until I got almost over to my particular barracks, which was approximately in this direction. At the end room, Dr. Loebmann's quarters were in that room. My quarters at that time were approximately in that position. I had not seen Dr. Loebmann since this came up. The only two that I knew about were Dr. Pedicord and Dr. Marks.

It occurred to me that I would have some reason for being in that direction, should I be accosted. And I was accosted along in this area by three or four Japanese men who said, "You can't come any further."

I told them I was looking for Dr. Loebmann. That was an excuse.

They said, "You can't come any further."

I said, "Would you look for him for me?"

I said, "He lives just there," and I pointed to his house.

And one man went to the door, knocked like that, opened it and shut it quickly, and said, "He is not there."

Then, immediately, two or three of these boys came to me and said, "Come with us."

And they escorted me to the administration building, exactly where I wanted to go. The crowd gave way as we went through them. They were completely surrounding this building in large numbers. The doors were opened by the Japanese people, and I was shoved in.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they make any remarks when they shoved you in?

Dr. MASON. They used some uncomplimentary terms on various occasions.

Mr. STRIPLING. To you?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was it, specifically, that they said when they pushed you in the door of the administration building?

Dr. MASON. Well, should I—

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you want that off the record, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not know that it is specifically necessary.

Dr. MASON. Suppose we leave that out.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is it what you would call an unprintable name?

Dr. MASON. It was uncomplimentary. It was usually "white" so-and-so.

Mr. STRIPLING. They did refer to you as a "white" so-and-so?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

On entering the building, or being pushed into the building, I found a great number of Caucasian people in the building. It was so constructed that you could see all the way through the building, more or less, with the exception of one or two offices that had some frosted glass by an ordinary wainscoting or flooring with plate glass completing the half wall, separating the various offices or cubicles.

Mr. COSTELLO. It would have been impossible for you to get through that crowd, you believe, if these other Japanese had not actually escorted you through the crowd to the administration building?

Dr. MASON. I would not have attempted it because of my repeated efforts to get through the crowd. And I was not molested, but I was immediately approached by a closed group of people who looked at me in such a way as to indicate that they did not expect me to get by.

And I took the hint. There were a number of people in here; I would judge, roughly, 100. There have been many estimates of the number of people in that building. I do not know. I did not count them, but there were a number.

Mr. STRIPLING. And they were all Caucasians?

Dr. MASON. All Caucasians. I believe I saw no Japanese, except on repeated occasions a group of Japanese men marched all the way through the building from the crowd in a military manner, and inspected us coolly.

At this point in the building is the office of Mr. Best. There was quite a group of people in that particular area, and my attention was attracted and I proceeded down the long hallway to that area, and there, looking through the glass, I could see Mr. Best.

I remember specifically seeing Mr. Best and Mr. Dillon Myer, who is the National Director of W. R. A., I believe. They, apparently,

were inconvenienced. There were a group of Japanese men sitting against the wainscoting in this area, and they were talking back and forth.

The secretary's office was in approximately this position, and I was somewhere in that area, and I saw one man here who looked official to me, and I told him we needed some help at the hospital, and told him essentially what Dr. Marks had said over the phone.

He was very kind, but he said he could not call the Army. Yet I am told there was an Army of 1,000 men situated in this area in an encampment there, where they had been for some months, I understand.

Mr. COSTELLO. How close to the administration building was that?

Dr. MASON. I would judge about 500 feet. It was not very far.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where was the entrance from the outside to the center?

Dr. MASON. The front gate was approximately in this area.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Army would come in around in that area, then?

Dr. MASON. They had their gates in these areas. I remember one gate particularly along here, because I had the pleasure of seeing them enter that gate later.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, you say you reported this to some official. Did you later learn his name?

Dr. MASON. I presume he was an official.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that Mr. Black?

Dr. MASON. His name was Black, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did he say to you, as you recall it.

Dr. MASON. As I recall, essentially, that the Army could be called only by Mr. Best or Mr. Myer; at least, that was my understanding.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you did explain to him that the hospital was being overrun, and Dr. Pedicord had been beaten, and you wanted help.

Dr. MASON. He wanted to know how badly he had been beaten and if he was in a serious condition.

And I told him by the time I had left that we had not been able to determine the exact extent of his injuries; that we thought by reason of our discussion, that he had internal injuries because he had complained bitterly of his abdomen and chest, and he had been kicked there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Dr. Pedicord tell you that he had been kicked there?

Dr. MASON. I remember him saying this: He said "I saw one Jap coming with his feet toward my abdomen, and I tensed my muscles in order to protect myself."

I remember him making that statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you reported this to Mr. Black?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did Mr. Black do then?

Dr. MASON. Mr. Black managed, in the course of a few minutes, to get the attention of somebody in the room, I don't know whether it was Mr. Best or not, and what he said or how he managed to do it, I do not know; at any rate, there was some question in my mind, and by general discussion around in the group subdued discussion for some time after that, we began to feel that probably the Army had better not come in at that time, and I did not press the matter much further.

These people were closely packing the building.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean the Japanese people from the outside?

Dr. MASON. The Japanese people from the outside. This place had a double door which was open, and at this other double door there were more, but this was the one I was concerned with, was the one where I was brought in, and the Japanese would march in through this door and out through the hall at intervals.

A group of 5 or 10 or 15 of them went out the doors at different times, but at regular, or rather, at repeated intervals that occurred.

Mr. COSTELLO. Awhile ago, when you said they marched through in military fashion, what did you mean?

Dr. MASON. I mean, their heads were erect.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were they in step or in unison?

Dr. MASON. I would not say they were in unison; but they had a very important air, I might say.

Mr. MUNDT. You said Mr. Black managed to get the attention of either Mr. Myer or Mr. Best. Why did not Mr. Black just call them in and talk with them?

Dr. MASON. Well, these Japanese were in conference. He told me they were busy, and they obviously were busy; very busy. The Japanese were in conference here.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you say that business was instigated by the Japanese or by Mr. Myer and Mr. Best?

Dr. MASON. Well, this particular group of Japanese had come in as a self-appointed committee, I am told, to present demands to Mr. Best and to Mr. Myer, who happened to be there.

Mr. STRIPLING. What you mean is that the situation was very tense at the time.

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir; very tense, and I think it would have been unhealthy to have Mr. Best come out and consult with anybody else at that particular time. That is my opinion.

Mr. MUNDT. The chances are that this committee of Japanese were in the office at the time Dr. Marks talked to Mr. Best.

Dr. MASON. Yes; they undoubtedly were. I presume that was true. In other words, that was my interpretation of the situation.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Best might have concluded it was not to his personal good health to send anybody over to the hospital at that time.

Dr. MASON. Well, just what transpired at that time, I do not know. I do not speak Japanese, and I do not understand Japanese, and for that reason I do not know exactly what transpired. I was told that they were presenting demands in there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what time it was when you went into the administration building?

Dr. MASON. I would judge it was around 1:30. It was a matter of a very short time from the beginning of this occurrence until I had finally gotten in there, because my purpose in going, with the delay I mentioned here, was to get to these people for that purpose.

You understand this was completely enclosed and I could look out the windows. There are a number of windows in all of the buildings, and there were still a considerable number of Japanese people in this areaway at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. About what number of Japanese would you say were in that area?

Dr. MASON. It would be difficult for me to say. There were certainly over a thousand, and I think a great many more than that.

But I have seen various estimates in the last month as to the number in that crowd, and I am probably no better at judging than somebody else. I would say there were six to ten thousand at this stage [indicating].

Mr. MUNDT. Was the office in which Mr. Myer and Mr. Best seated in such a position that they could look out the windows and see these mobsters out there?

Dr. MASON. Oh, yes. There were windows practically everywhere. The buildings are almost all windows.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, they did not need any telephone call, then, to let them realize there was trouble there?

Dr. MASON. Well, I judge not. I do not know whether they looked in that direction or not, but we certainly saw them coming away down here. They had to cross an open area of a thousand feet.

And the Army was in this position.

Mr. MUNDT. Was this a quiet mob, or did they make some noise?

Dr. MASON. They just walked determinedly and without hesitation, and proceeded on their way in the general direction that I pointed out.

Mr. COSTELLO. Both women and children—as well as men?

Dr. MASON. They were all there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they carry any arms that you observed?

Dr. MASON. I never saw any arms except I saw two Japanese men with pocketknives whittling at the windows and smiling.

Mr. STRIPLING. And were the faces of the Japanese pressed up against the windows?

Dr. MASON. I was in this area on a number of occasions when a Japanese came up and pressed his nose against the window and smiled. His smile was ever present.

Mr. STRIPLING. This army of Caucasian employees in the administration building, did they consider themselves to be prisoners in there? I mean, they were there against their will.

Dr. MASON. Some had been brought there just as I had.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were any brought there while you were there?

Dr. MASON. There were some brought in while I was there. On two occasions there was an effort made by one person in the room, that I remember; I mean, I remember one person who made an effort to get out and was returned quickly.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, everybody there considered themselves restrained against their free will and they did not feel that they were free to leave.

Dr. MASON. We were not free to leave, because efforts were made to leave.

Mr. ROLPH. May I ask a question?

What were these Caucasians, the white people, doing in there, outside of Mr. Myer and Mr. Best?

Dr. MASON. Those were the only two I knew.

Mr. ROLPH. What were they doing?

Dr. MASON. They were waiting there. We had nothing to do but wait. We did not know what to expect, but were alarmed. I can say I was alarmed. I can speak only for myself. I should say, in my opinion, that other people were alarmed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Doctor, there has been some allegation made that there were boxes of straw and oil-soaked rags found around the administration building.

Did you see anything of that character?

Dr. MASON. I did not see anything at that time. The crowd completely surrounded the building, and I saw nothing.

Some time later I did see, in another area, in a warehouse building next to the hospital, some boxes with excelsior in them. Whether they were oil-soaked or not, I do not know. I did not examine them at all, and I would not have noticed that, had not Dr. Marks called my attention to it, and pointed it out.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether they were brought there, or how they got there?

Dr. MASON. He just pointed it out as an interesting observation later.

Mr. COSTELLO. They were not boxes of excelsior from unpacking hospital supplies or anything like that, were they?

Dr. MASON. I do not know what they would have been doing under the building. There were just two or three such packages, and the remainder of it was clean and clear.

Mr. COSTELLO. Their being there was not incidental at all?

Dr. MASON. I would judge not, but I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. You went in there at 1:30, approximately?

Dr. MASON. I would say approximately.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long did you remain there?

Dr. MASON. We were there until about a quarter of 5 that afternoon, waiting and wondering.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was there much apprehension on the part of the Caucasian employees?

Dr. MASON. Apparently so.

Mr. COSTELLO. And people were excited?

Dr. MASON. Apparently so.

There were a number of different remarks made at different times that made it rather uncomfortable, I might say, to put it mildly.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you observe the crowd on the outside surrounding the administration building?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Could you give the committee some idea as to their behavior, or was there anything that occurred?

Dr. MASON. They were rather still; that is, most of the time they were rather still and just standing with stolid expressions, apparently waiting, too. We all, apparently, played a waiting game.

But I did have occasion to notice—I do not know whether it was called to my attention or not—but I did have occasion to notice the disposition of this crowd. We will let this circle indicate the outer fringe of the crowd.

They were closely packed around the building.

This double door was open and they were in a slightly semicircular position just outside of the door. A few would come into the entrance and stand there, close to the entrance.

Here was a microphone and a loudspeaker system which had been set up by somebody for the purpose of making announcements or speeches, I presume. A number of speeches were made later.

I did have this much observation of this crowd: We had sufficient time, but I do not think our observations were any too dependable at that time, but I do remember that it seemed there was a disposition of

women and children and old men in this position, and next to the building.

At frequent intervals during this number of hours there was a little part in the center of this crowd, and a large group of young Japanese men would march along through this crowd, in a manner similar to the ones who marched through the building; same general attitude and same general disposition. They seemed to be sort of a pep team, I might say, if you get my meaning. But that occurred frequently. They were more or less in the center of the crowd.

Mr. COSTELLO. About how deep was that crowd; 10 deep or 20 deep?

Dr. MASON. I think they were 40 to 50 deep; it was a large crowd.

Mr. MUNDT. Did this crowd continue in Mr. Best's office all that time?

Dr. MASON. It continued from the time of my arrival and had obviously been going on some time before I arrived. They did not convene on my arrival. And it continued until approximately a quarter of 5 that afternoon. At that time the committee arose and marched out. As I recall, one man stopped at the microphone and began a loud speech, or, rather, he began to speak.

Mr. MUNDT. In Japanese?

Dr. MASON. Yes. The crowd was attentive, and they were never at any time particularly unruly or disorderly. They would get restless, as anybody would, standing for a number of hours, but other than the two I saw whittling and the appearance of exhortation that went on occasionally in the crowd, I saw no particular disturbance.

At about a quarter of 5—and these times, gentlemen, are, you understand, not strictly accurate by my watch; I judge this—the crowd went out and this man made a speech, and within a short while they began to jump in from the crowd and make speeches. There were from three to five speeches. It got rather tiresome because we were wondering what was going to happen, as we had been wondering for some time, and shortly afterward I heard somebody whisper to Mr. Myer, "You had better speak to these people."

And he came from this office and went directly to the microphone and began a very short speech.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who whispered to Mr. Myer?

Dr. MASON. Mr. Myer is National Director of W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. No. Who was it that spoke to him?

Dr. MYER. One of the white men in the building; I do not know. I just heard the words. And they came by me as they went to the microphone.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following Mr. Myer's speech, what happened?

Dr. MASON. Following his speech, a Japanese man, and I do not remember whether he came from outside or inside, but he immediately seized the microphone and began a speech, which I presume was an interpretation of Mr. Myer's speech; I do not know.

I can say that Mr. Myer said bluntly and flatly that they would grant no demands. He did say that they had received their committee and had received many demands. I learned that one of their chief demands was the dismissal of the Caucasian personnel in the hospital, much to my surprise.

But then, very shortly afterward, as I said, a number of different speeches were made in Japanese—very shortly afterward some man

got to the microphone and this person whom I spoke to you about previously, Miss Shipps, who apparently knew Japanese, happened to be near at the time, and there was some remark made about it being a Buddhist priest—he said a few words and the Japanese people removed their hats and went down on one knee in a mass.

Mr. STRIPLING. The whole crowd went down?

Dr. MASON. So far as I know. Where I was looking, they were all down.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is, as you observed the crowd.

Dr. MASON. Yes. Whether every person went down in the whole circle, I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. But the ones that you saw, did.

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir. Some comment was given through the microphone system and the remark was made that they were doing obeisance to the Japanese Emperor, but I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Miss Shipps make that remark?

Dr. MASON. I think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long did they remain kneeling?

Dr. MASON. Very shortly; just a matter of seconds, and then they arose and started off. They went rather quietly. They dispersed and went off about as quietly as they had come.

With the exception of this little demonstration of roughness over at the hospital, that is, essentially, what happened that day, from my observation.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether any help was ever sent to the hospital during the time the disturbance was going on, or not?

Dr. MASON. There was no military sent there. I went back to the hospital as soon as we could get out. We began to filter out of the building then, although the Japanese remained about the area from then on. There were always a few standing around.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, after the crowd dispersed, you returned to the hospital?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you find when you went back and saw Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. Well, he was still there. He was now seated in a chair with the group I had left there some hours before, approximately 3 or 4 hours before. It was approximately the same number.

Mr. STRIPLING. Tell us who was present in that group.

Dr. MASON. Well, Dr. Marks was there, and, as I remember, two of the nurses at least, and another one would come in occasionally, back and forth, and Dr. Pedicord's wife was there at that time.

She described her experience during the afternoon. They had stopped her car and had gotten in, but somehow she had managed to get to her home during this demonstration, which was some distance over from the Army site, and slightly back of the administration building.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you describe now to the committee what happened after you returned to Dr. Pedicord's office?

Dr. MASON. I had not been back there very long until somebody looked out the window and stated that Mr. Myer and Mr. Best were coming.

As I recall, three men came from the administration building.

The crowd had dispersed by this time, and as I recall, I know that Mr. Best and Mr. Myer—you remember, gentlemen, I told you I had not met Mr. Best. I had not. I had seen him and had asked people; in other words, I had identified him but I had never met him up to this time. I had been there from the 20th until the 1st of November.

And shortly after he came in, I approached him and told him that I presumed he was Mr. Best. I had not had the pleasure of meeting him. And he agreed that he was; so for that reason I presume it was Mr. Best.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, you say that Mrs. Pedicord was there.

Dr. MASON. Yes. She was there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was she concerned over the condition of husband?

Dr. MASON. Well, she was considerably upset. He was certainly not a very beautiful sight to behold. He was very jolly, apparently feeling very well. He said his arm hurt and his leg hurt considerable. His chin area had been badly bruised, painfully bruised, and he was sore, necessarily, but he at that time frequently was minimizing the injuries done to him. He was rather jocular.

And when Mr. Myer and Mr. Best—

Mr. STRIPLING. Just a moment, Doctor. Do you think that Dr. Pedicord had a reason in minimizing his injuries or in trying to, so called, appear not to be injured as much as you considered he really was injured?

Dr. MASON. Well, I hardly know. His general attitude was that "I am a good man and they can't get me down."

Mr. STRIPLING. Is it not true he did not want to be seen by the Japanese?

Dr. MASON. He did not want the Japanese to see him; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. He did not want the Japanese to see him or get the idea that he had been compelled to submit to them, so to speak.

Dr. MASON. That is right. I think it was a matter of personal pride. It was my impression that he did not care to be considered a martyr at all.

But Mr. Myer and Mr. Best, and this other gentleman, arrived shortly and they came in and asked him how he felt.

And we were more or less gathered around, then, to see what would be said, and very shortly after Mr. Myer told all of us that we must be very careful; that this might become an international incident, and we had to be very careful what we thought or said.

He said, "You see the doctor is not injured; this does not amount to anything."

Mr. STRIPLING. When he made that statement, did you say anything to Mr. Myer?

Dr. MASON. Well, frankly, I resented the whole situation, I do not mind telling you. I resented it very much, and I stated—well, I do not care to repeat my statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. I think, if you do not mind making it, Doctor, that the committee would like to have it, because it reflects the attitude of an eyewitness to the affair, and also somebody who was serving under Dr. Pedicord.

Dr. MASON. Well, I pointed to Dr. Pedicord, who was not very beautiful to behold, and I admit I was angry, and I said, "Here is my chief lying here, beaten by these Japanese."

And I asked him if he remembered December 7, 1941, when Cordell Hull was talking to the Japanese delegates in an attempt to be peaceful, and if he remembered the attack on Pearl Harbor. That was essentially what I said.

I said, "That to me, sir, was an international incident, and this is war."

Mr. STRIPLING. What was Mr. Myer's reply to that?

Dr. MASON. He did not reply.

Mr. STRIPLING. What happened after your remark?

Dr. MASON. Then the discussion came up as to whether or not we would remain there or whether we would go out as a body, the Caucasian personnel in the hospital. And we were asked to express ourselves on the subject.

Mr. Myer had said that he could not guarantee it, but he believed that there was no further danger. And the general opinion was that we should remain, which we agreed to do.

Dr. Pedicord suggested that they ask each person how they felt. Unfortunately, again, he asked me first. I guess I had earned his attention previously.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was your reply?

Dr. MASON. I told him that I could not conscientiously further serve the Japanese professionally. I can quote that statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Myer and Mr. Best then leave?

Dr. MASON. Yes. And we agreed we would keep Dr. Pedicord there until dark, which was fast approaching then. He did not care for the Japanese people to see him, and we agreed that we would get him to his home. And we were very cordially invited to the home of Dr. and Mrs. Pedicord, who suggested we have coffee and get some sort of dinner there, and remain there.

Mr. STRIPLING. You are referring to yourself and Dr. Marks?

Dr. MASON. And Dr. Loebmann; in other words, she wanted the Caucasian doctors and nurses over there.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you all proceeded over there?

Dr. MASON. During the evening, at different times. We did not all go in a body at the same time, but at different times, I think, possibly at least the larger proportion of the Caucasian staff was in his home.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Dr. Loebmann was there at that time?

Dr. MASON. Dr. Loebmann had also been brought into the administration building a short time afterward, and was in his room when this Japanese man looked in.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was in his quarters, then, at the time that you asked for him?

Dr. MASON. He was in his quarters when I asked the man to look; that is, he told me that he was, and he had the habit of taking a short siesta in the afternoon.

Mr. COSTELLO. A Spanish custom in California.

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he was brought into the administration building subsequently by the Japanese.

Dr. MASON. Yes; he was brought in, as I say. I failed to mention that. He was also in the group and was considerably disturbed by this whole demonstration.

Mr. STRIPLING. At the home of Dr. Pedicord, did you discuss this happening with the other doctors and Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. Well, yes; of course, we discussed it.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the reaction to what had happened?

Dr. MASON. Well, I know that there was some wonder as to why this whole group had been allowed to advance across the fire-break without some sort of questioning or interruption. We all agreed, certainly, if the Army had come in at the time the crowd was congregated there, there would probably have been some sacrifice, both on the part of the Japanese and the Americans.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think it would have been a necessary consequence that there would have been some trouble if the Army had moved in at that time?

Dr. MASON. Our impression was that these people were more or less inviting some sort of disturbance.

Mr. COSTELLO. The same argument was made at Poston, and the fact that the Army was not called in at that time, and the comment was made they were very happy it was not because they feared bloodshed would have ensued.

The Army moved into the North American Aircraft plant and only one person was injured in that encounter. The inference seems to be that whenever the Army moves in, there will necessarily be bloodshed when, as a matter of fact, the general experience is that the Army does not shed blood, but prevents it from happening.

Dr. MASON. That was our impression.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean after they had surrounded the place.

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. But when they were approaching through the fire-break, what was your impression if the Army had moved in at that point?

Dr. MASON. Well, that was the discussion as to the benefits of the Army, when they were crossing that area, just to caution them and say, "What is your business here"; I mean, we wondered.

Mr. STRIPLING. Of course, your theory is after the Caucasian employees were placed in the administrative building and the place was surrounded and the committee was meeting with Mr. Myer, that it would have been dangerous to call the Army at that point.

Dr. MASON. That was our impression. Whether it would have been or not, I do not know, of course.

Mr. STRIPLING. When the crowd approached through the fire-break and the loud-speaking apparatus was being set up, do you think that that would have been a proper time to call in the Army?

Dr. MASON. Personally, I do. I think those people should have been asked what their business was. But that is purely a personal opinion. I guess I have a right to an opinion, but certainly not officially.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, what time did you leave Dr. Pedicord's home that night?

Dr. MASON. It was around midnight. We decided to go back to the quarters. Things were relatively quiet. And, on returning, I saw an occasional Japanese person around in different areas. They did not approach us. They made no effort to molest us at all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Just proceed with the events that happened the following morning, and so forth.

Dr. MASON. I talked with my roommate after getting back there, and this conversation was purely personal.

Mr. STRIPLING. Very well.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was your roommate?

Dr. MASON. At that time I had many roommates and changed rooms a number of times during my short stay there, because of the necessity for shifting personnel around.

I really lived out of my barracks most of the time.

At that time it was Mr. A. J. Muir, and I think he also is an official from Washington, and was there for an extended survey of some type. I believe he was a fiscal expert; I am not sure.

I told him it was very necessary for me to get in touch with my wife on an uninterrupted wire, and that I was going to make an effort to get out of there. And it was purely personal. That she was in the process of starting out to that place and I decided I did not want her there. I have two young children and I certainly did not want them out there.

The following morning, early, I went straight to the administrative building. He suggested that I talk to Mr. Myer, to tell him my intentions, and make some effort to get out, to get in touch with her, which I did. I saw him immediately and told him my desire, and he said that was quite all right, and that he felt there was no danger there at all.

And I told him I did not care to have my wife and children in any such place; that I did not understand what it was, and certainly would not let them come out there.

He did remark to me that he would not hesitate to bring his wife and children out there.

Mr. COSTELLO. He spent that night at the center, did he?

Dr. MASON. He spent that night; yes, sir. That is, the first night.

I managed to find a truck, a panel truck; it was a Government car, that was going in to get some supplies for the recreation hall, or the mess hall, I forget which—and I went out in that truck, back to Klamath Falls, and did get immediately in touch with my wife.

Later, the following day, I believe, that is, late afternoon, the following day, the remainder of the Caucasian personnel had been brought out and somewhere in Tulelake, the little town, at a hotel, and I think the nurses were congregated there, and the ladies would more or less go in and out.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that a voluntary removal of the nurses, and so on, out of the center?

Dr. MASON. Well, I think Dr. Pedicord had advised it. He decided that it was safer. An effort had been made to get back to the hospital the next morning and they had been repulsed and told to stay out of there. That they could run the hospital.

Mr. COSTELLO. By the Japanese doctors?

Dr. MASON. Yes. They wanted to run the hospital.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that, after November 1, the white personnel left the hospital?

Dr. MASON. We had nothing to do with the hospital. We had nothing to do, as a matter of fact. Wednesday night Dr. Pedicord's wife called me and said they were in Klamath Falls, and asked me to come over. And I went over and we talked more or less at random.

The following morning they invited me back and I went over there and Dr. Marks and Dr. Loebmann came in, and we more or less had

a little meeting there in his hotel. A number of the members of the press came in during that time and there was great reticence on the part of Dr. Pedicord to make any remarks at all, and he very cautiously made a few remarks.

And I told them what he said was correct, and I did not want them to get my name and didn't give them my name and refused any remarks at all.

They had some sort of printed denial of any disturbance out there at Tule Lake at all, which purportedly came from Mr. Myer, and one reporter approached him and said that his appearances belied any denial of trouble, and if he wanted to say anything about it, all right; if he did not, they knew there was trouble anyway, and that was the general meeting there.

We decided at that time that we would all return except Dr. Pedicord, whose eye was in such bad condition; he just wanted to wait a day or two and try to get some rest, I understood.

So Dr. Marks, Dr. Loebmann, and I returned to the center about noon, Thursday, November 4.

Things were quiet around there on our arrival. There were Japanese still around and evidence of a few, but not any mass of people at all. There was no attempt to molest us or attempt to prevent our passage from one building to another.

There were no more women who cleaned the quarters and the people who filled the oil stoves were gone. There was no actual business going on in the center, so far as we could see.

The mess hall was taken over by the Caucasian women, the teachers and wives of the personnel.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean the Caucasian personnel.

Dr. MASON. Yes; the cooks and waiters were gone, and the men helped by carrying away the dishes and things of that type. So everything was peaceful and rather enjoyed by everybody reasonably well.

Mr. COSTELLO. You said you returned to the center again on Thursday night?

Dr. MASON. Yes. On Thursday night, about 10 o'clock, Mr. Muir and I had just returned to our quarters from the little recreation hall where we were gathered to talk, to discuss the situation, and we had hardly gotten our lights on and gotten in until we heard a rather loud rush of footsteps, apparently around the building. They seemed to run around this building.

And we heard an automobile start and then another one start immediately, and they raced with screaming motor, apparently in second gear, directly toward the military area.

And we got our lights off quickly and could look out the window at an angle and saw the cars. They approached that area at a rapid rate and just as they got to the area they suddenly turned, one right behind the other, and came back to more or less their original position, and a group of people jumping out and running. I do not know whether they were white or Japanese.

Then, at approximately the same time, we heard some blows and groans, and both of us rushed out the door then, and a number of people then had rushed out from their doors and we learned that one of the guards, one of the men known as internal security, had been assaulted, and he was in the administration building, somebody said.

And I told them I was a doctor and I would go to see him.

I went there and found him with his orbital area damaged, his chin laid open, his scalp had a large lacerated wound in it, and he was cut in a number of places.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the name of the security officer?

Dr. MASON. I think his name was Borbeck. I hear, incidentally, that he had resigned that day, and was leaving that evening, but had stayed around more or less, for a train, to meet his wife, and he was most unfortunate in having waited, I guess.

But we did not have access to our hospital, of course.

We got him back to the end room of the block. There were two gentlemen there who suggested to bring him in, and we got him on a couch and somebody had found a first-aid kit that had a few dry band-aid bandages in it. And I was endeavoring to stop the bleeding, which was rather profuse, and remarked that I did not have much to work with.

But he needed to be in a hospital to get sutures, or to be sewed.

And just about that time we heard a rather loud sound of motors and rumbling about the place, and realized that the Army was coming in, and they came in rapidly, and they, very quickly, had the place under good control.

I think it was probably less than 10 or 15 minutes until they had investigated the different departments and were very rapidly rounding up a group of men around the place.

Mr. COSTELLO. When the Army came in, did they take complete control of the center?

Dr. MASON. Yes. We were under orders of the colonel who was in charge of the men. We were not allowed to go back to the hospital. That was Thursday night, and Saturday morning I voluntarily resigned.

Mr. STRIPLING. As to your resignation, you had discussed with Dr. Pedicord whether or not you would resign or whether you would ask for transfer to some other center?

Dr. MASON. Yes. When we were in Klamath Falls he understood that it had been my purpose, at least I had expected, previous to my arrival there, to arrange for my family to be with me, and arrange for them possibly outside, or somewhere, but since this had come up I discussed it with him, and he suggested that I ask for a transfer to some other center.

He said that that was a rather turbulent place and that there were better places and suggested and prepared a wire for me to Washington.

Later I received word through him. He said he had had a long distance Washington talk with Dr. Thompson, chief medical officer here in Washington, requesting that I remain. My wire had stated to Dr. Thompson that I would be glad to, or whether he would be willing to transfer me, otherwise I would resign. And when he sent word that I remain there, I asked Dr. Pedicord what my position was, "Can I resign?"

He said, "You can."

I said, "I am accustomed to doing what I say I will do, so, if I can, I will resign," and I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you resigned and returned to your home in Tennessee?

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You remained there at the center, then, Friday and Saturday.

Dr. MASON. I left in mid—later—afternoon, Saturday.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there any further trouble after the Army came in?

Dr. MASON. Not to my knowledge. It was very quiet; very nice.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say you were not allowed to go into the hospital, though.

Dr. MASON. We were advised not to; I mean, they said they did not need us.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were you able to give any medical attention to Mr. Borbeck?

Dr. MASON. Immediately on the Army's arrival, we did. One of the gentlemen had an automobile and we put him in the car and took him to the dispensary in the reservation and the Army surgeon took charge of him then.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was treated in the military reservation, then?

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But not in the center.

Dr. MASON. Not in the center.

Then Saturday afternoon I was called to see him. He knew who had seen him first and had called for me, and I saw him and dressed his wounds before I left.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you return to the hospital at any time after the Army took over?

Dr. MASON. I returned to the hospital Friday morning about 2 a. m.

Mr. STRIPLING. While you were there, did you go alone or were you escorted?

Dr. MASON. No; I had an escort of soldiers.

Mr. STRIPLING. They asked you to go there to treat certain patients?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the attitude of certain Japanese nurses or physicians that you had previously worked with in a very friendly circumstance when you returned; what was their attitude toward you?

Dr. MASON. Well, I went in and asked for some material to work with, and one nurse who had been trusted with the supervisory slip of one ward and was the only Japanese nurse who had been so allowed to function, and who I thought was very good and a well-trained nurse, and her husband was a young physician, and he also, I thought, was an excellent young man, immediately got up. I went in first, and I told her that I wanted these supplies, and she disclaimed any knowledge of their whereabouts.

Well, she just was excited, apparently, and I told her that I needed these things; that I had a little work to do. And I asked her if she could find somebody who knew where they were.

I had only been there a short while, and I was not any too well acquainted with the storage of this equipment, which had customarily been brought to us by a nurse in due course.

And after a little while another Japanese nurse came, and she at first said she did not know anything about it, but she decided she did a little later, and got what we needed. We had some surgical work to do.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then the following day you left?

Dr. MASON. The following day, in midafternoon, I will say, arrangements were made for me by Dr. Pedicord, and he was very gracious

in every respect and seemed to feel that I should leave. I do not know whether he did or not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to introduce into the record the official transcript of the conference between Mr. Myer, Mr. Cozzens, Mr. Best, Mr. Zimmer, Mr. Kahn, and Mr. Schmidt of the War Relocation Authority with the committee of 17 Japanese who came to the administration building on November 1.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the origin of the transcript?

Mr. STRIPLING. This transcript was furnished us by the W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is this the official transcript?

Mr. STRIPLING. This is the official transcript, taken by W. R. A. stenographers at this session of negotiations between the W. R. A. officials and the committee of 17.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the meeting of November 1?

Mr. STRIPLING. November 1.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there objection to the receipt of the transcript? (The matter referred to is as follows:)

CONFERENCE OF EVACUEES, TULE LAKE CENTER, NOVEMBER 1, 1943

The following took place while the committee was assembling for a meeting in Mr. Best's office at 1:30 p. m., November 1.

Mr. BEST received a telephone call reporting the incident at the hospital.

Mr. BEST. What is going on at the hospital, George?

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know.

Mr. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord; they are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up and they are going from one ward to another destroying property.

Mr. KURATOMI. We will stop it.

Mr. BEST. They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. That will have to be stopped right away.

(Committee sent some men over to hospital.)

Meeting in Mr. Best's office at 1:30 p. m., November 1, 1943.

Present: Dillon S. Myer, R. B. Cozzens, R. R. Best, C. E. Zimmer, S. Cahn, Willard E. Schmidt, M. Lucas (reporter), Dr. P. A. Webber, Isamu Sugimoto, George Kuratomi, Mits Kimura, Matsunaka Nakao, Satoshi Yoshiyama, Senji Nodama, Maso Hatano, Herbert Hoshiko, Hijino Takada, Shizuo Kai, Kiachi Yamamoto, Harry Nogawa, Isamu Ichida, T. Inouye, Y. Kobayashi, Fred H. Mori, Ichiro Hayashi.

Mr. KURATOMI. I would like to ask about the notes of the meeting we held the other day. Is that ready?

Mr. BEST. It will be ready. I have been away and Miss Lucas had a lot of work to do. Will get it as soon as it is prepared. Didn't you have a copy?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; but some questions were not answered and we are rather anxious to get it.

Mr. BEST. I told you that as soon as I got back I intended to meet with you and discuss every point in question, and we would go to work on that, which I will do.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is very unfortunate that it has come to this point. However, there are some things being brought up. The residents have asked that these be transmitted to you. Here are some of the things. First of all we want you to know that we understand our position and status in here. We do not want to commit any riots or conduct ourselves in a disorderly manner. The people outside are here to express their dissatisfaction and anger about the center administration.

Mr. BEST. Just on the whole or do you charge on some specific thing?

Mr. KURATOMI. I do not know if you can call it a charge. I will explain those things later. We have been asked to bring up their grievances, requests, and demands to you—I don't know whether you like the word "demand" but nevertheless that is the word that has been used to us personally—so that you may be able to get an over-all picture of how ill administered this center is. This has been directed to Mr. Myer.

Mr. BEST. I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me. It is very unfortunate that Mr. Myer is visiting here during a time like this. I will appreciate it if you will direct everything to me and we will leave Mr. Myer out of it. I am here and I want you to put it all to me direct.

Mr. KURATOMI. I will be frank with you. I know how unfortunate it is that this had to happen when Mr. Myer was present. Why this came up today will be explained later. Among other things we want to ask you today that we be treated humanely from this Government, this Government of the United States. If the administration should continue to treat us as it has been in the past, it is the feeling of the residents that we can report the whole affair to the Japanese Government through the Spanish Consul. These are not accusations or threats, they are facts to prove the things which we are bringing up now.

Mr. BEST. You will make specific charges, I presume.

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; later. We believe the American democratic principles are at stake. The Congress of the United States should have an appropriation sufficient to care for the welfare and well being of the center residents. However, they have been insufficient and there have been mismanagements permitted by Caucasian personnel to greatly jeopardize the true intentions of the United States Government toward Japanese evacuees in the center. If such conditions are allowed to continue to exist, the democratic quality of the United States will be greatly injured. The Caucasian personnel at this center, with few exceptions, are known to be hostile to Japanese evacuees. Mr. Best has failed to keep faith with us. He has failed us within 2 days after promising to cooperate with us for the improvement of the center living conditions. By his deed and acts he has lost complete faith with the center residents. What Mr. Best says today is not to be applied for tomorrow. His inhumane treatment can be best illustrated by one incident which occurred very recently at this center. As all of us know, some 29 persons were injured in a recent auto mishap and the residents still feel that the W. R. A. has been responsible for the accident. Mr. Best, as project director, seemed very indifferent. He showed no concern over the accident apparently because not once has he expressed his regrets. When Mr. Kashima died as a result of the accident the center residents decided to make his funeral a center-wide affair. Mr. Best refused to grant the residents the use of the outdoor stage or the auditorium, the reason being that Mrs. Kashima, widow of the deceased, did not wish such an affair. He refused to send a representative to the funeral for the same reason. When Mr. Ernst, project director at Topaz, can send a telegram of condolence, why couldn't Mr. Best do the same, inasmuch as he is right here? If further verification is necessary, we are prepared to call in Mrs. Kashima. Deplorable conditions at the hospital have caused the ire of the center residents. It is a wonder beyond our imagination how the residents of this center in the past let such conditions exist at the base hospital. The residents feel that the W. R. A. should be held responsible for the ability and efficiency of the Caucasian doctors and nurses sent to this center.

Mr. BEST. They haven't stopped over at the hospital. Dr. Pedicord has been beaten very severely and is asking for military police. What would you boys do in a case like that?

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know.

Mr. BEST. What would you think about it?

Mr. KURATOMI. Maybe if I read some more you can see some of the reasons.

Mr. MYER. I think we need to know about this now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of the reasons?

Mr. MYER. Not the reasons. We need to know who is going to be responsible for stopping this situation at the hospital right now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of the boys have gone over to stop it now. They came of their own accord. We didn't know they were going to do that. I think they will stop everything if we shall continue to talk this over.

Mr. MYER. No question of talking it over now. We can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's life be jeopardized.

Mr. BEST. Something has got to be done right now.

Mr. KURATOMI. Shall we wait?

Mr. BEST. Yes; we will wait till it is stopped over there. That has got to stop.

Mr. KURATOMI. We'll send some more boys over.

(Waited for report from hospital.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Here are some questions I would like to ask that were not answered in the last conference, namely: What would be the status of these

center residents by the American Government and by the Japanese Government from the interpretation of international law? Then, there is a demand from the center residents that this center should be designated for all those persons who have intention of going back to Japan when the opportunity presents itself. Can you answer me those questions, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. Will you read those questions again, George?

(Mr. Kuratomi reread questions.)

Mr. BEST. If you mean are you considered as prisoners of war, I can answer that. You are not prisoners of war.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are called "segregants." Is there any other name applicable to the status of the center residents other than the word "segregant"?

Mr. BEST. If there is I don't know it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. Evacuees. We simply called this center the Tule Lake Center because it is not a relocation center. It is, as you know, for those people who want to return to Japan and other people who will not indicate full loyalty to the American Government. It is not an internment camp, such as the Department of Justice has jurisdiction over. It is not a prisoner of war camp. We expect, if it is agreeable to you people, to carry on a peaceable operation at this center and carry out the same policies, insofar as they can apply, as in other relocation centers.

That is our intention if it is feasible. The events today indicate that we may have some difficulty in doing that.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the second question. The residents would have this center designated for all those who have intention of going back to Japan sooner or later. Would there be some solution to that?

Mr. MYER. Can't give you a final answer to that. It will have to be worked out on the basis of what is feasible from the standpoint of what is available in the way of a physical program to work that out. This is something that you and we, the W. R. A., have to work out. If it is not satisfactory we will look into it. I cannot make any commitment until the problem is studied more carefully.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is a possibility?

Mr. MYER. There is a possibility to anything that lies within the scope of my domain to decide. Nothing more than that.

Mr. KURATOMI. You wouldn't say there is a possibility?

Mr. MYER. No. Because I don't want to imply any promises that I can't carry out. I want to be very careful to have the policies understood. I don't commit myself if I can't produce. I don't want to do that until we can study the problem. We have to know how many people are involved—who should stay here and who can go somewhere else and a lot of other things have to be considered.

Mr. KURATOMI. Have you taken into note the friction between the people who have expressed their desire to go back to Japan and those who are still loyal to this country? There are still quite a lot in this center at the present time.

Mr. MYER. Certainly. Those who are considered loyal to this country will still have an opportunity to be considered for movement elsewhere. No question about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. How soon do you think the process of segregation can be completed?

Mr. MYER. I don't think it possible to estimate. Things are in a state of flux. We will have to get a program in order. I haven't been here long enough to know what the situation is. You people haven't given me an opportunity to talk to the people who have the records.

Mr. KURATOMI. Can you give us an answer before you leave?

Mr. MYER. I don't know if I can give an answer before I leave. It may take quite some time to study the situation. When you are dealing with thousands of people, in order not to do an injustice to the people it takes time to work out a procedure.

Mr. KURATOMI. Here is a question I would like to ask. It was announced the day after our conference with Mr. Best that all the farmers were terminated as of October 16 or 19, I am not sure about the date (19 confirmed) and consequently the farmers are very furious over the fact that they were more or less terminated without previous warning so to speak because there has been a statement that has Mr. Kallam's signature to the effect that these farmers did not go on strike. They merely stopped work until negotiations were completed. When

we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was already published that they were terminated as of October 19 so the farm committee came to see Mr. Zimmer and tried to talk with him so that misunderstandings would be clarified. However, unfortunately for everyone concerned, the farmers request to return to work was refused by Mr. Zimmer because, he stated, an administrative instruction No. 29; was that it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. Twenty-seven.

Mr. KURATOMI. Cannot be altered. That was the statement wasn't it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. Right.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people who worked in the packing sheds were terminated because there was no work for them. That statement is natural, however, they were given termination without at least a week's advance warning. Consequently, they are very much dissatisfied and if my memory is correct Mr. Best promised during our conference, that he would talk things over with the farm committee which would be chosen from the people to talk and plan for the future farm at this center.

Mr. BEST. For next year, why don't you add?

Mr. KURATOMI. Now the question is what was the reason for terminating the entire farm workers without advance notice?

Mr. BEST. You want that answered now?

Mr. KURATOMI. Sure.

Mr. BEST. You were given every notice that if you did not go to work we would have to dispose of the crop. Your committee sitting in this room stated that you were not interested in harvesting this crop. Isn't that right?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is true.

Mr. BEST. When you represented all the farmers?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is right.

Mr. BEST. There isn't any farm now and there wasn't any farm from that time on.

Mr. KURATOMI. But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz. If a person—

Mr. CAHN. We don't have to give a week's notice for termination. On this project it has been the custom to give a week's notice if the administration terminated a person because there wasn't enough work to do or if the evacuee was terminating. Either way. It is sort of a gentlemen's agreement but is not a regulation. When people are away from work without an excused absence he can be terminated without notice. A penalty of an additional day for each day of unexcused absence can be imposed. However, this additional penalty was not imposed. It could have been. They were terminated for refusal to work.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Kallam's statement mentioned the fact that this stoppage of work was not to be considered a strike.

Mr. CAHN. It wasn't considered a strike. If it had been a strike there would have been a conclusion to be reached between the evacuees and the administration and they would have been carried on the pay roll until the issue was settled. This was not a strike. There was no issue at stake. They just did not go to work. No one came to see anyone to say why they weren't at work. If you refuse to work, you can be terminated and penalized an additional day for each day you don't show up. Of course, there are many factors that can keep a person from working—illness or other emergencies at home, and there is the possibility that there would not be an opportunity to report the absence. We will wait 5 days for notice. We waited the 5 days. In this case did not penalize for special reasons. These people were terminated as of the date Mr. Best indicated there would be no harvesting of the farm.

Mr. KURATOMI. Of course, there is this point, too. That in the past Mr. Best repeatedly stated he would not recognize any representatives of any committee or any organization.

Mr. BEST. What? I never said that.

Mr. KURATOMI. That has been said. A statement was published in the Tulean Dispatch that I would, and wanted to meet with a representative committee, but they never came. After the statement was published the committee realized that you do entertain or receive representatives of any committee. Therefore they came to get assurance that the statement was correct and reported to the center representatives. Until that time no one came to see you for the reason just

mentioned. I have enough people here to verify the fact that you wouldn't see a committee before that.

Mr. BEST. George, are you still referring to our first conversation?

Mr. KURATOMI. One of them.

Mr. BEST. Are you referring to the statement I made to you the first time you were in here?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes. Would you like to repeat it? Do you remember what you said?

Mr. BEST. Now I understand. That is where they got it. I definitely told you the very first time that you arrived that I would make no public statement at that time. You are the only ones I told it to. You know why I said it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Don't know what your intentions were behind saying that.

(Short discussion in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. The members of the farm committee said that the first time they found out that you accept representatives of any group was known to them on the 21st of October. Therefore, he feels that if the crews are to be terminated on the 19th they were, in a sense, terminated prior to the time they found out that you do recognize representative committees. They couldn't negotiate with you because of the statement they already had and didn't feel they could come unless some official announcement could be made from you that you do accept representative committees. They didn't come because they didn't want to be penalized for something they did not intend.

That is the answer for not coming to see you before that date.

Mr. BEST. Get along to the rest of the questions. I can't do anything about it because they didn't come in. We tried to have people come out in the open about it. Couldn't get anyone to come in. I asked them to, but nobody came up here. At the time you came up here they didn't want any farm. Get on to the next question.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think that everybody agrees that the Caucasian staff does not understand the Japanese. All these representatives here would agree to the statement right now that this whole incident started from the fact that the administrative personnel, as a whole, do not know the psychology of Japanese people, that is, you mention these things more or less from the standpoint of laws, rules, and regulations of the W. R. A. or any other agency. We desire to transmit your interpretation of your answers to the people and I am sure that the people will not be satisfied with your answers because that is something a little different as far as psychology is concerned. I, for one, know that if we are to make such a report as this to the people outside, we, as a committee, cannot very well guarantee what the reaction might be of the people waiting outside. I want you to give me an answer to this question in regard to the farm situation that I can transmit to the people outside.

Mr. MYER. I want to say this about the farm question. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Best on this problem. He had crops to be harvested. I authorized him to wait a few days, which he did, to see whether or not the folks would go to work. We took the chance of having the crops frozen.

No one came to discuss the situation or to negotiate with him for several days, as I understand it. When you folks said you didn't want the crops, I had Mr. Best make arrangements for getting it harvested. Such arrangements were made only as far as this particular crop is concerned. Mr. Best has indicated he is ready to talk about future crops next year. He had to look ahead. He did that on the authority of the National Director; I want you to know that.

From the standpoint of public relations and from the standpoint of future needs, we had to go ahead and get it done. That is all there is to say on it.

Mr. KURATOMI. At any rate, we here as a representative committee, feel that since this was brought up it has become a problem not only among the farmers but it has become a problem for the concern of every single individual on the center. Therefore, as soon as this conference with you gentlemen is completed, we will make a report to the public to that effect. However, are you prepared to meet the representatives from the packing shed and from the farm crew at a later date, to discuss minor problems with them?

Mr. BEST. We will meet with any group, George, at any time and discuss any problems. I have assured you of that before.

(Kuratomi to Kai in Japanese; others in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. It is the unanimous opinion of the representatives that if you are willing and prepared to make such an agreement or such arrangements with the farm group or packing shed crews at a later date to discuss minor problems with them that this will be worked out.

Mr. BEST. We discussed that with you the other day, I thought you understood it.

Mr. MYER. May I make another statement?

Mr. BEST. Surely; go ahead.

Mr. MYER. It is my understanding and I think I do understand the situation, George, that your committee discussed this with Mr. Best before and indicated that you did not want the crops harvested; that you did not want to raise vegetables to be shipped out and did not want anything shipped in. There is a food shortage and there are people dependent upon that crop. Mr. Best understood me and I understood Mr. Best. We took action to have the crop harvested. I want that made clear on the record.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people in the center felt that they would harvest the crops necessary for this center.

Mr. BEST. You said you didn't want the crop. You said, "No." Definitely, no.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you will look back on the record you will find that we said this: The people of this center are willing to harvest and raise a crop for this center.

Mr. BEST. I said we would work with you to get a good agricultural committee to start working this winter so we would know what plans to make for the next year. This is exactly what I said.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will you meet with the farm crew with the status that they are designated?

Mr. BEST. We will meet them regardless of their status. Status doesn't mean anything to me. I will discuss any problem at any time with your group or any other group.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then the people here—I want you to get this straight Mr. Best—the people here in this center were notified of the conference we had with you and an announcement came out the very following day. The people want that statement retracted. It is not so much from the standpoint of money, but the principle involved of having an announcement made the day following after we had such an agreeable conference with you.

If the statement is retracted we could make a report to the people. If we make a report as it is now, the people will not be satisfied. I don't expect you can understand that from a Japanese psychological standpoint. I assure you that I am trying to make you understand what I am talking about because it carries very heavy weight.

Mr. BEST. Can we speak frankly?

Mr. KURATOMI. Of course, Mr. Best. I am speaking frankly.

Mr. BEST. To use terms that I can understand, if I do not retract the statement you will lose face; if I do retract it, you will lose face. Is that it?

Mr. KURATOMI. I was not thinking about that necessarily. When we represent anybody, we talk for the people we represent. We have to work for the benefit and feeling of the people and we are thinking about them.

What I want you to understand is that if you should agree to this about retracting this statement which came out the day you were not here, then the people's feeling would calm down. I want you to understand that feeling.

Mr. BEST. Wasn't that a true statement I put in the paper? That is what you are talking about, isn't it?

Mr. KURATOMI. The statement to the effect that farm workers were terminated as of October 19.

Mr. BEST. I didn't publish anything like that.

Mr. KURATOMI. It had your signature on it, but it came out the day you were not here.

Mr. CAHN. He is talking about the statement regarding the badges.

Mr. BEST. Oh; I thought he was talking about something different.

Mr. CAHN. As a result of termination, we asked them to turn in their badges by a certain date or pay 50 cents if they didn't turn them in.

Mr. MYER. May I ask a question? I am a little confused. It is not quite clear what statement it is that Mr. Best made that you would like to have retracted.

Mr. KURATOMI. The statement that came out about badges.

Mr. BEST. About badges? I don't know what you are talking about. I will have to see that.

Mr. MYER. May I make a suggestion? I certainly don't see any objection to holding that up until you have had a chance for negotiation.

Mr. BEST. That never came to me, evidently. It probably was sent out by the Pay Roll Section or the Employment Office.

Mr. CAHN. The statement probably was not interpreted correctly. It has been the policy of the placement office since the beginning of this project to turn in the badges upon termination, or pay 50 cents. We were running close to the end of the pay-roll period and the termination slips had to be prepared and processed, so we asked that the badges be turned in by a certain date or the 50 cents be paid.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think Mr. Myer has the right idea.

Mr. MYER. I want to make it clear. It doesn't make any change in policy if the badges are held until you have had a chance to meet with the farm committee.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you had talked with the committee and then put the notice out, that would make sense. I don't know if you get my feeling. I am trying to explain the best I can. The fact that the notice came out before the farm committee had a chance to talk with you angered the people. I am not talking for myself. I am talking for the people.

Mr. MYER. May I make another comment? I am sure Mr. Best understands, and I understand, that you felt you were representing the whole group, including the farm group.

Mr. KURATOMI. The farm workers felt that the problem was a little bit too big for them to decide, so naturally they brought the problem to the center committee which was chosen from one person from each block. After the center committee discussed this with the residents, they decided that they didn't want to harvest a crop beyond center consumption. Therefore, we made that statement when we came over here.

However, after the conference we had with you, Mr. Best, it was decided to turn the farm problem back to the subcommittee which represented the farm people to talk and discuss with you the minor problems as they came up. If they had talked with you before the notice came out, it would have been no problem. If you could retract that statement until after the farm group talks with you, there will be no problem.

Mr. BEST. We are not going to delay the pay roll.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the point I am trying to emphasize. I am trying to tell you what the Japanese psychology viewpoint is. Some minor things seem important to you. It is not the standpoint of money that they want the statement retracted but from the standpoint of principle.

Mr. BEST. I certainly have no objection to leaving the point on badges until after we talk the whole matter over.

Mr. KURATOMI. Termination date and badges?

Mr. MEYER. The termination date is a very definite thing. I am sorry we can't do anything about that, but we can hold off on the badges until the matter is talked over further.

Mr. KURATOMI. Here is the thing I want you to understand. We are not so much concerned about the pay. If the workers had been terminated on the 19th or 20th, it would make no difference if the workers had talked with Mr. Best first and knew what the date was.

The farm workers would have had knowledge of the procedure after the meeting so that they would not have felt so bad. That the announcement came before the farm committee talked to Mr. Best caused those problems from the farm crew. That is the point I am trying to emphasize; I am not telling you to change the date. It would be the 19th, 23d, or 25th, or anything, for that matter.

Mr. MEYER. Let me make this clear. We cannot put the people back on the pay roll when there isn't any work to do at the moment. We can wait on the matter of badges until we have a chance to look at the problem together, but I can't under our Government procedure put people back on the pay roll when they are not on the job.

Mr. KURATOMI. You don't understand. They don't want to be put back on the pay roll when they aren't on the job. As long as they were terminated on the 19th, that would be all right, if they had known it before they were terminated. They don't care what date it was, if they had known before.

Mr. MEYER. That stands. I have already indicated that I think it perfectly all right to hold the badges and let this be the last phase of the story until we get a chance to talk to the farm committee.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then the statement will be retracted until after we have had a chance to talk it over.

Mr. COZZENS. It means that the badges will be held up, but they will still be removed from the pay roll as of the 19th.

Mr. MEYER. It means just that, and they can't be put back.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am not talking about when they were terminated. My point is, as I said time and time again, we are objecting from a Japanese psychological standpoint. If this announcement to the effect that they were to be terminated on the 19th were to be held up, we don't care if they were terminated on the 20th or any other date. The only thing was that if the farm committee, which was working on this case, had a chance to talk with you and you named the date, and then the notice came out after they met with you, there would be no problem. I don't know if you get what I mean.

Mr. BEST. You can't do that on any employment. It is the practice to terminate people when they stop working in any business. You might not get to talk to a person for a long time after he quit working. It is a mechanical detail of employment. If a man never came to talk to you then they would be on the pay roll forever. It just can't be done that way.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are you planning to continue such a practice in the future?

Mr. BEST. I am probably all mixed up on the point you are trying to make. But I will tell you this: We have a very established employment procedure. However, we are going—as I told you the other day—to have a better employment procedure. Mr. Cahn is very much interested in that and is working on that now. If there is anything in our present employment practices that doesn't meet with your approval, suggestions will be considered.

Mr. KARATOMI. That is not what I am talking about. It is the principle of it that is involved, not the terminating procedure. I am talking about the principle.

Mr. MYER. When you are talking about the future, is it as to whether the people will have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Best in the future before terminating?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is still another point. If the farm committee had met with Mr. Best and had understood that these workers were being terminated on the 19th, there would be no problem. Instead of that, when it came out, these people didn't know anything about it. That is what I am trying to get at. I don't think you quite understand my point.

Mr. ZIMMER. Here is what George means. If this statement were retracted till the farm committee were to meet, then you don't care what kind of a statement comes out; but to have it come out before the meeting, they think advantage has been taken of the committee. Is that the idea, George?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the point; yes. It is a very important point, too.

Mr. BEST. There isn't anything very difficult about solving that problem in the future.

Mr. ZIMMER. Nothing difficult about solving it; no. It stands, whether it is retracted or not; but if that statement could have been—could be retracted until this committee met with Mr. Best, and then came out, it would be O. K.?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is the right idea.

Mr. BEST. No reason why it can't be done that way.

Mr. MYER. I want you to understand they will not be put back on the pay roll.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is clear now.

Mr. WEBBER. Couldn't you put it to the effect that it was a misunderstanding?

Mr. CAHN. That is not so. It was not a misunderstanding. The regulations provide that persons are automatically terminated 5 days after they do not report for work. An additional day of penalty can be added for each day over that. The penalty was not given. The project director has the right to remove the prejudice, if sufficient reason is given for not having worked.

Mr. MYER. Just say for the record that you will withhold the statement until after Mr. Best has had a conference with the committee.

Mr. CAHN. I just want it understood that it was not a misunderstanding.

(Received report from hospital at this point.)

Mr. BEST. They are still having trouble at the hospital. What are you going to do about it?

Mr. MYER. Let us stop this discussion until that sort of thing is stopped. We can't go on under that kind of a situation.

(Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee go to check up on the hospital situation.)

(Reported under control.)

Mr. KURATOMI. We are sorry about the interruptions.

Mr. BEST. How much longer are they going to carry on the demonstration outside?

Mr. KURATOMI. It is not a demonstration.

Mr. BEST. What would you call it?

Mr. KURATOMI. There has been no trouble at all. They are waiting for the answers to these questions.

(Returned with report from hospital that situation under control.)

Mr. MYER. Couldn't we move right along? My time is limited and we are going to have a lot of business to take care of.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are any Japanese persons, that is, loyal Japanese persons, coming to harvest the crop here?

Mr. MYER. May I answer that? We are going to take care of the harvesting of the crop outside and I have no comment to make now. You folks did not want to do it, so we arranged to have it done outside and I cannot make any comment. In view of the decision, we will have to keep that as a separate issue. I am sorry.

Mr. KURATOMI. The last 2 nights there has been merchandise taken out of the warehouse from this center. Do you know the reason?

Mr. BEST. We might take merchandise out any time. We are accountable for it and we can ship it out or we can ship it in any time we want to.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are interested in the merchandise taken out because of the fact that one mess hall couldn't receive their share of the goods that were to be distributed.

Mr. BEST. Let's get along. I will set down for the records that we will meet with any mess hall committee on those things. We haven't any records here and can't discuss those things at this time. If you want to get into details it takes time, George.

Mr. KURATOMI. We can't make such a report. They want a definite report, and I doubt if that answer will do.

Mr. BEST. It is our property and we are accountable for that property. We can do what we want to with it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Because of the fact that some merchandise was taken out of this center, some mess halls suffered a shortage.

Mr. BEST. I would want to get into that thoroughly. I would want to find out exactly what was supposed to be delivered and was not, and what mess halls were short. I want to know that.

Mr. KURATOMI. When you do find out what happened, will you take proper action?

Mr. BEST. What would be proper action? Maybe I don't know what the proper action is. I certainly will see that all staple commodities as far as the quartermaster can supply, will be kept there. I will see that the mess department keeps those things in here and supplies them to the mess halls.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Best gave you his answer. I am sorry, but there will be no report why the food was taken out. I don't feel that it is necessary to report every movement made. If you request an investigation regarding such a case and if it is proven that they were short, proper action will be taken. We will have to wait and see the results of an investigation. I am sorry to say we cannot be in a position to report to the community on every movement of trucks. The residents are supposed to have food and if they don't get any, investigations will be made. We don't have time to go into all those details now. Proper action will be taken as far as we can do that, George.

Mr. KURATOMI. There are incidents in the hospital, too. Dr. Pedicord made two appendicitis patients wait until it was almost too late and this has happened in the last week's time. One person is suffering from meningitis. This man took some of the children out on a picnic some place and one of the children struck his eye with a stick.

He couldn't bear the pain, consequently he went to the hospital and the Caucasian doctor over there said it was nothing serious and no need for him to worry and for him to go on home. It pained so he insisted on being examined. It was of no avail. He had to pick one of the evacuee doctors over there to examine him, but these doctors, as you know, are subordinate to the Caucasian doctors and have very little authority, almost no authority, in fact, and they have to get every little detail from the Caucasians.

The chief doctor tried to see if any case of meningitis was apparent but before he got to it they told him to stop such an examination so he went back and he still couldn't bear the pain. Then he came back to the hospital again, and the doctors do not know whether this man will survive.

Another case here in the hospital: One mother went over there because she had a baby, and the doctor, without taking proper precautions, gave her a couple of morphine injections. As a result, the baby came out dead. It was a still-born

baby. There are many cases such as that to prove the inefficiency and indifference of Caucasian doctors in this hospital. It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this center, and more or less see people die from day to day, they cannot stand to see such a thing exist.

So it was decided last night to ask the resignation of each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feel so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had big practices and lots of responsibility. It has been said that some of the Caucasian doctors employed here don't even have licenses to practice medicine.

Dr. Pedicord allows only one ambulance to be in operation on Sunday for about 18,000 people. He takes the keys to the other ambulances and has forbidden the ambulances to be driven.

You must be aware of the complications which might arise from such an instance. We feel that the request and demands from the hospital evacuee staff to remove the Caucasian doctors and nurses from the hospital should be done as soon as possible for the well-being of the people in this center.

Mr. MYER. Are you through?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. MYER. In the very first place, we are willing to have any suggestions that you folks have. You can sit down and talk it over with Mr. Best. As I told you before, we can't operate on the basis of demands. We are willing to take criticisms from your group and check and investigate them, and take action accordingly. We are always willing to have criticisms and suggestions, but not demands.

Mr. KURATOMI. These are the criticisms by the evacuee nurses and doctors.

Mr. MYER. We will be very glad to check into it. In view of what has happened over at the hospital today it will have to be checked very thoroughly and will take some time. It will have to be checked and investigated.

Mr. KURATOMI. Whatever might have taken place over there and to Dr. Pedicord in particular, might be justified, and some of the boys couldn't wait until the conference was over.

Mr. MYER. We are not going to argue about that now.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have a man here who can tell you what happened to his family.

Mr. FUKAHARA. I am block manager of block 16. Sunday night at 7 o'clock I had a report from my sister-in-law requesting an ambulance because her child was burned with hot water. I rushed to the phone, which is only 35 or 40 feet away, and an ambulance came and he was taken directly to the hospital and given some kind of a treatment on the outside and bandaged and put in a room and left there until morning without being seen by another doctor, and when questioned by the nurses about his welfare was told by a Caucasian doctor, Dr. Marks, that it wasn't anything serious. A Japanese doctor was called in and there were four looking on when they injected plasma, or whatever it is called. They could find only one container of it, which is not sufficient to save a child. They worked desperately, but he died this morning at 2 o'clock. If the burn was as serious as that, why didn't the Caucasian doctor take care of him between 7:15 at night until early in the morning when the Japanese doctors took over?

Mr. MYER. I am certainly sorry about the baby.

Mr. FUKAHARA. It should be the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority or Dr. Pedicord to take full blame for what happened, as far as I can see.

The COMMITTEE. That's right.

Mr. MYER. We will go into the matter thoroughly. This case and any other case you may have will be investigated thoroughly. We can't do it in the face of demands. I think you folks are interested in having a peaceful center.

The War Relocation Authority is interested in giving it to you, but we can't operate on the basis of demands and scenes of the type we have here today. We just can't operate like that. Generally speaking, the record has been pretty good on medical service. We will go into that matter, however, just as soon as we can get to it. We can't go into it today. I am no judge of that particular type of thing. I will be glad to have all the facts and I am not going to make any commitment until I get them. A judge never makes a decision until he gets both sides.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is not a complaint. We don't get anywhere with complaints. Consequently, it is turning into demands. The people want the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses, and we want a definite answer today.

Mr. MYER. That is impossible because I have been on the project only 6 or 7 hours, and haven't even had a chance to look around.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me say this much: This has been a request from the evacuee doctors and nurses that you arrange to have all the Caucasian doctors and nurses removed from this hospital for the reason that they don't want them and the people have the same feeling. Let me say this, Mr. Myer, I don't want to see any violence, however, unless you remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such time as an investigation has been held. I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors. I don't want to see any violence take place, but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

Mr. MYER. I have never taken any action under threat or duress.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is not a threat; it is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

Mr. MYER. I realize what exists. Someone is responsible for that. The people are pretty well shipped up. I am sure the tension would be much greater if I made concessions without going into the facts. I cannot make concessions without going into the facts of the matter. I am very sorry that is the situation. In view of what has happened at the hospital today I cannot take action until we investigate the matter. That is final.

Mr. KURATOMI. Do you want us to make the statement just as you said it?

Mr. MYER. You may state it as you wish. I hope you will give them the facts. Tell the people I am here. I hope to go quietly about my work looking into the problems of the center with the evacuees and the administrative staff.

This is my first trip since the segregation movements started. The movements are not yet complete. We hope to get a completely representative group of the Tule Lake center to come up here to discuss their problems. You folks are serving in a temporary capacity until a truly representative committee has been chosen. On matters of immediate concern, we will go into the matter. I am sorry but I will not make any commitments that require action of removal of any personnel without seeing the other side.

Mr. FUKAHARA. I don't belong on this committee. I am so grieved at the loss of my nephew that I wanted to speak to you so you can look into the matter. However, I am not being a party to any demands. I worked under Mr. Shirrell and Mr. Coverley and I don't want to make any trouble. I just wanted you to know the facts. I am glad to be excused; I felt out of place here.

Mr. KURATOMI. Remember what I said: This is not my personal feeling or personal opinion. We are here to represent the people and so speak for the people, and you might see this thing actually take place; I cannot say.

Mr. MYER. I don't think you or any member of this committee have any ulterior intentions and I certainly don't think you want anyone here asking me to make a commitment on 10 minutes' notice on a matter as grave as you have presented. I just couldn't do it.

Mr. KURATOMI. How soon can you make it?

Mr. MYER. I will give you an answer just as soon as I can. First, I have to get the facts together. If I can find time while I am here I will, but I can't promise you that I can get all the facts together in that time.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask then that these Caucasian nurses and doctors refrain from coming into the hospital for the time being. This is not a demand but a reasonable request. I don't think it is going to hurt anybody. We are asking you to do this because we don't want any violence.

Mr. MYER. I am not ready to do that under the circumstances. I have to get all the information together and know all the facts. I am sorry I can't commit myself now. We will go into the matter and give it further consideration.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Peck, who is the head of mess management in this center, is responsible for making allotments of food to each mess hall. The goods were never brought in according to the menus. Many items such as milk and eggs are absolutely necessary to the growth of children. Before I go into this mess-management statement and its facts and figures, Mr. Sugimoto can present it for further clarification.

Mr. SUGIMOTO. These are the findings the food investigation committee gave me. This was necessitated by the fact that when we came in, the segregants felt that the food was qualitatively and quantitatively below that of the other centers. They waited a few days, but the food continued to be worse than it was in September, so with the records existing right here in the Tule Lake center, these facts were investigated.

During the month of September the cost of food per person per day was 27 cents a day including the food products produced within this center.

I think you signed the administrative instruction, Mr. Myer, regarding 31 cents per person for whatever food products were consumed over and above the food produced at this center. But the way this food was computed in September it was all in one, with the amount of 27 cents per person per day including the food produced here.

The average cost of subsistence on October 3, which was an average day, one record was available and at that time the average was found to be 27 cents per person per day, including the food produced here.

Going back to the above statement, during the month of September vegetables and eggs and farm produce raised in this center was well over \$11,000 and this is equivalent to about 3 cents per person per day. That, included in the 27 cents, makes the cost per person per day about 24 cents.

The commodities brought and shipped in from the outside by War Relocation Authority are figured according to the Office of Price Administration meat ration system to feed 14,700 persons. By computing the points at 95,359, it was short-rationed to the evacuees and overrationed to the Caucasian personnel mess hall, which is in operation here, to the extent of 34,133 points, so there was enough shipped in to be distributed to the people in this center, but was evidently over-rationed to the project employees, and 168,000 points of processed food was brought and shipped into this project where only 127,000 points were needed.

But the funny part of it is that it was overrationed to the extent of 7,325 points to the Caucasian mess hall and underrationed to the evacuees mess halls according to the existing records in the warehouse.

And another item, between the time of September 17 and September 30 there is a record of 1,880 pounds of beef being dumped for reason of being unfit for human consumption and we thought this beef was to be Government-inspected.

Investigation reveals that the Caucasian mess hall not only gets some of the project meat but takes the choicest part of it. They get the cuts such as T-bone, rib steaks, and tenderloin steaks. That part goes to the personnel mess hall and the evacuee mess halls get what is left. All of these items are contributing factors about which these evacuees in this camp are complaining because they are not getting their proper share of food that comes into the project.

Mr. MYER. Let me say that if it proves to be true that you are not getting the food that you are supposed to be getting, that will be corrected immediately.

Furthermore, proper action will be taken to have someone operate it. I know that there are problems in mess management. We are investigating them. It will be necessary to go into the matter thoroughly. If you have any facts at all that will help Mr. Cahn, or Mr. Best, they will be delighted to have them.

Let me say it is the responsibility of the War Relocation Authority to provide the proper food. If the evacuee mess halls are not getting the points because someone else is, that will be corrected. I hope we can get this matter taken care of quickly. I am just as much interested in it as you are.

I want to say one thing, that the developments within the last week or 2 within this center may affect the immediate supply as it will take some time to get some of the products of the type that is produced in other centers. That will have to be taken into consideration in looking out for immediate needs.

I want to repeat it is the policy to trade with other centers to provide food in the quantity and quality necessary. Without that we will have to wait and get what food is available from the quartermaster. I am sure Mr. Best and Mr. Cahn are just as interested in getting those facts because we have a record to take care of. We will be pleased to have any information we can so that we can get into it and get this straightened out soon.

Mr. KURATOMI. If we are called in to clarify these problems we will be glad to furnish any information we have and follow along as food is the concern of all the people. We are not asking for the impossible. We are not asking for things that can't be had outside.

Mr. MYER. There is no argument about that between us. We are not going into that now.

Do you want to say anything, Mr. Best or Mr. Cahn?

Mr. CAHN. All these things we will clarify when going into detail.

We have been working on it for several weeks, checking ration points, taking inventory, and renting space in Klamath Falls. We had our own inspection of meat in the last 30 days. We had a Government inspector, for the first time, inspecting all meat and vegetables that came into this center. It is true that

they did not approve all the meat, but the meat that was rejected was sent back to the point of origin.

Mr. KURATOMI. Going on to the question: As a request from the colonists, we want you to promise us that uniform porches, and latrine-service improvements be made at once; dust control of the road should be attempted immediately. This has been more or less of a repetition. We have asked you for them before.

Mr. BEST. We agreed on that the other day.

Mr. KURATOMI. What later attempts have been made?

Mr. BEST. We agreed that you would have a committee and we would try to devise a standard porch and try to compute the total number of porches from that figure and prepare an estimate of what the entire program would cost, and if approval could be secured for lumber, nails, and other material going in there from the W. P. B. We said that we would consider it. We told you that the other day.

Mr. KURATOMI. Many units are still without brooms, buckets, mops, and other essentials. They still lack privacy, because the walls are up on one side only. The women cannot dress without being seen. There are still no closets. We are still waiting for buckets and brooms. This is my personal matter. I am not going to wait until the administration furnishes me with all these essentials. I am going to keep a record of it. If Mr. Myer wants to see all this, he can come down. It is a mess and I don't see how the people in responsible positions could be so indifferent to the welfare of the colonists.

It is a request from the center residents that at all times six ambulances should be in operation. This will be more or less of a repetition. Nevertheless, I will bring it up.

The center residents want you to recognize a central organization to report for the colonists on all matters concerning the welfare of the residents. They also want you to recognize various committees which will work with the administration on some of the functionings of the center.

They also want you to promise that the hospital be supervised more humanely and that the Japanese doctors in this center be given equal authority as those of the Caucasian doctors. As you all know, employment in this center is very grave, and the people want unemployment compensations made available to all the workers who find no employment, just as soon as possible.

Going back a little, what steps are being taken to furnish each unit with sufficient essentials?

Mr. BEST. I couldn't tell you. I don't know.

Mr. CAHN. We had a quantity of brooms on hand and issued those. We didn't have the buckets; we couldn't buy them. But I do think that Mr. Black has gone into the matter and has issued the brooms we had on hand. We had 20,000 at the time. I don't know if Pete Zimmer could tell you more about the buckets.

Mr. KURATOMI. There is an order out from the civic organization to all block managers, saying that no buckets, and so forth, were to be issued to the residents.

Mr. CAHN. I repeat, the instruction was to issue all brooms on hand. As I said, we had 20,000 in stock. We had no buckets and we couldn't buy any today any place. They just are not for sale.

Mr. MURTAOMI. What do you want us to do?

Mr. CAHN. As I say, Mr. Black is working on that problem and also on what you can use in place of it.

Mr. KURATOMI. Well, who is responsible for putting us in these centers?

Mr. BEST. Let's not go into that now.

Mr. CAHN. I am only discussing the problem as it arose at that time. Orders were given to issue them. I know that the problem has not been dropped and that they are working on it.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have been told to leave the brooms and buckets in Jerome, because they would be reissued here, but nothing has been done about it. I certainly think that the administration should do everything within its power to acquire these for us, because I don't see how you gentlemen could be so indifferent. I wish you were in our position.

Mr. CAHN. The assumption that we have been indifferent is not so. The problem was approached by the community management division here immediately. I know they have taken steps to secure the necessary items for cleanliness and sanitation.

Mr. KURATOMI. About these units: They have only plaster boards on one side. You could hear people talking and you have to whisper all day long and the embarrassment to us is beyond words. Many are without closets and the women cannot change their clothes without being seen from the outside. I believe it is

about time something should be done, at least to show that the administration is sincere about the welfare of the residents here.

Mr. ZIMMER. Do you realize that all partitions that are put in during the day disappear by night?

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask you this: Suppose you are put in a unit with nothing in there; wouldn't you do something like that?

Mr. ZIMMER. But can't you see that we can't gain on it at all? Housing tells us that this unit could be partitioned today. The partition is put in, but by tomorrow it's not there. It's gone. Somebody else has it. I would much rather they took material that is not put up. When they keep taking these partitions, we can't gain on our work. Do you realize what I mean? Over in block 66 we partitioned nine buildings. Only two partitions were left in a week.

Mr. KURATOMI. About this central organization or committee to work with the administration. I am sure that Mr. Best is in agreement with this.

Mr. BEST. I told you that if there is a fair representation to everybody, then that is what we wanted to work with. The quicker, the better. Mr. Black was instructed to work through you or any committee you send to him to devise such a meeting.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sorry that you gentlemen had to sit such a long time, but I think Mr. Myer, or any other gentleman has heard all the grievances and dissatisfaction of the center residents that came to a voting point today. There is a statement here from the residents demanding the removal of Mr. Best as project director; Mr. Zimmer as assistant project director; Mr. Schmidt, who is head of the internal security division, for letting over 20 tons of goods pass without stopping it at once; Mr. Kallum, head of the agricultural division, who is directly responsible for the termination of the farm workers; Mr. Peck, who is responsible for the management of all the mess division; Mr. Kirkman, of the warehouse division, who allowed 20 tons of food to be taken out of the warehouse; all of the Caucasian doctors—five of them—and all the nurses to be dismissed from this center administration.

That is just about all that we have on hand, and there are many minor points that could be brought up which would take days to clarify.

Consequently I feel that the committees should be entrusted with the responsibility of working out minor details. The last statement just made in my statement is a statement as requested by the center residents. I would like to emphasize that and repeat it. This is a request not among the representatives here, but from the center residents, to have these persons removed from the center administration.

Mr. MYER. Have you finished?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. MYER. All I have to say further is this, I am glad to have had the opportunity to meet with you. I want to say that I have absolute confidence in Mr. Best, or I wouldn't have placed him here. I placed him here because I felt that he had understanding, courage, and would know how to work with you people in working out your problems. I still think that.

As far as personalities are concerned, I came up here to go over with him problems in relation to personnel or any other problems that he might have. I am going to accept his recommendations and will probably make a few of my own.

I want to make it quite clear that Mr. Best is in charge, and that we can't operate on the basis of demands, but only on the basis of sitting down and talking things over. There is only one agency I know of who operates on the basis of demands. We don't operate that way. I want to repeat.

The War Relocation Authority has been in operation for a year and a half. We have gone through a good many trials and tribulations and troubles. We have been investigated twice by the United States Congress, as regarding the population and problems of these people. They have said things about your problems which I haven't agreed with.

We have tried to get together on facts and have tried to do it within the limits of the policies and our particular administration. We hope we can work with you. If we can't, I presume there will be someone else working with you. I don't know who that would be. I am sure you are not interested in having trouble.

When I went into this position, I knew there would be some trouble and I was prepared for it. I am still prepared for it. When you have suggestions, bring them to Mr. Best. Don't bring them in the way of demands. That em-

barasses him and it embarrasses you. We can't meet demands. We are operating under the United States Government and have to follow certain policies. We are willing to investigate charges and are willing to take action if we find they are based on facts.

I am much obliged to you for coming in. I am sure that you want to operate on that kind of basis, and, if you don't, there will have to be some other kind of basis worked out.

I am not here to make threats. I don't make threats. We stand on what we are trying to do. We think our program has been pretty sound so far, and that the evacuees generally understand that. I think you have some difference of opinion in this center. While I don't know how many people you represent, I doubt that you represent all of them.

I hardly think that you represent everybody's point of view. It is difficult to represent everybody's point of view when there are 15,000 people here.

I hope that I can have an opportunity to devote my time and attention to the problems represented here within the next 24 hours or so, and I want to get at some facts, and I am sure that is what you want me to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. That was just brought up. In block 34, I don't know which corner, there has been an evacuee picked up by an Army jeep and this man was inside a box. Around 50, rather stout, and he wore a beige hat, and I wonder if there is some way for you to check it up?

Mr. BEST. You say an Army jeep?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes. He was picked up, I imagine.

Mr. BEST. When?

Mr. KURATOMI. Just now. These people saw it: Kiyohara, Saito, and Kanano.

Mr. BEST. I can call the Army up and ask them.

(Upon later questioning Mr. Kuratomi was unable to furnish the name of the man in question.)

Mr. MYER. We will be glad to look into that. We are taking so much time, I feel we should get around and get the job done. We will check with the Army and will report the facts to you.

Mr. KURATOMI. I would like to say in a concluding statement that, as we have already stated, we are not here for trouble and we don't expect to have any unnecessary commotions and we are sincere and feel that the rights of the evacuees here are being jeopardized and sometimes tramped upon, and I feel that you are a man of character and will see justice as it is and try to rectify some of the wrongs that might have been committed by some of the Caucasian personnel.

We are depending on you and would like to say that we would like to get these answers or questions clarified for answer just as soon as possible, because the people are waiting and the sooner we can give them the facts, the sooner these problems will be dissolved and we will have a peaceful center that much quicker.

Mr. MYER. First, gentlemen, it will not be possible to give you answers to all these questions this afternoon. Thank you very much for the compliment. We will try to operate on the basis of justice and I want to repeat that I don't want any misunderstanding on that. Mr. Best has checked with me on policy every time. People do things that we don't always know about, both among the evacuees and the administrative staff. I am very much obliged to you and I hope that you will remember that we cannot operate on the basis of demands and the sooner we understand that, the better we will be getting along. We will operate on that basis, of sitting down with you folks as we have this afternoon.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will it be all right for us to report to the people?

Mr. BEST. You are reporting to your people? I don't know what you want to say to your people.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Myer, will you say a few words?

Mr. MYER. I would be glad to say hello to your folks, if you want me to.

I will tell them in summary what I have told you. I will be very glad to tell them.

Mr. STRIPLING. I would like to refer to certain pages here. The first sheet is entitled, "Conference of Negotiations, Tule Lake Center, November 1, 1943." The following took place while the committee was assembling for a meeting at Mr. Best's office at 1:30 p. m., November 1. Mr. Best received a telephone call reporting the incident at the hospital.

Now, here is the quotation:

Mr. Best speaking, "What is going on at the hospital, George?" "George" is George Kuratomi, who was the spokesman for the committee of 17.

Mr. Kuratomi says, "I don't know."

Mr. Best replied, "They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. They are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up, and they are going from one ward to another destroying property."

Kuratomi said, "We will stop him."

Mr. Best replied, "They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord. They will have to be stopped right away."

The footnote says that the committee sent some men over to the hospital.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, that refers to the Japanese committee.

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The center employees?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Then the negotiations go on with W. R. A. and the committee of 17 for 13 pages.

Then the negotiations are interrupted, and it says, "Received report from hospital at this point."

Mr. BEST. They are still having trouble at the hospital. What are you going to do about it?

Mr. MYER. Let us stop this discussion until that sort of thing is stopped. We can't go on under this kind of a situation. Mr. Schmidt and a negotiator should go to check on the hospital situation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Mr. Schmidt one of the center employees?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Dr. MASON. An internal security officer.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, all this time that this disturbance was going on in the hospital, the conference was going on in the administration building, yet no one in the administration building, so far as you know, went over to investigate or render any aid, so far as you know?

Dr. MASON. So far as I know; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Mr. Myer himself was sitting there during the conference and took no steps whatsoever to investigate the thing personally, or send somebody to investigate.

Dr. MASON. So far as I know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Up until this time that Mr. Schmidt, for the first time, one of the W. R. A. actually went over to the hospital to find out what was actually going on.

Dr. MASON. I know a number of calls were made before I left.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did Mr. Schmidt go over to the hospital while you were still at the hospital?

Dr. MASON. No; nobody came while I was there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether Mr. Schmidt left the administration building while you were over at the administration building?

Dr. MASON. I did not see him leave.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know?

Dr. MASON. I do not remember seeing him at all; however, I knew him.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STRIPLING. I have one other point. This is a quotation from Kuratomi, addressed to Mr. Myer, during their negotiations, speaking of the removal of the Caucasian doctors from the hospital:

This is not a complaint. We don't get anywhere with complaints, consequently it is turning into demands. The people want the immediate removal of all the Caucasian doctors and nurses, and we want a definite answer today.

Mr. MYER. That is impossible, because I have been on the project only 6 or 7 hours, and haven't even had a chance to look around.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me say this, Mr. Myer: I don't want to see any violence. However, unless you don't remove those people that I have mentioned from the hospital until such time as an investigation has been held, I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting at the doctors. I don't want to see any violence take place, but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

I ask that this entire transcript be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, the entire transcript will be made a part of the record.

(The transcript referred to has been recorded previously.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Stripling, whether that is the complete transcript, or the entire transcript, of the proceedings that took place there, or whether any parts have been removed therefrom?

Mr. STRIPLING. This is the transcript which Mr. Cozzens and Mr. Best submitted to the State senate committee of the State of California to be placed in the official record of the proceedings of that committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. It purports to be an official and complete transcript of the proceedings that took place?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Mason, I would like to ask you one or two questions.

Were you present at the time that the altercation at the hospital first started with Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you see the first blow struck?

Dr. MASON. No; I did not, because he had gone back into his office and I was at the front door when the crowd pushed past me.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you are not in a position to state whether Dr. Pedicord struck first or whether the Japanese struck first?

Dr. MASON. No; I only know what he said.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you recall any statement he made regarding the beginning of the altercation?

Dr. MASON. He said the first thing that was done, one Japanese reached up and removed his glasses, very kindly, he said.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean he smashed them off, or did he scratch his face getting them off?

Dr. MASON. He took his glasses off; that was Dr. Pedicord's statement. His glasses were not broken because he had them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the doctor state whether his face was scratched after the glasses were removed?

Dr. MASON. No; he just said they removed his glasses. He did remark, had he broken his glasses on his face, he might have injured him worse than he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. The removal of the glasses was the occasion of his launching out, then, was it?

Dr. MASON. Apparently so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding the other man, Mr. Borbeck, will you describe briefly the nature of his injuries?

Those injuries could not have resulted merely by falling and hitting one's head on the ground, or a rock, or anything like that, could they?

Dr. MASON. Well, I hardly think so. They were of such a character that the rock would have to be very irregular shaped to have fitted into the areas.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is, to be cut in four or five different places?

Dr. MASON. Yes. It would have to be a sharp instrument.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then it is quite evident that he was cut up?

Dr. MASON. He was apparently cut. They were incised wounds.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did it look like cuts with knives?

Dr. MASON. Yes; incised wounds. This wound across the chin was very clean and very straight.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it was not a case of being hit with a ring or anything like that, was it?

Dr. MASON. No; I can say that medically.

Mr. COSTELLO. There has also been the allegation that there was a great deal of use of narcotics by the Japanese at the center. Do you have any information regarding that?

Dr. MASON. No; I do not think I heard that discussed at all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether any narcotics were stolen at any time from the hospital?

Dr. MASON. No; I do not. I personally never used any in the few days I was there.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have not heard any discussion around the center regarding its use, then?

Dr. MASON. No; I do not recall any discussion about narcotics and its use.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that all, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. Just one more question. Did Dr. Pedicord or Dr. Marks, or Dr. Loebmann ever state to you that after you left their office for the administration building to obtain help that anyone from W. R. A. came over to determine whether the disturbance was still going on at the hospital? Or the condition of Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. I do not remember any such statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you know, to your own knowledge, that from the time Dr. Marks called the first time, and his repeated calls, that no one came over, Japanese or Caucasian?

Dr. MASON. I saw none; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you were there in the office?

Dr. MASON. I was in the office the whole time until I left, of course.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Doctor, you arrived at Tule Lake on October 22?

Dr. MASON. Well, I arrived at Klamath Falls the night of the 19th, but I didn't get to Tule Lake until the 22d; that is true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you went on duty when?

Dr. MASON. No; the 21st, is it not? The 19th all day, the 20th, and the following day, the 21st.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And your first day of duty was what date?

Dr. MASON. There was brief apology about that long wait there, and they said that I had officially gone on duty the 20th. Somebody made that statement to me that I should have been there, and it was through no fault of mine that I was not. I would say they were quite apologetic about it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you first commenced your actual duties on what date?

Dr. MASON. On the 21st.

Mr. EBERHARTER. On the 21st?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That was the day you arrived?

Dr. MASON. That was the day I arrived. I immediately went to the hospital and remained there throughout the day.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And your last day of duty was November 1?

Dr. MASON. November 6.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I mean, actual work at the hospital ceased?

Dr. MASON. Oh, so far as the hospital work; yes. In other words, I was still there, but there wasn't any work going on, so far as we were concerned. We did not have access to the place.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That was a total of about 9 or 10 days.

Dr. MASON. Well, from November 1 until November 6, it could not be over 6 days.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But actually on duty from the 21st?

Dr. MASON. Yes; from the 21st.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Until November 1.

Dr. MASON. November 1, noon; that is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is 12 days.

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Had you ever been in a relocation center before?

Dr. MASON. No; I had no idea what it was, even. I did not know just what it was. I made some effort to find out something about it previous to my acceptance, and I did not get any particular information that was of any value to me.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you know, when you went to Tule Lake that that was a special center?

Dr. MASON. I did not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To be used for segregants?

Dr. MASON. No; I did not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you had no idea, then, that there might be some difficulty with the segregants there because they had been selected for security reasons of the United States Government; you did not know that?

Dr. MASON. I did not. I was told in a letter from Dr. Thompson that approximately 80 percent of these people were American citizens. I have that letter.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who is Dr. Thompson?

Dr. MASON. He is the Chief of the Medical Division of W. R. A. and I believe is stationed here; G. D. Carlisle Thompson.

He and Mr. Best were the only names I knew until I actually arrived at the camp. I did not know Dr. Pedicord's name. It was never mentioned to me in correspondence and I just knew those two names.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In the 11 or 12 days that you were on actual duty

there, Doctor, did you form an opinion as to the capabilities and the character of Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. I have my opinion of him; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Professionally?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you care to give the committee the benefit of your opinion that you formed?

Dr. MASON. I would be glad to give you my opinion. I think Dr. Pedicord was a very capable man, both professionally and in an administrative capacity. I think that he had done an excellent job, and I think his ideas were certainly medically correct.

As to the administration, by the way, we owned a small hospital, and I was familiar with details and costs; I mean you know something about the necessities of a certain amount of conservation and a certain amount of care in the handling of equipment and the use of supplies and the management of the kitchen and other things, and I had reason to believe that he had inaugurated and was insisting upon better administration. That was the dominant note in his instructions to us, and that was to cut down on waste, extravagance, and unnecessary use of the hospital in all respects.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think the W. R. A., then, was rather fortunate in having a doctor of the capacity of Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. Well, I happen to know that Dr. Pedicord—rather, I have learned, because I do not happen to know; but I have learned—that in his previous capacity he had been and was an expert administrator and fairly well known and quite capable, and they were fortunate, I think, in having him. He was certainly agreeable to all of us and we thought a great deal of him.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When you arrived there, or shortly after your arrival, you say there was a strike in progress insofar as farm labor was concerned?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you see any evidence of it, whatsoever, while you were on duty there?

Dr. MASON. You mean on the farm?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you see any evidence of any sort that the strike was in progress?

Dr. MASON. Well, the farm was not on that particular reservation. It was across the road, and that some distance, and I had no occasion to see any part of it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you did not see any evidence of it?

Dr. MASON. No.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Everything was quiet when you first went there?

Dr. MASON. I was perfectly secure, and felt very secure, particularly with the Army across the fence. I felt very comfortable.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you did not know that the Army came in just on invitation.

Dr. MASON. No. I learned that by surprise—that they came in only when invited.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Doctor, when you first learned that there was some hostility on the part of the personnel in the hospital of the Japanese toward the white personnel, or the Caucasians, about what time was that?

Dr. MASON. Well, Dr. Pedicord, in the hospital, told us that they did not like them, and I just knew from what he said. He said, "They are very respectful; they do what I say, but it is obvious to me they do not like me." And he gave good reasons for them not to like him. I think they were very excellent reasons, because he had instructed us to not do everything they asked us to do, which is understandable and reasonable.

And of course he was in a position, I might say, to deny certain favors and certain privileges that they sought constantly, night and day.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just as any good administrative officer would do in the same position.

Dr. MASON. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you feel it was proper in every respect for Dr. Pedicord to advise you, as one of his assistants, of this hostility, and to keep you properly informed so that you would know how to conduct your duties in a fair and efficient manner?

Dr. MASON. Yes. He told us to expect a certain amount of confusion and to expect repeated and various requests of all types, under all guises, and to be on guard concerning these requests, of course.

He did advise us not to ever appear afraid before these Japanese. I remember he did say that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What was the patient intake there per day, or how were your records made; so many patients a day; is that the proper way to keep hospital records?

Dr. MASON. Of course, you have patient-days, estimates and summaries.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How is that?

Dr. MASON. You have patient-days that you keep records of. They are available in the record office, as to the number of admissions and discharges, a number of charts.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What was the approximate patient-day number?

Dr. MASON. Well, it had been cut down so that when I got there, there was not a great influx of admissions. But as I stated to you a moment ago, occasionally one would slip in with some minor condition that obviously was not a hospital case.

And we were very carefully checked by Dr. Pedicord personally in everything that we did.

I reported to him the necessity for an operation and got his permission before we operated. He did not operate, but I informed him of the case, the condition, which was proper, and I certainly had no desire to do otherwise.

And my surgery was done with the one Japanese physician who was an excellent surgeon. He was the man, though, whom Dr. Pedicord had particularly said was a troublemaker, and I saw some occasion to appreciate that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Doctor, have you had any experience before in free clinics?

Dr. MASON. Yes; I have.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Were the number of persons applying for free treatment at this very clinic there somewhat out of proportion to what the practice or the general experience would be; say, a free clinic in a big city?

Dr. MASON. Well, they have a population, roughly, of 15,000, and I dare say that a free clinic in a town of that size would not have brought the great mass of people to those clinics that you would see in a town where they were expected to judge the necessity of attendance.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They wanted a little very extra medical attention?

Dr. MASON. There was another thing that I think might be worth while, if you do not mind.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to have it; surely.

Dr. MASON. There was another thing that Dr. Pedicord mentioned to us frequently, and asked me to bring it up in a staff meeting, which I did on that Saturday morning, and that was the use of X-rays.

I, having done public health for the last 31½ years, knew that there was a distinct curtailment in the use of X-ray films. Our State Department, in their tuberculosis work, had been radically reduced in the amount of films that you made. And I happened to know that and he knew it.

A young Japanese baby was brought into the clinic one day whom I saw, that had a small cut on its little finger. It had been seen previously. I saw it as the second or third man, but I did notice the records. You glance over the records to see what had gone on previously.

It was brought in for a dressing, and I noticed that the Japanese physician who had seen him made a note "X-ray shows no fracture."

Well, of course, as you know, a laceration of the finger obviously does not need an X-ray. So that was the situation. They were crowding the X-ray technician to the point where he could not possibly do the X-rays which were being requested as necessary, and he asked for relief; at least, Dr. Pedicord told us to ask for some relief on the number sent to him.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You had several staff meetings in the first 10 or 12 days you were there.

Dr. MASON. Yes. Some, more or less informal, but two or possibly three were called by memorandum.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is more than the usual number of staff meetings that are held generally in hospitals; is it not?

Dr. MASON. Well, it usually is proper to have meetings, that is, for the in-staff, as we were, at least once a week, which I think would be proper.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that it was appreciated by Dr. Pedicord and by his assistants on the medical staff that conditions at that hospital were different than hospitals of a general nature.

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that it was a good thing to have many staff meetings.

Dr. MASON. I think it was proper, under the circumstances; quite proper.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were not those meetings necessary, also, due to the fact that your staff was new?

Dr. MASON. We were reorganizing; that is true. They were very necessary. The whole situation was such that repeated and frequent meetings, I think, were very necessary. We were all more or less strangers, and getting accustomed and acquainted, too, and he had

had considerable experience before us, and I do think they were very necessary.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And at these staff meetings there was a friendly feeling among the Caucasian doctors toward each other?

Dr. MASON. Oh, yes, indeed. We were quite agreeable and quite cooperative, so far as I know, in every respect; at least I noticed no friction.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think it was a good staff?

Dr. MASON. I think it was a fair staff. I would hardly say it was good because I was in it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, considering the shortage of medical men, and eliminating yourself from the staff——

Dr. MASON. It was excellent, eliminating myself.

Mr. EBERHARTER. An excellent staff.

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And I am sure it was excellent if we include you in it, too, Doctor.

Dr. MASON. Thank you.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, at any of these staff meetings, do you recall any suggestions or recommendations as to treatment and administration?

Dr. MASON. Dr. Pedicord invited any sort of criticism and any sort of suggestion. He, I thought, was very democratic. He insisted on that. I felt, being new, I hardly had time to make any suggestions.

There was one thing that annoyed me, I can say without hesitation, and that was the number of daily visitors at all hours. They were there all the time; you could walk out into the hall and find a group of people standing around when you were trying to make professional visits. And it is quite annoying. I have practiced medicine and do not allow people standing around. Get them away and get them out; that is the only way you can do anything.

But I was very courteous and agreeable to these people. I really thought I had made some friends. I am sorry I found out later I did not, but I thought I had.

I did not realize there was any animosity toward the staff as a whole. I thought it was more or less a personal matter between Dr. Pedicord and maybe one or two individuals.

Mr. EBERHARTER. At any of these staff meetings you got no protest against any of the practices that were being carried on?

Dr. MASON. No. The only time I did was at his request. I did bring up the question of X-rays. He asked me to do it privately. He said, "I wish somebody would bring it up besides me," because I think he had good reason to ask that, "and then we will discuss it."

But that, as I remember, was my only real official suggestion or approach about any discrepancy or any practice that was not desirable.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Were the physicians there quite busy?

Dr. MASON. Yes; we were very busy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In their professional capacities?

Dr. MASON. We were very busy. We had plenty to do.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There was no loafing on the job at all?

Dr. MASON. I did not loaf.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How about the rest of the staff?

Dr. MASON. I think not. They were always present, and apparently always busy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Including the Japanese doctors?

Dr. MASON. The Japanese doctors were quite busy. I certainly would say that they applied themselves diligently and they apparently were very much interested in their patients.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And your opinion of their professional capacity is what?

Dr. MASON. Well, the one physician whom I mentioned I considered a very good surgeon; quite radical, but very capable as far as technique was concerned. He was entirely too radical. I say that unhesitatingly, and I did have to sort of hold him down, so to speak. I was told I would have to, and I did.

On numerous occasions I found that certain things were contemplated that, being rather conservative myself, I did not approve of, but I am sure his intentions were good.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You mean, radical in his practice?

Dr. MASON. So far as practice of surgery was concerned. That is a personal opinion, you understand.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Surely.

Dr. MASON. People trained in different places do different things, you know; I think there are direct and simple means of doing things that do not necessarily have to have a lot of ceremony about and a great deal of folderol, so to speak, to get a simple thing done. And there was a great deal of ceremony about his activity.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You mentioned an instance, Doctor, where Dr. Pedicord had complained about the manner in which the records were being kept, and was endeavoring to put into practice a more accurate form of record.

Dr. MASON. Yes. We were personally made responsible for every record in certain wards that we were assigned to as physician, and it was my business and duty to check those charts two or three times daily. Some would be for histories, some would be for physicals. Some, I know, were withheld, patients who had been in the hospital over there 10 or 12 days and he insisted that certain complete history and physical examinations should be present in the charts within 24 hours, and that is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that is considered very good practice?

Dr. MASON. That is considered very good practice, often a shorter time, but he was very liberal.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And Dr. Pedicord was absolutely right about that?

Dr. MASON. Absolutely. We had, even, at our disposal, little Japanese girls who could take shorthand. We did not personally have to write it. And they were quite efficient. It could be dictated and brought to the chart, so that was simple enough.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That would not be considered such an unusual incident in the administration of the hospital, would it?

Dr. MASON. It was a very necessary and very commendable request. Any well-managed hospital has to have good records.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You would not say it was unusual?

Dr. MASON. By no means. It is essential to a good hospital.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Doctor, I have appreciated your testimony very much. Now, I wonder whether or not you would care to tell me some-

thing about the construction of this camp, or the Tule Lake center. Are the buildings in which the Japanese are housed all frame buildings?

Dr. MASON. I went through the colony on two occasions. One time, on one Sunday afternoon I was very kindly driven around by one of the persons there, and I do not remember seeing any that were not built of frame construction and covered with black felt construction paper.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What kind of a lighting system do they have in the camp?

Dr. MASON. So far as the Japanese colony is concerned, I do not know. We had electric lights.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you have any lights at night at all?

Dr. MASON. Oh, yes. There were rows of lights down the firebreak. I can remember looking down and seeing them. It was an absolute plain, flat desert. You could see the whole thing from almost any point.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was it the usual size, barrack type of construction, frame building?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What is the usual size, or were they all about the same size?

Dr. MASON. Well, I did not enter the Japanese quarters at any time; I do not know about that. Ours were medium-sized rooms, with small baths, and little closets screened off, with a little drapery of some type, with usually double beds, that is twin beds; two people in a room.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You were kind of cramped, were you?

Dr. MASON. Not particularly. They were very comfortable.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know how many families were housed in each barracks?

Dr. MASON. I do not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether each family had separate laundry facilities or anything of that nature?

Dr. MASON. You mean, the Japanese?

Mr. EBERHARTER. The Japanese.

Dr. MASON. I do not. I claim no knowledge of the colony, except general observation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether each family has separate running water in their quarters?

Dr. MASON. I do not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Or separate toilets?

Dr. MASON. I do not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know the type of heat used to heat these barracks?

Dr. MASON. I think it must have been either oil burners or these Warm Morning magazine stoves. There were quite a number in evidence. I remember seeing a freight car on side track one day, in the warehouse, drifting around on another Sunday, that was loaded with Warm Morning stoves, so I presume they used those stoves. There was a pile of coal near the barracks and I imagine most of them were heated by these magazine stoves.

Our quarters were heated with oil burners, mostly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is no steam heating system there, is there?

Dr. MASON. The only one I know of is in the hospital. It had its steam plant, and its own laundry. It was steam heated. It is the only building I know of that I would say had steam heat.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Doctor, when you first saw this crowd approaching, I think you said you were not concerned at all by their advance.

Dr. MASON. Not immediately. I had seen a group gather around the hospital a few days before, quite a large crowd of these people, and I do not remember what it was, but I remember a number of boys were up on the roof of the building, and whoever was with me remarked, "They might cave the roof in," and wondered where internal security was.

They were, apparently, having a meeting in the gymnasium on the Sunday before the Monday, but I had seen groups before down there, and I really did not think so much about it.

I began to be concerned when they were coming directly toward us.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And there were mothers with children in their arms?

Dr. MASON. I saw all types; yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The whole family probably turned out; is that not true?

Dr. MASON. Apparently so. I was told, and this is purely hearsay, but I was told that they had been told by a group of men that they would join that crowd or die.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I did not hear that, Doctor; will you please repeat it?

Dr. MASON. I was told—purely hearsay—that the Japanese had been informed to join that crowd or die; that the girls in the hospital had been warned to join it. That is purely hearsay; at least, they had a great group of people together. At least, I do know that, because I saw them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. None of these Japanese made any direct threat against you when they forced their way into the hospital, did they?

Dr. MASON. At one time, after I went back, after being pushed aside, I immediately went back and one Japanese boy put his hand under my chin and put his fist in my face and shook it and gritted his teeth. Other than being taken by the arms and led to the building, that I was subjected to, except a little language occasionally, that we felt keenly—we were all humiliated.

Mr. EBERHARTER. While these Japanese were mistreating and kicking Dr. Pedicord, from your testimony I take it that there was not a single white person who came to his assistance, with the exception of this nurse.

Dr. MASON. There was not a single white person that could come to his assistance. We were being crowded out and pushed out. We had no chance. It happened in a matter of seconds. Immediately, when we got to him, we were telling him that we could not help him. He said, "I know it," because I had gone back in for the purpose of helping him, or trying to, which was, of course, foolhardy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, the nurse got to him.

Dr. MASON. She got to him when they were leaving. She rushed by and got in.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that the time when you came to the assistance of Dr. Pedicord?

Dr. MASON. He was being dragged by us and the nurses had gathered and I got them off in the room, and they went around through this side door. It was rather confusing.

There were not many of us there, you see. You see, I was the only one there at the beginning, and the next thing that I saw was the nurses, and then after he was back in his office, then Dr. Marks came from his post and circled back in the hospital, claiming that they had pushed him out.

You see, there was nobody there, to begin with. I had gone to the back of the hospital to ask him what the trouble was, and he stationed me at the door.

Mr. COSTELLO. It would have been impossible for you to have been of any assistance to Dr. Pedicord with 18 or 20 Japanese around him beating him up.

Dr. MASON. I went over there for the purpose of assisting him up and this young Japanese advised me not to interfere, which I took to be serious; I do not know. I could not have gotten to him, anyway; they were all around him and more or less inside of the door. They were still fighting at the door.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You observed the crowd pretty closely throughout the entire afternoon?

Dr. MASON. Well, we had nothing to do. We were just waiting. Occasionally one thing would be pointed out and then another. I remember somebody pointed out the fact that these women and children were on the outside, which interested them, and this group of boys in the middle.

Some of them remarked that they were protecting the others.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you passed through the crowd at one time.

Dr. MASON. Yes; the crowd gave way when I was escorted in.

Mr. EBERHARTER. During all this time you did not see anybody with any weapons?

Dr. MASON. I saw two pocketknives.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Pocketknives?

Dr. MASON. Yes, sir. I saw two different men with pocketknives, whittling.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether or not there was an announcement made in the dining rooms when the Japanese were having their lunch that a speech would be made that afternoon at the administration building?

Dr. MASON. I heard it said later that they had made such an announcement.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the word had been passed to all the Japanese when they were eating lunch that the speech would be made by Dillon Myer, National Director, at the administration building, in the afternoon?

Dr. MASON. I heard that was true. I did not hear the announcement, but I had heard later that they had such an announcement and had been gathered by that means.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When these gentlemen were speaking in the afternoon, before and after Mr. Myer spoke, was there anybody taking shorthand notes or any notes of what the Japanese were saying?

Dr. MASON. I really do not know. I did not notice anybody doing that. They were speaking in Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes; surely. But there were persons of the white race who could understand the Japanese language who were present when those speeches were being made.

Dr. MASON. The only one I actually know was this Miss Shipps who occasionally approached, and we asked her what they were saying. And I do remember one time she said that she did hear them say, "Dr. Pedicord" and heard them say "Dr. Marks," but she apparently could not get a great deal of their conversation.

We were, of course, very anxious and were plying her with questions at different times as to what they were saying. They did not talk loudly and you could not hear a great deal.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The way it finally turned out, Dr. Pedicord was not seriously hurt, was he?

Dr. MASON. No. He sustained painful bruises and his eye was injured. It will take some time, as it usually does, for those subcorneal and subscleratic hemorrhages to dissolve, but so far as mortal or serious injury, I think not.

There was some question in our minds at first on account of mild shock, that he might have internal hemorrhage; we did not know. That is a matter of observation over a period of time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You decided to resign or to, at least, get away from Tule Lake because you felt that in the future you could not conscientiously, in a professional way, continue to treat these Japanese persons; is that correct?

Dr. MASON. That particular group.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, is that professional ethics of the medical profession?

Dr. MASON. Well, I do not know about that. It was an unusual situation. A doctor is not required to treat unless he chooses, legally.

Mr. EBERHARTER. He is not required to treat any patient? He can refuse to treat any patient? Is that professional ethics?

Dr. MASON. Under circumstances other than emergency; I mean, a man chooses his practice in private practice more or less at his will.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you feel, Doctor, if you had remained at Tule Lake, that your friendship toward these Japanese was such that you could not give them the proper kind of professional treatment?

Dr. MASON. My meaning was that I had a definite resentment against these people and I did not feel that I would be in a proper position to treat them correctly or incorrectly under the circumstances.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And it would probably interfere with your professional treatment of these Japanese, whether they were Japanese-Americans or straight Japanese?

Dr. MASON. That was my meaning when I made the statement.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, Doctor, do you know that the medical profession, that is, the medical officers in the Army, treat the wounds of the enemies?

Dr. MASON. That is true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think that their feeling toward them sways their professional treatment?

Dr. MASON. No; I think not. It did not sway mine, but I did not see any point in being subjected to that feeling. If there was any fortunate part about it, I made my position clear. I asked about it first, and I found I had a matter of choice and I decided I could do better, frankly.

I did not go out there to fight. I went out there to practice medicine. I made the remark, "If I am going to fight, I will be in uniform."

And I might say that I have made an effort to get in uniform on repeated occasions. I am connected with the Public Health Service, and we are more or less frozen to our position.

MR. EBERHARTER. Well, do you not think it is better to have Caucasian doctors, particularly at the Tule Lake center, especially set aside for segregants, than to allow the medical treatment to be given by Japanese doctors?

DR. MASON. I do not know that I am in a position to judge that. There it did not seem to work very well. With the Caucasians it did not seem to work at all very well. They did not like us. They did not want us.

MR. EBERHARTER. Do you not think it should be taken into consideration what the Federal Government wants; our own Government wants?

DR. MASON. Indeed I do.

MR. EBERHARTER. You do not give way to the views of the Japanese, do you?

DR. MASON. Not at all; but it was not to favor the Japanese that I desired to help.

MR. EBERHARTER. I am a little confused by your testimony as to whether or not it was your impression, immediately after the disturbance was over, that it was best that the Army had not been called in up to that time.

DR. MASON. Well, our general discussion was based on the gathering of the crowd itself, and its purpose, the purpose for the congregation, after they were in a position to have us surrounded and more or less at their own mercy, so to speak, and I think that I can safely say that we felt that any unusual move on anybody's part might have entailed some danger both to us and the Japanese; at least, that was our feeling. Whether it would have, I do not know.

MR. EBERHARTER. So that it is kind of hard for me to follow exactly what impression you want to give this committee.

Is it right for us to say that it was your impression immediately after the disturbance was over that it was perhaps the best thing not to have called the Army in during the conference?

DR. MASON. During the conference; yes; but not after the conference or before the conference.

MR. EBERHARTER. You think it might have been all right to have called the Army in before the conference commenced?

DR. MASON. We wondered why the Army did not dispose itself in such a way as to find out why these people were coming. Of course, they got there rather hurriedly, and there was nothing that could have been done then, so far as we knew, except to call the Army in and disperse them.

MR. EBERHARTER. Then is it your impression that it was best not to call the Army in while the conference was going on?

DR. MASON. That was our general impression.

MR. EBERHARTER. That was your general impression?

DR. MASON. That was my general impression; yes. I felt we would have all been in danger; that is my impression, that we were at the mercy of these people in the building at that time. Whether we were or not, I won't say.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, you think it was a wise thing on the part of the administrative officials of the W. R. A. at the camp there, and Dillon Myer, to hold the camp conference with these so-called selected leaders?

Dr. MASON. Well, he did not have a great deal of choice, I think. He was in there, too, with the rest of us.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that it was the proper thing for Dillon Myer and Mr. Best to hold the conference that afternoon, was it not?

Mr. COSTELLO. That was not the only thing for them to do, was it?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Let him answer my question, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. MASON. I would say that he had no choice; that is the way I look at it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Had you been in his place, would you have held a conference?

Dr. MASON. I think that I would have; yes, indeed. I certainly would.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I believe you said you did not know whether the security officer went to the hospital or not.

Dr. MASON. I do not know that he did or he did not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, that evening, about midnight, you went home to your quarters from Dr. Pedicord's home?

Dr. MASON. Yes.

Dr. MASON. Did you have an escort?

Dr. MASON. Just another doctor, as I remember; two Caucasians.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It was dark at that time?

Dr. MASON. Yes; it was around midnight.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You were not physically afraid?

Dr. MASON. Not particularly. It was quiet, and I was not comfortable at that time; I will say that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, it was not fear of physical violence that caused you to resign from the position and leave the camp, was it?

Dr. MASON. My chief reason for wanting to resign was that I had expected to arrange to have my family with me, and I had that impression when I went. I was told that facilities were available, and that was my expectation and intention, but it did not appear to me to be the proper place to have a nice wife and two nice children, and I did not much care for them to be brought up in any such atmosphere. I was a little surprised.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you remember much of what Mr. Myer said in his speech to the Japanese that morning, and can you give us an impression of how long that speech lasted?

Dr. MASON. It was very short; very few words and a very careful speech.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, some people call a 20-minute speech short.

Dr. MASON. I would say it was not over 5 minutes; I do not think it was even that long.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What was the main gist of what he said?

Dr. MASON. The main gist was refusing their demands at that time. That was essentially what he said at that time. He assured them he would investigate their complaints and he would see what could be done about separate demands, and then he bade them good day.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. COSTELLO. You felt, Doctor, if you were to have brought you wife and children out there, it would not have been a safe place for them to live on the reservation?

Dr. MASON. Certainly not.

Mr. COSTELLO. For that reason you wanted to notify them and get out; is that correct?

Dr. MASON. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your quitting was not due to any particular fear, although you did not think you were any too safe in that center; is that the idea?

Dr. MASON. I did not wait. I mean I felt perfectly secure, you understand, the whole time, until I realized that the military and the amount of protection was a little different from what I had anticipated.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, actually there was no internal security within the center.

Dr. MASON. They had organized what is known as internal security. I do not know the number of men involved, and I do not know their arms, whether they were armed or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, those were mostly Japanese, were they not?

Dr. MASON. There were, I understand, a number of Japanese in it.

Mr. COSTELLO. The developments on this particular day demonstrated that the internal security problem was not taken care of when you needed police protection within the center.

Dr. MASON. Obviously so.

Mr. COSTELLO. And apparently the calls to the administration brought no aid.

Dr. MASON. Obviously so.

Mr. COSTELLO. And apparently there was no aid to be brought in other than the Army, outside of the gates?

Dr. MASON. Apparently not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe that Dr. Pedicord was a trained disciplinarian?

Dr. MASON. I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not think he was too abrupt in his handling of the Japanese, or too rigid in his handling of the problem?

Dr. MASON. He was equally abrupt to us. It might have been a difference in understanding but he was equally abrupt to us.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you believe his attitude was one which was necessary in order to have an efficient handling of the hospital?

Dr. MASON. I should think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any other questions?

Mr. STRIPLING. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I appreciate very much, Dr. Mason, your coming in and giving your testimony before the committee.

We know it has inconvenienced you a great deal to come to Washington for a few days. I think your testimony has been very helpful to the committee and will aid us materially in trying to work out some solution of the difficulties that seem to confront the handling of W. R. A. centers.

I want to thank you for your frankness and your openness in answering the numerous questions here.

The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10:30, at which time we will hear Congressman Engle.

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., the committee adjourned until November 30, 1943, at 10 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello, presiding.

Present: Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. John Z. Anderson, California; Hon. John Phillips, California; and Hon. Clair Engle, California.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

We have, as our first witness this morning, Congressman Engle, who represents the district in California in which the Tule Lake segregation center is located.

Although Congressman Engle was not an eyewitness to the events which transpired out there in California, he did leave from Washington to go out there to make an investigation of the situation.

Now, as the result, he was present at the hearings of the State senate investigating committee, and had an opportunity to observe the various witnesses who appeared and testified on that occasion. Although his testimony may be in the nature of hearsay evidence, I think it will give the committee the picture they desire to receive regarding the events out there as observed from the statements made by eye witnesses to the events.

I would appreciate it, Mr. Engle, if you would come forward and give your full name to the reporter, please.

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIR ENGLE, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

Mr. ENGLE. As you have so kindly stated, Mr. Chairman, I proceeded to California in response to numerous requests from my own district, and particularly from the vicinity of the Tule Lake Area, after reports had been received in my office about the Tule Lake disturbance on November 1.

In addition to the various telegrams, I talked on the phone to some of the people at Tule Lake, particularly on November 4, which was Thursday, the night the Army was called in to take over the camp; so on that week-end I proceeded to California and arrived at Tule Lake on Monday, November 7.

At that time the Senate Fact-Finding Committee For Resettlement of Japanese had already arrived on the ground. The California Legislature, at the last session, set up this Senate Fact-Finding Committee, and shortly after the disturbance at Tule Lake, they arranged to go there and hold hearings.

When I got to Tule Lake they had subpoenaed a great number of witnesses and were prepared to start their hearings on Monday morning at 10 o'clock, which they did.

Now there was a good deal of confusion at that time regarding what had actually occurred at Tule Lake because of certain press releases, one press release in particular, which had been issued out of the W. R. A. office in San Francisco. This press release, which came out after the disturbance on Monday, November 1, was to the effect that there was no real trouble or disturbance at Tule Lake whatever; that the reports regarding that were apparently German propaganda.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did that press release carry the name of any officer of W. R. A., or was it just simply issued in the name of the office?

Mr. ENGLE. No; the press release carried no name, but at the Senate Fact-Finding hearing, Mr. Cozzens, the regional director, attributed the press release to Mr. Joyce of the San Francisco office.

The press release further stated that the regional office had received five telephone calls within 5 minutes after the alleged disturbances were supposed to have been, or alleged to have occurred, which was the basis for their assumption that it was a subversive plan of some sort.

So I was very happy yesterday to see the Doctor here from the Camp to give you an eye-witness account of what occurred there on November 1, because it eliminates to some extent any necessity on my part of going over what the investigation revealed regarding the actual occurrences.

The doctor's testimony, as you heard it yesterday, covered a great many of the points covered by the witnesses at the Senate investigation, and to whom I talked, and all of those witnesses covered the whole subject with a great deal of detail and with testimony which I felt had a good deal of weight.

Now, there were some factors about it that the doctor did not bring out and which were brought out in testimony which I might mention.

Mr. Dillon Myer, the national director of W. R. A., arrived at Tule Lake on November 1, a Monday, and he was immediately approached by a committee of Japanese who wanted a hearing with him. He agreed to meet the committee on Tuesday afternoon, at 1:30, and that was supposed to be the time when the meeting was to be held.

Notwithstanding that arrangement, the Japanese announced in the mess halls on that day, that is, Monday, that all of the Japanese should get together at the administration building at 1:30 to hear Dillon Myer speak, and so at 1:30 they did assemble and the Japanese committee did call upon Mr. Dillon Myer, which was in violation, of course, of the understanding and agreement which had been had regarding the meeting which was to be held the next day.

And as the doctor testified, Mr. Myer and Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens, and those others present, did proceed then to go ahead and hold the meeting with this Japanese committee.

Now, the testimony regarding the actual occurrence at the demonstration was supplemented by testimony, that is, testimony given by the doctor, and the facts stated by him are supplemented in great detail by testimony given by other people, that is, regarding their particular activity in the affair.

For instance, with regard to the women, the Japanese had apparently Japanese women patrolling the apartments during this demonstration, and there were two white women in an apartment whom they forced to go to the administration building. One of them was up on top of the house and the Japanese told her to come down or she would be hurt. So she came down and was escorted to the administration building by the Japanese and in the process of being escorted, was abused, and language was used toward her which was not very complimentary or very nice.

The total effect of it was to frighten this lady to the extent that she sat down during the process of the afternoon meeting when they were held prisoners in the building, and made out a will.

Now, that sort of thing came up. I could mention a great many witnesses who would testify in the same manner. For instance, a man who had previously operated the slaughterhouse, who was a farmer, who lived in the vicinity—

Mr. COSTELLO. What was his name?

Mr. ENGLE. His name was Wilkinson. He was at the camp with reference to some business he had there and when he saw this vast mob coming and approaching—and apparently they approached, so the testimony indicated, in a very orderly and organized fashion—he tried to get out of the camp by getting in his automobile and driving out the front gate.

If the map is still on the board, I could illustrate.

He was dragged right back of the administration building, between the administration building and the fence, and he tried to get in his car, and got in his car and tried to get out of the gate before the Japanese all could surround the administration building.

He got in his car and started toward the gate, but the Japanese surrounded him and stopped him and started to turn his car over. He opened the door on the left-hand side, and swung it open. When they tipped the car up to the left, the door caught, and that kept it from turning over. They informed him that he had to stay and take his medicine.

So they got him out of the car and escorted him without manhandling him, in particular, but with sufficient emphasis to let him know that he was to go along to the administration building, and at the administration building he was put in there along with the rest of them.

He testified in some detail about the situation there in the administration building. At that time, he said there were about 60 to 65 people in the office building, in the north wing. There were several wings to that building, and there were people in each one of the wings. The Japanese, from time to time, would bring someone else in, and put them in the building.

He saw these cartons that they were carrying around full of straw, and he saw that they had guards at each door and window. They had

two bonfires built there for some reason or other, although the day was not cold; it was warm.

He saw hundreds of people with sticks and he saw one knife 14 inches long, and sharpened on both sides. He said that some of them had handles sticking out of their coat sleeves.

One fellow by the name of Miller, who was a traveling salesman of some type, tried to get out, and when he could not get out he tried to phone with reference to his train reservation. They have a telephone booth there in the administration building which, as the description was, was just outside on one of the porches. And he tried to go out and phone, but the Japanese took him out of the telephone booth and would not let him remain there. They could go to the window and look out any time they wanted to and one of the Japs asked him if he would take a thin dime for his life when he was looking out the window, and made a suggestive swipe through the grass with his knife.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what kind of a knife that was?

Mr. ENGLE. If he indicated the type of knife it was, my notes do not show what he said.

Incidentally, I might say in that regard that a court reporter's transcript was taken of all of this testimony, that is, the testimony at the hearing, and I have asked for a copy of that, and that transcript will be made available to this committee; as to the testimony of any of these witnesses whom I have mentioned.

Now, the situation as developed by the testimony, seemed to indicate that the Japanese had some plan, if they were driven sufficiently, to burn down the administration building, the warehouses and the garages. There was a good deal of testimony supplementing that, to which the doctor testified yesterday, regarding these bundles of straw, and straw saturated with oil being placed around the administration building and the garages, and under the warehouses.

The officer charged with fire control in the camp was a man by the name of Rhoads, and it was his special business, of course, to determine whether or not there was a fire hazard. He testified that he made an investigation and he found these boxes of straw saturated with oil in the garages.

Now, these garages are large garages and are made to hold some 10 or 12 automobiles, and these little boxes, as I understand it, of straw would be put in those garages, and also were put under the warehouses, and at the time of the demonstration were put around the building itself, that is, the administration building, in such a fashion as to indicate that if the circumstances required it, they could have set the straw and the boxes on fire, the straw being saturated with oil, and start a conflagration there in the camp.

That testimony was also given by Mr. Paine, who was a police officer at the camp, and also by some of the other witnesses who stated that they saw these boxes of straw.

Now, as far as any testimony indicating that the Japanese ever undertook to light the boxes of straw or to otherwise set the building on fire, there is no such testimony.

Now, the Japanese committee which presented its demands consisted of 17 Japanese. Their demands are particularly set forth in the court reporter's transcript of the hearing there of the committee, which was taken down, and which yesterday was made a part of this record.

They demanded better food; they complained about the food conditions, saying that the distribution was bad, that is, that some mess halls were getting more food than others, or better food than others.

They wanted porches over their doors; they wanted buckets, mops, and brooms. The record indicates there were a great many brooms distributed already, but the Japanese were complaining that they wanted more. They also wanted the resignation of most of the white personnel.

Now, that is all set up in the record. They asked for the resignation of Mr. Best, who was the camp director. They asked for the resignation of all of the white personnel in the hospital, and complete control of the hospital; the resignation of Dr. Pedicord and of Mr. Peck, who was the chief steward, and also a good many of the others; Mr. Rhoads, who was the fire chief; and also, I believe, they asked for the resignation of the chief of internal security there at the camp.

At any rate, their specific demands on that are all set forth in the record. They said they wanted six ambulances to be on duty there at the camp at all times. And the Japanese spokesman said that there was a very serious unemployment condition in the camp and that they wanted unemployment insurance provided.

With reference to the situation at the hospital, they were very specific about that, and they not only wanted the resignations of all the white personnel, but they wanted an immediate answer on that subject that day, and they informed the W. R. A. leaders that if these demands were not yielded to, that the Japanese committee would not be responsible for what would happen.

There was a good deal of property damage that went on during the riot. The Japanese got on top of some of the cars and smashed one of them in. They tore some of the windshield wipers off. Mr. Rhoads testified he looked at his car and it had been completely ransacked, and the windshield wiper taken off, and I believe the rear-view mirror stolen out of it. Some of the cars were scratched.

They had also poured stove oil on the tires of the cars and poured oil around some of the cars. Now, that was testified to by Mr. Rhoads, the fire chief, and Mr. Paine, and I believe one other witness who made an investigation of that particular circumstance.

Mr. COSTELLO. They let the air out of some of the tires of the cars also, did they not?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. There was testimony that they let the air out of the tires of some of the automobiles. They got in these trucks and definitely anticipating that the Army might come in, they put these trucks so that they would block the streets, and then they had Japanese at the controls of these trucks at all times.

The entire performance seemed to be, from the testimony, very well organized.

From time to time, as the doctor testified, the Japanese committee, or a group from the outside, would march completely through the administration building and inspect the situation, look over the white people, the white personnel in there, and on one occasion came through and inquired as to where the committee was holding its hearing. Apparently they had not heard a report and wanted to know what was going on.

They had this broadcasting system set up and the equipment with which it operated, that is, the batteries and the speakers, and what not, were guarded by the Japanese. They had a Japanese sitting on the batteries.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that a permanent installation of the camp?

Mr. ENGLE. No; that is not a permanent installation; and after the demonstration was over it was taken down and removed by the Japanese.

Now, during the course of these negotiations, when it began a telephone call came in, as the doctor testified, regarding the situation going on at the hospital. There was a good deal of negotiation about that, and finally Mr. Cozzens, or rather, I think it was Mr. Schmidt, the internal security officer, in company with one of the members of the committee, went across to the hospital to see what was going on. And the record shows that Mr. Myer and Mr. Best stated, in effect, that they would refuse to continue negotiations until the action in beating up the doctor was terminated or brought to a close.

Mr. COSTELLO. When did Mr. Schmidt leave that meeting?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, there was nothing indicated in the record or the testimony to show the time, but it was some time after the commencement of the negotiations and the message first arrived.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was not in response to the first phone call, then?

Mr. ENGLE. No. There were some 15 pages of testimony in between before he went over there to check up on the situation.

Mr. Best, at the time the report was made, asked the spokesman for the Japanese what they were going to do about the situation; that is, as to the Japanese committee, what they were going to do about the situation; that the doctor was being beaten up in the hospital.

Now, at the end of the conference, the Japanese from time to time were addressed over their broadcasting system, their loudspeaker system, by a spokesman. They spoke in their own language, but some of the witnesses, like Peck, testified that they heard their own names mentioned. Now, whether they could recognize their names or not, I do not know; it might have been a name that the Japanese could not pronounce in their own language, but they were under the impression that they heard their own names, and therefore got the impression that the report was being given to the crowd as to what the demands were, and whose resignation was being demanded.

Incidentally, Mr. Peck's resignation was subsequently demanded, and he has since resigned from the project there. Mr. Peck, as I said before, was the chief steward, the chief procurement officer. He ran all the mess.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether he voluntarily resigned, or whether he resigned at the request of the project manager?

Mr. ENGLE. He resigned at the request of the War Relocation Authority, and the grounds stated for his resignation were inefficiency. At the hearing he protested that rather vigorously, and stated that he had letters, which he showed to me and which I have in my possession but not here—they are out in California or being shipped back—which were very praiseworthy of his efforts as a procurement officer and chief steward in the camp.

But, notwithstanding that, as of this occurrence, his resignation was demanded. And I endeavored personally to get him to stay on, at

least until this thing blew over and we could find out what was going on out there.

But he felt that proceedings would be taken against him from a civil-service standpoint; in fact, he said that he had been told that they would proceed against him under his civil-service set-up; that is, that they would call for a hearing, and he did not want that on his record; he would rather just resign and get out of the thing and let it go, and have his civil-service record clear rather than go through a contest with them on it. So he did resign.

At the present time, as I understand it, he is driving a truck there at Tule Lake for one of the contractors. His resignation was demanded by Mr. Cahn, who was the assistant project director. As I said, the reason given for his resignation was inefficiency. He had been at the camp for some 18 months.

Now, in regard to weapons at the demonstration on November 1, there is considerable testimony regarding weapons. Some of them saw as many as five and six knives in the crowd during the afternoon, but nobody testified, to my knowledge, to seeing firearms.

As to whether or not the civilian personnel there were actually prisoners, the testimony was unanimous, that is, that they could not get out. Several of them tried it. One man by the name of Donovan, who was the head of their construction department, who seemed to be a very determined sort of chap, decided that he was going to go out. So he started through the Japanese crowd, and it pretty near precipitated a riot on the fringe of the crowd, and they manhandled him and shoved him around and cursed him and abused him, and called him a "white so-and-so," and other names, and forced him to go back into the building. Others tried the same thing and had the same experience, so whether or not the white personnel were actually prisoners, there does not seem to be any question about that.

Now, Mr. Myer's claim is that he did not feel that he was a prisoner; as a matter of fact, Mr. Myer and Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens, did not try, so far as the testimony indicates, to get out, but one member of their group that they did send to the hospital to investigate that situation, was escorted by a member of the Japanese committee and did not go through the crowd there of his own accord; he went through under Japanese escort.

Mr. COSTELLO. During the entire time of the trouble at this time, neither Mr. Myer nor Mr. Cozzens nor Mr. Best made any effort to leave the administration building, or leave the room in which they were holding their conference?

Mr. ENGLE. None of the testimony indicates that they did, and they, themselves, did not testify, that is, Mr. Cozzens nor Mr. Best never testified that they tried to leave the building.

Now, they did submit a statement on the situation there, which is part of the record and covers pretty well their testimony which they gave before the committee.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you like to have this transcript?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. I can read that into the record, if you desire. This is headed "Factual Statement for the Record Concerning Tule Lake Center, November 1st to November 4th, 1943, Inclusive, by R. B. Cozzens."

And, as I say, it follows substantially the same testimony which he gave at the hearing, and I think indicates, to some extent, their position in the matter.

Mr. Myer, Best, and I arrived on the project from San Francisco at about 10 a. m. November 1. While in conference and at about 11 a. m., two evacuees called on Mr. Zimmer and wanted to know if Director Myer would meet with a committee. Mr. Zimmer informed the above evacuees after consulting with the Director and Mr. Best, that we would meet with the committee at 1:30 p. m. November 2. The director, Best, Zimmer, and I discussed additional security measures necessary to satisfactorily protect and control the area, such items as jail and additional fence, both of which had been considered since segregation was announced.

Following lunch the director, Best, and I viewed the new motor-pool area and looked over the area to determine proper location for jail and additional security measures. We were advised just as we left in a car for this trip that the colony had been informed that the director would speak to them at the administration building. Further checks revealed that the people in the colony had been advised at the noon meal that the director would talk to them at 1:30 p. m. By that time 3,000 to 4,000 people of the colony—men, women, and children were moving into the administration area. We, the director, Mr. Best, and Cozzens—carefully considered the advisability of calling in the military. From past experience and due to the fact the general population had been called to assemble under a hoax to hear the director, we deemed it inadvisable to call in the military.

I might say Mr. Cozzens was very frank in saying in his testimony that the calling of this demonstration was a pure hoax on the part of the Japanese leadership in that colony, apparently to show their influence and their power to the people.

Continuing with the quotation now:

We realized that this was the first major move on the part of a committee in the colony to play for power. In the crowd there were a number of small groups who appeared to be well organized and told the crowd where to go. The crowd assembled around the three wings of the administration building. Another crew of evacuees erected a loud-speaker system on the building.

While the crowd was assembling there were, as mentioned, well-organized small groups, probably 200 to 250 total, told appointed personnel or any Caucasians they saw to either stay in their apartments or go to the administration building. This last statement is from hearsay only.

When the crowd had assembled, an evacuee called at Mr. Best's office and asked if the director and Mr. Best would see the committee. It was agreed to see them. They came in—17 in all. The transcript of the meeting reveals what took place at the meeting.

The crowd outside was orderly all during the meeting except that, as reported, some cars were scratched, one car top caved in by kids sitting on it, two car aerial poles taken, and a small amount of minor damage done to a few cars, including letting air out of tires on five or six cars.

During our meeting with the committee we were advised Dr. Pedicord was in a serious condition. Our meeting was stopped by the director, and a member of our internal security staff, together with members of the committee, visited the doctor at the hospital. He had been in a fight, but had already received medical attention and was not in any serious condition. His injuries included a black eye, bruises on the head and body. No damage was done in the hospital except the knocking over of a railing across the hall at the entrance. I was able to see about half of the crowd from the windows of the director's office. I saw no knives, or no clubs, as reported. The crowd was surrounded by some of the organized group, and on two occasions I saw evacuees start to leave, and they were told to go back into the crowd. In other words, the evacuees were held here by a few of their number, many against their will.

Following our meeting with the committee, the director and Project Director Best were asked to talk to the crowd. This was done. The director told the crowd he had met with a committee that said that they represented the colony. He told the people that many demands had been made and that the W. R. A. would not consider demands, but that we would meet with committees and consider the colony's problems and make decisions based on facts only. Mr. Best

talked to the colony and both Mr. Myer's talk and his was interpreted accurately.

Rev. Kai then talked concerning both subjects. He completed his talk by saying, "You are Japanese. You must give your all for Japan. Take off your hats. Bow your heads; and go home." About one-half of the crowd complied with the first two commands. All dispersed quietly and left the administration area.

During the entire meeting, W. R. A. had constant communication with the Military and, in accordance with our agreement with the Military, they were ready to move on a moment's notice.

Following the meeting and dispersal of the crowd, the colony was notified by the project director that no more gatherings or crowds would be permitted in the administrative area; at the same time definite procedures and plans were further perfected with the military for their taking over if it became necessary. Further arrangements were made with the United States Army engineers for the construction of additional security measures.

It being understood we were placing in this colony some people who were known or who had declared themselves loyal to Japan, and with that type of people it could be expected that different factions in the colony would do all in their power to cause trouble, the trouble which started Thursday night did not take the W. R. A. or the military by surprise.

The colony was rather quiet through Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. Thursday night groups of boys started forming in the administrative area and at that point, due to the fact that they had violated the order issued by Mr. Best, he immediately requested the Military to take over. This they did.

I will read Mr. Best's statement into the record, if you wish me to.

Do you wish to hear it? It follows a good deal the same line.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the committee would be interested in hearing it.

Mr. ENGLE. It is headed "Events Leading Up to Demonstration at Tule Lake on November 1, 1943."

Segregation brought a conglomerate group of Japanese together in the Tule Lake center and it was inevitable that a struggle for political control of the 15,000 persons in the center would follow. The group to move first and to make the strongest bid for control through forceful methods was a gang of social mis-fits from Jerome, Gila River, and central Utah relocation centers belonging neither to the well-defined Nisei or Issei groups. Many in this group were at one time interned at Sand Island, Hawaii.

This group apparently set out to gain political control of the center so that they could use this control, first, to aid Japan by causing the United States Government as much trouble as possible; and, second, to gain advantages and prestige in the center itself for themselves and followers.

Their method seemed to be to create major issues such as work stoppages out of small grievances so that they could confer and negotiate with the project administration and thereby come to be considered the representatives of the entire Japanese colony. This was important since this group quite obviously did not actually represent the Japanese population as a whole.

Incidentally, the record of the meeting of October 26, submitted at the hearing, is a part of the record, and it is in the record of your committee. It was turned in by your investigator and it concerns a conference which occurred between this Japanese committee and the camp administration; that is, the director, not the national director, Mr. Cozzens.

It was a conference between the Japanese committee and Mr. Best. Mr. EBERHARTER. What date was that?

Mr. ENGLE. That was October 26. And at the hearing, when this record of the transaction on November 1 was asked for and supplied by Mr. Best, that record itself contains a reference to the record of October 26. The Japanese asked for a copy of the record, and then the committee, myself included, asked for a copy of the record, and it was produced.

Mr. STRIPLING. We can make that a part of the record, if you like, which is the proceedings and negotiations between the committee and Mr. Best on the 26th. We have the actual transcript.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, that may be incorporated.
(The transcript referred to is as follows:)

CONFERENCE WITH EVACUEES, TULE LAKE CENTER, OCTOBER 26, 1943

Present: R. R. Best, C. E. Zimmer, H. L. Black, M. Lucas (reporter), Herbert Hoshiko, I. Hayashi, George Kuratomi, K. Yamamoto Kobayashi, Yoshiyama, Takada, Yoshida, H. Mori, S. Kai (stenographer).

Mr. BEST. Who is to be spokesman?

Mr. KURATOMI. I am. First of all, I would like to ask if you would recognize us as being the representatives of Tule Lake evacuee residents?

Mr. BEST. Is that a question?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. There is that word "recognize" back again.

Mr. KURATOMI. I could put it a different way. We have been asked to represent center residents as all cannot come in.

Mr. BEST. And as such, will I agree to entertain you?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. Yes; but recognize—I do not like the word. It does not mean what is intended.

Mr. KURATOMI. I imagine the nature of some of these questions would be beyond your authority. If such a question should arise, would you be kind enough to forward the question to Washington or wherever necessary?

Mr. BEST. Wherever necessary.

Mr. KURATOMI. These are the questions that we have been asked to bring up.

Mr. BEST. Okay.

Mr. KURATOMI. The first of all, the residents of Tule Lake center wish to know the status of the people in here by the American Government and by the Japanese Government and what would be their status from the standpoint of international law.

Mr. BEST. This question should go to the Department of Justice or State Department. Mr. Myer probably should answer that. This question probably should be sent to the Spanish Consul.

Mr. KURATOMI. A supplement to that question—this center has been designated as a center for those persons who have either indicated they are disloyal or cannot abide by the laws of the United States Government or people who have expressed either desire to be expatriated or repatriated to Japan. It is the wish of the residents to get the clarification of the center established as soon as possible. Then, there is a strong feeling among the residents to segregate the residents between the people who have just said "no" to question 28 and the people who have intention for going back to Japan. They wish to know how soon such a question could be answered and how some such a plan could be worked out.

Mr. BEST. To further segregate?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. That is a good idea and is something that will have to be worked out.

Mr. KURATOMI. To go back to the automobile accidents.

Mr. BEST. Which accidents, the fire truck and farm truck?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes, the two that we had. The residents wish to have it clearly understood that W. R. A. should take full responsibility in regard to these accidents and the residents want a public announcement made to that respect. Furthermore, the residents want the administration to express a regret concerning these accidents.

Mr. BEST. O. K. What is the next one.

Mr. KURATOMI. The project director has not expressed his condolences toward the people who have been the victims of the auto accidents and they feel regretful that you have not taken any step to show your sympathy toward them and they wish to know the steps which the administration has taken in regard to the people who have been injured or died from the accident. Maybe I could get answer from you in regard to compensation.

Mr. BEST. All forms have been properly complied with. The accident is under the United States Employees' Compensation Commission. It is not W. R. A. All forms have been completed and transmitted to that Commission. Does that answer it?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; in regard to the late Mr. Kashima's funeral. The attitude taken by the administration of this center has been very inhuman and residents wish to know the reason for such an attitude by the administration. Maybe you could answer me.

Mr. BEST. I couldn't answer your question because you make a definite charge that I, as project director, am inhuman. Who is to be the judge of that?

Mr. KURATOMI. The judge is the rest of the people in the center. That is the way they feel.

Mr. BEST. I have no inhuman tendencies.

Mr. KURATOMI. Maybe I could add something. I imagine you have been approached by residents of this center to have you or one of your representatives at the funeral to send words of condolence and, if my report is correct, you have refused to do so.

Mr. BEST. Maybe I could tell you something. They didn't ask me, they demanded that I appear at the funeral and speak. They demanded that I transmit a letter of condolence to the widow. I do not recognize demands.

Mr. KURATOMI. Shouldn't you think the word "demand" could be interpreted in two different ways?

Mr. BEST. In my way—no. Your representatives that came down here didn't come down here with any other interpretation. They said, "You do it that way."

Mr. KURATOMI. I will have to verify that.

Mr. BEST. I know. I was right here.

(KuratomI talked to Takeda in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Takeda is one of the persons who was here. According to his words they never used such a word. It would not be a very proper word to use even if they thought it was the proper thing to do. Here is one of the witnesses saying that they did not make any demands.

Mr. BEST. They told me to be there. If that isn't a demand, what is it?

(KuratomI talked to Takeda in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. What he said was to have you come, asked you to come—

Mr. BEST. It isn't anything to debate. I didn't go. I told the funeral committee not to have a public funeral—

Mr. KURATOMI. What do you mean by a "public funeral"?

Mr. BEST. Out in the firebreak, on the outdoor stage, or in the high-school auditorium.

Mr. KURATOMI. Do you think that the people could possibly get into a recreation hall or mess hall?

Mr. BEST. I think so.

Mr. KURATOMI. How could 10,000 people get into a recreation hall or mess hall?

Mr. BEST. I didn't say 10,000 people, I said the people who wanted to go to the funeral—

Mr. KURATOMI. How can you make such a statement?

Mr. BEST. If I told you that there were men forced to go to that funeral, would you say it wasn't so?

Mr. KURATOMI. Absolutely not so.

Mr. BEST. If I told you that certain people, when asked where they were going, and answered they were going to the store, canteen, or elsewhere, were told, "You are going to the funeral," would you say that is not so?

Mr. KURATOMI. I shall have to get witnesses on those.

Mr. BEST. We are not before trial. I am just telling you this for your information. I am telling you this: That the widow did not want a public display of a big funeral. I abided by the widow's decision.

Mr. KURATOMI. I will check up on that. I do not think your statement is correct. What will you do if that statement is not correct?

Mr. BEST. What would you do?

Mr. KURATOMI. I would apologize to the people. Wouldn't you?

Mr. BEST. You, or no one else, are going to tell me what to do in letters. Keep it informal. We will do this without putting me on the spot. I am not going to be put on the spot, and you are not going to come here and tell me what to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am asking you.

Mr. BEST. I am going to tell you a few things later. I am not ready yet.

Mr. KURATOMI. They wish to have a public report from the hospital about each of these cases of injury and the death. To prevent further occurrence of such accidents, what steps is the administration taking?

Mr. BEST. I don't know of any way of preventing a fire truck from turning over when a man turns a corner at an excessive rate of speed. Of course, they have governors on trucks, but fire trucks do not have governors. The person driving the fire truck is no longer a truck driver. He asked to be relieved of driving.

Mr. KURATOMI. I don't know about that.

Mr. BEST. There is nothing that we could do to prevent the accident of the fire truck with an incompetent driver. I understand that a warden pointed and he immediately turned; is that correct?

Mr. KURATOMI. That part is not on the paper.

Mr. BEST. That is the report I have. I don't know how to prevent that. I am willing and would like to have any kind of suggestions if you could tell me how to prevent any of those types of accidents.

Mr. KURATOMI. Motor-pool drivers should be over 21 years of age.

Mr. BEST. That is right. That is the order. They should be 21 years old for trucks and passenger-car drivers 25 years old.

Mr. KURATOMI. The person who turned the fire truck over was only 17 or 18 years old.

Mr. ZIMMER. Eighteen.

Mr. BEST. Eighteen; which is a legal age in California.

Mr. BLACK. This has already been published and is in effect. The orders have already been issued. We do not have any drivers now that are not 21 or 25.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of these additional people you have here as drivers don't even seem to know how to use the gear in reverse or the compound. There is quite a complaint in the motor pool on that. We feel that if the motor pool could more or less control such drivers, that is, if they could fire them or hire them, it would remedy this situation. The residents feel that the persons in the motor-pool division should be given more authority to supervise; or if not, recommend for the dismissal of the drivers if such a case should come up. The way it is, that is, the system, now the motor pool has nothing to do with hiring or firing of drivers.

Mr. BEST. That is an administrative instruction. The Employment Division hires or fires people. Each section does make the recommendation but the actual termination is through the Employment Division. That is an administrative instruction and cannot be changed, but we could recommend that it be changed in Washington. However, that is a mere detail and is something that will have to be worked out. Termination through the Employment Division is merely a mechanical detail of the operation of termination. It is an instruction that we didn't write or have anything to do with and it couldn't be changed here. It would make no difference where the termination is processed, a man would be terminated for inefficiency regardless of who does it.

Mr. KURATOMI. The mechanism of some of these automobiles is not adequate to transport people or haul goods and those automobiles should not be put into operation, especially the one that tipped over. Defects were found in the truck.

Mr. BEST. Of what nature?

Mr. KURATOMI. I did not bring the statement but I have a statement submitted from the garage in that respect. There were 9 or 10 items.

Mr. BEST. Just for my own information, what was the matter?

(Mr. Yoshiyama in Japanese to spokesman.)

Mr. KURATOMI. Shall I have him go after it?

Mr. BEST. No; that is not necessary now, but I would like to know just what it was.

Mr. KURATOMI. Going back to the farm. It is the feeling and it is the determination of the people that we should not farm any more than the acreage to feed the center residents.

Mr. BEST. Have you thought that through?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. In other words you don't want to ship anything out and you don't want anything shipped in?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is up to the Government.

Mr. BEST. No. The reason that other people are raising crops is so that they can ship us what we can't raise and we ship out what they can't raise. We are getting carloads of beef from Gila. The Government is going to feed you, cer-

tainly, but if you don't use what is raised here and exchanged with other centers it will have to be requisitioned from the quartermaster and you will have to take what comes. Have you thought that through? I am very much interested in that because I have something here this morning that I will show you in a few minutes.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is what we want, only raise enough for the residents of this center.

Mr. BEST. Have you discussed this to the point that you don't want beef that is raised in Gila? You would rather get it through the quartermaster rather than get it from Gila?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. You don't want to get any other than through the Government?

Mr. KURATOMI. No.

The reason we came here is because we cannot comply with or abide by the laws of the United States.

Mr. BEST. That is the reason this center was established. That is the reason I am trying to find out some of these things. I think you should think that through further, because a carload of beef from Gila will be ours if you want it. If we go through the quartermaster we will have to take what comes. Is that what you want?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. Mr. Zimmer take this [telegram] and cancel it right now. We will have to wait 50 days before we get any.

Mr. KURATOMI. We would like to have a committee to decide how much we want to raise.

Mr. BEST. That is one thing that I would like to do. We have got all winter to plan that. I would like to have an agricultural committee so that we can plan what acreage we want. If we are not going to farm I want to know; if we are going to farm I want to sit down and decide how many acres we want to take care of. I presume there will be about 20,000 people here. Don't you think so?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. I want a good agricultural committee to sit down and plan, to see how much land we need, what crops we want raised. If we are going to raise chickens, how many? And to plan in advance. I want you to think about that. We can raise chickens and hogs. We cannot raise cattle. We can raise chickens, hogs, and turkeys and we can raise farm crops and we will want to figure them for 20,000 people. That is what we have to think about and I don't want to wait until next spring when we don't have time. We are going to be here and I want to get this planning done because we want to raise the crop—that is if you want the crop.

Mr. KURATOMI. Since it is evident that the acreage of the farm could be cut down there will be unemployment. So that it is the wish of the residents that these people should be given some other employment and if such is impossible then be given assurance of their well being such as clothing, and of course the food and shelter is provided by the Government, and a little spending money besides. Also, is there any truth to the report that the farm products here have been sent to the Army or the Navy?

Mr. BEST. No truth to it. No farm products have been sent to the Army or Navy.

Mr. KURATOMI. Never has?

Mr. BEST. Never has.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the public school here. Under what plan has it been operated and under what plan does it plan to open here?

Mr. BEST. Probably Mr. Black can tell you. The plan is to open school just as soon as we possibly can. You know what we were faced with here. The segregation movement, people coming in and people going out. We thought we would have to use the recreation halls for additional residents; however, we didn't have to. We had to use the high school for processing. I don't know how soon they can start, possibly next month.

Mr. BLACK. There is still some construction work to be completed before school can begin.

Mr. BEST. On the high school?

Mr. BLACK. On the high school.

Mr. KURATOMI. Let me ask you this question? Would there be a flag ceremony in the morning?

Mr. BLACK. There will not be. It is planned to have a flag over the administration area here and not in the colony area. We have a number of teachers here, as you know, who have been doing other kinds of work and are ready to start teaching as soon as construction is finished. There are some stoves to be installed, some painting to be done, and installation of desks, tables, and chairs. The school census has been underway for several days but still is not completed and we have to wait for the results from the census to know how many classes are required, how many teachers will be needed, and what the division of classes will be. We hope to be able to start elementary schools about November 1, and every preparation is made to open just as quickly as facilities are available. High school teachers will be used in the elementary schools and elementary schools will be opened first. Later, when more facilities are available, we will open the high school, but not at the same time as the elementary schools. Because there are more children to go to school than there are facilities, it is planned to operate on a platoon system. Part will go in the forenoon and part in the afternoon. The students that live the nearest will go to school in the morning, and in the afternoon the ones who live further away will come for their session, so we can start at 8:30 to 12:00, and from 1 to 5:30, and get pretty good school operation. Does that answer your question?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. As facilities are available, either by using recreation halls or vacant apartments, we can make a transfer of elementary schools to those facilities and use the high school for high school classes on a staggered system. The schools will be open for everyone who wants to go to school, but it is not required. It is a service rendered to the community and is agreeable to all the people, but will not be forced on them.

Mr. BEST. It is not compulsory.

Mr. BLACK. No; it is not compulsory.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people want a center organization to govern and take care of the welfare of the center residents, and this center organization would have every right and power to negotiate with the administration, that is, with you or with the other personnel if such case should arise. It is the feeling and the request of the residents that the whole set-up should be left to the free will of the center residents and that they wish to have you more or less recognize such a group in the center.

Mr. BEST. Just so that you be sure to get complete representation. I don't want it out of one block. I want complete representation. That is being worked on. We had to wait until all were here or it would not be a fair representation. I want you to have a working committee to go to the community activities section to devise some kind of a program so that you can have an election to get the proper representation. Are you set up to do that at the present time? Or do you think you have it already? I don't care how big the representation is, just so it is not bigger than this group here. We can't work with a bigger committee than this and get anything done.

Mr. BLACK. May I ask a question?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. We would like to have suggestions from the people on that plan. I believe that any workable scheme depends on working between members of the colony and of the administration. I have in mind to submit to the colony a proposal something like this: That an advisory council be composed which will be almost entirely selected by the people within a geographical area. In order to keep a committee of a workable size, it should be composed of a chairman and representatives from each of the seven wards. The chairman of the ward committee might be one of the block managers, or it might be any other person whom residents of that ward would select. Certain groups such as the P. T. A., Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., religious organizations, Catholic and Protestant churches, and such other project-wide organizations as we have had would give us a representation but it would not be a geographical one, but rather would represent the interests of the whole project. We are having a meeting of the community management staff this afternoon in order to discuss that a little further, and then find out if you have this committee or another committee to represent the people in the development of such a plan. May I ask if this committee is specifically for the farm situation or whether it is an over-all committee. Could I have an answer to that?

Mr. BEST. He is asking whether this committee is a general or over-all committee or whether it is a specific committee for the farm situation.

Mr. KURATOMI. The farm problem became so big for the farm group that they asked for center-wide support to work out some agreeable solution of center-wide problems in connection with the farm problem. Therefore, an election was held in each of the 64 blocks and each block sent in a representative elected by the people and they came to a meeting and decided on some of the questions for clarification for the colonists. They chose a committee and we happen to be the committee to negotiate with the administration. What I was saying awhile ago is this, that if something comes up the committee would bring it to your attention. The idea is that some of these people who have been here all the time and some have come in have different ideas, such as some people wish to go out on relocation or people who came in here with a plain "no" answer and the people who have a definite mind to go back to Japan when the opportunity arises. The ideas among those groups are definitely not the same. There will always be friction of some sort unless resegregation is carried out. I think it would be easier for you to run the center if such a program was put into effect.

Mr. BEST. Much easier. One of the things we are going to discuss when the Director is here is further segregation.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is about the biggest problem right now.

Mr. BEST. That is one of the things that will be taken up with the Director first.

Mr. KURATOMI. We should have a center organization eventually. Since this is such a large center and the problems concerned are so varied it is evident that it will be necessary to have different committees to work in particular divisions. It is the idea that these committees or representatives groups be allowed to work in cooperation with the administration. Would it be possible to recognize such an organization in this center?

Mr. BEST. We are anxious to have that organization.

Mr. BLACK. We are anxious to have an organization to advise and counsel the administration for the over-all promotion of well being and welfare of the community but I want to make it quite clear that there cannot be such a thing as self-government. I am asking that in lieu of self-government your committee and all of its personnel serve as an advisory committee to the administration or the project director so he may know what things you wish to have done. Does that make sense?

Mr. KURATOMI. Very logical. It is the feeling and request from the residents that these working committees be paid under W. R. A. wages.

Mr. BEST. They always have been.

Mr. BLACK. Block managers, wardens, public welfare, and so forth, are paid by W. R. A.

Mr. BEST. All committees under community activities.

Mr. KURATOMI. Offices should be set up in some central location in the colony.

Mr. BEST. Don't worry about offices. We will have office space for every activity that we need. Definitely we will have that.

Mr. KURATOMI. So that the central governing body from the center residents could get into direct contact with the administration to discuss all negotiations.

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. BLACK. I don't like the use of the expression "central governing body." Should use the expression center committee or council.

Mr. KURATOMI. Is it perfectly agreeable with you to go ahead with the organization and submit the full plans to you.

Mr. BEST. That is what we are here for.

Mr. KURATOMI. It is the feeling of the residents that the block managers be put under supervision of the center committee. That is the way the residents want it.

Mr. BEST. That would be right back to community government. We have to get away from that. We have no choice in the matter. Those are our instructions.

Mr. KURATOMI. What capacity are the block manager's working under right now. Each block manager has a different interpretation of his powers, and so forth.

Mr. BLACK. They transmit to the people information that we feel is for their benefit and we have used that means in many instances to combat rumors that are not true. If the people want something done they tell the block manager. The block managers notify the people that their freight has arrived and letters are distributed through the block managers. Through the block managers come complaints and reports to the administration. Part of this work probably would be better served by the center committee. The main function of the block managers is the transmission and exchange of information with the administration.

Mr. BEST. We discuss the problem and lay our problems right out on the table for the block managers to discuss. We have no secrets. It is our desire to give them information as far as the administration is concerned.

Mr. KURATOMI. What difference would there be if the block managers took orders from the center committee who represent the residents.

Mr. BEST. We don't want to try to get around the instruction that has been handed down to us. By reason that this is a segregation center we can't have self-government. I want to keep in the clear on that. The block managers might be on your committee though.

Mr. ZIMMER. Since the planning board and the city council dissolved during registration the block managers have been the clearing house for grievances.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people have right to ask for reelection of the block managers. The reason I say that is this: Since this is a segregation center the language of Japan has become predominant. Some of the block managers can't understand Japanese. They cannot transmit your instructions to the colony because they cannot interpret in the Japanese language.

Mr. BEST. I have thought there probably will be a complete change of block managers.

Mr. BLACK. Many people are not settled down. We have got to go through the process of having new people integrate with the community. It is better all around to have block managers who have been residents of Tule Lake before until the new people integrate with the community. It is better all around to have block managers who have been residents of Tule Lake before until the new people familiarize themselves and get settled down.

Mr. KURATOMI. In regard to the hog and poultry farm out there. There are quite a few doubts and questions among the residents in getting their share of the pork and eggs.

Mr. BEST. We can settle that quickly.

Mr. ZIMMER. Since the 22d of June there hasn't been a hog slaughtered from the farm. Every egg comes into the mess management warehouse and from there it goes to the colonists. Everything from the hog and poultry farm goes to mess management. We have nothing to do with it from then on. We deliver it to them. What they do with it from then on, I don't know.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people here haven't seen any pork.

Mr. ZIMMER. Haven't seen any since June 22 because we haven't slaughtered since then.

Mr. KURATOMI. They say there is 190,000 pounds of hogs on hand. Residents who have been here all the time tell us they haven't seen that much pork at any time even if it was divided among 16,000 people. Will you be kind enough to check this with mess management as to what basis these eggs and pork and other products are distributed to each mess hall.

Mr. BEST. We can find that out.

Everything from the hog or poultry farm is all going down to your mess and no place else. I can't tell you what happened in the past because I didn't arrive until August 1. We all have to live here, and I want to make it just as livable as possible. All the hogs and poultry are coming into the mess management warehouses. Now, if you have a tie-up and have no one out to the farm to work of course I am going to have to have to dispose of the produce. If you don't have a work crew out there we will just have to find a buyer and sell it.

Mr. KURATOMI. As far as I know they are working out there.

Mr. BEST. I mean if you should stop working I couldn't give you any of the crop.

Mr. BLACK. With all the produce raised it doesn't begin to meet the requirements of the center. We still have to buy more all the time.

Mr. KURATOMI. Will you please be kind enough to investigate this from the day you came here to the present date as to what basis farm products have been distributed to each mess hall.

Mr. BEST. That is a matter of record and should be easy enough to do.

Mr. KURATOMI. We would like to have you make a report to the people.

Mr. BEST. I think you have plenty of people working in the mess division who can tell you.

Mr. KURATOMI. Just want a verification.

Mr. BEST. I know we haven't shipped any out. We have to ship in all the time.

Mr. KURATOMI. This has come up often. The people would like to have latrinal facilities improved. If you came down to these blocks and could see the conditions—

Mr. BEST. We can see they are crowded but with the addition of the 10 blocks that is starting today, 3,750 people will be moved out of those blocks and will relieve the pressure and size of the blocks, and there won't be nearly so many people using these facilities. We can't buy some of the fixtures and materials that is going into the new blocks. We want to improve conditions in the wash houses and the men's rooms. As soon as I came here that was one of the things we talked about, but we can't buy things like we used to. But I want to try to make this place just as livable as possible. This condition may be due to the fact that some of the blocks are overpopulated. There may be more men and there may be more women. However, the next adjustment in housing will relieve that.

Mr. KURATOMI. Can't even wash our faces in the morning. The hot water and the cold water won't operate. It is either too hot or too cold. No basins to accommodate the water.

Mr. BEST. You mean you can't mix the hot and the cold water.

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; that's it.

Mr. BEST. That is purely a matter for local adjustment and I want to improve all such conditions.

Mr. KURATOMI. What about the lots around the barracks?

Mr. BEST. I am very much interested in that. I am getting kind of touchy about that. I don't want all those porches. They look terrible. We will have to have a committee to sit down and make plans. I think we can probably do this whole thing for about \$20,000. We will have to plan it and work it out. We can't just go up to people and say your porch looks terrible, tear them off. When we get a plan that all can agree on then we have to send it to the Washington office for approval by the W. P. B. We have to have approval to buy lumber, approval to buy nails, roofing, and so forth. When we get that we can tell the people this is what we want to do.

Mr. BLACK. In that connection, there are rumors to the effect that we will tear the porches down and not replace them. That is definitely not true.

Mr. KURATOMI. The residents feel that since it was possible for the people in other relocation centers to receive first-class mail delivered to the individual units and since we are using the United States postage stamp that delivery of mail should be to each unit instead of to the block managers. Some of the mail which might be very important is missing. The people would like to get letters delivered to each unit.

Mr. BEST. That is a matter of adjustment later. Lots of cities this size don't have mail delivered to the door. But that is nothing. We will try to work that out as soon as possible. The people will get their mail even if it is still delivered to the block managers. That is what we will have to do next winter—work out details.

Mr. KURATOMI. The food is very poor in this center, especially food given to children. There is not nearly enough of some things such as milk and other essentials. They are not getting enough in quantity. The last 2 or 3 days some mess halls did not give out any milk.

Mr. BEST. That is probably the fault of mess management.

Mr. BLACK. Had a report yesterday that mess hall 16 or 44 failed to have their quota of canned milk delivered for infants and children. Mr. Peck explained that it had been a clerical error and that an allocation of milk would be made from another mess hall.

Mr. KURATOMI. That must have been in two or three blocks.

Mr. BLACK. I just heard about one block.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is a known fact—that there are slightly tuberculosis patients being sent back to the blocks. They should be segregated and sent back home.

Mr. BEST. Any matters pertaining to TB patients are referred to the medical staff.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think that the project director should check into these matters.

Mr. BEST. I understand that there are two buildings—919 and 913 housing TB patients. We know all about that. That is where they take arrested cases. That is what you are talking about, isn't it? 919 and 913?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes; that's it. Now, going back to food again; the food in this center is very poor.

Mr. BEST. When did it get poor? Just since you people came here? There hasn't been any radical change.

Mr. KURATOMI. The food is lots worse than when I got here.

Mr. BEST. The quality or the preparation?

Mr. KURATOMI. The quality.

Mr. BEST. Meats or staples?

Mr. KURATOMI. Especially breakfast. We get hot cakes and things of that nature but have never had eggs. Not once.

Mr. BEST. Eggs are on the menu every day.

Mr. KURATOMI. But we never have them.

Mr. BEST. Seven thousand people have been here 15 or 16 months. Do they find it bad, too?

Mr. KURATOMI. The people that were here have no way of knowing how the other centers were treated. When we compared notes they couldn't believe that other centers were treated so much nicer than this center. Food is the major problem of every individual.

Mr. BEST. I will tell you this so that you can make a big complaint about the food. When the Spanish consul comes again, you holler about the food. He said he has never had any complaints about the food. So when he comes you complain about it to him. Now is your chance.

Mr. KURATOMI. At any rate, the fact that the food is not distributed according to the menu is a foregone conclusion. I wish you would check this matter with Mr. Peck and verify it.

Mr. BEST. Some places I have been, and I have seen it work very satisfactorily, is to appoint a Japanese head steward. Let him handle it. I haven't had time to get into details on some of these things, but I am very much interested in mess management. I can see no reason why we couldn't have a Japanese head steward here to correlate with Mr. Peck. We are bound by very strict rules. We can spend just so much. We can requisition just so much and the quartermaster buys it. It is our fault when we don't distribute it right or when we don't cook it right. I don't like to see food spoil either in the kitchen or in the warehouse. I would like to get into this thing myself. If you have someone in your organization, some good Japanese head steward, that can function as such, he could handle such things.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think all of us agree that the preparation was not adequate to meet the onrushing work of the incoming into this center when segregation took place. We wish to know whose responsibility it was.

Mr. BEST. I would say it was the Congress of the United States. They demanded and ordered segregation. The Tule Lake Center was selected as the place. We had all of these trains coming in and going out, and I don't believe that you or I or anybody else could have done better with what we had. We didn't have time. I didn't get here until the 1st of August. Other centers but Tule Lake had no preparations made and had no plans. Other centers moved out 1 to 3 trains. We moved 14 trains out and received trains from every center. I believe there were 18 or 19 trains in.

Mr. BLACK. Nineteen.

Mr. BEST. I guess we will just have to blame Congress. I don't want to blame you and I don't want to take the blame. I guess the blame rests on Congress.

Mr. KURATOMI. In the event any strike or any other incident should take place within the center and if the residents should fail to solve it and there is any likelihood that it couldn't be mastered, then I imagine that the W. R. A. or administration would take steps to see that some quick solution be made.

Mr. BEST. Well, the W. R. A. is not going to call a strike and the W. R. A. couldn't make a solution when you call a strike when we don't know what is going to prevent it. A strike isn't the way to deal with me. We don't need a strike, and I can't tell you what will happen. If you want to find out what will happen, have a strike and find out. I am not going to call a strike, and I can't tell you there will be a speedy solution when I don't know what it is about. Possibly I don't understand you.

Mr. KURATOMI. I think you do, all right. The residents wish to know if we have been treated according to the Geneva Conference.

Mr. BEST. I imagine so. I don't know anything about that. But Japan didn't even sign the Geneva Conference. We are taking all of our orders from the Washington office, which is in contact with the State Department. The State Department would know all about the Geneva Conference. I am taking my orders from Mr. Myer, who is in daily contact with the State Department, and I would presume, and would say, that they are following the provisions of the Geneva Conference. I will tell you this: You are not prisoners of war, or anything like that, if that is one of the questions. You are not here as prisoners of war.

Mr. KURATOMI. Our status might change later.

Mr. BEST. I couldn't tell about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. In the past—it hasn't occurred here yet—but in other relocation centers when some articles belonging to the W. R. A. disappeared we, the residents of those centers, took the blame without any investigation. That has been done in the past. If such a thing should happen in this center I wish the administration would investigate thoroughly before making any accusations.

Mr. BEST. What articles do you mean?

Mr. KURATOMI. In other centers such things as saws, hammers, and various other things. At Jerome at one time someone stole 38 brand-new double-edged axes. Without making a proper investigation, Mr. Cook, chief of internal security at that center, made accusations that evacuees were to blame for losing such items. I have heard that in other centers similar cases have taken place and evacuees were blamed and the administration made reports to that effect.

Mr. BEST. We don't blame anyone around here without an investigation. I don't like to put those things in the paper anyhow. I can assure you that we will have an investigation.

Mr. KURATOMI. Some of these questions it will be necessary for you to refer to Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. That is right. He will be here on this center next Monday and Tuesday. I would like, as a matter of fact, to have a transcript of this for him to read so he can see how we are proceeding. If it is at all possible I would like to arrange so that we can sit down and talk with him.

Mr. KURATOMI. This is something I haven't clearly stated in the beginning. People going out to the farm realizing that this problem is too big to handle have made resolution to abide by the will of the residents and refrain from working until final words are received from you here or W. R. A. office in Washington. We will wait until then.

Mr. BEST. About what? What we are going to do with the crop?

Mr. KURATOMI. No. These questions.

Mr. BEST. In other words, you are going to tie all of the questions and the answers to the questions into the harvesting of the crop.

Mr. KURATOMI. No; the thing is—

(Reverend Kai talked in Japanese to Mr. Kuratomi.)

Mr. KURATOMI. The residents of this center are not clear as to the need of 3,500 acres of farm. They have had various reports that the crops are being sent to the Army or Navy.

Mr. BEST. No. None of it has been sent to the Army or Navy. Some of the crops have been sent to other relocation centers in the past. We get crops from them that we can't raise and we send them things they can't raise. It is worked on the basis of exchanging of commodities with other centers. Now, with this being a segregation center, it is your unanimous consent that you will not ship to any other center. That is the way I get it. Is that right?

Mr. KURATOMI. Yes.

Mr. BEST. That is your choice. Nothing shipped out and by the same token there will be nothing brought in from other centers. We will have to get all our food through the quartermaster. The only thing I am concerned about is that it takes us 50 days to get our requisitions in. We are going to be short on some vegetables until they can be picked up, as long as we have our own crop out here and won't use it. I am going to sell this crop. There is a food shortage. There is a war on. We are going to salvage this food. I am going to sell it to the Government. We will never see any of the money. I am going to sell the crop to save it. The crop is going to be harvested. We will work out this winter what to farm and what size you want, if any. And I don't want to wait until next spring to do that.

(Kuratomi and Kai in Japanese.)

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sure the people will be satisfied with the statement you have just made.

Mr. BEST. You get a good agricultural committee. I don't want someone who doesn't know agriculture. Get yourselves some farmers. I assume you still want the hog and poultry farm, the pork, the chickens, and the eggs. You are still going to carry that on, aren't you?

Mr. KURATOMI. Never said such a thing.

Mr. BEST. You want that, don't you? You better meet to talk about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. We are still working on that.

Mr. BEST. I want to know. We can raise more hogs and we have quarters for 25,000 chickens.

Mr. ZIMMER. Twenty-one thousand.

Mr. KURATOMI. We will raise that if given assurance that they will be used for center consumption.

Mr. BEST. I will guarantee it. That is what they are for. There is no question about that.

Mr. ZIMMER. We have a quota of what we can slaughter in points on hogs. We can't slaughter more than what a ration book would be per person per week. We are duty bound to slaughter so many pigs according to the population. You are a little better off in here than on the outside because you have 15,000 ration books and on the outside you would have only 10,000 ration books.

Mr. KURATOMI. Are you finished?

Mr. ZIMMER. Yes; that's all.

Mr. KURATOMI. Then, have you any plan whereby center residents would not suffer any financial set-back in the future? From the way I can see it, it appears certain that each and every person who wishes to work cannot find employment. Have you plans made to care for those people?

Mr. BEST. There are instructions to govern all that and people that need clothing grants we have that. There is so much money appropriated to operate this center. We don't know exactly what the census is going to be or how many constitute a family. We haven't even got the school census broken down to exact figures. It takes time to get what the local situation is.

Mr. BLACK. I want to point out that people who haven't a work opportunity should be entitled to public-assistance grants. They would need to qualify by an investigation of need.

Mr. BEST. Yes; that is a detail of operation. There are instructions, there are rules that apply to this center. If they do not fit, they will be adjusted to fit, but we can't do anything until we know what the census will be. It takes a little time to work these things out. There is no ulterior motive along the line to work any hardship on anyone. We want to start making this center just as livable as we possibly can. I intended to see to that. I am here only because you are. You are not here because I am. I am here to carry out the Director's wishes clear up to the top, and I want you to know that I am here to make this just as decent a place as we can possibly make it. I want to ask you, What is your attitude, what is your thinking on internal security?

Mr. KURATOMI. We have been approached by Mr. Tsuda on that. Think we should wait until a representative committee is set up. Then it could be worked out for everybody.

Mr. BEST. We will do just what you want. If you want a good internal security, you can have it. If you want a bad internal security, you can have it. Suit yourselves. If you want law and order, you can have it. You can have trials and sentences and punish those who violate laws. You can have a jail if you want it. We will do what you want. I want you to talk about that.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is about all we have at this time. The minor details can be worked out with the committee.

Mr. BEST. That is fine.

Mr. KURATOMI. I want to mention to you that from time to time you have promised people certain things as they come in to talk with you, and we have talked with Dr. Opler and he feels the same, that to gain the confidence of the residents is the quickest solution to local problems.

Mr. BEST. I want that.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am sure you could get it very easily if you could fulfill your promises. Everybody is looking up to that. Such as the erection of uniform porches.

Mr. BEST. That isn't a promise.

Mr. KURATOMI. You promised.

Mr. BEST. No; I didn't promise. That is my personal desire and I want a committee to sit down with an engineer's drawing and a plan to see how many porches it takes. See what goes into them. That is my desire but not a promise. I will see that it will be given every consideration and see what we can get first; that is a promise.

Mr. KURATOMI. If you are going to build new ones, the old porches could be taken off.

Mr. ZIMMER. That will have to be the responsibility of your committee, to work out a plan. We couldn't just go down there and tear them off. If we did that, then we would be in bad. If we all get together on the detail for the new porches, if we can get a new one, and explain it to the people, then the old ones could be

taken off; but you can't just go to your neighbor and tell him his porch looks like the devil.

Mr. BEST. If we want to get together here and want to get in touch with your committee, can I contact you?

Mr. KURATOMI. You can contact Rev. Kai—503-B—on anything.

Mr. BEST. I have a lot of things to take care of, so you contact Miss Lucas when I am not here and she can tell you when I can meet with you here. I have got to go to San Francisco tomorrow night. I am coming back with the Director. I won't be here for a few days. Any other time get in touch with Miss Lucas.

Mr. KURATOMI. One more thing. It appears to me that the people who come in here as interpreters more or less give you a wrong interpretation from time to time, such as "demand," which we don't like. I want you to know we are just as anxious to work for the benefit of the colonists as you say you are.

Mr. BEST. You will find that I aim to.

Mr. KURATOMI. That is a promise. Don't make it a broken one.

Mr. BEST. There is not one thing we can't do if we sit in here and talk it over.

Mr. KURATOMI. I am going to see that you carry that out.

Mr. BEST. Getting back to internal security. I am very much interested in that. I wish you would do some thinking on that.

Mr. KURATOMI. We have a plan but we have to submit it to the people.

Mr. BEST. Internal security can be as good as the people want it. I want you to think that through. It is just what you make it. If you want lots of law and order you will get it. If you don't, well, that is your business; not mine.

Mr. KURATOMI. That covers everything. We will send in a committee as soon as we get it worked out.

Mr. BEST. I will be right here. There is no reason why we can't come to an understanding. We can lay our problems right here on the table. I am here to help you. I am not here for any other purpose. I want to spend 90 percent of my time with you and your committee. That is what I am here for. If you make it possible for me to do it, we can get together and solve our problems. There is no reason why we should get off on the wrong foot. I don't think there is a problem that we can't solve if we get together. We can work these things out just as they come up. I don't like to let things magnify and get worse. We can get right down to the bottom of these things. Come up again.

Mr. ENGLE. I think it is very revealing, because it tends to support the proposition that the Japanese were stirring up riots and trouble in the camp on trivial and unreasonable grounds. For instance, that whole record relates to an argument with Mr. Best over whether or not he should have sent condolences of the widow of the Japanese who was killed in the automobile accident some time around October 15 or 16, I think, and whether or not he should have permitted a mass funeral to be held at an open air place there which they used for mass meetings.

The Japanese, incidentally, also in that record, were continually asking about their status, that is, whether or not they were considered prisoners of war, and just what their status was under international law. Apparently they wanted a definition of that.

In the record also the committee, at least, stated for themselves that they did not consider themselves Americans, but they considered themselves loyal Japanese, or words to that effect.

Continuing the statement of Mr. Best:

When the committee of 17 from this group met with Mr. Best on October 26 they admitted this by requesting that those who wanted to return to Japan be separated in the camp from those simply expressing disloyalty to the United States. About 7,000 of the population were already in the center, including many children who stayed because their parents did. Likewise, some of those from other centers came to Tule Lake to follow the head of the family. However, it is safe to assume that a large number of the center do want to live the Japanese way.

This troublesome group worked two ways: First, to force even by strong-arm methods when necessary a large number of indifferent Japanese to participate in their demonstrations, such as the public funeral for a truck-accident victim—

Now, I pause there to mention what is in this report. The report indicates that when the Japanese spokesman was quarreling with Mr. Best over whether or not he should have permitted a public funeral, Mr. Best called this Japanese's attention to the fact that he knew of his own knowledge that some of this group were herding those people around. Some people would say, "I am going to the store." "No; you are not. You are going to the funeral," herding them around, indicating that there was some coercion and force being exercised by these groups within the center who were causing these disturbances.

Second, to impress the administration through large demonstrations and their representation of many different groups and work crews—farm, coal, food, hospital—that they were really the leaders of the Japanese colony and the men to deal with. While this meeting was supposed to be on the farm work stoppage it embraced many other situations, such as hospital, food, and administration.

There is some interesting testimony in the record, and I am referring to the record of October 26 regarding the farm situation.

The Japanese objected to the manner in which the farm—in which the situation there—was handled, on the ground that they were not notified that they were going to be fired when they did not come to work; they just simply struck and quit, and the administration did what they called "terminate them off." They took them off the pay roll, and they contended that they were entitled to notice that they would be terminated if they did not go back to work, and that was the basis of a good deal of their discussion and a good deal of their argument.

They contended it involved the Japanese psychology in some way—the manner of "saving face."

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact was, was it not, Mr. Engle, that some of the Japs went to Mr. Best and insisted that they were not going to work and that they were not going to harvest any of the farm products there whatsoever, that they did not want to produce any farm products on that particular center ground, and that they were wanting to be supplied by the Army quartermaster for their food, and things of that kind; is that correct?

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct, but they just quit.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Mr. Best made an announcement to the effect that they were no longer going to be employed, that all hiring of farm workers in the center had terminated, and when he made that announcement through the local paper, whatever they had there, that was the thing about which they complained, that he had no right to make any such announcement, although he made it as the result of a conference he had had the day before and at which these spokesmen had definitely agreed that they would not farm the products there at all.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct. That is what the transcript indicates.

But here is another thing in the transcript that I want to call your attention to. Mr. Cahn, I believe, who was the assistant director, makes the statement on the record there that this was not actually a strike at the farm. He said that if it had actually been a strike, that they would have continued to keep the Japanese on the pay roll and pay them, until, by proper negotiations, they had straightened the matter out. But he differentiated from that by saying that it was not a strike; that the Japs just quit, and therefore they terminated them immediately, but if it had been a regular bona fide strike they

would have continued them on the payroll and negotiated with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently the Japanese wanted Best to retract the statement he had made, because evidently he left the leaders in a bad situation in relation to the workers in the camp; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. That is the situation; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The farm workers did not actually want to quit and get off the pay roll; they wanted to be paid.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. I was somewhat amazed by the statement of Mr. Cahn that if it had been actually a bona fide strike, according to their construction, the Japanese would have been left on the pay roll and the matter negotiated.

Now, to continue reading from Mr. Best's statement:

George Kuratomi and S. Kai, who professes to be a Buddhist priest, and who obviously is a Shintoist, both from the Jerome relocation center, have been the self-appointed spokesmen for the Japanese residents and are ring-leaders of the group of power seekers. They have appeared several times on negotiating committees regardless of whether the questions involved the farm, coal crew, hospital, or mess halls.

The first incident causing disruption of normal community functions was the slow-down and finally the stoppage on October 9 of work by coal crews unloading cars at the siding. Other evacuees were not permitted by the power-seeking group to replace idle coal workers—4 or 5 days of negotiations ended with the terminated workers returning to work, on October 13, and agreeing to work a full 8 hours. This was claimed by the trouble-making leaders to be a victory over the administration. Demands for luxuries such as pool tables for the fire stations and for shorter working hours were made, and always they demanded immediate action "or else."

They next achieved a slow-down at the motor pool, but no stoppage. This was in line with their announced plan to make Tule Lake a 4-hour center with a 4-hour workday.

At that point I might pause to say that the Japanese, if you are familiar and you perhaps are, are paid from \$12 to \$19 a month, depending upon their situation, and they are supposed to work 8 hours a day.

The testimony was that a good many times they worked 2 hours a day and collected pay for 8, and Mr. Best's statement regarding the 4-hour day apparently was an effort to reduce the 8-hour day to half, which would be 4 hours.

Continuing now from the statement:

On October 15, two large stake trucks hauling workers to the farm started racing, and one upset. Twenty-nine workers were injured, twelve seriously enough to be hospitalized, and one died. No farm workers reported the next day or thereafter. A center-wide funeral demonstration for the one man was held October 23, although Mr. Best, after learning that it was not desired by the widow, had disapproved of the plan.

A fire truck traveling too fast overturned en route to a fire October 13 and 9 men were injured, 3 seriously. This accident also was blamed on the administration.

A 2-year-old child was scalded in its home, and although it received prompt attention at the hospital, it died during the following night, and this was attributed by Kuratomi's committee to the negligence of the War Relocation Authority doctors.

This group has tried to get Mr. Best to give them control of various project functions for the past several weeks, including the motor pool, block managers, the farm and the hospital by suggesting that they would be run more efficiently under a central governing committee of Japanese. War Relocation Authority personnel were frequently threatened and intimidated and told that the way to be successful in their jobs was to let the Japanese run things. The attitude in general was that the Japanese were going to take over the camp and the leaders proposed a central governing body to advise the administration how to run the project.

Now, that covers, in its major aspects, the testimony of Mr. Cozzens and Mr. Best, except that Mr. Cozzens stated that he had selected the site for the Tule Lake camp. He did not indicate who was responsible for picking it out as the camp to be used for disloyal Japanese.

He said also, in his testimony, that the statement attributing rumors regarding the disturbances at Tule Lake were planted by subversive elements with Mr. Joye in the San Francisco office.

Mr. Best's testimony was along the line of the statement, except he said that around August 1 they had a petition from the white personnel at the camp to establish a man-tight fence between the administration area and the Japanese colony. Referring to the map drawn by the doctor, they wanted a fence to run between the administration area as shown by him, and the Japanese colony there in the vicinity of the wide firebreak between the two. The white personnel wanted that man-tight fence in there; or, according to some of the testimony, the original plans called for a man-tight fence which would set off this colony which was then to be occupied exclusively by disloyal Japanese, or their immediate families, from the rest of the relocation center.

Those demands were not complied with, although I understand at the present time the fence is in process of being built.

He stated that the Army was in control at that time, which was November 7, but that his staff still carries out the utility services. He stated that he knew about the knives being stolen and manufactured in the camp; that he knew about the knives being taken by the Japanese, but that he did not know about the knives being made at the garage until after the incident.

The man who operated the garage testified that the Japanese would make knives out of the truck springs which were broken, and other pieces of metal they could get their hands on, and that he tried to stop them at first, and reported the occurrences to the director of internal security, but he did not get anywhere with it, and finally he just gave up. And he estimated that one old fellow there manufactured 1,000 knives in the 8 months he was at the camp.

He stated that the W. R. A. did not change its policy after segregation; that there was no change in the employment policy and no change in the internal security policy; that the only thing they did after they put that in as camp for disloyal Japs was to build a man-tight fence around the outside of it, which makes it different in that respect than some of the other camps.

He thinks that a good many of these Japs are absolutely loyal to Japan; that they wanted to make all the trouble that they could, and that they could not possibly continue running the camp in the same way they were now running it; they would have to have an entire re-vamping of the entire internal security program.

He said that there had been no change in the policy of handling the entire protection in the camp after the segregation occurred, and that Mr. Rhoads had told him that there was no way to handle the matter effectively under the existing arrangement.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you familiar with the arrangement of handling fire equipment, and so on, at the center?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; from the testimony of Mr. Rhoads, the fire chief. Mr. Rhoads gave a very complete picture of that.

Mr. Rhoads was formerly battalion chief of the Los Angeles Fire Department, and he was retired in 1928, and he lived at Grant's Pass,

Oreg., and apparently took this job on just as a contribution to the war effort. And he quit, and resigned, during the height of these disturbances, because he contended he could not get adequate fire protection with the situation as he had it. He complained bitterly to Mr. Myer about it, and has tendered his resignation to Mr. Myer as a result of their discussions on that subject.

Now, he stated that he had no definite instructions regarding the operation of the fire department except that he was to build up a fire department operated by the Japanese, and that he was to make suggestions, and to teach. They had 3 fire stations of 8 men each, and then they used a Jap fire-fighting group in each of the 64 blocks. He stated that they got along fairly well until registration. Registration is when they asked question 28, which caused all the difficulty, and at that time they had a good deal of fighting and trouble among the Japanese themselves.

Finally they withdrew question 28 and supplemented it by question 28-A, which asked about loyalty to the United States rather than being as specific and direct as question 28.

He was instructed to get along with the Japanese, and if he could not get along with them, he had failed. He appointed leaders, three leaders for each of the stations, and he had nine men in all, and then he had a Japanese fire chief to whom he gave his instructions, and his instructions were transmitted to the fire department, down through the Japanese chief; that is, he had no authority to direct any Japanese in the fire department. His program was to transmit his instructions through the Japanese fire chief.

Now, after segregation occurred, he lost most of his crew because the Japanese in the fire department were recruited from what they considered the best and the most loyal of the Japanese; therefore he lost most of his crew because they were the fellows who did not claim any loyalty to Japan. So he had to take on a crew of Japanese who were almost completely disloyal.

He asked to hold his engineer, who was a Japanese, in order to get his new department under the new set-up worked out, and this fellow practically told him that there were not any of them that he could trust in the new arrangement.

And just as soon as he got these disloyal Japs in the fire department, the thing became impossible. They demanded every sort of convenience; they wanted new blankets and mattresses, for instance. These disloyal Japs refused to sleep on the same mattresses or to use the same blankets which were used by the loyal Japanese.

And they made demands for that, and finally they got it.

Mr. COSTELLO. How efficient was the fire department, itself, in preventing fires?

Mr. ENGLE. The fire department just did not function. He said a fire would occur and the trucks would go in the opposite direction. They had a fire down in the military area one day, and the truck, as it was coming out of the front gate, was headed down toward the farm, which was some 4 miles away. And he stopped them and asked them where they were going, and they said they were going to the fire. They thought it was back at the farm when, as a matter of fact, it was back at the military area.

For instance, they demanded pool tables. That is referred to in Mr. Best's statement, if you remember. He said they demanded pool

tables and they came to Mr. Rhoads and told him he would either have to requisition pool tables or they would get the fire chief, who would requisition them.

Now, they had a great many false fire alarms start after they got these disloyal Japanese into the fire department. They caught one of the fire captains turning in a false alarm, and he admitted that he had turned in five other false alarms. He was given 90 days in jail, but he got out in 30 days.

Their fire-alarm system is an independent telephone system set up in the camp, and apparently if they take the phones off the hooks enough times, they run down the batteries. And that is what the Japanese would do. They would take the phones off the hooks and run the batteries down, and completely wreck the fire-alarm system.

Mr. Rhoads testified he would come in there and find 15 of those bells all ringing at once. And they cut out 120 yards of wire in the fire-alarm system. It is difficult to understand why they would sabotage the fire system when it might protect themselves or their own belongings, but they did.

They put kinks in the cable, and one thing or another. They had the men out there continuously, trying to keep that fire-alarm system in operation.

The fire hydrants were buried under the ground about 2 feet. Because of the cold up there, they had to get them down in the ground far enough so that they would not freeze. They had standpipes leading down in so that they could go down in and hook on to the main.

The Japanese filled these standpipes up with sand and sometimes sand and glass; so he had to keep continuous inspection of these hydrants and keep the sand scooped out of them, because if fire occurred, he could not use the hydrants.

The Japs were very prone to knock down the fire hydrants with the equipment. They apparently could not drive very well, or did not try to, and he had a high casualty rate on his hydrants with the Japanese driving the equipment.

He fired one crew, terminated the crew, as they call it, and he got another crew, and wished then that he had the original crew back.

One of those changes occurred immediately before this fire truck turned over. They fired one fellow for reckless driving and put on another one, and he turned the truck over, a big \$3,000 fire truck, over two or three times, in taking it around the corner. The fire extinguishers were always empty. The Pyrene fire extinguishers were gone, a good many of them. The Japanese had keys to his warehouses. He would lose his fire buckets out of the warehouses. Just a week before he testified, he had lost a number of buckets out of the warehouses, or out of the fire warehouses.

The Japanese would throw the fire couplings and the fire nozzles off the trucks and dent them so that they were unusable, and he had great difficulty with his fire hose which has to be handled very carefully, because the Japanese would throw it on the ground and run the trucks over it and wreck it. And a fire hose is a very hard thing to get hold of now.

For instance, as to one of the demands, they demanded gloves to fight the fires with. Well, he could not get gloves, the kind they

wanted. He did get some rubber gloves and those all disappeared, and then the next time he got cotton or canvas gloves, and they were not very well satisfied with them.

They demanded midnight meals. Now, the fire department there is operated a good deal like the fire department in a small community. They have their regular crew at the fire station, they have their clothes right there, and they go to bed and when the bell rings, they jump up and into their fighting togs, and away they go.

But these fellows wanted midnight meals. And so the conditions finally became so chaotic that he just simply gave up and tendered his resignation. He stated that he had had no instructions, or no arrangements had been made for any change in policy with reference to the fire protection for that entire camp, pending, during, or after the time that the camp was set aside and designated and used as a camp for disloyal Japanese; in other words, the protection of all of that Government property was put in the hands of these Japanese who had affirmed their loyalty to the Emperor of Japan.

Now, the same thing might be said with reference to the police department. The police department consisted of six white men, including the national director of internal security, a man by the name of Mr. Schmidt. The policemen were unarmed. They did not even carry a club. The entire internal-security program of the center was in the hands of the Japanese.

They did not have an adequate police force, apparently, even to police the administrative area, or that area occupied by the white personnel.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know approximately how many Japanese were employed as police officers?

Mr. ENGLE. I did not get the number, and I do not know as it was developed in the testimony. There were only 6 white men, however, in the entire camp for all of the white personnel and the 15,000 Japanese who were there.

Mr. COSTELLO. The internal-security system evidently had not been a successful means of preventing disorder in the center.

Mr. ENGLE. How is that?

Mr. COSTELLO. The method of employing Japanese as police officers has indicated that that was not a definite means of providing security within the center.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it has not. As an illustration, when the internal-security officer, Boerbeek, was beaten up on the night of November 4, one of the fellows he recognized as being in the midst of all of this turmoil that was going on there, and one of the chief leaders of it was one of the fellows on the police force, one of the captains of the police force.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you visit the center after the Army came in on November 4?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the condition in the center at that time?

Mr. ENGLE. It was very good order in the center, so far as any disturbance was concerned. The Japanese were still making representations to the camp administration; in fact, even after the California State Senate hearings terminated, the Japanese were sending com-

mittees to the administration and were holding conferences at that time, objecting to discrimination, as they called it, between some of the members of the center and others.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have the names of the members of the State senate committee that held that hearing?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. The names are Senator Donnelly, Tulare County; Senator Dorsey, Kern County; Senator Quinn, of Humboldt County; and Senator Slater.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Was not Mr. Hatfield on the committee?

Mr. ENGLE. Mr. Hatfield was on the committee, but he was not at the hearings.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Slater?

Mr. ENGLE. Senator Slater was at all the hearings; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Senator Tenney a member of that committee?

Mr. ENGLE. Senator Tenney was not a member of that committee.

There was a good deal of testimony brought up regarding the actual operation of the camp, that is, with reference to whether or not it was efficient. There was testimony given there that there was no adequate control over property.

For instance, the chief warehouse man resigned because he would not go under bond. He resigned rather than go under bond to take care of the property. His five predecessors had never had an inventory, and none of his predecessors had ever checked out from their assignments.

The Japanese had keys to all of the warehouses, and were continually pillaging and committing thefts in the warehouses, to the extent that Mr. Weis, Charles J. Weis, finally just handed in his resignation on October 31, when he had the alternative between resigning and putting up a bond to protect the Government property.

I also have a letter bearing upon that same subject, that is, with reference to the property control, which I would like to submit to the committee, which comes from a previous property control officer, who heard of this investigation and wrote me this letter. His name is Henry E. Deni. Would you be interested in having it read or having it made a part of the record?

Mr. COSTELLO. It might be incorporated as a part of the record. You might refer to pertinent parts of it.

Mr. ENGLE. He states that he was supply supervisor with the War-time Civil Control Administration at Marysville, Calif., and then later went to the W. R. A. and after he got to the W. R. A. he found the property management there in a chaotic condition.

He found all types of property scattered about the warehouses, with absolutely no inventory or any check on them. He tried to clean up that situation, and he had to work, of course, with Japanese internees, as his employees.

He says:

I checked through the warehouses and found thousands of dollars of hardware and carpenter implements scattered around under empty boxes and trash. There was no way possible to check this property.

I then went to the project director and suggested that he permit me to try to get this property in some semblance of order so that it might be inventoried. He gave me permission to do this, and with the aid of a few Japanese internees I set out to do it.

He says further:

I was making very good headway on this when the various vendors from Klamath Falls who had sold considerable property, came to the project, started refusing to give the project any more supplies unless they were paid for the ones they had already delivered. I was then called into the project director's office and asked if I knew anything about the proper method of making receiving reports and checking of property and supplies so that the vendors could be paid.

I told him I did, so I was told I was being promoted to property control officer, and to take over the property accountant's office, and see what I could do about getting some of these vendors paid.

Upon taking over this office, I found accounts where there was almost \$100,000 owed and no record of receipt or distribution of the property purchased.

And he goes on to state that he tried to clear up the situation and in going about, from one officer to the other, trying to get the thing cleared up and getting these various heads of departments to acknowledge or deny the receipt of this property, which the W. R. A. was being billed for, and on which they had no records, he made so many enemies and stepped on so many toes that he finally resigned and got out.

I will file the letter for the record, if you wish to have it.

Mr. COSTELLO. We would appreciate very much having it.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

TRACY, CALIF., November 18, 1943.

SIR: Having followed your investigation of the Tule Lake War Relocation Authority project at Newell, Calif., in the daily papers, I felt it my duty to write you and tell you what I know of conditions at the project.

Last year I was a supply supervisor with the Wartime Civil Control Administration at Marysville, Calif. Upon the closing of the Marysville Assembly Center and the transferring of the internees to Tule Lake, I was transferred to the San Francisco office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, where I was made field representative of the Supply Division. My duties consisted of visiting the various Wartime Civil Control Administration assembly centers, for the purpose of assisting the supply supervisors of the various centers in bringing their property records to date in order that they could be properly audited upon the closing of the centers.

Upon the closing of the centers, much of the property was transferred to various War Relocation Authority projects. In the transfer of this property I worked with the supply supervisors and with Colonel Knudsen of the Quartermaster Corps. It was at this time that I had my first experiences with the War Relocation Authority.

After property had been shipped to the War Relocation Authority it became next to impossible to get signed documents from the War Relocation Authority to show receipt of the property. However, as I was only responsible for the property shipped from the Marysville Assembly Center, I was interested only in signed documents for this property. After writing several letters to the project director at Tule Lake, I finally received the necessary documents. I naturally thought at that time that the property had been properly checked and counted before signing of the documents. However, I learned later, to my sorrow, that it hadn't.

Upon the closing of the various Wartime Civil Control Administration centers, all personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Administration was released, then I applied for employment with the War Relocation Authority and was appointed storekeeper at Tule Lake. The conditions I found upon my arrival at Tule Lake would take hours to explain.

My direct supervisor, who had charge of warehousing property not in use, and of receiving all property being received on the project, had absolutely no knowledge of this type of work. He had an organization built up of Japanese internees who were running his division for him. They were interested only in getting the property and supplies into the camp without caring where it came from or how it got there. Insofar as making proper documents showing receipt and distribution of this property was concerned, this was done with about 10 percent of the property and supplies received.

There was absolutely no inventory record maintained of the property received, no record of distribution of property, no records of how, when, or where the property or supplies were used, or any record of unused property. No one had any record or knowledge of property on hand. I checked through the warehouses and found that thousands of dollars of hardwares and carpenters' implements were scattered around under empty boxes and trash. There was no way possible to check this property.

I then went to the project director and suggested that he permit me to try to get this property into some semblance of order so that it might be inventoried. He gave me permission to do this and with the aid of a few Japanese internees I set out to do it.

I was making very good headway on this when the various vendors from Klamath Falls, who had sold considerable property to the project, started refusing to give the project any more supplies unless they were paid for the ones they had already delivered. I was then called into the project director's office, and asked if I knew anything about the proper method of making receiving reports and checking of property and supplies so that the vendors could be paid. I told him I did, so I was told I was being promoted to property control officer and to take over the property accountant's office and see what I could do about getting some of these vendors paid.

Upon taking over this office I found accounts where there was almost \$100,000 owed and no record of receipt or distribution of the property purchased.

One of these accounts was with the Home Lumber Co., of Klamath Falls. Another was with Sears, Roebuck, of Klamath Falls. Another was with Montgomery Ward Co., of Klamath Falls. I immediately contacted the managers of these firms and together we tried to clean up these accounts. The first account I worked on was the Home Lumber Co. account. Mr. Glenn Hout, president of the firm, worked on the account with me. We finally got this account cleaned up, but in doing so I found that thousands of dollars' worth of property had been purchased without any purchase order having been issued, or receiving report showing receipt of this property having been made.

In order to get the proper documents signed so that Mr. Hout could be paid, it became necessary for me to go direct to the project director, much to the annoyance of the various division superintendents who had received this property and failed to make the proper documents showing receipt.

Because of the various toes I trod on in cleaning up this account, I found I would receive very little cooperation from the various division heads in cleaning up other accounts, so I submitted my resignation and left Tule Lake.

The foregoing is just a part of what I found at Tule Lake. However, if I can be of any assistance to you in your investigation of conditions on that project, I will be glad to cooperate with you in any way. If you care to contact Mr. Glenn Hout, of the Home Lumber Co., and wish to use my name with reference to the account I previously mentioned, you have my permission to do so.

Respectfully yours,

HENRY E. DENI, *Tracy, Calif.*

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Certainly.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you could straighten me out on this, Mr. Engle.

How long did this riot at Tule Lake last, from the time it started until the time that the Army was called in?

Mr. ENGLE. You mean the one Thursday night?

Mr. MUNDT. The one that started with the beating up of Dr. Pedicord and continued, as I understand it, until the Army was called in.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, they had a riot on Thursday, according to the testimony, and then when that riot subsided, there was no further activity in the camp; just a tense situation until Thursday night and then Thursday night—

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean Monday.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; Monday, November 1 was the first occurrence, and then the situation was tense Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday; and then Thursday night these Japanese, a gang of them, started

out of the motor pool armed with clubs of various sorts and they surrounded the house of Mr. Best, calling out that they wanted to get Best, and he called in the Army at that point.

Mr. MUNDT. That was, then, from Monday until Thursday.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. But there was no overt act between Monday and Thursday.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, if I understood Dr. Mason yesterday, Mr. Dillon Myer, the Director of W. R. A. was at this camp when the riot broke out on Monday.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. He arrived the day that the first disturbance occurred.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he stay there until the Army was called in?

Mr. ENGLE. No. He stayed Tuesday and he left on Wednesday.

Mr. MUNDT. He left during this tense situation?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. That seems rather strange to me, because I remember distinctly that Dillon Myer was very critical of one of the witnesses at our hearings, which were held this spring, a Mr. Townsend, I believe, because he had left another camp where a riot was threatening, during a tense situation, and it is a little bit amazing to me that Mr. Myer would leave the camp under a similar condition.

Are you sure he did leave before this Thursday?

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, yes; that is the testimony, and the testimony of Mr. Myer. And Mr. Best was asked about that and Mr. Best stated that Mr. Myer had an itinerary to keep and that he arrived at the Tule Lake camp on schedule and that he left the Tule Lake camp on schedule.

Mr. COSTELLO. He arrived Monday morning and left on Tuesday evening, you say?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not know whether he left Tuesday evening or Wednesday morning, but he was there Monday and Tuesday; those are the 2 days.

Mr. MUNDT. He left the camp on schedule, but he did not leave it in good condition.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that may be true.

Now, in regard to that, after this riot occurred on Monday, there were several meetings. One meeting was held immediately that evening with the internal security officers, in which the internal security officers talked about how they should handle the situation. And they were instructed to go in pairs, not singly, and to confine their patrolling to the administration area.

Then, on Tuesday, the white personnel at the camp held a meeting in which they were protesting, because proper security measures were not being taken, according to their viewpoint, for the protection of the white people in the camp.

Mr. Myer and Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens were all at that meeting and the discussion, according to the testimony, grew quite heated. The camp white personnel wanted to know what was being done.

Mr. Myer said that steps were being taken for their protection, but that he could not tell them what those steps were. And they asked him specifically whether or not that included that man-tight fence between the Jap colony and the administration area, to which I previously referred and for which they had petitioned since August.

And he said that he was not in a position to tell them that either, and his testimony is that he told them if they could not take it, they could get out.

Now, several witnesses testified to that.

Mr. MUNDT. "They could get out," you say?

Mr. ENGLE. In other words, he said the situation looked all right to him, and if they could not take it, they could get out.

And the statement was also attributed to him, although there is some dispute about it, that he told Borbeck if he had kept his hands in his pockets, he would not have been hurt as much as he was, or as bad.

Mr. COSTELLO. That statement was made by Mr. Best to Dr. Pedicord.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, the testimony that I heard was that it was made by Myer. They got to twisting the thing around. Some said that Dr. Pedicord said that if he had kept his hands in his pockets, he would not have been hurt. So there is a little confusion about that statement.

At any rate, the white people there were complaining. Now, Borbeck, the police officer who was beaten up, resigned after Monday. He turned in his resignation. First, he turned in his resignation with the understanding that it could be held up until they could get somebody to take his place.

In the meantime, he moved his family out. He did not want his family out there and he agreed just to stay on Thursday night to show Mr. Paine, who was the new officer brought in, and who arrived Sunday before the riot, which would be the last of October, at Klamath Falls, to assist him around and show him his duties.

So Mr. Borbeck, on Thursday night, was just helping out there, and he is the one that tangled up with the Japanese groups finally and was beaten up.

Now, there is some dispute about that. Mr. Borbeck testified that the Japanese threatened to kill him so he started swinging, and they were guarding him with clubs, and the last thing he remembers he was fighting, and when he came to, he had a big laceration on the back of his head, and he had numerous cuts and bruises, and abrasions, and he felt like he had been beaten all over.

The press release issued by the W. R. A. states that the police officer stubbed his toe and fell down and hit his head on a rock, and he was probably beaten by the Japs after that.

Mr. MUNDT. One other question I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman.

You may not have any convictions to express on this question, and if so, you do not have to answer it, but you are the only Member here today who has been at Tule Lake since this riot who has personally talked to those members of the white personnel, so I am sure the committee would very much like to have your expression on the following matter:

As you know, at the earlier hearings of this committee, both in California and here, several witnesses suggested that these relocation camps, especially where they have the disloyal Japs, could better be handled by the War Department than they could by W. R. A. And the American Legion at its national convention suggested turning the duties of W. R. A. over to the War Department.

Now, I wonder if you have any statement that you would care to make in an advisory capacity to the committee on the basis of your examination of the situation at Tule Lake as to the competency and ability of Dillon Myer and the W. R. A. to handle the Japanese situation under their control.

Mr. ENGLE. In my judgment, they cannot do it; and I recommend that the Tule Lake camp should be put under military control.

And not only that, that just does not happen to be only my opinion but it is the opinion of the W. R. A. people at Tule Lake themselves.

Now, some of them got on the witness stand and testified to that.

Mr. MUNDT. Some of the white people?

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, yes. Mr. Gerry, who is still working there and who represented the white people at the meeting held on Tuesday, in which they protested the security measures taken, chief procurement officer, and, as I say, he is still on duty there, made this statement, that it was the opinion of the white personnel there that the Japs were getting steadily out of control; that it was the policy of the administration to make one concession after another; that he thought his wife was unsafe; and that he had gotten her out of there and that he would not stay there 3 minutes if the Army left the Tule Lake relocation center.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there any dispute about that testimony of Mr. Gerry or was that accepted as a fact?

Mr. ENGLE. Regarding what?

Mr. MUNDT. I thought you said there was some dispute about some of the other statements.

Mr. ENGLE. No; nobody disputed that. He said if the Army does not continue, he wants a sufficient internal security force, and he would want them backed by the Army.

Now, he is just one witness who testified to that. There were others, but that is one of the high-ranking officers in the camp, and the man, as I say, who was made spokesman for the white personnel at this meeting with the national Director in which they demanded further security measures.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you very much.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ENGLE. I think, in addition to that, since you asked the question, that there is a matter seriously involving the efficiency of the W. R. A. administration.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like brief further elaboration on that.

Mr. ENGLE. I am talking about fiscal matters and property-control matters, and those other things, independent of the matter of internal security.

Mr. MUNDT. You appreciate this committee is concerned, primarily, with internal security, but the Members of Congress, you and me, and all of us, are interested in the fiscal operations and the other aspects also.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. I appreciate that; I just mention that in addition there are these other questions.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that complete your statement, Mr. Engle?

Mr. MUNDT. I did not want to shut you off. If you have some testimony that you want to put in about the general inefficiency, I think

it would be illuminating to the Congress, as a whole, which, after all, has to vote the money for these matters.

Mr. ENGLE. Of course this committee, as I understand it, is involved in subversive activities. I assume if somebody was sabotaging the war effort in some way, that would be subversive; is that not right?

Mr. MUNDT. That is right. It is almost becoming subversive if a man throws away public funds needlessly; because, after all, that is important in this war.

Mr. ENGLE. I might mention the testimony of a man named Noble C. Wilkinson. He is a farmer in the Tule Lake area and appeared to be a substantial man and highly regarded by his neighbors.

Now, he testified regarding the slaughter house and the butchering operations at the camp. He was in charge of the slaughter house.

They had a hog farm there and they wanted to do their own slaughtering so they got Wilkinson to do it. And he ran it somewhat the same as the other agencies were run; that is, he told the Japs what to do or told the head Jap what to do, and they were supposed to carry out his instructions.

But he testified that he had continual troubles. They were striking or slowing up. He could not satisfy them. They always wanted new clothing. They would look at magazines, for instance, and they would want to be dressed like the butchers in the papers, with frock coat and pouches.

Then they got away with the knives. They all wanted knives with which to cut meat. He said he never heard of such a thing. He finally got them appeased but he never did give them the knives.

They demanded Federal or State inspection of the meat, and when they could not get it, they decided to inspect their own meat. And they would throw away a great amount of perfectly good pork, because it might have been bruised, or something like that. They created a hog graveyard, and the Japs even put tombstones up on this hog graveyard, and when they would get it filled, it would be more or less of a trench—they would cover it over with a bulldozer.

And he said over 100 hogs, to his knowledge, were in the first hog graveyard, and that there were 6 other hog graveyards just like it.

One of his Japs, he thought was loyal, told him he ought to take notes. So he took notes of all of this and reported it to the camp director, or the camp leadership, but it did not get anywhere.

He told Zimmer about it and Zimmer told him that it was his own fault if he could not work with them. He said that he had to butcher; if he was called upon to butcher 50 hogs, he would have to butcher 100 because they would always steal about enough to keep that much ahead of him.

He said sometimes he would have 15 hogs butchered and there would not be a sparerib in the lot.

At one time the Japs stole 500 pounds of bacon out of the plant and they stole knives, until he could not hang on to the knives, so he got some kind of an outfit to print the W. R. A. name on the blade of the knife, that is, to put it right into the steel, and that did not stop it.

He said they must have stolen a thousand knives in the 9 months he was there. He turned the report of it over to Mr. Jacoby, who was the head of internal security, and he did not get anywhere with

it, and finally he just kept getting so far behind, he could not make the Japs work; they would strike.

One time they got out of humor with him and stole his automobile, and he had to walk clear to camp and get hold of some of the camp directors to get the directors to talk the Japanese into giving him his car back, which they did.

They would have a strike. They would get some hogs killed and quit, and the strike would be on, and there would be the pork lying up there, ready to be butchered, and the strike was on.

Sometimes they would get rough about it. One time they called one of his white men a "white so-and-so," and they said they would like to cut him off right under the chin.

Finally, it got so bad he just quit, and at the present time, the last reports he had on it, they were not doing any more slaughtering out there. And they had great amounts of pork. Many of their hogs were overweight and should have been butchered a long time ago, but they were not doing anything with them, because they just simply had to close down the slaughterhouse. They built the slaughterhouse at an expense of about \$5,000, and had to quit running it.

Mr. MUNDT. Is Tule Lake in your district?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; and so is Manzanar. I have them both.

Mr. MUNDT. Is that in a district in California where there are killing frosts up there in the fall?

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. The reason I ask that, I have here the official transcript furnished the committee by W. R. A. itself, which quotes Mr. Myer as follows, in discussing the farm question. He said:

I want to say this about the farm question. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Best on this problem. He had crops to be harvested * * * we took the chance of having the crops frozen.

I was wondering what he meant; frozen by cold weather or ruined by one of these directives?

Mr. ENGLE. No; he meant frozen by cold weather.

Mr. PHILLIPS. How is that?

Mr. ENGLE. I said, it was frozen by cold weather and not the directives.

Mr. MUNDT. It was a pretty bad loss to the consumer, either way.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, they have very cold weather up there, and they have to get those vegetables and what not out of the ground. They had a big farming operation which they put in, notwithstanding apparently that they knew this camp was going to be used as a camp to segregate disloyal Japanese.

Well, as soon as the disloyal Japanese got to the camp, they refused to harvest the crop. They said that they were not going to harvest any crop or eat any crop which was planted or cultivated by loyal Japanese.

In addition to that, they were not going to harvest any vegetables which could be used elsewhere for loyal Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Were not these crops for the use of the Japanese in this camp, so that they would be eating their own food?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. Here is the way that worked out: They ran the camp farm and they charged the cost of farm operation against the

product, and then ran all that stuff through the warehouse and through the regular mess stewards to the various mess halls.

Mr. COSTELLO. They also exchanged service between the various centers.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. Some centers would raise some beets, maybe, and they would trade that sort of vegetable, or pork, or chickens raised at the Tule Lake farm. They had a hog farm, and a chicken farm, and this vegetable farm.

Now, they got 250 loyal Japs in there to harvest that after the disloyal Japanese struck, but they still had 580 acres which was not dug, and it was going right along then, where Kallam testified it ought to be out of the ground, because it would be ruined.

They had a heavy frost when I was there. The cars would have great layers of ice on the windshields.

He said there were 500 acres of grain not harvested, 400 tons of carrots, seven or eight hundred tons of cabbage, 80 to 100 tons of rutabagas. They refused to harvest the rutabagas because they said they did not like them; 10 cars of spinach; 10 cars of Napea, they called it. That is apparently a vegetable that is grown, which the Japs themselves like.

Then there were 15 cars of lettuce and a great many others that I did not itemize in my notes, and which will appear in the transcript of Mr. Kallam's testimony when it comes back here and is presented to the committee.

Whether or not these 250 loyal Japs brought from elsewhere were able to salvage all of that or not, I do not know. He said two-thirds of the crop was in the ground at that time, and they were having heavy frost.

The Japs beat Mr. Kallam up about October 16 or 17, I believe it was, and made him sign a statement to the effect that the Japanese were entitled to be fed under the terms of the Geneva treaty without working. I do not know what good they thought it was going to do them, but at any rate, they did beat him up and make him sign the statement.

He reported this occurrence to Mr. Best and Mr. Best took no action in the matter; merely to ask him if he was hurt.

Incidentally, he was one of the gentlemen that the Japs, in their demands of October 1, asked be terminated.

Mr. MUNDT. I think at this point, Mr. Chairman, it should be stated that Japan never was a signatory to the Geneva Treaty.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think that is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. I think that is the law, but they did not get it.

Mr. PHILLIPS. She was a signatory, but she never confirmed the convention which had to do with it. She actually signed it, but it was never confirmed.

Mr. MUNDT. The representative of the Government signed it but the Government never confirmed it; is that it?

Mr. PHILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. Going back to another matter, let me state that Mr. Kallam, incidentally, was a former assemblyman from the State of California, known very well, I believe, by Congressman Phillips, and appeared to be a man of very substantial character, no riffraff at all. He was the type of man that you could listen to and believe.

He stated that he had recommended and suggested to the camp director and to the assistant director that the Army operate this particular camp, that is, the Tule Lake camp; that the War Relocation Authority could handle the others but not this one; that it should be an Army proposition.

He said that actually internal security has never meant anything; that it was a farce.

He testified regarding the loss and the disappearance of farm tools, beet cutters, and things of that sort; knives of all types.

He complained particularly about the attitude of the social workers in the camp. He said that these social workers had been the source of a lot of trouble; that they told the Japanese that they were American citizens, and that they had been treated very harshly, and they felt that it was not right.

And all this matter was discussed in open forums.

Mr. COSTELLO. Congressman, from your interrogation of various witnesses out there, do you believe that much of the trouble possibly at Tule Lake originated from these statements by white persons to the Japanese and that they encouraged the Japanese to stir up trouble and make all these demands?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, they undoubtedly encouraged it, but I do not know how much encouragement the Japs needed and therefore I would not be able to say how much the statements of the social workers actually influenced them.

Except that I think the whole attitude out there encouraged the Japanese to do just what Mr. Best said they did.

They staged these riots and these demonstrations and these strikes and these slow-downs, and all of this turmoil on trivial and unreasonable grounds, just for the purpose of causing trouble.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you find that spokesmen or representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union or War Resistance League or Fellowship Reconciliation were allowed to go into these various centers and address the Japanese?

Mr. ENGLE. Mr. Kallam testified that they allowed the Civil Liberties group in there, and he referred to certain others, if I can find it. He referred to the Civil Liberties group but not the others.

They did have groups there talking to them about their constitutional rights.

He stated, incidentally, that the Japs were well treated, that is, that they had balanced diets, they had better dental and surgical attention than they ever had had in their lives.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel if possibly some of these groups had been kept out of the centers, you would have had a lot less trouble in them?

Mr. ENGLE. No doubt.

Mr. COSTELLO. The agitation on the part of some of the social welfare workers in the centers might have stirred up a lot of trouble.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that is probably correct. But more fundamental than that, it seems to me, is the whole social theory of the program as it came down from the national leadership.

Now, there was some testimony by one of Mr. Best's secretaries regarding the conscientious objectors in the camp. She stated that she had known of a few conscientious objectors in the camp, about six of them. She could tell from the remarks they made that the Japanese were justified in what they did at Pearl Harbor and that they were

getting harsh treatment, and she said that a certain proportion of the administration knew about these people and the remarks they were making because they had come in contact with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was that? The secretary of Mr. Best making that statement?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. She said most of the conscientious objectors were among the teaching staff.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they make the statement to the Japanese that the Japs were justified in attacking Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right; and that they were getting harsh and unreasonable treatment.

Mr. COSTELLO. But no reprimands were made to the teachers who made those statements?

Mr. ENGLE. Apparently not. She said that certain of the top-ranking officials of the administration knew about it, because they had come in contact with it.

In addition to that, the white children at camp were going to school with the Jap children, and a good many of the white personnel in the camp objected to it; they not only objected to attending the same school, that was not quite so bad, but they objected to the teachers who were conscientious objectors teaching this kind of thing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation made any examination into that report?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, if they have, they have not let me know what the result of their investigation has been. They are out there now.

Now, there was a missionary by the name of R. E. McNaughton, who was permitted to go out there to the camp at any time he wanted to. He was a missionary to the Japanese and his sole object in going out there was to teach Christianity. He testified that about 2 months ago, which was previous to the time of his testimony, which was on November 8, he had heard Japanese records being played over the radio, and he knew that this station was close.

He had lived in Japan a great many years and he recognized the Japanese music immediately, and on his set at home there in Tule Lake, which is about 6 miles from the camp, he heard this Japanese music being played.

And he made some investigation out there, and he said that he was in a house or two there where they were playing the same music, so it was the same Japanese record; he recognized it. There were Japanese pieces which were very well known.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they were being broadcast from the Tule Lake center?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he could not say that there was any transmitter set up there; he could not say that. But subsequently, I think it has been developed, that there was a Japanese transmitter in the relocation center.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you suppose that caused interference with local broadcasts in and around Tule Lake; this Japanese broadcast?

Mr. ENGLE. No; you would just hear it coming in sometimes adjacent to, and sort of with some other station. But he picked up this Japanese music because he was familiar with it.

A very interesting explanation was given by Mr. Silverthorne, project director. He said he heard the record and he talked to Internal

Security, Mr. Cole, about it, and they had come to the conclusion that an electric record player on a beam could be picked up by another radio. That was their explanation of the thing.

Mrs. Adams was a school teacher at the camp. She was still there at the time the investigation was going on. She was one of the ones that was picked up and brought by the Japanese to the administration building, and she made out her will while she was there in the building, and stated that she was aware of a great deal of danger in that situation.

She did not have anything to say at the Fellowship Reconciliation or some of those groups, on the record; but I understand she did make some statement off the record that there were members of that group in the center. There were numbers of them in the center.

Now, coming back to the proposition raised a moment ago, about the coddling of these Japanese, the appeasement of the camp. Dr. Pedicord was one of those at the camp who wanted stronger methods. He informed us that the Japanese cannot be handled by coddling methods.

Mr. Shirrel, by the way, told Mr. Peck, Mr. Ralph Peck, procurement officer, that this whole thing was a great social experiment. He said, "Let us delete the word 'experiment' and say 'problem'."

He went on to say that "we are not here to save money."

Peck was complaining about some feature of the camp that was costing money and that is when Shirrel made the remark that this was a great social experiment. Shirrel is now with the W. R. A. in the office in Chicago.

The testimony of Mr. Rhoads in regard to the fire situation was supplemented and backed up by the testimony of Mr. Leuck, who was his assistant and who is now chief fire-control officer, in control of the handling of the entire fire-control problem at the camp.

I think that is about all of my testimony, unless you gentlemen want to ask some questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mentioned the name of Mr. Shirrel. What is his position at the center? Or what was his position before he left for Chicago?

Mr. ENGLE. He was the camp director. Mr. Best came to the camp August 1, or thereabouts, and Mr. Shirrel was there sometime prior to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know how he spells his name?

Mr. ENGLE. S-h-i-r-r-e-l.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was the predecessor, then, of Mr. Best, director at the center?

Mr. ENGLE. I would not say that he was the immediate predecessor. There may have been one man in there for a short time between.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Do you know Mr. Shirrel's initials?

Mr. ENGLE. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt, do you have some questions you want to ask?

Mr. MUNDT. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman it is 20 minutes to 1 now. I have a series of questions which I think will take at least an hour and a half, or so; also there is an important Democratic caucus this after-

noon in which I am personally interested. I would ask the kindness of the Chairman to have Mr. Engle come back, either later this afternoon, or tomorrow morning.

We have had the benefit of the testimony that was given to the Senate committee of the State of California, and while it has been hearsay in every respect, practically, nevertheless it has been illuminating, and has brought up quite a few questions which I would like to have clarified for my own purpose and help me in coming to a proper judgment on this question.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might say that we had planned on having Mr. Myer up here tomorrow morning. Of course, we could have Mr. Engle come back any subsequent time for interrogation.

Mr. ENGLE. I will be glad to come back any time you suggest, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Engle, would it be convenient for you to be here tomorrow morning at 10:30?

Mr. ENGLE. I will be very happy to be here.

Mr. COSTELLO. And submit to questions by the committee?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; or I will come this afternoon.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Anderson, I understand you have a statement which you wish to present to the committee?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN Z. ANDERSON, EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, first of all I wish to compliment this subcommittee for the thoroughgoing manner in which it is attempting to arrive at a solution of the problem presented by the unprecedented evacuation and relocation of over 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry who were living in the United States when war was declared. Admittedly, this is a tremendous task, and due to the fact that a large number of the evacuees are citizens, it presents complications and constitutional questions that must be handled with the utmost care.

I have carefully read the report which your subcommittee filed in the House of Representatives on September 30, 1943. I heartily concur in the findings and conclusions of the majority.

I cannot share in the minority views of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Eberharter, and I take sharp exception to his statement that—

There was nothing in the evidence heard by the subcommittee that would bear out the implication that the program was being incompetently or inefficiently administered. All things considered, the preponderance of evidence indicates that the War Relocation Authority is doing a good job in handling an extremely difficult problem.

That the problem is extremely difficult we can all agree. However, if further evidence was needed to emphasize the fact that a good job is not being done by the W. R. A., the recent outbreak at Tule Lake furnishes rather conclusive proof.

I sincerely hope that the present investigation will further develop the need for some sweeping changes in the W. R. A. personnel and that you will adequately prove the absolute necessity for maintaining strict Army control at Tule Lake. For my own part I should like to see all Japanese relocation centers in this country placed under the

control of the War Department until the termination of our war with Japan.

Those of us who have followed the recent developments at Tule Lake find it difficult to understand why the W. R. A. has tried to hide the facts from the public. We all know that we are dealing with a delicate problem and that we must avoid taking any action that might result in reprisals against our citizens who are interned or held as prisoners of war by the Japanese Government. This does not mean, however, that we should not adopt a firm policy in dealing with all persons of Japanese ancestry who have avowed their loyalty to the Emperor of Japan.

At this point, and with the permission of the committee, I should like to include a statement which was made by Gov. Earl Warren, of California, at a press conference in Sacramento, on November 5, 1943.

As soon as we heard of the situation developing at Tule Lake, we looked into it and came to the conclusion the Federal authorities were not telling the truth about conditions there.

Knowing the attitude of the Relocation Authority toward protecting the good name of even the violent anti-American Japanese, we concluded that no purpose would be served in negotiating with that Authority for the protection of our people in that part of the State.

We communicated with the proper military authorities on Tuesday and were told that the Army was not in charge of the situation there, that the custody of the Japanese was under civilian authority and that there was nothing for the Army to do unless called in.

But we were also assured that the Army was alerted to the situation and that we could be assured that if the situation got out of hand, the necessary military assistance would be forthcoming and danger to the civilian population could be averted.

Relying on that information, we took no steps at all with the Relocation Authority and merely tried to keep ourselves advised as to the general situation.

I firmly believe that there is positive danger attached to the presence of so many of these admittedly American-hating Japanese in an area where sabotage or any other civil disorder would be so detrimental to the war effort. As long as they are there, our civilian population and the war effort are in danger and our only protection must come from the Army or small units of the State guard (approximately 80 State guardsmen at Tule Lake) in that locality.

I always have felt that the reason for the concentration of these Japanese is based on military necessity. And I have felt that the Army, charged with the external security of the country and thoroughly familiar with the Japanese and their machinations, is the only agency that can tell us what the situation is with relation to them and the only agency that knows what the military necessities are here on this coast.

I also have felt that the Army is the only agency which should determine where and how they are to be interned. I think the security of this coast, designated as a combat area, is one for the Army to administer and inasmuch as the presence of many thousands of potential saboteurs and fifth columnists is one of the greatest dangers that confronts us, that the Army should control the entire situation.

I wish to particularly emphasize that portion of Governor Warren's statement that "As soon as we heard of the situation developing at Tule Lake, we looked into it and came to the conclusion the Federal authorities were not telling the truth about conditions there." It is my hope that this committee will ascertain what Federal authorities were not telling the truth about conditions at Tule Lake and recommend their immediate removal from office. We are having enough trouble with this question without dealing with liars on top of it.

I should like to again draw attention to a statement made by General John L. DeWitt, then commanding general of the Western Defense Command, while he was testifying before a Subcommittee of the

House Naval Affairs Committee in San Francisco on Tuesday, April 13, 1943. When questioned about the Japanese situation, General DeWitt said:

There is a development of a false sentiment on the part of certain individuals and some organizations to get the Japanese back on the west coast. I don't want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations essential to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese on this coast. There is a feeling developing, I think, in certain sections of the country that the Japanese should be allowed to return. I am opposing it with every proper means at my disposal.

Unfortunately General DeWitt has been removed from the position he held when that statement was made and Japanese are now being permitted to return to the Pacific coast. The present release policy of the War Relocation Authority is absolutely indefensible and I hope that this committee will recommend strongly against it.

The facts so far submitted to this committee are sufficient to justify the most searching inquiry into the entire relocation problem. If I can be of assistance in any way, my services are at the committee's disposal.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Anderson.

The committee will now adjourn, to meet again tomorrow morning at 10:30, at which time Mr. Engle will submit to further questioning. The committee will now go into executive session, so I wish all spectators would kindly leave the room.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10:30 a. m., tomorrow, Wednesday, December 1, 1943.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello presiding.

Present: Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. John M. Phillips; Hon. J. Parnell Thomas, New Jersey; Hon. Noah M. Mason, Illinois; and Hon. Clair Engle, California.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Yesterday, when we concluded, Mr. Engle had completed a statement, and Mr. Eberharter was about to question him.

You may proceed, Mr. Eberharter.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIR ENGLE, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, I believe you issued a statement concerning the subject under discussion to the press.

Mr. ENGLE. I did, to some extent; yes. But nothing that I wrote out. I have not any typewritten transcript of any statement which was issued, if that is what you mean.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I noticed in the newspapers, on one or two occasions, at least, that you had issued a statement regarding the subject.

You say you do not have any copies of it?

Mr. ENGLE. No; because there were a great many newspapermen at those hearings, and they would talk to this one and that one, and I did not see all of the alleged statements.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But do you know approximately how many times you made a statement to the press regarding the subject?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not know. I would say perhaps half a dozen times during the process of that hearing, and after.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And after that?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Were any of these statements issued before the disturbance at Tule Lake on November 1, regarding the general question of the handling of the Japanese problem in this country?

Mr. ENGLE. No.

MR. EBERHARTER. And you had come to the conclusion, or to some conclusion, regarding how this problem should be handled when you issued those statements?

MR. ENGLE. Yes; I had. That is, to some extent, just in the discussions that I had had with my own people. I am pretty well aware how the people in California feel about it, particularly in my own district.

MR. EBERHARTER. Do you know personally the members of the Special Senate Committee of the State of California investigating this subject?

MR. ENGLE. Yes.

MR. EBERHARTER. And your general opinion of those members is what? That is, as far as their reliability and their character and dependability, and so forth, is concerned?

MR. ENGLE. They are very fine gentlemen, and, for the most part, well, in fact, all of the members of that committee are highly recognized and respected in the California Senate.

Now, Senator Slater, for instance, is the dean of the California Senate. He has been in the California Senate for over 30 years. He runs a newspaper at Santa Rosa.

Senator Dorsey is an attorney from Kern County, and was in the assembly back in, I believe, 1906 or 1908, and then after a good many years of public service, part of which was as district attorney for Kern County, and is an outstanding man down there in the field of the law. I understand that he made a good deal of money in the law business and in the oil business. Then he returned to the State Senate and went into the California State Senate at the same time I did.

Senator Donnelly is, I believe, in the insurance business, and he has been in both the California Assembly and the California Senate. He was speaker pro tempore of the California Assembly before he graduated, you might say, and went to the California Senate.

Senator Quinn is an attorney in Yreka, and has been in the California Legislature for a great number of years; I do not know just how many. I cannot say how many years he has been there, but it has been several terms.

Then, Senator Hatfield, who is also a member of the committee, but who did not attend these particular hearings, is a former Lieutenant Governor of California, and a very outstanding man, also; so the California Senate committee was picked with a good deal of caution, it would appear, with reference to securing men who were balanced and whose judgment would be given weight.

MR. EBERHARTER. You think, then, that they are truly representative of the sentiments of their constituencies, insofar as their particular districts are concerned?

MR. ENGLE. Yes; they are. And I would say they are truly representative of the entire State, and from a partisan standpoint, they are representative.

Senator Donnelly and Senator Slater are Democrats, and Senator Quinn and Senator Dorsey are Republicans; that is, the committee was perfectly balanced on the basis of partisanship, although that never entered into the thing, so far as I am aware, and has not.

But it was certainly a very well-balanced committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that the conclusions of that committee would be representative of the sentiments of the people of California?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, in my judgment, those conclusions are representative of the sentiments of California; yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, do you think that the people of California, generally, have a particular dislike for the Japanese people?

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman yield to me at that point?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. Does not the gentleman think that the people of the United States, not only the people of California, have a general dislike for the Japanese? I hope the gentleman is not defending the Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am just getting some opinion of the witness here. I am not making any declaration as to what the people of the United States think.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I will make one, then. They have a great dislike for the Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I will yield to the gentleman if he wants to state to this committee and to the country at large his conclusions, which he has already formed, before the completion of the hearings, and before the completion of the investigation.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you mean me?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. Oh, I would be very glad to make that statement.

There has been one investigation right after another. Even the gentleman from Pennsylvania, himself, went out and made a thorough investigation. He went from one end of the State of California to the other, as I understand it, and visited some of these camps. That was all followed by many other investigations, and we have had one disorder right after another, and my conclusion is that we want to get rid of this fellow, Dillon Myer, the Administrator, just as quickly as we possibly can. I think the whole thing is a joke and a racket.

That is all I have to say.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Reporter, will you read my question again, please?

(Pending question read by the reporter as follows:)

Question. Well, do you think that the people of California, generally, have a particular dislike for the Japanese people?

Mr. ENGLE. I think that the people in California generally dislike and are suspicious of the Japanese people, based upon what they consider good grounds, over a long period of time of experience with the Japanese.

I might add, in that particular, Mr. Eberharter, that this problem is one in which the people of California have had a special interest, and on which they have had a special opinion over a long period of time.

Just to illustrate to you the sort of thing that creates the viewpoint that California has, when I was district attorney of Tehama County, which I was at the time of Pearl Harbor, the attorney general, Earl Warren, now Governor of California, asked each of the district attorneys to prepare a plot or map of Japanese owned or controlled real property in the State of California.

We all proceeded to do this; the district attorneys working in an association there and in very close harmony with the attorney general.

We prepared these maps in conjunction with the work of our sheriffs' offices, and the information revealed in those maps, with reference to the disposition of Japanese owned and controlled real property in California, was such as to just simply knock your hat off, to put it in slang.

The Japanese had, in many instances, practically surrounded vital and strategic installations throughout the State, on a scope and to an extent entirely beyond any possible coincidence.

For instance, they established a bombing base at Bakersfield, out in the isolated area where there had never been any farming activity, and it was not given to farming activity in that general area.

After this bombing base was established, some Japanese, for some reason or other, suddenly acquired an interest in farming out there in that area, right adjacent to the bombing range, where they tested these planes, and what not. Roads, which could have been blocked very readily, were found to be in Japanese ownership, at points where the blocking could occur very readily.

There was wide ownership of Japanese property down along, and adjacent to the coast, particularly in those parts where our fleet operated and was extensively harbored.

The location of Japanese property with reference to airports was particularly revealing, and as a result of that investigation, when I went to the California State Senate the first of this year—I might explain that I was district attorney and I ran for the State senate last summer and was elected, took office the first Monday in January this year, and then this spring ran for Congress, which put me up through the district attorney's office, the State senate, and Congress, in a period of 1 year, so you understand my reference to time there.

When I went down there, I introduced a bill——

Mr. EBERHARTER. If you do not mind an interruption there——

Mr. ENGLE. Gladly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When did you take your oath of office as a Member of Congress; this year?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. It was about the 20th or 21st of September.

When I went to the State senate I introduced an alien-land-law bill, which had as its purpose, perhaps you might say, closing the barn door after the horse was out, and might—and we think it will—prevent that sort of thing in the future and cause the forfeiture of the land where it stands in the name of enemy aliens.

At that time a gentleman from the State attorney general's office, who had complete control of it and all the information with reference to it, appeared before the California legislative committee studying that bill, that is, my alien-land-law bill, and gave testimony bearing along the line which I have indicated, and gave particular reference to particular spots where it occurred, and what their investigation had revealed.

Although I cannot give those to you in detail, I will say that they were very startling. And it is just that sort of thing which, over a long period of time, has built the suspicion which you allude to, and which does, in fact, exist in California.

I just say that by way of explanation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. This feeling of dislike, based upon the experience that the people of California have had with the Japanese was, of course, intensified after Pearl Harbor because of the occurrence at Pearl Harbor; is that a fair statement?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. I think the people tended to feel that that supported their previous conclusions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that might be determined to amount to a prejudice.

Mr. ENGLE. I would say it amounts to a prejudice, being very frank, I think it does.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And shortly after you became a Member of Congress, you, on your own initiative and at your own expense and in the interest of the people of the country, undertook to make this investigation yourself?

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct. As previously stated, I went to California at the request of the people from my district, in regard to this problem.

It is one, incidentally, with which they have been very much concerned, and one which, from time to time, has created a good deal of uneasiness and uncertainty and dissatisfaction in my district, the Second Congressional District.

I have both of the Japanese camps—the one at Manzanar and the one at Tule Lake, in my district, although they are some distance removed from each other.

Of course the people there feel very vital about the problem. I might say also that they have questioned the sound judgment of placing Tule Lake camp, for instance, only for disloyal Japanese in California, and so close to our Pacific coast industries, and so close to the north and south railroad which goes through California and which would be particularly vulnerable to sabotage.

That is just one of the factors.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, the military of the State—the military authorities—had control of the external security of the Tule Lake reservation, and no Japanese segregants were permitted out of the reservation without permission of the military authorities; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not know how they got out but the people at Tule Lake testified and told me that they had seen Japanese a great many miles from the Tule Lake relocation center.

I have a brother who is a member of the California highway patrol, and who is stationed at Tule Lake. And being a peace officer, he had every reason to be appraised of the situation there at Tule Lake and particularly with reference to the Japanese, and he told me that he had had complaints from farmers about seeing Japanese as much as 7 or 8 miles away from the relocation center.

And he would go and ask the farmers to take him right to the place where the Japanese were seen in order that he would know what they were talking about in the particular location.

Now, how those Japanese got out and got around and under what circumstances, and why, I am not prepared to say; but they, in fact, had, and the people in that community so say and so testified.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then there was no testimony to the effect that those Japanese got away from the reservation without the permission

of the military authorities, or no incident has come to your attention or to the Senate committee out there that those Japanese got out of the reservation without the permission of the military authorities.

Mr. ENGLE. As I say, I do not know who gives permission. I assumed that the W. R. A. gave the permission, if there was any permission given.

But as far as they have of ever getting away and the military trying to stop them, I have never heard of that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then, I think you believe to a certain extent that Congress should rely somewhat on the results of the investigation held by the California Senate committee.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think that this body should consider the evidence submitted to that group and also should consider the recommendations of that group based upon that evidence.

It may be, after studying the evidence and hearing the testimony, this body, or Congress itself, will not agree with the recommendations they made; but then, they are factors, it seems to me, which should be considered.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You believe it is wise for Congress to have its own Senate investigation?

Mr. ENGLE. In fact, I have two formal requests on file with the committee requesting this committee, and particularly this subcommittee, to go to California to hear this evidence.

I think it would be much more satisfactory to hear the evidence than to hear me tell you what the evidence was or what the testimony was, because, obviously, you can judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony much better from seeing the witnesses and hearing them yourselves.

I filed a request, it seems to me, on or about—

Mr. STRIPLING. You filed one before you left.

Mr. ENGLE. I filed one shortly before I left, based on the information which I had already accumulated by virtue of several telephone conversations to my own people at Tule Lake, and then, after I got out there and had gone through this situation, then I filed a formal request with the committee asking for an investigation.

In addition to that, I was on the telephone almost continuously, as I think Mr. Costello's office will testify to; we kept the wires hot almost continuously to Washington, trying to determine when he would come back so that we could get a decision as to whether or not this committee would come out there.

The thing I had in mind was that the investigation that had been made should have been more thoroughly pursued by the body which had the obligation of recommending action on it, and I was prepared to stay out there and to assist this committee in accumulating evidence and presenting evidence, because of my personal contacts throughout the district, and my personal knowledge gained from what investigation had been made.

So I kept in constant contact with Mr. Stripling and Mr. Costello until Mr. Costello got back. I did not like to stay too long away from Congress, so I came back here when he stated that they would hold an executive hearing to determine whether or not they would go out.

I thought it might be a good idea if I could get back to that hearing and, at least while I was personally present, urge the committee to come out.

I believe you were at the meeting where I appeared, and I think I did express myself on that score.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So you believe, Mr. Engle, that a more thorough investigation would be justified?

Mr. ENGLE. I think a more thorough investigation would be justified, but I am personally prepared to base my conclusion on the investigation which I have personally made and the evidence which I have here.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Had you finished?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think the Senate investigating committee of the State of California had really any jurisdiction over this problem which, to my mind, appears to be a problem of Federal significance and not of State significance?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that is true, as far as action is concerned. The interest in any jurisdiction, you might say, that the California Senate committee had over it, was by reason of the fact that California was primarily concerned—well, I would not say primarily concerned, but concerned, perhaps, more than any other particular locality, in the problem, and they have been sufficiently concerned in it to set up this senate investigating committee for the purpose of studying the entire problem of Japanese resettlement.

In other words, the functions of that committee go beyond the immediate problem at hand. It goes to a study of the entire problem for the purpose of acquiring data and being prepared to make a plan and a recommendation to Congress in regard to the final post-war disposition of the entire problem.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, you believe that this problem involves the constitutional rights of persons of Japanese descent who are American citizens by birth, do you not?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think a constitutional question may be involved; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, you are sure it is involved, are you not, Mr. Engle?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it has not been brought in and tested. I am familiar with what the Supreme Court had to say in the cases that have been brought up, which dealt only with the curfew law. As I understand it, the Supreme Court has not passed on the question of internment of the Japanese for the purpose of relocation.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentlemen from Pennsylvania yield to me? Does not the gentlemen from Pennsylvania also believe and agree that the security of the Nation is involved?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of course, Mr. Chairman, as I stated before, we have a witness here for the purpose of getting information, and his opinion on this subject.

And while I do not hesitate to answer the question, I think we ought to get the knowledge that Mr. Engle has on this subject, which is of particular interest to this committee, he having taken it upon himself to make an investigation; and the testimony, as already given, shows that he has special knowledge, in view of the fact that the reservation is located in his district.

I have no hesitancy in saying that it is of paramount importance that the internal security of the United States be first considered,

and it is on that basis that I have been proceeding, at all times, since I was accounted a member of this special committee.

Mr. ENGLE. I was going to complete my answer there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Go ahead.

Mr. ENGLE. In respect of the constitutional question, I think probably there is a different situation involved where you have internment of those Japanese who declared their disloyalty to the United States; in other words, the Tule Lake situation is in a special classification, even from a constitutional standpoint, in my judgment.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that in any action which the United States authorities might take, the question of the constitutionality of that action would naturally be of importance, in your opinion; would it not?

Mr. ENGLE. It would be of importance if the action taken tended to change the existing situation, so far as its legal aspects are concerned; in other words, at the present time we already have the Japanese in these relocation centers, and we have the Japs at Tule Lake in a segregation center and they are being held there.

From a legal aspect of the question, therefore, with regard to the custody of the Japanese, that is already established. If you are concerned with a change in administration, for instance, that really does not affect the constitutional aspect of it, because that does not change the legal aspect of the question.

Internment continues to exist, only under a different body.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, did you say that the constitutionality of the denial of freedom of action to the Japanese has already been established?

Mr. ENGLE. No; no. I say the legal situation has been established; in other words, the factors which would be determinative in making that decision, have been established.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I agree with you on that.

Mr. ENGLE. And how you change that with reference to the internal management of the camps, for instance, whether it is the Army holding them, or the W. R. A., or who it is that is administering it, it cannot vary the legal aspects of the problem.

From a constitutional standpoint, that problem is established when you put them in the camp and hold them there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But that has not been decided, as to its constitutionality, by any high court.

Mr. ENGLE. So far as I am aware, no high court has declared such internment or such holding in relocation camps illegal.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And so far as you know, no court has declared such holding legal, either.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You appreciate that many of these persons who are being denied freedom of movement are American citizens.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that, as American citizens, they would have the same rights under the Constitution of the United States as persons of any other nationality.

Mr. ENGLE. That would be true, I would say, except as to those who had declared their loyalty to the Emperor of Japan, and that might raise a question.

I am referring particularly to those in the Tule Lake segregation center. I think that their rights might be, to some extent, compromised by the fact that they declared their loyalty to Japan or refused to declare their loyalty to the United States.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I believe it would involve a little different approach to the question of their constitutionality, as to the restriction of their movement. I agree with you on that.

You did not state any conclusion that it would make any action that we took constitutional, with reference to the denial of their freedom of movement, but there is at least some doubt as to whether the United States Constitution would permit the denial of freedom of movement to a great block of people who are citizens of the United States without specifically charging them, at least, with a possibility of endangering internal security in this country.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that may be true, but the point I made just a minute ago was that if that question exists or is to be raised, it already exists; in other words, we cannot change that. The relocation centers have been established and those people have been held.

Now, whether or not the Tule Lake camp, for instance, should be under the control of the Army or under the control of some other agency than the W. R. A., would not seem to me to change that constitutional question or affect it in any way.

The constitutional question, if it arose, arose when the incarceration or holding within these relocation or internment centers first occurred.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, do you think it would be a good idea to have an immediate test of this question at this time?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I am not prepared to answer that. I do not propose to test it, if that is what you mean.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Pardon me?

Mr. ENGLE. I say, I do not propose to test it, if that is what you mean.

Mr. EBERHARTER. No; that is not what I mean, Mr. Engle.

Do you think it would be in the best interests of the internal security of the United States to test the constitutionality of the withholding of these American citizens from freedom of action at this particular time?

Mr. ENGLE. I think it probably would be against and a detriment to the national security and the internal security of the United States, to test it at this time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then if that be true, do you not believe that the best policy of the United States to pursue, and for the authorities to pursue is to act in such a manner that no test will be immediately made?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not think you can prevent a test being made, if it is going to be made, or if somebody wants to make it, regardless what you do.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You cannot prevent a test being made, naturally not, because the laws of the country give every citizen the same privilege of action for relief in the courts. But there is such a thing as agitating and taking such action as would precipitate a test. You agree with that?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that might occur all right. You might have, even by reason of the disturbances which have occurred, in my judgment without any good reason, the making of a constitutional test.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not believe, Mr. Engle, that the Government had every right to take these Japanese and remove them from their homes along the Pacific coast under the application of martial law, in the manner in which it was done?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; I do.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that it was within the Constitution to do so?

Mr. ENGLE. And I think in the Supreme Court it would be sustained.

Mr. COSTELLO. And do you not think, as long as the Japs are held in the State of California, which is within the western defense zone, that they are entitled to keep these Japanese people confined to the precincts of the relocation centers?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think that they have a right to keep the Japanese out of military zones just the same as they have the right to keep any citizen out. If I try to get into some of these Army camps, I do not get in, and I am an American citizen also.

Mr. COSTELLO. In fact, you cannot even get into the relocation centers. They won't let you in.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. And I cannot even get into some of these buildings around Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. And when the relocation camps were located outside of the boundaries of the Pacific defense coast area, then the application of martial law possibly might not apply in these centers, and as the result, the Japanese possibly could not be held against their will in the other centers.

Mr. ENGLE. That may be a proper distinction, because the Pacific coast is a more vital area.

Mr. COSTELLO. That possibly explains the reason why the War Relocation Authority has been following the practice of allowing Japanese to go out whenever they had a place to go. I do not believe the Japanese are really being held in the relocation centers against their will but because of the fact that they have no place to which they can go, so personally I would question whether any personal rights of these Japanese are actually being invaded at the present time, or have been.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not think they have, either, as a matter of fact. As I understand the relocation program, the relocation centers were only supposed to be temporary holding propositions until they could be placed in other areas.

Now, that is not going to be true with reference to these Japanese in Tule Lake. They are in a different status because of their professed disloyalty to the United States.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think that may explain the reason why the W. R. A. selected a camp in California in which to place these disloyal Japanese, where there would be no question as to their right to hold them in the center?

Mr. ENGLE. I have not heard that explanation, but that may be it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, I agree with you that the question of the denial of freedom of movement of these Japanese in these relo-

cation centers is quite different from the denial of freedom of movement of those who have been sent to Tule Lake as segregants.

Well, then, if you follow that logically, do you not think that the program of resettlement of the W. R. A. is the best program, because it brings it within the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. ENGLE. You mean, as to those Japanese-Americans?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Those Japanese against whom we have nothing specific, no specific charges, or even suspicions based upon any facts which can be ascertained or proven, that the program of allowing for freedom of movement, if they have a place to go, is a proper program under the Constitution.

Mr. ENGLE. It is probably the only feasible program, with the exception that they have a right to keep them out of military areas.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I agree with you on that.

Mr. ENGLE. The entire Pacific coast of California particularly has been designated as a military area.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The question then arises, Mr. Engle, whether or not a district, or certain sections of it, as in Philadelphia, have been declared—not exactly a military area; what do they call it?

Mr. COSTELLO. Defense zone.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Defense zone, and it was recently decided by a Federal judge there in Philadelphia in a case which denied the power of the military authority to order a certain woman to cease doing business in that area and to move to another area; and in that particular case the military, I believe, were not able to prove specific danger from this particular person.

Now, if these Japanese in Tule Lake whom we have good grounds to suspicion would endanger the security of the United States, were to go to one of these defense areas, in a body, it would necessitate action in the courts against each individual in order to have them removed, would it not?

Mr. ENGLE. You mean the ones at Tule Lake who have professed their disloyalty to the United States?

Mr. EBERHARTER. We have grounds for suspicion that their loyalty, and their only loyalty, is to the Japanese Imperial Government, but if they decide to go to a defense area as defined by the military authorities, then the military authorities would be under the necessity, if those cases were taken to court, of proving to the satisfaction of the Federal court, that the military authorities had good grounds for believing that each particular individual constituted a potential danger to the security of the country.

Mr. ENGLE. I do not think that would be hard to do where they profess themselves loyal to our enemy, even assuming that they could get out of the Tule Lake camp to go some place else.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But we would perhaps be faced with thousands of cases which the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Intelligence and the Army Intelligence would have to individually prove.

Mr. ENGLE. I know, but they cannot get out of the Tule Lake camp. They are being held there on the basis of their own declaration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But each and every one of those 15,000 persons, approximately, that are at Tule Lake have a right to bring a writ of habeas corpus, have they not?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, they have, yes; but I do not think they have much opportunity of success.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, the Federal Government would be under the necessity of proving in open court that there are, at least, reasonable grounds for their detention in each case; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. I assume that they would; yes. If they brought a writ of habeas corpus they would have to show the grounds for their detention, assuming that the Jap that brought the writ was an American citizen.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the testimony of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence and the Naval Intelligence would be public testimony.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; of course.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that this confidential and highly secret information which has been gathered by all of our intelligence agencies, would be open to the entire public, not only in this country, but open to the entire world, including the Japanese, the Imperial Government of Japan.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it would be, if the Government undertook to use that evidence, but they would not have to use it, in my judgment.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I thought you agreed with me, Mr. Engle, when you said that the Federal authorities would be compelled to show to the court the evidence in each individual case under which the individual was being detained.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; but in each individual case that individual has come within certain definite classifications. He has either declared his disloyalty to the United States or he has declared that he would not obey the laws of the United States, or he has declared his loyalty to the Emperor of Japan—and they have some mental cases there, too, I understand—or otherwise indicated that he is a proper person to be put in a segregation camp, and in my judgment, the Supreme Court would sustain that detention on that ground.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you not believe, Mr. Engle, that the Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have developed against many of these individuals substantial evidence which they desire to remain secret and confidential, and that any general movement for the bringing of a writ of habeas corpus may force the Federal authorities to disclose some of that highly important internal security evidence?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not see how they could force them to disclose anything. If the Federal Government showed a proper case for detention, that is all they would have to show.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes; they would have to show a proper case on detention; that is what I say. In each individual case they would have to show a proper case for detention.

Do you not think that might be embarrassing to the internal security of this country?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not see why it would, because detention is based on something that the Jap has done, to wit, declared his disloyalty to the United States.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it be possible for the court to have that testimony received in secret session without having to hold it in public?

Mr. ENGLE. They do have secret sessions of the court.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where the matters were of such highly confidential nature that the War and Navy Departments would not want to reveal it, I am sure the court would take a recess and go into chambers with counsel and receive that testimony in secret.

Mr. ENGLE. That is a matter of Federal procedure which I cannot testify on.

Mr. COSTELLO. Which, of course, really has no direct bearing on the particular question here.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is permitted to hold secret hearings on writs of habeas corpus. That is my curbstone opinion right now.

Mr. MUNDT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Certainly.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I am just a mere layman, but is it your position that these people are held illegally now and that General DeWitt and the President had no right to put them in these camps?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No. I certainly do not take the position that they are being held illegally at Tule Lake, or in any other relocation center.

But the point I want to make and bring out and bring into the testimony is that there really is a constitutional question involved insofar as the detention of these people is concerned, and that the Congress of the United States and the Federal Authority should be very, very careful, lest there are some cases made which would perhaps be decided against the action of the Federal authorities, and thereby release every American citizen of Japanese descent to go wherever he wanted to in this country and thereby really decrease the internal security of this country ten-fold.

Now, that is my position, and that is my reason for questioning the witness as I have, because he has been a district attorney; he has been a member of the California Assembly and is now a Member of Congress, and I know that he has reverence for the Constitution; I know that he will appreciate the danger to the internal security of this country.

I have at no time felt that we should develop any particular highly specialized social program for the advancement of these people, and the first thought in my mind has been the internal security of this country; but I do not want any hasty action taken by any of the authorities through hysterical or emotional motives that would really endanger the security of this country. And that is my position.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I yield.

Mr. THOMAS. As I understand it, the wartime powers of the President give him authority to intern anyone or any group that might endanger the internal security of the country.

Now, on that basis, a defense area was set up, and on that basis these camps were set up.

The President must have felt that he had the constitutional right before he acted.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will the gentleman yield to a further question?

Mr. EBERHARTER. If I might answer that first.

I want to call your attention, Mr. Thomas, to the case in Hawaii, which is certainly in a very critical defense area, where the military

commander ordered the continued internment of two alien Germans, enemy aliens, and the Federal court ordered the release. There was a good deal of trepidation on the part of the military, as well as the Federal courts, and the Justice Department as to which side would prevail. That case itself indicates the care with which the authorities must proceed.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, but the President must have had this authority or, at least, he thought he had the authority, or he would never have set up these camps.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is the question that was before the Federal court in Hawaii.

I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as I understand, the Army would have had complete authority to evacuate the entire city of Los Angeles and could have ordered every civilian off the Pacific coast, if this were necessary in order to provide for the security of the Nation.

However, in exercising their power, they only designated certain individuals who had to leave certain areas, and I do not think there is any question about the constitutionality of their doing that.

Now, as far as testing the thing in court is concerned, I do not think we have anything to worry about. If the Japanese-American Citizens League, or the American Civil Liberties Union had thought that they would have been able to prevail in court, they would have had 50 cases up in the Supreme Court long ago, and I think they themselves realize that they do not have a constitutional leg on which to stand, and therefore have not made any effort to bring a bona fide case of that kind into the Federal courts.

It is not a problem to worry about, because I do not think anything will happen about it. It is merely conjecture, from start to finish.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I hope the chairman won't persist in his thought that this is all pure conjecture. I think it is a fundamental matter which this committee is bound to take into consideration.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is all hypothetical; it has to be.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I agree that the military authorities, if they had decided to remove the entire civil population of the city of Los Angeles away from that territory, that district eastward, that they were certainly within their rights, but there is also some doubt in the minds of a good many lawyers who have studied the Constitution of the United States whether or not it was constitutional to select a certain limited group and designate them for removal; so there is a vast difference in those two propositions.

Mr. THOMAS. I am amazed that the gentleman from Pennsylvania should be defending these Japs the way he is. It is just unbelievable. I do not understand what the gentleman from Pennsylvania is driving at, if he is not trying to defend them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am afraid that the gentleman has come to an altogether wrong conclusion.

Mr. THOMAS. I hope so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I certainly am not defending, as I said publicly and at the hearings many times—I certainly am not defending the Imperial Japanese Government.

I just stated my position. My first interest is the internal security of this country, and for that reason I think we ought to go very, very

slow in adopting any emotional or irrational, hysterical methods in handling what is, in my opinion, a very delicate problem.

Mr. ENGLE, if the Army were in complete control at Tule Lake, would you consider that these persons, under their supervision there, and under their control, would be the same as prisoners of war?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not think they have that status. That is a question for the United States Attorney General, and I understand that they do not have that status.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They do not have that status, even while the Army is in complete control?

Mr. ENGLE. No; no more than our civilians over in Japan, or wherever they might be, are considered prisoners of war, even though they are held by the Japanese Army.

Under international law, it seems to me they have a different status than prisoners of war; at least that is what I understand from Mr. Biddle and his office—that they do not have that status.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If they are under complete control of the military, is there not some question as to whether they are being treated similarly to prisoners of war?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not think the status of a prisoner or person that is held, can be determined by who he is. It is a question of what his background was and how he happened to be held.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I agree with you on that. His status would be determined by the facts which caused the denial of his freedom of movement; that is his actual status, but there may be quite a contention as to whether or not they were being treated similarly to prisoners of war.

Mr. ENGLE. I am not familiar enough with international rules on that subject to really say; I do not know.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, you realize that there are many families in these internment camps, or this Tule Lake segregation center, for instance; women and children. You think the Army is qualified to properly take care of them?

Mr. ENGLE. I think the Army could do a very good job; yes, sir; just the same as the Army did an outstanding job in moving those people out of the California area to the place that they took them.

Nobody questions but what the Army did a beautiful and magnificent job of handling that evacuation. Not only were the people generally satisfied with it, but the Japanese themselves found no complaint because of mistreatment, because of lack of proper facilities or proper care being taken.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me if the Army is not able to take care of this area, including the women and children, they better learn how to do it pretty quickly, because we have now all of Sicily and all of southern Italy, and pretty soon all of Italy and all of Germany, so they better learn pretty fast.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is a little difference there when people are held in a camp or reservation, and their entire civil movements are strictly under the military.

It is not quite the same as a country under the supervision of the Army.

And I might say, also, that is one reason for the establishment of the A. M. G., because the Army does not want to continue to oversee or directly handle the conquered territory.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is not the A. M. G. largely military?

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is a specialized training so that the functions of the military can go along.

Mr. MUNDT. Could they not have specialized trainees at Tule Lake?

Mr. EBERHARTER. That certainly would be possible, but whether or not we could spare them is another question.

Mr. Engle, going in a little different direction now, I want you to know I appreciate the benefit of your appearance before this committee; I frankly do. After the hearings of the Senate committee out there and your own personal investigation, have you come to a conclusion or an opinion as to approximately how many people gathered around the administration building that afternoon of November 1?

Mr. ENGLE. The estimates vary all the way from four to eight thousand, and I think the doctor here has even gone further than that. He said it might have been up to six or ten thousand. But I did not hear any estimates less than 4,000, to my knowledge.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I thought I heard a discrepancy in his testimony, and I meant to clear it up but I just forgot it. I thought at one time he said 1,000.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the testimony will show not less than 1,000; that he would not want to estimate the group, but he felt it was far greater than that, and anywhere from four to six thousand.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Six to ten thousand is what he said. He said when they started off—and you or somebody asked him the question—there were over a thousand, and he subsequently said “it looked to me as between six and ten thousand.”

Mr. MUNDT. He said it looked like a thousand when they first came out of the fire strip.

Mr. PHILLIPS. And the six to ten thousand estimate was higher than I had heard before.

Mr. MUNDT. He also said he was not very good at estimating.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think that is important and we ought to clear that up, because if there were 15,000 people in the camp, and 1,000 appeared there, it would make a great deal of difference whether or not this group did try to gain control of the camp and really had made any substantial progress in that direction, and for that reason I think that particular question is important.

Mr. ENGLE. As I was saying, I do not recall of any estimate made by any witness of less than 4,000.

Mr. MUNDT. If the gentleman will yield, I have the transcript of some testimony taken at the hearings at Tule Lake, and Mr. Paine, who was formerly an internal security officer at Tule Lake, stated that there were about 8,000 Japanese around the administration building.

There are some other witnesses here who testified to the same effect. I was looking through it while listening to the testimony this morning, and they seemed to range anywhere from four to eight thousand. Of course, we all know it is kind of hard to estimate how many there were.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As I said before, I would like to have that point cleared up, because this group that was trying to get control of the

civilian administration of the camp, this Japanese group—it would be interesting to see whether they really had control over the greater proportion of the camp; of course without taking into consideration the fact that announcements had been made in the mess hall that a speech would be made, which would naturally attract all of the residents of the camp, to some extent.

Mr. MUNDT. If the gentleman will yield further.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Here is the testimony of Mr. Robert B. Cozzens, regional director, and a member of W. R. A. He says about 1:30 p. m., 3,000 to 4,000 people from the colony were moving into the administration area.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Wilkinson, who had been an employee, in charge of the slaughterhouse there?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; I did. And addition, I talked to him personally.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is he the gentleman you said had been a member of the assembly there?

Mr. ENGLE. No; that was Mr. Kallam; Mr. Clifford Kallam, was the member of the assembly and he was superintendent of the farm.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I wanted to ask you about Mr. Wilkinson. He seemed to be a reliable and substantial person and gave you the impression that he was balanced in his judgment, and fair?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; he did.

He did not appear to be flighty; in other words, he is a fellow that farms there, and is well known in the community, and looked very much like the average farmer.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And his testimony was to the effect that there was a tremendous waste in the activities of the slaughter of hogs, particularly?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. That was the effect of his testimony.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that as high as one-half of the hogs that were slaughtered at various times were wasted and thrown away or discarded?

Mr. ENGLE. He did not put it quite that way. He said that if he started out to kill some hogs, he usually would have to butcher twice as many as would ordinarily be required, because the Japanese would get away with so much of it; they would steal it and take it away, and if he normally would be required to kill 50 hogs, he would probably take 100.

As an illustration, he said they did not always take the same parts, but he said he might kill 15 hogs and not have a sparerib out of the whole group. He just illustrated it that way.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, was it brought out in the testimony there that in the camps all the persons in the camps are subject to all of the orders of the O. P. A. insofar as rationing points are concerned?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; it was.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was it also brought out there that they are allowed ration value of, I think, 50 cents a day per person?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it was estimated there, or stated, and I do not recall, but it would run somewhere between 45 and 55 cents per day.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then if these Japanese were wasting this meat, they were denying themselves and the rest of the Japanese persons in the camp; would that not follow?

Mr. ENGLE. It might necessarily follow; yes. And that may have been part of their program, to stir up dissatisfaction.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was one of the complaints; was it not?

Mr. ENGLE. I might illustrate that further. Dr. Pedicord stated that the people complained a little bit about special diets, and also Mr. Peck, who was the camp steward.

He said he went to a great deal of trouble to get special food for babies and old people, special diets, and then they would truck this food down into the camp and the Japs would come along and steal it all and take it away, and it would never arrive at its destination at all, and then they would complain that they did not have the food.

I can refresh my recollection on that, if you are interested, and tell you just what they did say.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think everybody will agree that there was a very bad element at that camp and it was their purpose, their design, to create trouble.

Mr. ENGLE. Dr. Pedicord testified that he had special vegetables after the farm strike. After the farm strike they did not have any vegetables, because they relied on the farm for their vegetables, and it would take 50 days, approximately, to put a requisition through the Quartermaster Corps and get the vegetables coming in.

So they were short on vegetables in the camp, but Dr. Pedicord, who was especially concerned about the diet for the babies and the elderly people, made some arrangement through the camp administration to get in these vegetables. And he said they were all stolen, were not given to the babies, and then the Japs claimed that the hospital administration had failed to properly care for the infants in the community.

Mr. Perk, who was the mess superintendent, or they called him steward, testified to the same effect, more or less, on I think a different phase of the thing.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Dr. Mason did not testify at the Senate investigation out in California?

Mr. ENGLE. No; he did not. He was in Tennessee, I presume.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you heard his testimony here.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. He seemed to be fair, or he seemed to endeavor to be fair in his recitals of what occurred there.

Mr. ENGLE. I felt so. In fact, his testimony was very much like that we had heard before from a great number of people.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But there is quite an important conflict, in my opinion, between his testimony and the testimony as you revealed it to us yesterday, with respect to this salesman. I think you said you did not know his name at that time.

Mr. ENGLE. His name was Miller, if I am not mistaken. Is that whom you have in mind?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, you said you thought he was a salesman. And he testified, I think, to the effect that he saw hundreds of sticks and some knives in the hands of this group that was gathered around the administration building; do you remember that?

Mr. ENGLE. That was not the salesman. The salesman I testified about tried to get out of the camp, and who tried to phone in connection with his reservation. He was a traveling man and he tried

to get in the phone booth and the Japanese took him out of it. Now, that man never appeared and testified.

Mr. ENGLE. But the circumstances regarding his effort to get out and his effort to phone were testified to by other people.

Now, I did mention somebody's testimony that said there were hundreds of sticks and I am just trying to think.

Mr. PHILLIPS. That was on Thursday, Mr. Eberharter, in connection with the gathering in the automobile pool. I remember the testimony.

Mr. ENGLE. It was probably Mr. Paine.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, do you remember any testimony of any of the witnesses with respect to whether or not the crowd on November 1 appeared to be armed or had sticks and knives; that is, at the Senate investigation?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. Various witnesses testified regarding that, and the estimates regarding the number of knives and sticks varied. Some of them did not see any, particularly. Others saw maybe as many as half a dozen knives. Some testified to seeing a great number of sticks. I think the farm man, or the slaughterhouse man, was the one that you referred to.

Mr. MUNDT. I think probably the testimony you have in mind is that of Mr. Paine.

Mr. ENGLE. The testimony that you refer to and which mentioned, Mr. Eberharter, was my reference to the testimony of Mr. Wilkinson, who stated that hundreds of people had sticks. He saw one knife 14 inches long, and sharpened on both sides, and he saw handles sticking out of the coat sleeves of others.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So there is a great deal of variance in the testimony of these different eyewitnesses, and I think it is important that that testimony either be reconciled or the true picture be determined, because on that I think the committee will want to base its consideration as to whether or not the W. R. A. functioned correctly that afternoon—and wisely.

You see what I mean, don't you?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, if there were 8 or 10 people there, or a thousand people, it makes a big difference. If they were armed or if they were not armed also makes a big difference as to the conduct of the W. R. A. officials that afternoon; and also as to what caused them to gather there, that is, this hoax, that I think everybody will agree was perpetrated in the dining halls.

I just want to explain why I am stressing that point.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I am just trying to tell you what the witnesses testified to.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is right.

Mr. ENGLE. And I am trying to refer to my notes.

Mr. Wilkinson did make this additional explanation. He said the Japs had two bonfires there and they were throwing sticks of wood and what not on it, on those bonfires, to keep them going, which may explain, to some extent, his statement about the hundreds of sticks. But he did say that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The testimony there was that it probably was the intention to burn down the administration building. There was testimony to that effect, was there not?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, there was testimony to the effect that that conclusion could have been drawn from the things that occurred, that is, the existence of this straw and the oil and the oil on the tires of the automobiles and around the cars.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. The gentleman from Pennsylvania was going to explain a point back a few seconds ago.

Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania continue that line?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Which line?

Mr. THOMAS. You said that it makes a lot of difference whether there were one thousand here or eight or ten thousand Japs there, and whether they had many knives or whether they did not have many knives, and then you went on to say that difference is important, and the reason that you were following that line of questioning was that you were going to explain why you were going to follow that line of questioning.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, Mr. Thomas, I might say this, that the committee of course wants to get a true and correct picture of what actually happened that afternoon, and the divergence of this testimony is so great that unless we can determine with some accuracy just exactly what happened that afternoon, we will have great difficulty in arriving at proper conclusions.

It seems to me it makes a great difference, particularly in view of the testimony of the director at Tule Lake, to the effect that there was this small group who were endeavoring to get control of the camp, the administration of the camp, insofar as the general physical administration was concerned, which, in other camps, is left, to a great extent, to the Japanese evacuees.

That was the reason I thought we ought to clear up that particular point.

That is the explanation.

Mr. MUNDT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I will be glad to.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not see where there is very much confusion about the testimony. It just backs up the statement of a gentleman who testified that there were between three and four thousand Japanese in this crowd. There is no dispute about that.

Where there were 2,900 or 4,300 is not so important. There was a big crowd there, that is admitted. Nobody denies that one segment of this crowd beat up Dr. Pedicord, and nobody denies that another segment of the crowd imprisoned the Caucasian employees in the administration building for 3 or 4 hours.

With a crowd of three or four thousand, it is impossible, in any kind of hearings, here or in California, to determine by consensus, how many were carrying knives and how many were carrying sticks, because with the witnesses all imprisoned in different places, looking out the windows, no one could see over three or four hundred faces, probably. One segment might see some of the crowd carrying knives; another segment may not. One segment might see some of the crowd carrying sticks.

So it seems to me the vital point under consideration is the fact that Dr. Pedicord was beaten up; that the Caucasian employees were im-

prisoned in this building; and that a crowd of vast proportions had assembled.

I do not believe we can interrogate Mr. Engle, or any other witness, to determine precisely how many knives three or four thousand Japanese were carrying, because there just is not any way to find out.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Mundt, I do not altogether agree with you. Of course, I may say, aside, I do not approve of the practice of anybody stating what his conclusions are when an investigation is in progress. But it occurs to me that it is important for this committee to determine whether or not this crowd had actually had violence in mind that afternoon, or whether or not a great proportion of them were there for the purpose of hearing the speech which was to be made by the director.

Mr. MUNDT. I agree with that 100 percent, so it seems to me, therefore, we should determine, Was Dr. Pedicord attacked or was he not? Were those people in the administration building held there against their will for 3 or 4 hours, or were they not? That is the way to determine whether there was violence.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Oh, there certainly was violence. There was, perhaps, imprisonment in the administration building of these Caucasian employees, but whether there was violence in the minds of 6,000 or 8,000 or 10,000 or only in the minds of three or four hundred is very important.

Mr. THOMAS. About the only way to find out now—and I do not agree with this gentleman's statement—would be to take a poll out there; send out a questionnaire or something like that. Certainly the gentleman would not agree with that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, you do not have any doubt but what a proportion of the segregants at Tule Lake had in mind making a determined effort to start trouble, do you?

Mr. ENGLE. That is quite apparent.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In hearing the testimony at the California Senate Investigating Committee hearing, did not Mr. Best, the director of the camp, indicate that he was well aware of that fact, and he seemed to have a pretty good knowledge or grasp of the situation; in other words, that there was potential trouble brewing and that there was likely to be a flare-up at any time?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he so stated, but—

Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not want to go on with the question of whatever action he took; we will come to that a little later.

Mr. ENGLE. That is the thing I was going to say; although he so stated, his action before and subsequent to the disturbance would seem to cast some doubt on it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As to whether or not he did really have a good knowledge, or a knowledge, he should have had of the potential danger that would arise.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. In addition to that, he testified to something else that raised some misgiving in my mind.

He testified that he had left his own family on the grounds there and used that as an argument in favor of the proposition that there was no great danger there after November 1, in response to questions in regard to what they had done in respect to internal security after that riot on November 1 and said that he highly regarded his fam-

ily—which no doubt he does—but it just made me wonder whether he really knew, or whether he thought that he could handle the situation.

It just left me in some doubt about it, because others there in the camp had moved their families completely out; Mr. Gerry had and Mr. Borbeck had, of the internal security force; and others were coming out of there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So perhaps he did not have the appreciation of the situation that he, as director, should have had.

Mr. ENGLE. From the standpoint of physical danger, he might have thought there were groups of Japanese maneuvering to get power in the camp, and that sort of thing, without appreciating the physical danger to himself and the other members of the white personnel.

At any rate, it developed finally, after all of these other people had been beaten up—and I refer particularly to Mr. Kallam and to Dr. Pedicord and to those who were shoved around and mishandled on November 1; Mr. Donovan, for instance, who tried to get out, and Mr. Miller, the salesman, who tried to phone, and notwithstanding the numerous threats which had been made against the safety of various members of the camp—that when they did finally surround Mr. Best's house with a great number of billy clubs and with the statement, saying "Get Best," and Mr. Best testified they had a truck there all ready to haul him off, then he called the military, and in my judgment that is the first time that he became appraised of the physical danger, because he did take some action then.

Mr. COSTELLO. However, as long as they were attacking the other Caucasian employees, there was no harm or danger, but when it came to the attack upon the director of the center himself, there was real danger and necessitated the calling in of the Army; is that not about what the situation was there?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, the implication was very direct at that time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you come to any opinion as to why the Japanese did not burn down the building that afternoon, when it looked as though it might be their intention to do that?

Mr. ENGLE. No; I did not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think it might have been because they were holding a conference there and they were awaiting the results of this conference?

Mr. ENGLE. It may have been that. It may have been part of a well-organized program to terrorize and to force their demands by fear.

I am not prepared to ever say that they ever intended to carry those plans to a conclusion, because there is no testimony on that. None of the Japanese ever said what they intended to do, but at any rate they were apparently prepared, and whether or not those preparations were bona fide and with the intention of carrying them out in the event they decided to do so, or were only for the purpose of creating a semblance of terrorizing by which to force their demands, I am not prepared to say.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They may have had the intention to burn it down if the results of the conference had not been satisfactory.

Mr. ENGLE. You would suppose that they made their preparations for some purpose.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. ENGLE. Now, their purpose would be either to carry the preparation to its logical conclusion, or to make people think that they were going to.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, there was the police and fire departments. Let us take the fire department first, Mr. Engle.

Mr. Rhoads testified that he got along fairly well insofar as the operation of the fire department was concerned up to the time of the coming in of these additional segregants.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. His trouble in the operation of the fire department started when the segregants began to man the fire department.

Mr. ENGLE. Now, just a minute. I may have answered your previous question incorrectly. I do not know whether you said "segregation" or "registration."

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I should have said "segregation." And I would like to have it corrected.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he said he got along fairly well until registration. That was about a month before segregation.

Registration involved the question of loyalty. This caused fighting and trouble. Once, for instance, when he went down to one of his stations, he found 1 out of 10 men on duty. That was an internal proposition among the Japanese themselves. Question 28, he said, was the one which caused the difficulty.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So it would appear to be not feasible to attempt to operate the fire department with persons who had been declared, in effect, loyal to Japan.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that was his conclusion, and also the conclusion of his assistant, Mr. Leuck, who is now in charge.

Mr. COSTELLO. The difficulties in the fire department extended over a long period of time, as I understand it.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he testified that he got along fairly well until segregation. He had his troubles but they were not of the type that he had after registration. The real trouble started with registration.

Mr. COSTELLO. As to the questionnaire that was put out, was that not put out to the Japanese along about February or March?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that is not what he said. I think it was just about the time they started to process those Japs in reference to which ones they would keep in the camp and which ones they would take away. That is my understanding of what he had in mind. In other words, they started out in Tule Lake, like all the other camps, deciding which Japs to take out and which ones to leave in, but the process there was the reverse that it was everywhere else. In other camps they took out the disloyal ones; at Tule Lake they took out the loyal ones.

Mr. COSTELLO. He said registration took place in March and they had a 10-day strike at that time. He describes the various difficulties and, as I read his testimony, the difficulties in the fire department were over a long period of time and not over the brief period that the loyal Japanese were in the center.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he did not mitigate the difficulties prior to that time, but apparently he did not have then so much grief, as I recall his testimony.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was Mr. Peck's resignation requested by the Army or by the W. R. A., if you happen to know?

Mr. ENGLE. It was requested by the W. R. A. He gave me the name of the person who demanded it. Mr. Cahn, I think it was.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was that after the Army had taken possession?

Mr. ENGLE. I think it was after Monday, November 1, when the first demonstration occurred, which was 4 days prior to the time the Army took control and subsequent to the time that the Japanese demanded that he resign or that his resignation be secured.

Mr. EBERHARTER. He said that he did not want to have a hearing before the Civil Service Commission as to whether or not he was efficient or inefficient.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that is not his testimony in the record. Those are some things he told me on the side, through some personal investigation. I do not think those matters were recorded at all in his testimony, but I talked to these witnesses personally afterward, and sometimes off the record.

And some of the things he told me I would not be privileged to repeat, but the substance of it was he did not want his civil-service record cluttered up with a lot of charges; whether they would be true or false, they would still be on his record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was there any representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation present at any of these Senate hearings or at any one of them at this time, if you know?

Mr. ENGLE. No. The F. B. I., as far as I am aware, arrived the day that I left, which was the second day after the Senate hearings terminated, toward the end of the week on which those hearings commenced.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that would also indicate that further congressional investigation over and above this Senate investigation would be justified; in other words, if we got the benefit of the investigation by the F. B. I., it would help us.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct. And after the California Senate investigation was terminated, I then filed a formal request for this committee to proceed to California to hear the evidence.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Had a part of this crowd started to leave before Mr. Myer made his speech that afternoon, or was any testimony adduced to that effect?

Mr. ENGLE. I cannot recall of any. Mr. Cozzens testified, I believe, that from time to time he would see somebody try to leave, and some of this gang would hold them in there.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Engle, how long did Mr. Myer stay there?

Mr. ENGLE. Mr. Myer arrived on Monday morning, November 1, and he left these Tuesday night or Wednesday morning of the same week. In other words, he was there for 2 days.

Mr. THOMAS. By the time he left, had everything quieted down?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, there was a great deal of tension in the camp, according to the testimony, although there were no outbreaks.

Mr. THOMAS. What was the date of the Army coming in?

Mr. ENGLE. The Army came in on Thursday, which was November 4. Mr. Myer came Monday, and he stayed Tuesday, and Wednesday was quiet and tense; but Thursday there was this same situation; and then on Thursday night they had this gang of Japanese surrounding Mr. Best's house with clubs, and the fight there with the

internal security officer in which he was beaten up, and that is the time the Army was called in.

Mr. THOMAS. So Mr. Myer did not quiet things down in the camp at all, except perhaps for the one day.

If you had been the Administrator, and it would have been your duty to administer the affairs of that camp, would you have stayed on as long as this disorder was prevalent and there was a tendency for another outbreak, or would you have put your tail between your legs and beat it, like Mr. Myer did?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, Mr. Best was asked about that, and his testimony in explanation of Mr. Myer's leaving was that Mr. Myer was working on a schedule, and that he arrived on schedule and left on schedule.

Mr. THOMAS. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle. I would like to be clear in my mind as to whether or not this Mr. Schmidt, who left the administration building to go over to the hospital, was the national security officer?

Mr. ENGLE. He is the national head of internal security in those camps; and his name is Schmidt.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And where is his office?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, he is supposed to be located in Washington, but he was there at that camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, was he one of the men accompanying Mr. Meyer on this tour schedule that had been made up, do you know?

Mr. ENGLE. No; he had been there previously in connection with the problem of internal security, as I understand it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was he a stranger to the Japanese in the camp, do you think? Or was he just sort of a visitor there that day?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, there was no testimony, so far as I am aware, as to how long he had been there, or with what frequency he had visited the camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you remember the testimony of Mr. Donovan, the contractor?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes, Mr. Eberharter. He evidently is a man with quite a good deal of physical courage and a little self-determination. Yes; very definitely the kind of a fellow who does not stand for too much shoving around. He is spunky.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I was very much interested when you said that Mr. Donovan, when he attempted to go through this crowd, nearly precipitated a riot.

Now, the inference of a person reading the testimony would be that up to that time there certainly was no riot.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, what I meant by that was this: There was nobody fighting or any physical violence there in the crowd. The crowd was surrounding the administration building.

When he started to go through, why, it definitely stirred up some action and violent action. For instance, he stated here that he told them he was going out, that is, he told the Japs that he was leaving and they called him a few names, and he went a little further, and one of the Japs grabbed him and said that he would kill him and called him a profane name.

And they surrounded him there in a very turbulent and threatening way which, as I say, disturbed the previous situation there to the

extent that there was active violence in progress at that point, where-as otherwise, they had just been surrounding the building.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If, perhaps, half a dozen or a dozen or maybe 50 of the white personnel there had attempted to go through that crowd, probably there would have been a very serious riot.

Mr. ENGLE. That is problematical.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman yield?

If there had been the same number of soldiers, there probably never would have been a riot in the first place; is that not true?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I am not prepared to say what would have happened; I do not know. It is all speculative. I do not know what would have happened.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So it is a question, Mr. Engle, as to whether or not it was advisable at that time to take the situation as calmly as possible; not become hotheaded and lose their heads and try to use any force against this great number of Japanese people.

It is a question of judgment as to whether or not the manner of the officials of the W. R. A. acting at that time was such as to quiet the situation or whether they contributed to a more acute situation then and in the future; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, the question was whether the temper of the crowd was such that they should move the Army in or start in an aggressive action to release themselves from imprisonment and whether or not that would have brought about the result in which people would have been killed or injured.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. That was the question.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. And apparently W. R. A. leadership took the view that they did not dare take any precipitous action for fear that such violence would result and people would be injured and killed because of the temper of the crowd.

Mr. THOMAS. But they finally did call in the Army, did they not?

Mr. ENGLE. That was Thursday.

Mr. THOMAS. But the fact still remains, they called in the Army.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct. And if they had called in the Army when this crowd was assembling, they undoubtedly could have handled this thing without the potentialities of people being killed and injured.

Mr. THOMAS. And if the Army had been there from the start, it probably never would have happened.

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You testified about a strike, and I do not remember which particular strike you were testifying about yesterday, because evidently there were several strikes at Tule Lake.

But there was one to which you testified where some member of the personnel of W. R. A. at the camp there said they should be kept on the pay roll, that is, the strikers.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was a farm strike.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. If I may have that record, I will read that testimony to you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would this be a good point at which to suspend?

Mr. ENGLE. May I answer the question to bring that subject to a close?

I am reading from page 6 of the reporter's transcript of the November 1 meeting. This is the W. R. A. transcript.

Mr. KURATOMI. Here is a question I would like to ask. It was announced the day after our conference with Mr. Best that all the farmers were terminated as of October 16, or 19, I am not sure about the date. (19th confirmed.) And consequently the farmers are very furious over the fact that they were more or less terminated without previous warning, so to speak, because there has been a statement that has Mr. Kallam's signature to the effect that these farmers did not go on strike. They merely stopped work until negotiations were completed.

When we made the announcement over the result of our conference with Mr. Best, the farmers naturally felt they would be permitted to go back to work. However, just before they started back to work a notice was already published that they were terminated as of October 19 so the farm committee came to see Mr. Zimmer and tried to talk with him so that misunderstandings could be clarified. However, unfortunately for everyone concerned, the farmers' request to return to work was refused by Mr. Zimmer because, he stated of an administrative instruction, No. 29; was that it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. 27.

Mr. KURATOMI. Cannot be altered. That was the statement, wasn't it, Mr. Zimmer?

Mr. ZIMMER. Right.

Mr. KURATOMI. The people who worked in the packing sheds were terminated because there was no work for them. That statement is natural, however; they were given termination without at least a week's advance warning. Consequently they are very much dissatisfied and, if my memory is correct, Mr. Best promised during our conference that he would talk things over with the farm committee which would be chosen from the people to talk and plan for the future farm at this center.

Mr. BEST. For next year, why don't you add.

Mr. KURATOMI. Now, the question is, What was the reason for terminating the entire farm workers without advance notice?

Mr. BEST. You want that answered now?

Mr. KURATOMI. Sure.

Mr. BEST. You were given every notice that if you did not go to work we would have to dispose of the crop. Your committee sitting in this room stated that you were not interested in harvesting this crop. Isn't that right?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is true.

Mr. BEST. When you represented all the farmers?

Mr. KURATOMI. That is right.

Mr. BEST. There isn't any farm now and there wasn't any farm from that time on.

Mr. KURATOMI. But that isn't the way we were terminated at Topaz. If a person—

Mr. CAHN. We don't have to give a week's notice for termination. On this project it has been the custom to give a week's notice if the Administration terminated a person because there wasn't enough work to do or if the evacuee was terminating; either way. It is sort of a gentleman's agreement, but is not a regulation. When people stay away from work without an excused absence he can be terminated without notice. A penalty of an additional day for each day of unexcused absence can be imposed. However, this additional penalty was not imposed. It could have been. They were terminated for refusal to work.

Mr. KURATOMI. Mr. Kallam's statement mentioned the fact that this stoppage of work was not to be considered a strike.

Mr. CAHN. It wasn't considered a strike. If it had been a strike there would have been a conclusion to be reached between the evacuees and the Administration and they would have been carried on the pay roll until the issue was settled. This was not a strike. There was no issue at stake. They just did not go to work.

Then they go on with a long discussion whether or not they should have been terminated or be cut off without the usual 5-day notice.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, I am interested in that, and I think I want to ask you about that when we come back.

So if you want to read that over during the recess, I will probably have about 5 or 10 minutes to question you on that. I have certain phases on that that I want to develop a little bit.

Mr. ENGLE. Very well. I will be glad to.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, do you know, or was it testified, when these Japanese refused to work a period of time, that they were ever paid for that period when they did not work?

Mr. ENGLE. There was no testimony on that subject. The thing I have reference to was the record in which Mr. Cahn presumably set forth the policy of the W. R. A. with reference to strikers.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. ENGLE. Where there was what they called a bona fide strike.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And no testimony was given as to whether or not they were actually paid later for the time that they did not work?

Mr. ENGLE. There was no testimony on that point.

The only reference to that situation was what I read in the record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words, the W. R. A. man represented that if these men had been on what he considered to be a strike, that he would have left their names on the pay roll.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; and they would have been paid while negotiations were in progress.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, that is the point I want to bring out. There is a difference in being on the pay roll and being paid, in my opinion.

Now, there are many times when persons are working as employees in an industrial concern, and they are on the pay roll for the whole month, but they are only paid for the actual hours that they put in, or the actual days that they put in.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, his statement does not indicate that distinction, if it does exist.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I think it is worth developing and finding out.

Mr. ENGLE. But that was not the impression that I got from reading it. Maybe I am in error.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not think it should be concluded because he said they were on the pay roll that they were actually paid, because the committee of Japanese would not have been protesting his action and his viewpoint had they been satisfied.

You see what I mean?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, they protested it that they were terminated and taken off the pay roll without the usual 5 days' notice.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes. And they were dissatisfied by his action.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right; for not giving them the usual 5 days' notice.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. ENGLE. And that is what brought me to the conclusion that if they were not paid when they struck, there would be no particular

reason for complaining in this instance, because they would not have been paid anyway.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, as I see it, it would be fair to assume that they were not being paid, even though their names were on the pay roll, otherwise they would have had no complaint, the Japanese, and they were complaining.

Mr. ENGLE. That is what I understood to be the basis of their complaint.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. ENGLE. That usually they were left on the pay roll while the matter was being negotiated. In this instance they were kicked off, and they said that that was not right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is it not the custom, when there is a dispute between private industry and employees or labor unions, that the private industry keeps the names of its employees on the pay roll, and subsequent negotiations or findings of the National Labor Relations Board or War Labor Board adjudicate as to whether or not they should be paid for the time that they were striking, or part of it, or for a certain period?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. Sometimes they make it retroactive, but I did not understand they leave them on and paid them while the negotiations were in process.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Certainly not. And the testimony is to the effect that they were not to be paid for this period when they were not working.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; and that is what the Japanese were objecting to, as I understand it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

So no fault could be found with the W. R. A. civilian personnel involved in this instance.

Mr. ENGLE. That is true. The thing that startled me was the statement if it had been a bona fide strike, according to their construction, they would have been left on the pay roll until the strike was negotiated.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There were conferences held between this committee of so-called self-selected leaders of Japanese and the W. R. A. personnel after the trouble on November 1.

Mr. ENGLE. You say there were?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think your testimony was to that effect, that they were holding conferences after the trouble on November 1.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, my statement was that they held some conferences after the Army moved in on November 4.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, those conferences were held with the knowledge of the military.

Mr. ENGLE. In conjunction with the military, in fact.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And then with their approval?

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct, apparently, because the conferences were in conjunction with the military. The military was represented at those conferences.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Apparently, then, the military were of the opinion that it was well to have conferences with this Japanese committee.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I never had any statement from the military. Evidently they thought it was wise to sit in on the conferences, at least, to find out what was going on.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, they were in control, the military.

Mr. ENGLE. The military was in control, as I understand it, of the internal security of the camp, but the camp administration was still under the W. R. A. In other words, W. R. A. was still administering the service features of the camp, the supplies and that sort of thing. The Army never undertook to run that feature of the camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If, under the agreement between the Army and the W. R. A. the Army was to have complete control and ultimate authority, and conferences were held after the Army had moved in, would you differ with the judgment of the Army authorities in taking part in these conferences?

Mr. ENGLE. No; not at all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, you have no criticism to make of these conferences that were held between this Japanese committee and the W. R. A. and the Army after the Army took control?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I would not say that. I would say I did not see any objection to the Army sitting in on them. It was apparent, however, that the Japanese were still carrying on their passive resistance, or whatever you want to call it, and as I understand, one of these meetings, at least, involved that proposition that the Japs objected to any discrimination between the employment of one Jap in the camp and another.

Apparently there had been some effort to weed those fellows out who had been the source of the trouble, and the committee was objecting because they said, "Well, if you are going to discriminate against some of these segregants and not employ them, why, we are going to protest that."

Mr. EBERHARTER. What I would like to know, Mr. Engle, is whether you criticize the holding of these conferences after the Army moved in.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not see any particular reason for conferences myself.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, you will not say that you would disapprove or are willing to go on record as criticizing the holding of these conferences after the Army moved in?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it would depend a good deal on what the situation was. Personally, I do not see any particular reason—and this is a matter of opinion only—for holding conferences with the Japs if the Army is running the camp.

The Army ought to go ahead and run it; in other words, what they were still doing, they were still listening to attempts of the Japanese to dictate the policy in the camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the Army authorities were still listening?

Mr. ENGLE. They were sitting in on the conferences.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do not know who called the conferences?

Mr. ENGLE. No; I have an idea the Japanese probably called them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do not know whether the conferences were called at the instigation of the Army authorities, or the instigation of the Japanese, or the instigation of the W. R. A. personnel?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I have no direct information on that; no. All the information I had was that a Jap committee was calling on the administration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think you believe that the segregants who are in Tule Lake, on the Tule Lake Reservation, should be handled in a different manner than those who are being kept in the other relocation centers.

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, I think different measures are necessary; yes, sir. I think the whole policy has to be different, because in those camps where they have presumably loyal Japanese, they can, at least, apparently get along, although they have trouble.

They can still get along in Tule Lake, but, for instance, in running the fire-protection thing, I think anybody would agree that that should not be in the hands of the avowed enemies of the country.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the same with the police department.

Mr. ENGLE. That is true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think you said yesterday that you disapproved of the whole social program as it came down from national leadership. Do you remember saying that yesterday?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you care to say what you meant, or whom you meant by "national leadership"? That might be construed in different ways.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think it goes back to Mr. Myer.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It does not go back to the President of the United States.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, as far as I know, I got a copy of the administrative orders, and what not, that came out, and I do not know whether the President knows anything about that or not. I sort of doubt that he does.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, what did you have in mind when you used the words "national leadership"?

Mr. ENGLE. I was referring to the national leadership of the W. R. A.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What is that social program, in your understanding?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it was expressed very well by Mr. Shirrel when he said that they were not there to save money; that this was a great social experiment. And then he took out the word "experiment," and he said, "Shall I say 'problem'?"

That characterizes it somewhat. Then further, as to the policy of the W. R. A. in the handling of the situation, they had their social-welfare workers there, and they may have been necessary to a certain extent, but they encouraged a fraternization between the Japanese and the white personnel there. They encouraged the white personnel, for instance, to entertain the Japanese in their homes.

As I understand it, the basic reason for failing to build the fence between the Japanese colony and the administrative area and the area where the white personnel lived, was because they did not want to set up a physical barrier, which would emphasize the racial distinctions which existed there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, is that all of the program that you know about; the social program?

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, I could go on perhaps more in detail, but then, that is the general attitude.

I might say that the testimony of various of the witnesses indicated that they were told they had to get along with the Japanese, and that if they could not live with those people, they could not work with them, and that they should not question the honesty of the Japanese when any question was raised about theft and things of that sort; just little items.

Apparently there were no definite instructions that came down in writing that I could find, from Washington, regarding the attitude, for instance, that the camp personnel was to take from the Japanese. It was disseminated more or less on a verbal basis; somewhat in the manner that Mr. Shirrel did and somewhat in the manner that some of the other witnesses testified to.

For instance, the man who ran the slaughterhouse, the farmer referred to this morning, testified regarding the complaints he made as to theft, and he was informed that he should not question the honesty of the Japanese.

Then there was the whole policy was testified to by Mr. Gerry, for instance, of making one compromise after another, and there was the policy of continuous appeasement with reference to the Japanese claims, whether based upon sound grounds or not, and all that type of thing, which is what I have reference to, when I refer to the whole social policy.

It was not a policy, apparently, which was directed to any degree of firmness.

I think that those camps should be operated humanely and that justice ought to be done to the Japanese. I am not in favor of mistreating them, and I do not think they have been mistreated, but I think an integral part of that policy should be a degree of firmness.

But the Japanese have just taken it over and run it themselves, and the disposition, apparently, has been to permit them to do it, and that has given way to encouraging these elements in the camp which sought for power, to make trivial and unreasonable grounds the basis of demonstration and riot and claim against the administration which, in turn, finally culminated in this thing which happened on November 1, and which created an international incident, in effect, and provided the Japanese Government with propaganda which was valuable and useful to them in the Pacific warfare, and may, perhaps, have laid the foundation for action against our nationals, which they will claim, would be justified by the alleged treatment of their nationals.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If I follow you correctly now, you have indicated you believe there was not enough firmness displayed.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But still I do not believe—I do not see where you have enumerated or outlined any social program insofar as the handling of these evacuees is concerned; that is, a social program.

You have indicated that they have not been firm enough in the handling of the evacuees, and that they, perhaps, were too much inclined toward appeasement. Is that what you mean by "social program"?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. Just let the Japanese run their camp, being paid for by the taxpayers; but nevertheless it was their program.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You will admit, though, that it is a problem; that is, the handling of these Japanese, both those of alien citizenship and of American citizenship.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think that the W. R. A. ought to have definite objectives, just like any other organization.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, will you admit that it is a problem; that the handling of these Japanese is a problem?

Mr. ENGLE. The accomplishment of that objective may be a problem, but if they proceed toward the accomplishment of that objective in an efficient and speedy manner, why, the problem will soon dissipate itself.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, it is a problem, is it not? It was a problem at the commencement of the war, was it not?

Mr. ENGLE. It was a problem on the coast; that is why they moved them off.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, it was a problem in any section of the country where there are located any number of important industrial centers contributing to the war effort; is that correct?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not know what you mean by "problem."

Mr. MASON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question along that same line.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. MASON. You say it is a problem, and immediately in my mind comes the thought, "What kind of a problem?"

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is what I am trying to develop.

Mr. MASON. If it is a social problem, that is one thing. If it is a disciplinary problem, that is another thing. If it is a management problem, that is another thing.

Now, of course, you have to clarify the word "problem" before you can get light on any person's opinion as to whether it is a problem or not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is just exactly what I am trying to get from the witness.

Mr. MUNDT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. He said he appreciated the social problem. Then I endeavored to find out whether he considered it was a problem, and then I want to find out what kind of a problem, in his opinion, because this gentleman has made a special investigation, at his own initiative and his own expense, and I want to see what his opinion is as to whether it is a social problem, or a disciplinary problem, or a military problem, or internal-security problem, or what kind of a problem it is.

Mr. MUNDT. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I will be glad to.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to have the reporter read the question asked just before the gentleman from Illinois made his statement.

(Statement read by the reporter as follows:)

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, it was a problem in any section of the country where there are located any number of important industrial centers contributing to the war effort; is that correct?

Mr. MUNDT. I want to emphasize that, because the gentleman from Pennsylvania will recall when Mr. Myer was before the committee, he and I had a little colloquy about what I considered a rather bizarre

theory that he has to the effect that a bad Japanese in Manhattan was a good Japanese in Minneapolis.

Now, I am afraid that you are getting into that same category, indicating that there are certain sections of the country where there are no important contributions to the war effort, and I am wondering if you could specify any such section of the country.

It seems to me that wherever you find a single piece of territory in this Republic today, there are important war activities going on.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There are certainly important war activities in almost every section of the country, and my primary concern always has been the protection of those important war industries.

Mr. MUNDT. I did not want you to forget temporarily the fact that farm production, for instance, is an essential war effort. I happen to come from a farming area, and I do not want that theory of Mr. Myer's to become infectious to the extent that a Jap could be a very desirable citizen in one section of the country and a bad citizen in another section of the country.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, the only comment I have to make on that is, in a farming district, the Japanese, bent on sabotage, do not do nearly as much harm as they could in a defense plant producing various kinds of critical and strategic material.

Mr. MUNDT. It all depends on the value you put on a ripened field which is not guarded, and which is highly important in the production of bread, and a factory manufacturing some material, such as an implement of war, which is well guarded and which would be very difficult to sabotage.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you care to make any comment along the line of the questioning there which Mr. Mason pointed out?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think, to begin with, it was a problem of military security on the Pacific coast. And evidently the War Department felt that the Japanese, as a whole, were of such character that the national safety required their being moved from the Pacific coast, and as soon as they got them away from the coastal area, a transaction which was carried on by the Army, for the most part, they then had the problem of putting them some place; and that is the problem of relocation.

Now, pending, and temporarily, they held them in these relocation centers until such time as they could relocate them, presumably in areas which were not as vulnerable, from a military standpoint, as the Pacific coast.

Now, the problem, then, after the Relocation Authority got hold of the thing, was to relocate those people as quickly and as effectively as they could, and that, apparently, has not been proceeding as rapidly as it should. At least, they still have them in the relocation centers, great numbers of them.

They have gone into the process of segregation and they have segregated those who have admitted their disloyalty, and put them in Tule Lake.

Now, when they go to Tule Lake, those in Tule Lake do not involve the question of relocation any longer, as I understand it, because they have no intention of relocating those segregees, as they call them.

At Tule Lake it simply becomes a problem of administering the segregee camp, as I said, fairly, humanely, and efficiently.

Mr. EBERHARTER. From that statement, I take it that you approve of the relocation program of the W. R. A., and the resettlement of the evacuees in these relocation centers as consistent with the internal security of the country.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I approve of it to this extent, that I think so far as American citizens of Japanese ancestry are concerned, that from a constitutional standpoint, you have no alternative except to relocate them. You cannot hold them indefinitely in a camp without bringing some charge against them, so, as a practical matter, that is the only solution to it, unless you amend the Constitution or face constitutional difficulties in holding them.

I think that has been a matter which was gone into, to some extent, by the Chandler committee and also this committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So this problem is really a specialized problem with which the Government of the United States has never before in its history been confronted with.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And we have never attempted to evacuate by groups or as a whole the enemy aliens of other nationals, either during the last war or during this war.

Mr. ENGLE. No. And I think that is quite a consideration in itself. The fact that the military of this country would consider the Japanese population on the Pacific coast as a whole so dangerous as to require their removal for reasons of national security is, in itself, quite a subject.

It is a good deal beyond what we have ever done anywhere else, and raises the point suggested by Mr. Mundt, and that is, where can you put them if they are not safe on the Pacific coast, which is an exceedingly vital area; where can you put them? Why won't the same consideration which required their removal from the coast also not reflect upon placing them somewhere else?

As I say, when you get down to brass tacks of the matter, the only answer you can give is, as a practical matter, where you have a large group of people who, because of their background and heredity and training, are of such a nature that you do not think they should be kept in a vital military area, why, pretty soon you have to take the most practical method to handle them, and that is what this turned out to be, because of the constitutional question involved in the American citizenship of perhaps 75 percent of those people.

And that is why I say I am not implying here that I think that the Japanese will be safe anywhere; I am just simply saying that as a practical consideration it appears that we are doing the only thing we can do with these American citizens against whom we cannot make any specific charges.

Now, I am not subscribing to the proposition that it may be safe to put them some place else, because I think these loyalty tests are pretty hard to apply and I think, further than that, the Japanese who have the strongest motives for failing to disclose their loyalty toward Japan, will be the ones that you won't find in the Tule Lake center, for instance.

The Japanese who actually wants to commit sabotage in the United States is not going to hesitate to falsify about the loyalty question.

In addition to that, those who are, in fact, disloyal but have strong economic reasons for wanting to maintain a semblance of loyalty, will continue to do so.

There are Japanese in this country who have thousands and thousands of dollars invested in property, and they have a vital economic stake in that property, which might answer on that question; so the fact that you have thousands of disloyal Japanese in Tule Lake does not mean that you have all of the disloyal Japanese, by any means.

There may be a good many more in those other camps who are disloyal.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Engle, as I understand it, you have lived on the coast for a number of years.

Mr. ENGLE. I am a native son.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, that would be a number of years.

And you come in contact with many of these Japanese, both native sons of Japan, and native-born Japs.

Do you think that you could tell a loyal Jap from a disloyal Jap?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not think I could, but I want to qualify that answer by saying that my personal contact with the Japanese, so far as day-to-day association with them, has been very limited, because I happen to live in an area where there were not a great number of them.

Mr. THOMAS. The reason I bring that up is that I discussed these same matters with some Naval Intelligence men out in California—I might say men who had been for many years associated with Naval Intelligence—and they gave me the impression that while they had been practically concentrating on the Japanese out there, they could never tell a loyal Jap from a disloyal Jap.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, that is the belief in California.

Mr. THOMAS. So if we have in one camp Japs whom we think are disloyal and in other camps Japs whom we think are loyal, if this theory carries through, the chances are we are wrong in many cases.

Mr. ENGLE. That is my opinion, and that is why I made the statement I did.

Mr. COSTELLO. Right in line with this question, you think, then, that it is advisable to allow Japanese, particularly alien Japanese, to have their freedom here in Washington, D. C., itself?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, it would be very dubious, in my judgment.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, that is the fact, that there are Japanese, and alien Japanese, here in Washington; in fact, one of whom was a decoding expert for the Japanese Embassy.

I believe there are 24 of them employed by the W. R. A. offices here in Washington.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, then you will agree with me that the problem with which this Government is faced, in having this Japanese question, is an acute problem, as well as being unprecedented.

Mr. ENGLE. You mean the problem of relocation?

Mr. EBERHARTER. The whole problem, from the very commencement up to the present time, now and in the future, as long as the war lasts.

Mr. ENGLE. It is not only a difficult problem, but it is going to be a difficult problem after the war is over.

Mr. THOMAS. And the more disorders there are in these camps, the more difficult the problem will be; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. Particularly from the standpoint of the Pacific coast.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do not believe in the theory of punishing a mass of people because a certain percentage of them should be punished?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I do not believe in punishing anybody who is not guilty of something, but sometimes for reasons of national security, it is necessary to deal with a group of people when you cannot take time to distinguish between one and the other.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. ENGLE. That is what happened in this instance.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is exactly what happened when they moved all of the persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coast.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right, and they had no method or no means of determining which ones were good ones and which ones were bad ones and, therefore, they moved them all.

That, by the way, is a proposition they applied to the Japanese exclusively; they did not apply that to other of our enemies. Even the alien enemies were not treated in the same category.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that we did discriminate against loyal Americans, to some extent, when we moved every person of Japanese descent from the Pacific coast.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Will the witness answer my question? I want his opinion.

Mr. THOMAS. I would like to have the gentleman from Pennsylvania's opinion on that, too.

Mr. ENGLE. We have discriminated, if you could find the loyal Japanese. In other words, if you take a hypothetical case and assume a loyal Japanese, why, you might say he got a tough break because he had to move off the coast; but if he was loyal enough, he would have been glad to do it, because he would realize it was in the interest of national security and because the American Government could not distinguish between the one and the other.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It was impractical or, in fact, impossible to make a quick finding as to those who were loyal and those who were disloyal so, in the interest of national security and from a practical standpoint, it was decided to move all of them; that is correct, is it not?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. That is what they did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And in that process, some innocent persons were inconvenienced, we can say, at least to a great extent.

Mr. ENGLE. If you assume the existence of such innocent persons; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, you will agree that there were some Japanese on the Pacific coast who were loyal to the United States.

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I think perhaps there were some; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you have confidence in the Army Intelligence Service?

Mr. ENGLE. I do, yes; facing an ordinary problem.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the Naval Intelligence Service?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; I have confidence in them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; facing an ordinary problem, I would say I did.

Mr. THOMAS. And confidence in the Dies committee?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; I have confidence in them, too.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You qualified your answer by stating "in solving an ordinary problem."

Mr. ENGLE. That is true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you have confidence in them in the solving of this particular problem with which the committee is now concerned?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, if you have in mind the solving of the question of the Jap who was loyal and who was disloyal, why, I am afraid that that is a problem that the Lord Himself would have to solve.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And if the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Army Intelligence, or the Naval Intelligence, feel that they are able, with their many years of experience, to come to a reasonable conclusion as to the dangerous capacity of some of these particular individuals of Japanese descent, you would be skeptical as to their conclusion?

Mr. ENGLE. I would want to know the methods by which they arrived at their conclusion; yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You have never had any expert training in investigations, aside from your practice as a lawyer and as district attorney?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I had about 9 years.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As an investigator?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I conducted my own investigations; yes, sir. In addition to that, I might say I worked with the division of criminal investigation and identification of the State of California, with some of their best investigators. I think I am familiar with some of their methods.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And yet you are doubtful of the ability and capacity of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army Intelligence, and the Naval Intelligence?

Mr. ENGLE. This is my position: If any of those groups undertook to say that they can tell a loyal from a disloyal Jap, I want a chance to examine their methods.

That is my statement.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Even if they say they have arrived at a system which is sufficient, in their opinion, to make a reasonably satisfactory decision on that subject, you would still not take their word for it?

Mr. ENGLE. I would like to know their methods; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I interrupt at this point here?

While we are discussing the method of trying to determine between a loyal and a disloyal Jap, I might point out here, so far as passing upon the Japs being released from these centers is concerned, and so on, the F. B. I. does not pass upon those Japs; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. I am not prepared to say, because I have not made an investigation on that score.

Mr. COSTELLO. The information that has been submitted to the committee is that the names of those Japanese who are about to be released from the centers are submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and if they have a file in their records on any one of those Japanese, that then they report that fact back to W. R. A.; but if they have no record in their files, they simply notify the W. R. A. that there is no record.

So far as investigations that are being made at the present time, or have been made up to this time, the F. B. I. has made no specific investigation of any individual case prior to that individual being released.

As far as the Army Intelligence of the Naval Intelligence is concerned, a similar procedure prevails, namely, only if they have records in their files concerning the particular Japanese, do they pass that information on to W. R. A. So as far as investigations are concerned, up to the present time, there has been no specific investigation made of any individual Japanese before he is released, that is, by any of these intelligence services of the Federal Government.

Mr. ENGLE. I understood that information to be in the records of the committee, and I read the report on it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Another question I would like to ask you in that connection: You have been asked here whether you approve of the F. B. I.'s system as to the person's loyalty, and so on. You would only do that if you knew the method that the F. B. I. or other intelligence services employed to determine the loyalty of the Jap?

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct, because I do not think you can do it.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, for the Japanese people, it is very easy for them to assimilate the feeling or attitude which actually they do not feel within themselves; is that not correct?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, yes; they seem to be very adept at it.

Whether they are better at it than anybody else, I do not know. But the racial characteristics and background are such that they have a different concept of morals than we do.

Mr. COSTELLO. They have an entirely different ethical code to what we are accustomed to?

Mr. ENGLE. That is right. A Jap can lie with good conscience if it serves the Emperor, as I understand it.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might ask you one other question in this connection. At the time the Japs were evacuated from the coast, was it not the feeling of the Japanese that it was being done for their protection just as much as it was for the protection of the public generally throughout the country?

Mr. ENGLE. I never talked to any of the Japanese about it, but from what I got from public reports, some of the Japs seemed to take that position.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the preliminary movements the Japanese were not resentful at all. As a matter of fact, they were quite content to be removed and evacuated from the Pacific coast, and it was not until after they had been in the centers for some time until the feeling of resentment was developed, and certainly it came to a rather high feeling in many of the relocation centers, and that was largely due, I think, to some of the activities of the welfare workers who worked on the Japanese to create that very feeling, impressing them with the fact that they were injured, wronged, and their rights taken away from them and were mistreated, and were still being mistreated, and if they would demand their rights, they could get anything they wanted.

Now, I think that has been one of the sources of the trouble which has arisen in many of these centers.

That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, you believe the handling of this problem by the Federal Government and our treatment of the Japanese evacuees really has international aspects to it?

Mr. ENGLE. I think that it can have international implications; yes, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I will yield in just a moment.

With particular reference, it would have international aspects to the treatment of any American citizen or soldier who may be in the control of the Japanese authority.

Mr. ENGLE. It might have that reaction.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think that aspect is worthy of deep consideration?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. And that is one of the reasons why I think that we ought to have a change of administration, particularly with reference to the Tule Lake camp, because this is what has happened.

The Japanese in the camps have in fact not been mistreated; they have been well treated, but because of the manner in which the administration has been carried on, these Japanese have been permitted and encouraged to cause strikes, to cause slow-downs, to make demands upon the administration, and by continual concessions and appeasements they have been encouraging that policy, particularly toward those Japanese who were seeking for power in the colonies themselves, and consequently the entire occurrence which took place on November 1, and which is claimed to have had already international reverberations so far as Japan is concerned, is based upon and is attributable solely to the fact that the W. R. A. failed to exercise the proper type of firmness and the proper type of administration in handling that situation. Otherwise it would never have occurred, because they did not have any reason for it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, you do not subscribe, then, to the theory that if it can be definitely shown that these evacuees were treated with consideration, sympathetic consideration, that that would have any effect whatsoever upon the treatment accorded our civilians and our imprisoned soldiers?

Mr. ENGLE. I do not think it will have any effect.

If after all of that, and after giving them every consideration, giving them food, giving them clothing, giving them better medical and dental attention than they ever had perhaps in their lives—if after all of that, for trivial and on baseless grounds, they are permitted to riot and to make demands claiming that they are mistreated, in the final analysis the story will go back to Japan, to their own people, from these people fomenting this trouble and they will claim justification and grounds for it. And the Japanese Government, from the fact that the riot itself occurred and the statements made by their own people—whether groundless or not—will claim that they were abused. Whereas, if a firmer hand were exercised, no riots and no disturbances could occur, and the people were in fact fairly treated; the Spanish representative, who is the representative of the Japanese Government, could walk through the camp and make an inspection, and any fair-minded man would say that they were being fairly and justly treated.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You know that there is an international set-up whereby these camps can be inspected by an impartial observer.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To ascertain whether or not the Japanese evacuees are being fairly treated.

Mr. ENGLE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you not think that that report that would be made, at the request of the Japanese Government, would be an impartial report and would state the facts fairly and honestly, and that would have a good effect on the Japanese Government, insofar as their treatment of our nationals is concerned?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, there is only one thing about that that I am wondering about, and that is this: If the Spanish Ambassador or consul makes an investigation of Tule Lake, as he presumably will, and I am informed has done, and after making that investigation his report on the conditions there disagrees with the reports of the Japanese nationals in that camp, regarding the background of the riots, and the causes for them, I am just wondering whose statement the Japanese Government is going to take; whether it is going to take the statement of the Spanish consul or representative, or is it going to take the statement of its own nationals who, in fact, fomented the riot on trivial and unreasonable grounds?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, throughout many years, since civilization started, we have always relied upon the reports of impartial neutral observers, and if you are going to take the position that the machinery which has been set up over the centuries is unreliable, then we better start on an entirely new basis so far as our diplomatic and foreign affairs are concerned.

Mr. ENGLE. I did not take the position that the machinery was unreliable. I take the position that the Japanese Government is unreliable.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You take a different position.

Mr. ENGLE. I said, let us suppose that the Spanish representative makes a good report and a favorable report which would be, in my judgment, in accordance with the facts and stated, in effect, that the Japanese were not justified in the riot which they conducted on November 1, but along comes the report from the Japanese nationals, themselves—and they certainly have the facilities for getting that information out—which contradicts the statement made by the Spanish representative, then I ask you, if the Japanese Government, for its own purpose, wants to pigeonhole the report made by the Spanish representative and to accept the reports made by its own nationals, it is going to do so, is it not?

Mr. EBERHARTER. It may do so, but at the same time, we have the machinery by which we can ascertain the facts as to their treatment of our nationals over there, and we can take retaliatory measures.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. After he answers that question, I will be glad to yield.

Mr. ENGLE. We are not disposed to take retaliatory measures against anybody.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, they have been threatened in the past, insofar as certain phases of warfare are concerned, have they not?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I know; but our Government is not disposed to take retaliatory measures against Japanese nationals in our custody because of something that the Japanese Government does.

In any event, that is aside from the international aspect of this thing that we are driving at, and that is, that the W. R. A., by permitting these riots to occur on baseless, and for trivial, reasons, are themselves laying the foundation for an international treatment of this subject which will be detrimental to our own people.

Mr. THOMAS. Now, will the gentleman yield at this point?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. We heard Dillon Myer when he testified before this committee and we are going to hear him again next Monday, as I understand it.

I think it is very important that we do not permit Dillon Myer to leave the impression, as I think he tried to do when he testified before us previously, and as he has tried to do during the past, that any disorders that might occur or anything that might happen to our people over in Japan is due to what is happening at these relocation centers here in the United States.

Now, going further, we want to make certain that he does not whitewash his own bad administration by trying to throw the blame for these disorders at the relocation centers on the Dies committee.

I think you will find when he testifies here on Monday, that he is going to cry "International crises" and try to blame it on these hearings and blame our investigation and all these other investigations, in order to whitewash his own bad administration. We want to guard against that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then, in order to have the best obtainable testimony on that subject, I suggest that we call a representative of the Department of State to give us his views so that we can view the subject from every angle.

If you are going to foreclose Mr. Myer from testifying on that aspect, I will request that a gentleman from the Department of State be called as a witness.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Mr. Myer already testified on that point, not only before our committee but also before the press.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is a matter that we can take up in executive session.

Mr. MASON. I am quite interested in this international aspect of the question that has arisen at these relocation centers. I understand that our nationals are under the direct supervision and care of the Japanese Army officials.

I am also of the opinion—and this is only my own personal opinion—that our Japanese problem, if you want to call it a problem, of these nationals, of Japanese ancestry, should be under the control of the management and discipline of the Army, as our nationals are over there.

In that case, they would both be on the same basis and we would avoid these international complications, because the Army would certainly be interested in avoiding them.

The problem arose, as I see it, when the Army moved these Japanese nationals into these centers and then turned them over to the

administration of civilian employees who have, as their objective, social work and social welfare and social other things, which naturally bring out these other troubles that we have been going through.

Now, I am wondering why we do not recommend that, why we do not arrive at some such conclusion? Why should we bother with all of these things when it could and should be satisfactorily arranged in that manner?

Mr. COSTELLO. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MASON. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding that the American civilians who are interned over in Japan proper are under the control of the civilian police.

Now, the police in Japan, as I understand it, are sort of an adjunct of the military service. They are not strictly soldiers who are handling those camps in Japan.

However, in the camps located in the territories that have been conquered by Japan, there the Japanese Army does handle those camps in the Philippines and in China.

Mr. ENGLE. May I ask a question at that point, Mr. Chairman?

Is not the police force in Japan, in effect, a part of the Army, and corresponds, in effect, to our military police?

Mr. COSTELLO. They do not have the same police system as we do in this country. They are sort of an adjunct of the military, but it is not directly the soldiers, as such, as I understand it, who are handling the camps in Japan, but this police organization.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Engle, do you know anything about the schedule of pay set up by the W. R. A. for these persons in Tule Lake?

Mr. ENGLE. The testimony indicated that the pay ran from \$12 to \$19 a month, depending upon the status of the particular individual, whether he was a foreman or had a higher capacity, or was just doing common work.

Mr. EBERHARTER. \$19 a month?

Mr. ENGLE. That was the maximum.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Plus maintenance?

Mr. ENGLE. Oh, yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is the highest pay that any person in those camps can make?

Mr. ENGLE. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That includes even the medical doctors of Japanese descent?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I am not prepared to say on that. I know of no exceptions, if that is what you mean.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I have concluded my questioning of the witness, and I want to give my personal thanks to him for his very fine testimony. I appreciate it. I have learned a lot from his testimony, and I think it will help to clarify the record in many respects, and I want to also thank the other members of the committee who were so patient in their attitude when I was asking all of these questions.

Mr. ENGLE. It has been a pleasure to be here.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt, do you have any questions?

Mr. MUNDT. Just a very few.

Were you present at the time the California Senate committee hearings were conducted out there?

Mr. ENGLE. I was present during all of the hearings; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. During all of the hearings?

Mr. ENGLE. From its beginning to its end.

Mr. MUNDT. How many members of the California Senate committee comprised the hearing board?

Mr. ENGLE. Four out of five. Senator Hatfield was the only one who was not present.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know those four senators personally?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. I worked with them in the State senate.

Mr. MUNDT. You served with them in the State senate, you say?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Was it a biparty committee?

Mr. ENGLE. Yes. The committee consisted of two Republicans and two Democrats.

Mr. MUNDT. From your knowledge of these men and your service in the senate with them, do you feel that they were pretty able to hold hearings and take testimony of this kind?

Mr. ENGLE. Extremely able. And some of the best men in the senate, incidentally. They were men who were highly regarded. One of the men, Senator Slater, is the senior member of the California Senate. He has served in the California Senate for over 30 years.

Mr. MUNDT. Was it your personal conclusion, which you secured from your observations at the hearings and the supplementary investigations which you made of the situation individually, that it jibed pretty well with the conclusion made by the Senate Investigating Committee?

Mr. ENGLE. I concurred in their recommendation, which was transmitted to the Congress.

Mr. MUNDT. Were the security officers, the internal police force at Tule Lake, comprised of Caucasians or of these disloyal segregationists?

Mr. ENGLE. They were disloyal segregationists, except for six white Caucasian internal security officers, including Mr. Schmidt, who was the national chief of internal security and at the camp at the time.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, the sole Caucasian force to keep law and order over 15,000 alleged disloyal Japanese were 5 Caucasians, aided by Mr. Schmidt, who was there just part of the time?

Mr. ENGLE. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. You think that there is any conceivable way in which a battery of six white security officers could control a group of this kind and prevent riots and mobs?

Mr. ENGLE. In my judgment, they cannot.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they armed with machine guns or bazookas, or what were they supposed to use?

Mr. ENGLE. They were required to perform their duties unarmed. They did not even have clubs.

Mr. MUNDT. One of the recommendations made at our previous hearings was that Mr. Myer should instigate a definite, constructive Americanization program in each of these relocation centers, even at Tule Lake, where these internees have indicated their disloyalty to the United States.

If they are American citizens, the chances are we are going to have to contend with them after the war, so if they could be Americanized and made to appreciate American ideals, and in some way we could inculcate western manners and habits and ideals in them, we might help solve the post-war problem.

Did you see any manifestation of a constructive Americanization program under way at Tule Lake?

Mr. ENGLE. Well, I did not; although I think that they do have. They have laid the foundation for such a program, but their school system was in a state of suspension; in fact, they were not running their schools at all.

Mr. MASON. Would the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MASON. As one educator of some thirty-odd years' standing, I know of no educational system that can Americanize any disloyal person, regardless of race or color or anything else. That is beyond the power of the educational system.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you not believe in the doctrine of reformation?

Mr. MASON. I do not believe in the doctrine of reformation from the standpoint of education.

Mr. MUNDT. Of course, an Americanization program arranged by this committee would not be limited to the school.

Mr. MASON. I have heard of educational programs which were not based in connection with schoolbooks but some of these pedagogic theories that we have nowadays. This is the speedy handling of a disciplinary problem.

Mr. MUNDT. If you are going to educate them, the first thing you have to teach them in respect for law and Government.

Mr. MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I am afraid that 6 men with clubs would have kind of a hard time doing that, with 15,000 disloyal segregationists.

Mr. ENGLE. Without clubs, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MUNDT. With or without clubs.

I just want to thank Mr. Engle for the time he spent in studying this situation and for his corroborative statements, concurring in the findings of the senate committee of California, and, it seems to me, having been on the ground and taking testimony and making a transcript of it, has pretty well covered that field of testimony.

Consequently, I see no particular need of the Dies committee putting the Congress to the expense of going out, rehashing, and re-traveling all this ground and examining all of these witnesses, since the testimony seems to be unanimous that a very competent committee has done that.

I think we might hear very well from Mr. Myer, and certainly I, for one, would like to, and if Mr. Eberharter wants to call somebody from the State Department, we would be glad to hear him, or the War Department, at this end of the line.

But I do not see much purpose in going out and talking to the witnesses whose sworn testimony we now have.

That is all I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Congressman Engle, for having come here before the committee, and for being so kind to give us

your time in responding to all the questions that have been asked and put to you.

I also would like to emphasize the fact that we appreciate your having gone out, as Mr. Eberharter pointed out, on your own initiative, to look into this problem, and, likewise, at your own expense.

It unquestionably has been of benefit to the people of the country, and a saving of expense not sending the committee out there, which might not have been at our expense.

Let me say that we appreciate what you have done, and I think the people of your district have been very happy to have you alert to the problem which is far more serious than we, in Washington, or the administrators of W. R. A. are inclined to realize. You have done a great good in going out there and bringing this message back to us, and I hope through the medium of this committee we are going to bring about a situation that will be beneficial and put an end to the trouble, this trouble that they have been having in these various camps.

The committee will stand adjourned until Monday, at 10:30 a. m., at which time we hope to have Mr. Myer as a witness.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p. m., the committee adjourned to reconvene Monday morning, December 6, 1943, at 10:30 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello, presiding.

Present: Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. Lowell Stockman, Oregon; Hon. Norris Poulson, California; Hon. Clair Engle, California; Hon. J. Parnell Thomas, New Jersey; and Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Stripling, will you call the first witness?

Mr. STRIPLING. Congressman Stockman.

STATEMENT OF HON. LOWELL STOCKMAN, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, OREGON

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you give your full name to the reporter, please?

Mr. STOCKMAN. Lowell Stockman, Second Congressional District of Oregon.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Stockman.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I wish to appear before your subcommittee to give you what I know about the Japanese situation at Tule Lake.

As you might know, I am particularly interested in that situation due to the fact that the district I represent runs within 6 or 8 miles of this Tule Lake concentration camp, and Klamath Falls, which is the largest city in Klamath County, is a town of about 25,000 population, and which city does most of the business of the Klamath Basin in which the Tule Lake camp is located, is tributary to, and a part of that region.

My people in Klamath County are very much interested in what goes on at the Tule Lake concentration camp.

Now, I have had several communications from people down there regarding the trouble that has been had there, and some of them have been very much roughed up about the situation as they view it, so that is what I wish to appear here before you today on.

My thought is that you members of the Dies subcommittee, charged with investigating un-American activities, have a real matter before

you, something that is serious, of an international complication and implication, and something that, to my notion, is much more than committees from State legislatures or county or State officers, can cope with; that it is a matter for the Federal Government.

In my opinion, I think that you members of the Dies committee are derelict of your duties that you are not out on the Pacific coast at the moment, and for the last 10 days be holding hearings out there on this matter.

I think that you men have too important a job than to be listening to what evidence you can cover here in Washington, D. C., and it is my judgment that you should go out there and have a first-hand look into this very serious matter.

I realize that the matter of Japanese concentration camps is very involved; it goes further than being a matter of dollars and cents, or a matter of security, even, for the American Continent. It takes in the well-being of our own American people who are locked up in Japan.

As I see it, we have a responsibility and a duty to the Japanese in our concentration centers here that is a very weighty one, and we must handle it with care; but I think we should be realistic instead of socialistic in the handling of it.

And from what I hear and from what my people tell me, the W. R. A. is having a lot of trouble with this problem, and I think that the W. R. A. should either be vindicated and be given a clean slate, or else it should be revamped or else the Army should be told to take control of these centers.

This thing has gone too far and with too little done to the matter back on a workable basis, and I think it is long past time that the matter should be rectified and that one of those three things should be done.

Now, I have heard what, for my own part, I am not personally familiar with. I cannot say that the W. R. A. is wrong. That the Japanese are doing this or that or the other thing, that they should not do; but I have always gone on the theory that where there is smoke, there is fire.

And there is certainly plenty of smoke out there.

I would just like to read to you, for your information, a letter from a constituent of mine at Klamath Falls, who makes some very grave charges, and I think that those charges should be run down and either substantiated or thrown out, and whoever is handling the situation be cleared of all blame, or else somebody else more fitted should take it over.

This gentleman comes from Klamath Falls. His name is W. Yoe-man, representative of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.

The letter is addressed to me, and states:

DEAR SIR: I note by the press that you have been appealed to for an investigation of the Jap camp at Tule Lake, Calif. I believe that I know more about what is going on there than the average person for this reason: For the past several months my work has taken me by that camp two or three times a week, and nearly always I pick up soldiers and give them rides, and from their conversation the following facts stand out:

That our soldiers are subject to the vilest abuse from the Japs; that they are vilified; in some instances the Japs have spit in the faces of our soldiers; that rocks are thrown through the windows of cabs, and in some instances, the

drivers were injured; that the Japs have better food than Americans are able to get; that the Japs have a radio sending and receiving station; that at times they jam up the air until our soldiers are unable to get American programs; and that the Japs have a "hook" shop for the pleasure of the Jap men.

I won't identify any of the men that have given me this information for if I did they would probably have any future leaves revoked, but I believe that the above facts are true for they have been told me not by one soldier, but by many.

We know from investigation that was made last winter by congressional committees, the officials of the War Relocation Authority have lied to us in the past, it is my belief that they are now.

Sincerely yours,

W. YOEMAN,

Representative, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.

Now, gentlemen, I do not purport to know whether or not that is true, but I do say that this Dies committee, with the official standing that it has, should go out to the Pacific coast, to the Tule Lake relocation center, and either give the War Relocation Authority a clear bill of health and absolve them of these charges, or else make the recommendation that the Army should take over, or else clean house in W. R. A.

Do whatever you find best to do, under the circumstances; but something should be done about it.

Now then, I also am told from sources out there that the Japs are making moonshine whisky in this camp. That is another thing that should be cleared and run to the ground. If the authorities are allowing that to be done out there, proper cognizance should be taken of their actions, and punishment meted out, or else they should be given a clean bill of health. You gentlemen should look into this and give it an official going-over.

I believe that is the main thing I have in mind.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who is the gentleman that wrote the letter?

Mr. STOCKMAN. I can leave the letter with you, if you wish.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was just wondering if you knew his background, and whether or not he is a reliable person. Are you personally acquainted with him?

Mr. STOCKMAN. I have met him several times. His name is Wilfred Yoeman, and he is the representative of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. He is a labor man in Klamath Falls. He has lived there for a good many years, and I have met him several times, and talked with him.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you received any number of complaints of that character?

Mr. STOCKMAN. Several.

Mr. COSTELLO. From people out there in that general vicinity?

Mr. STOCKMAN. Yes; all of my complaints, you understand, come from Klamath Falls, Oreg. Naturally, that is my district, and those are the ones that I have talked to about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I believe that the charges made in this letter are of a very serious nature, and that the committee should immediately act, by requesting, I think, an official report from the War Department through the commanding officer of the soldiers stationed out there. That reply can be had within a very few days; even by telegram.

I think Mr. Stockman is absolutely correct in his assertion that this matter should be cleared up. If those charges are true, of course, it is a serious matter.

I think it would be very simple to have a report from the commanding officer of the detachment that is stationed out there to prove or disprove these charges, and I think that it should be done immediately.

Mr. STOCKMAN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Make a note of that, Mr. Stripling, that that request is made of the War Department for a report.

Now, Mr. Stripling, will you call the next witness?

Mr. STRIPLING. Congressman Poulson.

STATMENT OF HON. NORRIS POULSON, THIRTEENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

Mr. COSTELLO. State your full name and title to the reporter, please.

Mr. POULSON. Norris Poulson, representing the Thirteenth District of California.

Mr. Chairman, I want to protest in behalf of the people of southern California on the lack of firmness in handling the Japanese of proven disloyalty in the Tule Lake center in California.

I heard a high official of the Government in executive session state that he did not care what the people of California thought or wanted, and that he was still going to protect the rights of all Japanese. And then, I later heard this same gentleman, with other men in high position, state that this was a social problem.

I wish to call their attention to the following fact:

The people of California are sacrificing, and we hope only temporarily relinquishing their personal liberties and rights, in order to help the war effort. Therefore, I warn the leaders of this administration that if you expect the continued unified support of California you must show an entirely different attitude in the handling of this Japanese problem.

The recent release about the Japanese instructing the American farmers in how to live is just a mere carrying out of the policy adopted by the leaders of W. R. A.

We, in the United States, have had certain groups trying to inaugurate a certain European philosophy and thought, and now we find this same group wanting to adopt the Japanese way of life by having them instruct our farmers how to live.

Much has been said about the fact that we should not discuss this, because Japan will take steps to retaliate against our citizens in her prison camps. I might state that this Tule Lake incident would not have happened had the leaders of W. R. A. been humane, just, but firm. I would also suggest that Mr. Myer and others interview some of the American citizens who have recently returned on the *Gripsholm*.

That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do not think that this is a partisan matter—the handling of these Japanese?

Mr. POULSON. Yes; I think it is a group of socialized theorists who have no idea of the practical way of life. They just want to merely put over their philosophy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And what philosophy is that?

Mr. POULSON. It is a social philosophy which they want to exaggerate. They want to cause dissent and everything else. It has proven that.

And I can tell you, Mr. Eberharter, I know your stand on the question, and I positively merely think it is a case of protecting the administration on it; that you have no idea whatsoever about the Japanese; you have never lived around them; you have never dealt with them; and they are so foreign, so different from any Americans that you have ever come in contact with that you have to deal with them entirely differently.

I will give you an illustration. If you go to trade with them, they will take everything from you, if you try to be what you call decent. The only way that you can deal with them is to be firm. You say to them, "There it is; take it or get out of here," and they will take it.

I have spent years among them. I know about their associations; that is, they have an association where they will move into a community and run the other farmers out by cutting prices, and then after they have run the other farmers out, in the vegetable-garden country, they will try to jack the prices up.

And the only way to deal with them is to be firm; telling them, "That is it; take it or leave it" and not this idea of coddling or giving in.

You ask Mr. Myer when he comes before you if he did not give in to the demands of this disloyal group when they met at the Tule Lake camp after they had this trouble; if he did not give in to their demands. Now, you ask him that question, Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Surely. Now, Mr. Poulson, I think you made the statement that you know my stand.

Mr. POULSON. I am taking that stand on the basis that you are always interrogating from the standpoint of backing up the W. R. A. administration. I have read and heard enough of it that that would be my personal opinion, very firmly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you have not decided in your own mind that I have already arrived at a conclusion with respect to exactly how this problem should be handled, have you?

Mr. POULSON. No. I say, from the questions and from the minority report, and all that has been said to this date, I would say that you were approaching it as a person who did not fully realize the psychology and the method of handling Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You admit, Mr. Poulson, that this is a very serious problem?

Mr. POULSON. I do.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You admit that it is a problem?

Mr. POULSON. I admit that it is a problem, Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that it is rather a keen problem, is it not?

Mr. POULSON. It has been made an acute problem. It has resulted in one as the result of their lack of firmness in dealing with these disloyal Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How about the loyal Japanese, loyal to the American principles?

Mr. POULSON. I am referring to the Tule Lake incident.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Only to Tule Lake?

Mr. POULSON. Only to Tule Lake.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then you would absolve the W. R. A. from any blame in connection with the other relocation centers?

I take it your remarks this morning only referred to the Tule Lake relocation center.

Mr. POULSON. That is the one I am placing the greatest emphasis on.

Mr. THOMAS. I will go further than that; I would include them all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the gentleman answer my question.

Mr. THOMAS. I would include them all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to have him answer my question.

Mr. THOMAS. And he is doing a darn good job, too.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am sure you want to answer my question, Mr. Poulson?

Mr. POULSON. Yes, I will, Mr. Eberharter.

I will say it is their attempt to encourage the Japanese: not by the method of telling the Japanese that they were smarter and could teach the Americans something, but their idea of encouraging the Japanese of American ancestry.

And we will say what they would call their method of proven loyalty, of going to other portions of the United States—I have not objected to that, and I am not one of these men who say that the Japanese should be lined up and shot. I believe that you have to be humane and just, but we certainly have to be firm when we are dealing with these babies, because if you have ever been around them you will find out that you absolutely cannot live around them unless you are firm.

Now, it is a strange thing how quietly they changed their attitude after you have shown that you will take a definite stand.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then I take it, from your statement that you just made, that you approve of a resettlement program for these loyal Japanese Americans that are in some of these relocation centers.

Mr. POULSON. After they have been proven, yes: on the basis of loyalty. I am definitely talking about this Tule Lake area.

Mr. THOMAS. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes. I will be glad to.

Mr. THOMAS. Does the gentleman from California then feel that it is all right to release these Japs from the other relocation centers and send them back to California?

Mr. POULSON. Not back to California.

Mr. THOMAS. You do not mean you want all of them to stay in California.

Mr. POULSON. We have a problem right there. I feel that I am at liberty at this time to quote a statement made by General DeWitt, right after Pearl Harbor, when he called the committee of the State legislature before him, and explained why they did not want any anti-Japanese legislation at the time, because they had this program of moving the Japanese to the camps, and they did not want to get the people incited so as to cause any trouble.

And he definitely brought out the fact that these people were dangerous when in groups, if they were not protected or if they were not under the jurisdiction of certain authorities, because it is impossible to tell who is loyal and who is disloyal.

Now, I am not O. K.'ing the particular method used by the W. R. A., but I still believe personally that there are some loyal Japanese.

I had stated, in answer to Mr. Thomas' question, I believe, that if these other States are willing to accept them—and they evidently are, in small groups, and having them segregated around the country—that I am not objecting to that; but the fact of the business is, coming to California, I am objecting to that for this reason: First, that we definitely would have trouble, because there are many people who are so worked up about this problem at this time that I am positive that we would have riots and no doubt bloodshed if they were allowed to come back into Southern California.

As to the matter of handling the Japanese after the war, I am not going to make any statement on that, because I do believe that we will be able to approach it then from a better viewpoint than we can today.

MR. THOMAS. You quoted General DeWitt as saying that it was impossible to tell a loyal from a disloyal Jap.

MR. POULSON. At that time; yes.

MR. THOMAS. On that basis, why release these Japs to other States than California? Why not keep them where they are, for their own protection?

MR. POULSON. "For their own protection" is a very good remark, because I am afraid, after this last incident, and the publicity that came out about it, that it will not be helpful to them.

Frankly, I am speaking for California now, when I say that we do not want them there.

MR. THOMAS. One of the criticisms you made of the W. R. A. was that the W. R. A. was not firm enough, and you were referring particularly to Tule Lake.

Now, do you think the W. R. A. has been firm enough in the other centers?

MR. POULSON. I think that they have stressed too much the social aspect of it by allowing them certain privileges.

For instance, I have letters in my file from people who work in the camp, who claim they do not want their names divulged, telling me of things, of course, which are certainly not to be commended, which have resulted from the fact that they allow this so-called self-rule, the one case where I paid particular attention to, which has been the Tule Lake incident, and I have felt that right along, from all the testimony I have read—and I have read everything, and I have got first-hand reports from men who have been closely associated with it.

I personally know all the members of the Senate committee who investigated that incident, and I happen to know that three of those members are probably as good supporters—I will say it this way—we could not call it political, but as good supporters of the administration as you will find, on general plans, and they have taken it up strictly from a nonpartisan standpoint.

I think Mr. Engle will bear me out, as far as the membership of that committee is concerned, and I am protesting about that particular incident, because I think that is, as I understand it, the subject that is before the committee now.

MR. THOMAS. That is all.

MR. EBERHARTER. I want to be sure that I know your position, Mr. Poulson.

I take it that you feel that it was right, in the first place, for these Japanese, all of them, to be removed from the Pacific coast, because

it was impractical, or practically impossible, to determine immediately the loyal and the disloyal Japanese; that is, to separate them.

Mr. POULSON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So you approve of that.

Mr. POULSON. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And I take it that you also approve of the program of W. R. A. insofar as resettlement of American citizens who are loyal to the United States Government, in various sections of the country, with the exception of California.

Mr. POULSON. That is, in theory; yes.

Now, I am not going to O. K. their method of having the Japanese sign a slip of paper as to whether he is loyal or disloyal; but in principle I feel that that is a problem which is going to be a very serious one after the war, and this might be one of the means by which we can help alleviate a very serious problem at that time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Your criticism this morning, and the reason for your appearance before this committee was to emphasize your position that the situation in Tule Lake was not handled with enough firmness and discretion and judgment.

Mr. POULSON. Yes; definitely so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you will also, I think, Mr. Poulson, admit that the whole question involves constitutional rights of some of these American citizens who have even if not proven beyond question their loyalty to the United States, still there is no specific charge which can be brought against them.

Mr. POULSON. Well, now, I certainly am no constitutional lawyer. I am just merely a certified public accountant, but I am going to be frank and state my position on this subject this way:

We find that under the terms of war necessity and war emergency that we, ourselves, have lost many of our personal liberties and our rights, and we are compelled to do some things because of the war, and if these Japanese are so loyal as they profess to be themselves, or as the officials of W. R. A. profess them to be, that if the picture of the loyal and the disloyal Japanese is presented to them, and they have evidence to prove they are loyal American citizens among the Japanese, that if the story is presented to them in this fashion they can undergo temporary relinquishment of some of their liberties for the general welfare of our country, and as everyone else is concerned and everyone else is compelled to do, think about their Government first and their personal privileges or discomforts secondly.

Now, with that policy adopted, it should be a matter of working it out rather than accentuating personal liberties and rights of a very small minority of just one particular right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is a very good statement. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. You made some comment on the matter of the Japanese farmers. You think the Japanese would be able to teach the Midwest farmers throughout Ohio and those States, how to pack and display farm products?

Have you ever seen any Japanese products displayed on the markets?

Mr. POULSON. I know, when you look at a box of strawberries, you will notice everybody in the market turn it upside-down to see what is on the bottom.

I know that that is one thing I certainly was amused at, when those remarks were made, because anyone in California, around the agricultural districts, will know that of all people who can live in hovels and huts and in unsanitary conditions, it is the Japanese that live under such conditions and in such places, and that, of course, merely substantiates the fact that the people who are writing these articles, and some of those things, certainly do not know anything about the Japanese people.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have seen some of the houses in which the Japanese live out on the west coast?

Mr. POULSON. Oh, yes; I have been around there, because I had a client, a big chain-store operator, who purchased from these farmers, and I have had occasion to be there and go with him to some of these vegetable gardens and truck farmers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you ever gone inside, in any of those houses?

Mr. POULSON. No; but I have peeked in. It was bad enough.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are they clean and fairly comfortable?

Mr. POULSON. I would say this: We hear a great deal about how some of the Mexicans have lived in California, but the Japs are still living in huts and hovels which are far more unsanitary than these Mexican places we hear so much about in California.

Mr. COSTELLO. As a people, they are not much interested in luxuries or refinements in their homes, are they?

Mr. POULSON. No; they are interested in profit and money.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, crowding into small huts, with one or two families, sometimes, in each of them.

Mr. POULSON. As to the children, you will find them working in the field until time to go to school, and then they go off to school. You will see them start off to school after working in the vegetable garden, after hoeing or weeding the garden.

The Japanese people just look, as far as their habits are concerned, I would say, just like the rest of the people you have in different groups. We have some who are exceptionally clean, but they are an exception to the rule, as far as cleanliness is concerned. That is the point that I want to definitely make.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not think they set a fine example for an Aryan standard of living, do you?

Mr. POULSON. I am afraid not.

Mr. COSTELLO. In huddling together, with three or four children in one room, sometimes?

Mr. POULSON. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. With the wife and all the children there, and working the whole family on the farms?

Mr. POULSON. And a good-sized family, at that.

Mr. COSTELLO. They utilize the children in working the farms, do they not?

Mr. POULSON. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they work them from the first ray of light in the morning until the last ray at night.

Mr. POULSON. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And is that not one of the difficulties that the white farmers have to contend with, because the Japanese use all of these children for their farm work?

Mr. POULSON. Including the wife.

Mr. COSTELLO. The wives, daughters, and sons?

Mr. POULSON. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Will you call the next witness, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. The next witness is Mr. Myer.

**SWORN STATEMENT OF DILLON S. MYER, DIRECTOR, WAR
RELOCATION AUTHORITY**

Mr. COSTELLO. Please state your name and title to the reporter.

Mr. MYER. My name is Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, when was the present segregation program of W. R. A. put into operation?

Mr. MYER. I think the first announcement that we were going ahead, that was put in writing, with the segregation problem was in April, in a letter directed to Senator Chandler; I have forgotten the exact date, but some time around the early or middle of April.

The actual promulgation of the program, in all of its details, did not get under way until the last week in July, at which time we brought together all of the representatives of all of the centers, and went over the detailed plans for train movements, and the detailed program for completing the analysis of the individuals to go to Tule Lake and the general handling of the problem.

I think that date was July 26 or 27, but, of course, it was necessary, previous to this time, to have methods of planning and detail—

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I want this to be more brief. He is just starting out the way he did before. He is going to make a speech every time you ask him a question.

Mr. MYER. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I was trying to answer the question as definitely as I could.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, that is a long ways around it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Ask the witness to directly answer the questions as they are put to him.

You may proceed.

Mr. MYER. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, do you think I was dodging the issue on this one?

Mr. COSTELLO. I think you have given us a general statement in reply to the question.

You may proceed.

Mr. MYER. May I ask you, was that statement too long in answer to the question?

Mr. COSTELLO. The question was a general question, so it would call for a rather full answer, but I would suggest that the question be answered as directly as possible.

Mr. MYER. I will do my best, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. The program of segregation, then, was really inaugurated on July 26 and 27.

Mr. MYER. Detailed plans were presented to the group at the centers at that time, but the program was inaugurated many weeks previous to that time, with the plans for the gathering of detailed records and information as a basis for the segregation program.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long did the process of segregation require?

Mr. MYER. We have been in progress of segregation ever since the War Relocation Authority was established practically, laying the ground work for the development of records, and it is still in process. It has gone on over a period of many, many months.

Mr. STRIPLING. When do you expect the program to be completed, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I hope that we might complete it, or we have hoped that we might complete it, by January 1.

Now, at Tule Lake it looks like it might carry over until February or March, depending whether we can take the space available at Tule Lake for the movement of additional people who are still at Manzanar and a few at the other locations. They are now building additional barracks, and it will depend when the Army schedule and their contractors can complete that job.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many evacuees at Manzanar, or any of the other relocation centers, have been determined to be disloyal and subject to segregation, who have not yet actually been removed to Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. Approximately 3,000. I do not know the exact figure, because final determinations are not quite completed.

There are 1,900 at Manzanar who should have been moved at the time we made our major movemnet between the middle of September and the middle of November, but barracks space was not available.

We are estimating that there will be approximately 1,000 in all of the 10 centers, in addition to that, that will ultimately be moved, who have not yet been moved for a number of reasons.

Some of them were ill at the time; some of them we had not completed hearings on; and there were other reasons.

Mr. STRIPLING. The 1,900 that are at Manzanar now, are they segregated from the other evacuees?

Mr. MYER. They are not; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. They are not. The 1,000 others you spoke of, are they segregated from the general population?

Mr. MYER. They are not; no sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What are the real factors of the delay in removing the 1,900 from Manzanar?

Mr. MYER. Merely a matter of space at Tule Lake in which they might live.

We do not have barracks space enough for the whole group. They are building 10 additional blocks at Tule Lake to take care of the additional segregtees. Had we had the space, they would have been moved, as I already said, between the middle of September and about mid-October.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it your thought, Mr. Myer, to keep all of these disloyal Japs at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. That is correct; yes. Anyone who is not eligible, ultimately, for relocation, would be located at Tule Lake.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think it would be advisable to break them up into smaller groups? Smaller units, that is, than to have 20,000 all in one of the camps?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Costello, if we did not have a war on, and had plenty of construction material and manpower to guard them, I would say yes.

As a matter of fact, we have examined throughout the months, beginning in August 1942, the possibility of securing other places where we could relocate repatriates other than at Tule Lake, and we have been unsuccessful, and because of the manpower problem, and for many other reasons, we have decided that the only logical approach was to take one of our larger centers, of which Tule Lake was one of the three, and to use that center.

We are, at Tule Lake, now breaking up the units, and those who have been active troublemakers will be separated from the rest of the colony in a compound that will be operated as a separate unit from the rest of the colony.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that why the new barracks are being built?

Mr. MYER. We will probably use some of the older barracks over next to the military police headquarters and utilize some of the new barracks for some of the people coming in.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the present Japanese population, Mr. Myer, of the Tule Lake relocation center?

Mr. MYER. Approximately 15,000. It is slightly under. I cannot give you the exact figure, but that is approximately correct.

Mr. STRIPLING. You say there are 1,900 at Manzanar and 1,000 at the other relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. Approximately. We anticipate there will be about 18,000 at Tule Lake when we have completed the job.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then there will be 18,000 evacuees whom the W. R. A. will consider to be disloyal?

Mr. MYER. No; not necessarily. There will be 18,000 evacuees. The majority of the adult population of that group have so declared themselves as disloyal to the United States, or who want to be pro-Japanese. They will be mixed in with the group.

However, members of families whom I do not think should be considered disloyal, but they have simply joined their families who have youngsters there from ages 1 up to 25 years of age, who have decided, even the older ones, to go along with their families, who lived all their lives in the United States, and who are not unusually disloyal, and in my judgment some of them are not—but because of family reasons, are located at Tule Lake.

It is a mixed group, but I would like to repeat, that the majority of the adult population are the people who have determined that they want to be repatriated to Japan, that would not agree to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States or who would not agree to abide by the laws or do nothing to injure the war effort of the United States.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, will you explain to the committee the process used by W. R. A. in determining the loyalty or disloyalty of an evacuee for the purpose of segregation?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I would be glad to do that. First, let me say that I could shorten this statement if you would care to go back to the original record, in remembering the statement that I made previously, on our general sorting process on which Mr. Mundt questioned me in detail.

However, I will be glad to go over that again, if you wish.

The basic records on which we started this program were the records that were secured previous to and during the registration period

conducted in February and March of this last year, following the advent and announcement of the combat team by the War Department.

Those questionnaires were detailed and a complete questionnaire, a copy of which I would be glad to put into the record, Mr. Stripling, which would save time.

But it generally provided information regarding the individual, the place of birth, whether an alien or citizen, his ability to speak the Japanese language, the organizations to which they belonged, the type of employment in the past, whether they made trips to Japan, and if so, how many and for what purpose, business relationships with Japan, as well as religious affiliations, and contact relationships with other people who had done business with Japan. Also numerous other questions with which I think you are familiar, and we will be glad to complete the record without going into detail.

Now, that questionnaire served as background material for setting up some criteria on which to begin to group people of different types.

(The above questionnaires appear in appendix, pp. 10120, 10123.)

In the first place, everyone who, previous to July 1, had requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan and had not officially changed their minds up to that time, were categorically sent——

Mr. EBERHARTER. July 1?

Mr. MYER. Of 1943, yes; were categorically sent to Tule Lake, and along with them the members of their families, if they cared to go with them.

That was the only group that was sent as a total category of people.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, how many people were included in that group?

Mr. MYER. I think at the time we started there were 6,300 people. I think since that time, additional ones have declared, so that the total group, as I understand it now, including the members of families, would be something over 7,000 people.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question there, please?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, you used the phrase "who would not change their mind."

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you mean by that if one of these Japs, after he had indicated that he was disloyal, but who later changed his mind, that you would now consider him loyal?

Mr. MYER. No; that is not what it means. It simply means that anyone who previous to July 1 revised their decision for repatriation, was put in a group that we called group 3, and they had a further hearing before being sent to Tule Lake, to make a determination as to whether we thought they should go there or remain in the other center.

He was not categorically sent because he at one time indicated he wanted to go back to Japan.

Now, may I proceed?

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. MYER. The second largest group, I presume, that were sent to Tule Lake was that group of people who refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States, or who, if they were aliens, refused to answer the question in the affirmative relating to their willingness to abide by the laws of the United States and to do nothing to interfere with the war effort.

Now, that group were all given another hearing, if they cared to have it, before they were sent to Tule Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, may I interrupt?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the total who answered that question in the negative? That is, question 28; is that right? That is the question you are referring to, of the Army questionnaire?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. As I remember the number, it was approximately 7,100 people in all the centers, but I would have to check that, for the record. I cannot recall offhand whether that was American citizens or whether that was the total number of unqualified aliens and citizens.

I do remember that of the total population at the time, there were approximately 11 percent of those people over 17, who answered that question in the negative, or gave a qualified answer.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10126.)

Mr. STRIPLING. All right, sir; go ahead.

Mr. MYER. Those were the first two categories.

The third category was a group of people whose intelligence records were such, or whose records within the relocation centers were such, that we ourselves felt, even though they may have had said "Yes" to the allegiance question, who we ourselves thought might be dangerous to the internal security of the country, and who we felt had better be sent to Tule Lake. That was the third category.

Now, the fourth category of people was probably the largest of the total group, and they were members of families of the other three groups who wished to join their families and stay there.

There was one other group of people, I should mention, who stayed in Tule Lake, and who were not a part of the movement. At the time of the registration period in March, February and March, the only center where we did not get a complete registration of all people, 17 years and older, was at Tule Lake. We had resistance there.

There were approximately 3,000 people, and that included, again, members of the families who had not registered, adults who had not registered, and of course they became a part of the segregated group simply because they did not comply with the request of the administration and provide records; so really that makes another category that I had not mentioned.

That, briefly, is the group.

Now, I would like to make this statement: Excepting for the repatriots and expatriots that I mentioned, all of these other people were given an opportunity for a hearing before they were sent to Tule Lake, if they cared to have one, for the simple reason that there were some mechanical mistakes made in handling several thousands of records, and the major reason was that we wanted to be sure that proper care was taken because of the delicate legal problems involved; that we had not sent American citizens, in particular, to a center where leave would not be granted, without a sound record as to why we sent them there.

So we have documented thousands of cases in relation to those hearings. We are still in process of completing some of that documentation. That is one of the reasons that they are not all at Tule Lake as yet.

Mr. STRIPLING. What percentage of those given a hearing changed their answers?

Mr. MYER. I do not have a figure on that, Mr. Stripling, but I can supply that to you when we get the final figure in.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately.

Mr. MYER. I should say one-fifth to one-fourth. Most of the folks who categorically said "No" to the allegiance question did not care for an additional hearing. They definitely stayed by their guns.

There were a few of them who, for different reasons, requested a further hearing and decided to change their minds. The most of that group, I might say—well, I won't say "most of them," but some of that group were people, youngsters, who said, "No" at the time under pressure of groups, or family pressure, who later came around and said that they had done so under pressure.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where are these records to the original questionnaire maintained?

Mr. MYER. We have copies of the records here and we also now have copies of them at most of the centers.

There is one copy at the War Department in relation to all the citizens, and one copy of the 304-A form, and then we have a copy of all the alien records, because they did not take the records of these here in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. If one of the Japanese changed his answer in regard to question 28, is that merely noted on the form, or is there an erasure made?

Mr. MYER. You make an additional statement which will be attached to his record. We do not change the old form. We do not do away with the old form, in any case. We maintain a complete record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke of resistance to signing those questionnaires at Tule Lake. What was the nature of that resistance?

Mr. MYER. Well, there was general resistance for quite a period of time to the whole registration problem. The registration proceeded very slowly at Tule Lake. There seemed to be an organized group trying to interfere with the registration generally, but finally, before the job was finally completed—well, all of those people were registered at Tule Lake except this group of about 3,000 men, women, and children, who simply did not come up and register.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10126.)

And it was a passive type of resistance, which is a little bit tough to handle, we thought.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did any people refuse to register at any of the other centers outside of Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. I think every one registered at the other centers finally. There was a group that held out until the last day at Jerome.

I might say that that group is at Tule Lake now, and have been some of the center of our trouble at Tule Lake, but they finally did come in and complete the registration at the last date and filled out the questionnaires—at least, in part.

We had some resistance at two or three other centers early in the registration program, but the resistance was overcome in a comparatively short time, all excepting at those two centers, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, once an evacuee is moved to the Tule Lake center on the ground of disloyalty, is it possible for him to be released from Tule Lake and sent back to the other centers?

Mr. MYER. The only possibility of release there at Tule Lake would be through an appeals process. We are establishing a panel of people who are not members of the W. R. A. staff, something similar to the hearing boards, that the Justice Department has set up for internees, so that the people who are in Tule Lake may have an opportunity to make an appeal, and if they do, they will have an opportunity to have a hearing before this board, which will be selected from this panel, and the board will make recommendation to me.

They will not be relocated under the normal procedure. The reason we are setting up that appeal board is, again, because of the fact that we have a very delicate legal situation at Tule Lake; that we normally do not hold people in centers who are American citizens without action through a court of law.

We will have a great many American citizens at Tule Lake who will not be eligible to leave under our plans, and we believe that it is essential that we have some kind of procedure previous to court action, in order to be assured that we are protecting the public properly, in order to make the appeal rather than going directly to the courts.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the nature of that Board?

Mr. MYER. The Board will consist of three people. We are setting up a panel of 12 or 15 people who will be available, Mr. Chairman; most of them lawyers; most of whom have been recommended by the Justice Department, who will set from time to time, and are selected from the panel itself, those who might be immediately available at that time, to sit for 2 or 3 days or a week, and hold hearings; most of them being west coast people who are within the general area and who can come into Tule Lake and hold hearings on the basis of applications made by people within the center.

That is the only way where they could be removed from Tule Lake, unless they are people already eligible to leave, and there are still a few people at Tule Lake who have not been moved out because of illness, or certain other reasons, like in the other centers.

That process will take some few weeks yet to clean up the job.

Mr. STRIPLING. What percentage of the population at Tule Lake now is alien, and what percentage citizens?

Mr. MYER. I do not have the final figures on that, and I am sorry I cannot give you that figure offhand.

I will be glad to supply it for the record as soon as we can get a complete file on it, because of the fact that we have not completed the job, and because we have been in a state of flux in the movement from there, we have not tried to get those percentages worked out until we get our job completed.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10127.)

Mr. STRIPLING. Who would be responsible for the selection of the members of the panel and the board, which would consider the release?

Mr. MYER. We are taking the responsibility for the selection of the members of the panel, of the board, with the advice and association of the Justice Department.

I might say the names of all people that have been requested have been submitted to the Justice Department against check of the Federal Bureau of Investigation records there, regarding their background before they are given an invitation to sit in connection with this program.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, explain briefly why the Tule Lake relocation center was selected as a segregation center?

Mr. MYER. There are about four reasons why Tule Lake was selected.

First, there were more people in Tule Lake who would be ultimately among the segregee group than at any other center, so it was less costly to move people to Tule Lake than it would have been to any other center.

Secondly, it was one of the largest centers we had, and consequently was selected because of its size.

Third, it was selected because we felt there were opportunities at Tule Lake for a work program for these people, including the agricultural program, that would provide the basis for their own subsistence better than we could have at some of the other centers.

Fourth, because of the fact that it lies within the boundaries of the evacuated area, and as such, Tule Lake would not have made a good relocation center because of the fact that we would have had to continue to provide escorts in and out, for everyone who moved in and out of the center, and would have been more costly and would have created a problem from that angle.

Those were the four reasons.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who is the director at the Tule Lake center?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Raymond Best.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long has he been the director at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. Since August 1.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was his former position?

Mr. MYER. He was director of the Leupp isolation center, at Leupp, Ariz., which was the center set up following the Manzanar incident, temporarily at Moab, Utah, last January, and later was moved to Leupp, and continued to serve as the isolation center director until very recently.

Previous to that time, I might say, he was also a member of the staff of W. R. A. at the Minidoka center, in charge of the operation work at that center.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the policy of W. R. A. in the operation of the segregation centers, compared with the operation of the regular relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. There were two major differences in policy between the two centers, or between the two types of centers, at the time it was established: One, there was no provision made and there has not been any provision made, or plans for any community government, as such, at Tule Lake, as there was at some of the other centers.

That policy was announced before we even made the move to Tule Lake.

Second, the fact that no one at Tule Lake would be eligible for relocation.

Now, there were other plans being developed as time went along. We took the position that we would not change our general policy excepting as we found need to change that policy.

One of the changes was that we were not planning to insist on the group who wanted to go back to Japan attending American schools if they did not care to do so, and certain other minor changes.

Of course, there was a definite change in the guarding provision at Tule Lake, which was the responsibility of the War Department, in which we concurred.

Tule Lake was changed over in this respect. Previous to the time we made the movement of the segregates the War Department constructed a man-proof fence completely around the center, one of the kind that leans over the top like this [illustrating], so that people could not get over the top. They put in turnstiles and made extra provisions for checking people in and out.

They increased the guard—not only increased the guard but increased the equipment of the guard at Tule Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you referring to the external guard or the internal guard?

Mr. MYER. I am referring to the external guard, but which is also available for internal use if we care to call on them; so that extra precautions were taken there not only in the center proper but in the agricultural areas surrounding the center by providing additional fencing and making provisions for guards while people were at work in that area.

Those were the major differences between the Tule Lake center and the other centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were demands made, were there not, to have a man-proof fence also put in to segregate the Japanese area from the area in which the Caucasian employees were employed?

Mr. MYER. That came later. There were certain other provisions made at the time which I did not go into detail on, such as the moving of the motor pool and equipment over back of the military area into a special fenced area, where we would have everything under control. I might say, unfortunately, it was not completed by the time we had completed segregation.

It was one of the problems that upset our program at that time. There is no criticism involved. It was some one of these things that was not finished, and the contractors would not allow us to use the compound, so we did not have the equipment we should have had at the time these people arrived.

There were certain other provisions for security that were jointly taken care of by the military and ourselves.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there ever any actual plan to erect that fence?

Mr. MYER. Yes; it had been under consideration. We had planned to complete the rest of the job and determine the need for it before we put it up, for the reason that any fence that was put down through that area would tremendously complicate the administrative program; that we could get along without it; and it would increase the cost by several thousand dollars by putting in such a fence.

The fence was not considered until after I left Tule Lake on November 1, but it was started during that week after it seemed evident that we would need to go ahead with it. We did it quite reluctantly for the reasons I have given. I could go into some details of the difference in cost on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the fence being built now?

Mr. MYER. Yes; the fence has, I think, been built by this time, although I do not have the final statement on it, Mr. Costello.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, you told the committee about the external protection. How about the internal protection set up at Tule Lake compared with the internal security system of the other relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. In general, there was no change at Tule Lake on that other than the fact that we have increased the staff to some extent, and were in the process of increasing it by additional recruitment at the time the incident developed.

The plans are to increase the internal security police at Tule Lake by a very large number under our present conditions.

Mr. COSTELLO. That means Caucasian employees?

Mr. MYER. That is right; Caucasian employees.

Mr. STRIPLING. Prior to November 1, how many Caucasian police were there in the Tule Lake center?

Mr. MYER. I think there were six on November 1, and they were coming on and resigning so fast it was a little hard to keep up with it, but as I remember it, there were six actually employed at the center, and Mr. Schmidt, our national security officer, had been on the job and had been there for some weeks studying the problem with Mr. Best, and working with him on other problems, so I believe there were actually seven on the job at the time I had the meeting.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, the remainder of the police force at Tule Lake, then, was composed of evacuees?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who were located at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those Japanese security officers recruited from the disloyal Japanese in the camp, or were they loyal Japanese?

Mr. MYER. They had to be recruited from the people within the center, because, ultimately, there was no one to leave there except the categories I mentioned, Mr. Mundt.

We operated all those systems on the basis that there were two general types to be done; one was to maintain order in the evacuee colony itself, and the other was the protection of Government property and the other types of police work that requires general responsibility.

One of the reasons we are increasing our internal security staff is to insure that we have enough staff to provide for the protection of Government property, and for our own staff at the center.

We think the evacuees themselves can still do a great deal of the job of policing their own area.

Mr. MUNDT. How many of those Japanese evacuees did you have as security officers in addition to the six Caucasians?

Mr. MYER. I cannot answer that question offhand, but I will be glad to get the figures for you, for the record, if you wish it.

Incidentally, would you like me to supply that for the record, Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MYER. All right.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10127.)

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever give any consideration to bringing in Japanese whom the W. R. A. felt would be definitely loyal?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. MUNDT. For security officers?

Mr. MYER. We never have.

Mr. MUNDT. You gave, as the reason that you had only six Caucasian guards, the fact that they were coming in and quitting and you could not find men available.

Mr. MYER. Well, there was quite a bit of flux at that particular time. Mr. Paine, who testified before the State committee, came on the job November 1, the day I arrived. He was in the process of instruction at that time.

Mr. Paine, I believe, left the same week, after this incident developed. And we have had quite a lot of turn-over within our staff.

Of course, there are good reasons for it. It is pretty hard to compete with defense plants and other types of operations for the type of police we need, at the salaries the Government offices of that type pay; but we have been recently successful, and in a given time I think we will be able to recruit a staff there of pretty satisfactory people; I cannot say all on the west coast; but we will have to ask civil service to recruit from other sections of the country.

Mr. MUNDT. As of the latter part of October, what was the size of the Caucasian security staff at which you are aiming?

Mr. MYER. That was a matter that we were discussing at the time I arrived. I had gone to Tule Lake. I had planned a month ahead of time to go to Tule Lake on the days that I was there, November 1 and 2, and it was part of the agenda for our program to make, after having studied the program.

Mr. Schmidt, our national officer, as I say, was out there with Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens, and we had tried to make that determination during the 2 days that I was there.

In the meantime I had left it open to them to increase the staff as they went along, up to whatever point they felt needed to provide proper security, not to exceed a reasonable number of people; but that had not been finally decided at the time I arrived and our plans went a little awry on November 1, as I think you have heard.

Mr. MUNDT. In your new plan, you say you have determined to substantially increase the number of Caucasian security officers. Does your new plan also call for the continued use of Japanese security officers recruited from the disloyal elements in the camp?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you not a little bit afraid that is like employing an arsonist in the fire department?

Mr. MYER. No; I think not. It depends where they are utilized. I think we can use evacuees within other portions of the center.

As Mr. Costello has brought out, the area between the administrative quarters, the warehouses, the administrative staff quarters, and all of the business end, will be fenced off from the colony.

Now, I do not see any reason why they should not assist in policing their own part of the colony, because they are interested in law in that portion of the colony as well as we are.

Now, we are also going to police it with radio cars, and we will have additional police in there, but from the standpoint of supplementing

the program in there and the type of thing that they can do, and which they have a definite interest in, I think they can make a contribution more cheaply than we can hire additional guards to do the job.

I might say that we have authorized the setting up of 66 positions for appointed personnel in the internal security staff already, in relation to their policing job total out there, rather than 6.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is at Tule Lake alone?

Mr. MYER. That is at Tule Lake alone, and we have authorized certain other things in relation to the internal security program which has been worked out, I might say, jointly with the commanding officer and ourselves as to the security methods, because it is true that internal security has some bearing on external security, and vice versa.

There is one other thing that I think probably has not been made clear, and I do not want to be gratuitous in answering the question, but I think it is important to understand that from the beginning, both at Tule Lake and all the other centers we had had an agreement with the War Department as regards the policing of these areas, and at Tule Lake it was revised previous to the time of segregation.

The War Department is responsible, as I have already stated, for guarding the exterior boundaries of the center, both as to ingress and egress of people, evacuees as well as other people, going in and out.

Passes are supposed to be checked. They are responsible for guarding the outside community out there, seeing that they are properly protected, as well as to see that the evacuees are properly protected from the outside communities.

In addition, it provides for a division of labor in this respect, that if any force were needed, we would call upon the military to provide the force necessary to restore order, for the simple reason that we felt that disciplined groups, who were trained to handle guns and other types of weapons, were much better prepared to meet that situation than we would ever be. Consequently the agreement provided that they could be called in at any time upon the request of the project director and, as you know, they were called in on the night of November 4.

It so happens at Tule Lake, in the revision of the external security plan, the instructions to the military were that they might go in on their own volition and that is the only center where that is true, if they felt the situation were such that they should go in.

However, they did not do that, about which I am very glad.

But I want to make it very clear, in view of the fact that there seems to be some criticism because of the fact that our guards and policemen were not armed with guns, generally speaking, and perhaps some criticism because we did not have, that is, on the part of some people who thought we did not have enough guards, that we never had plans providing for enough people to put down or keep down insurrection and riots—but we feel that the Army is much better qualified on that.

And it is my understanding that even in prisons it is not the ordinary normal practice, excepting in towers, to provide guards with guns.

And I think if you will check the records, you will find that the validity of that agreement was sound.

Mr. MUNDT. You say, generally speaking, guards are not armed with guns?

Mr. MYER. We have checked with the prison groups and the national head of the Federal prisons, and he tells us it is not good prison practice.

Now, I do not want to consider this a prison, for good reasons.

Mr. MUNDT. I know; but when I was out on the west coast I went throughout Alcatraz, the Federal penitentiary, and I found that the guards there were not armed with guns on the basis that a few guards, with a lot of prisoners, having guns, is of more advantage to the prisoner than the guard.

Mr. MYER. That is exactly our point of view, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. You said that, generally speaking, our guards are not armed with guns.

Mr. MYER. The only reason I made that statement is this, that we found, unfortunately, on the night of November 4, one of the new men carried a gun; but it was against orders, and he testified before the Senate committee that he and others did some shooting.

Mr. MUNDT. But it was the policy that they should not carry guns.

Mr. MYER. It was out of line with our policy, so to do. That is my point.

Mr. MUNDT. Under your new plan, how many Caucasian security officers do you expect to have at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. I thought I made it clear. We just authorized the hiring of 66 security officers at Tule Lake.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those are all Caucasians?

Mr. MYER. All Caucasians; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then the six you had there, you do not consider to be sufficient to maintain internal security, or to direct internal security?

Mr. MYER. Not under present conditions; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. You think the 6 were sufficient at any time to maintain order of approximately 16,000 people?

Mr. MYER. I thought I made that clear, that whenever you have a disturbance of the type that we had at Tule Lake 6 or even 66 would not be enough to maintain order.

It will require, under those conditions, the assistance of trained troops of the type we have at Tule Lake, and whom we have called on in two instances in the past, one at Manzanar a year ago, and one at Tule Lake last November.

We have never planned and are not yet planning to provide enough guards within the centers to overcome every evacuee in the center. To do that we would have to have one man for each person.

Mr. STRIPLING. I do not think that is the point, though, Mr. Myer. If the W. R. A. maintained a larger police force, internal security, it would have been possible for them to have appreciated the situation leading up to November 1 better.

Mr. MYER. There was no lack of appreciation of the situation, Mr. Stripling. We understood the situation, I think, as well as we would have had we had 100 internal security officers.

Mr. STRIPLING. At what point did you appreciate the situation?

Mr. MYER. All the way through. We knew we had a difficult problem.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you realize on October 26 that such a situation was possible?

Mr. MYER. We certainly did. We realized it before we ever moved the people into the center, that we were moving the type of people into that center that if they became concentrated there, would likely cause trouble, and we were in a position to take care of it, and I think the record will show, and I would like to repeat, that we have a division of labor between the Army and the War Relocation Authority in which we call in the Army if we get a situation of the type that we had on November 4.

I would like to also point out that the job was reasonably well done in view of the fact that with that development only two people were injured, both of them in line of duty.

We could not provide guards for every Caucasian employee on the center. That would be entirely out of the question.

There is bound to be some insecurity in a situation of this kind. Even in the normal city, there will be some insecurity.

We tried to avoid the creation of an internment camp atmosphere at Tule Lake, as long as possible, for three main reasons: First, the legal and constitutional grounds. It was important that we avoid it, if we could. And secondly, because of the international implications involved in the situation, we had hoped to avoid that kind of an atmosphere. And third, because of governmental economy.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, certainly, Mr. Meyer, 1 police officer for every 3,000 persons, would not be construed as prison atmosphere, would it?

Mr. MYER. That, I assume, would be a matter of opinion, Mr. Strippling.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what is your opinion on it?

Mr. MYER. I have no opinion on it.

Mr. STRIPLING. On October 26, did Mr. Best, the director of the camp, and Mr. C. E. Zimmer, and Mr. H. L. Black, meet with the committee composed of 10 segregees which were under the leadership of George Kuratomi?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Best met with them. I am not sure, off-hand, about Mr. Zimmer and Mr. Black, but I presume they were present. I think the record will show that.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did have a full report on that meeting, did you not, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I had a full report of the meeting on a later date; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. When were you advised of the meeting of October 26?

Mr. MYER. I knew about the meeting of October 26, but I mean I was not able to see a transcript of it until some time later.

Mr. STRIPLING. You would know who was present, would you not?

Mr. MYER. The record shows Mr. Best, Mr. Zimmer, Mr. Black, and Miss Lucas, who is Mr. Best's secretary, and was the reporter at the meeting, other than the committee of 10 that you mentioned.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you determine how this committee of 10 Japanese was selected?

Mr. MYER. No, sir; I would like to repeat that there were no plans at Tule Lake for a community government of the type we had at other centers. This was a committee self-appointed, and evidently they secured some support, I presume under duress, but I do not know just how—from the people in the center, and were acting on their own—not under authority from the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you mean authority from the War Relocation Authority. What I had in mind was how was the committee of 10 Japanese selected by the Japanese population.

Mr. MYER. I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not know whether they represented the Japanese population or not?

Mr. MYER. My judgment is that they did not represent the Japanese population, as a whole; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you informed by Mr. Best—will you inform the committee why Mr. Best entertained these peoples' requests or demands?

Mr. MYER. He did not entertain their demands.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did he negotiate with them as representatives of the population?

Mr. MYER. He listened to their demands. He did not negotiate with them. He told them that he did not operate on the basis of demands.

Mr. STRIPLING. He did receive them——

Mr. MYER. He did receive them.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a delegation of the——

Mr. MYER. He received them as a delegation; period.

Mr. MUNDT. How was the committee of 17 meeting there on November 1?

Mr. MYER. They are in the same category, mostly made up of these same people, plus a few additional ones, and they were a self-appointed group who were received and listened to; but we did not concur in their demands, and they were told that we did not operate on the basis of demands.

And furthermore, I told the group leader we did not think the group was representative of the center. We hoped some of those out of that center would have represented them. They would better have represented these—the center.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you did view the committee of 17 as representing the group in there?

Mr. MYER. I did not. I so told the group.

Mr. STRIPLING. You received the committee of 17 as representing the 17 segregates; is that right?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you spent 4½ hours of your valuable time there.

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Discussing the welfare of 17 segregates?

Mr. MYER. No; we spent about 3 hours.

Mr. STRIPLING. Three hours.

Mr. MYER. They were presuming to represent the center.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, the point is that you spent 3 hours with them.

Mr. MYER. They were presuming to represent all of the people in the center, but I never recognized them as a committee representing all of the people in the center, Mr. Stripling.

Mr. STRIPLING. Why spend all of your time and effort concerning yourself with the feelings and requests of the 17 individuals when you had 17,000 to think about, approximately?

Mr. MYER. Well, I might say we had a reasonably tense atmosphere. It absolutely looked on that afternoon that any move that might have upset the general schedule might have meant loss of life to a good many people, including the members of our own staff.

Furthermore, it seemed well to find out, if we could, by listening to these people, just what their strategy was, and where they were planning to make their next move.

I am willing to say for the record that this committee—this is an opinion, now, and I want it so considered—that this committee had under their control a number of strong-arm boys and had very good control of the evacuee colony generally, as indicated by the record, from October 15 up until November 1. We knew that.

However, it was not a voluntary type of control, as far as the people were concerned. It was the type that is done by gangsters' methods, for the most part, in my judgment.

Having had some experience in the past with emotional upsets of that type, I did not care to be responsible for causing an incident, if I could help it, through my own actions, that might lead to injury and bloodshed of people under a tense situation of that kind.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, coming back to the meeting of October 26, between Mr. Best, the director, and the 10 evacuees, what does your report show as to the reasonableness—the reasons for this meeting?

Mr. MYER. My report shows that this committee met with Mr. Best and made a number of requests and demands, the most of which were similar to the ones that were repeated on November 1, where I was present, but there were additional ones added as of November 1.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you consider those requests and demands to be reasonable and substantial as to the conditions or situations within the relocation center?

Mr. MYER. I did not. There were some of them that probably had some basis in fact as to the reasons why they might request them.

I might say this, that a group of this type are usually pretty adroit in trying to find among the people whom they are trying to represent, what the griping causes are.

Most of these demands, that is, not all of them, but most of these demands were based upon their survey of what they thought the difficulties were, as would any good group of politicians who wanted to present a case for a group that they were presuming to represent.

Mr. STRIPLING. As to one of the complaints in this committee of 10, did that pertain to the farm situation within the camp?

Mr. MYER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you explain to the committee that situation?

Mr. MYER. At Tule Lake we have a good-sized area of good farming land that had, I think, at the time this hearing was held, between five and six hundred acres of crops still unharvested, most of which were potatoes, some of which were other types of vegetables, part of which was destined to be used at Tule Lake and a part of which we expected to ship to other relocation centers, for their use, because at Tule Lake, along with the other centers, we had also a national program of subsistence, utilizing the land that we felt best adapted to crops, particularly crops that they could grow most effectively, and then ship some to the other centers.

It happened on October 15, within about 2 or 3 days after the last trainload of these major movements moved into Tule Lake, we had an unfortunate accident.

An evacuee, a boy driving a truck at the farm, tried to pass another truck, and this truck he was driving carried, I think, 29 people, all farm workers, got off on the bourne, and upset the truck, injuring all or nearly all of the people in the truck. Twelve of them were rather seriously injured, one of whom died, I think it was 3 days later.

The committee that was represented here in the October 26 meeting immediately seized upon this incident to blame the administration for the accident, and were able to get the farm group to quit work at that time for a period of 10 days.

There was no one to talk to about it; they were just off the job. I might say that the whole group was terminated on the rolls of the W. R. A. immediately.

Mr. Best called me by phone. I was out on the same trip at that time that I was on when I visited Tule Lake. He called me in Utah. He told me of the incident and the problem and told me that they were not harvesting the crop.

And I told him that of course we would not waste the crop, and we were going to have it harvested some way or other, but I suggested he wait another day or two to see whether they wanted to harvest it before we moved in and harvested it some other way.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time did you not risk the loss of the crop by waiting 2 or 3 days?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the risk?

Mr. MYER. The risk that we might have an early frost that would cause some damage to the crop. Unfortunately, we did not have.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. May I just finish, Mr. Costello, regarding this item?

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, go ahead.

What was the particular crop that they were refusing to harvest at that time?

Mr. MYER. As I remember it—I do not have the exact figures—but I will be glad to correct them for the record, but as I remember, there were remaining 475 acres of potatoes, about 30 acres of onions; there were some carrots; there was some broccoli, cabbage, and probably two or three other types of vegetables.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10127.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there not also a large amount of rutabagas which they refused to harvest?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure about that. I had not heard that they refused to harvest rutabagas.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding that the Japs did not like them and for that reason would not harvest the rutabagas.

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so, but if you have that information—I do not have it. I have been informed that they had completed their harvest in the interim, and I assumed that they were harvested.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, is it not a fact that a large quantity of rutabagas were not harvested the year before?

Mr. MYER. I do not know the answer to that question, but I will be glad to check it for you.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony presented before the California Senate committee by Scott Warin, assistant farm administrator, indicated that 250 acres of rutabagas were lost by the frost the previous year, because the Japs had refused to harvest them.

Mr. MYER. This is the first time I heard that statement, but I will be glad to check it.

Mr. COSTELLO. He also made the statement that 50 acres of turnips were lost because they were not harvested; also destroyed by frost.

Mr. MYER. I will check that. That is also something I had not heard before, and at which I am somewhat surprised because it had not been reported to me.

May I proceed now with a statement?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes, proceed.

Mr. MYER. From the central Utah project—I went from the central Utah project at Minidoka, and upon arrival, Mr. Best told me it became evident they were not going to harvest the crop.

And I told him to proceed to get it harvested, and asked him to work with Mr. Barrows, who was acting director there, and Mr. Cozzens, in San Francisco, to carry out plans for getting the job done.

The plan developed was to bring evacuees in from other centers and from other areas where they had been on seasonal leave, to harvest the crop.

Recruitment began immediately. These evacuees were moved in and they did complete the harvest of the crop.

On the 26th when this committee met with Mr. Best, they told him that they did not want to harvest the crop, because they refused to harvest any crops that would be sent to loyal evacuees in other centers.

Mr. Best, I believe, pointed out to them that it would take some time to get fresh vegetables through, under the circumstances; that normally we placed our orders 50 days ahead with the Quartermaster Corps, and that they might be short of fresh vegetables for some time to come.

And they still were adamant about it and said they did not care to harvest the crop.

That, basically, is the information regarding the crop.

If you care to go into more detail, I will be glad to supply the information for the record.

Mr. STRIPLING. As to these segregees, were they very good farmers; the ones at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. Many of them were excellent farmers; yes. Most of the Tule Lake segregees originally came from the Sacramento Valley, and there were some very excellent farmers among the group.

Some of them, of course, were not, however.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider the Japanese farmer to be superior to the American farmer, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I would not care to generalize on that question.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, do you know whether it is the policy of any of the officials of W. R. A. to so consider it or them?

Mr. MYER. Not that I know of; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. I show you a photostat of an article, a document known as Midwest Frontier, which it states is published by the Cleveland area of the War Relocation Authority, and ask you if you know whether that is a publication of the War Relocation Authority?

This is entitled "Volume 1, No. 1, December 1, 1943."

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I found out last evening that this is a publication of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all right, Mr. Myer, but I would like to ask a question at this point.

Mr. MYER. May I ask a question first?

Mr. STRIPLING. I ask you if this is a publication of the War Relocation Authority, and you have answered the question, Mr. Myer.

I would like to ask you a further question.

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who is Mr. Everett L. Dakan?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Everett Dakan is a member of the War Relocation Authority staff located at Columbus, Ohio, who is working with the War Relocation Authority in Ohio and Michigan, representing the Cleveland office.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is his position?

Mr. MYER. His position is relocation officer at Columbus, Ohio.

Mr. STRIPLING. And his salary?

Mr. MYER. I cannot tell you offhand, but I believe it is approximately \$3,800 a year; I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately.

When was the plan to issue this paper devised in the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. I believe it was about the middle of November.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was the purpose to staff it with Caucasian employees of the War Relocation Authority or Government employees, or was it planned to staff it with Japanese-Americans?

Mr. MYER. I was not present at the time the details were worked out at that meeting, and I could not give you that information offhand, but I am sure that the paper is being handled by employees of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you would not say that they also had in mind the employing of Japanese on the editorial staff of the paper?

Mr. MYER. I think not, unless they were Government employees.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from paragraph 2.

Paragraph 2 of this Midwest Frontier, volume 1, No. 1 states—

With a staff of American-Japanese editorial assistants in the principal cities where suboffices of the War Relocation Authority are situated, the paper will be put out regularly by the people who have an understanding of the kind of information most desired by persons in the centers.

Is that statement untrue, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I am afraid that it does not quite indicate the facts.

The people who are members of the staff, as indicated, on the so-called masthead of that paper, some of them are secretaries and other evacuees who are working in the offices and who make contributions from time to time, but are not editorial in the sense of being selected as editorial people.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the W. R. A. have in mind publishing this paper or a section of it in the Japanese language for distribution in the United States?

Mr. MYER. I believe a section of it was published in the Japanese language.

Mr. STRIPLING. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the same article, which appears on the front page. It says:

Depending upon the success in obtaining Japanese translators, it is intended to have a Japanese language section in each issue. This will not necessarily be a translation of all material appearing in the English section. The best judgment of the staff will be used, deciding which articles will be of interest to both groups of readers, and which will be of interest to one group alone.

Mr. Myer, would you explain why the W. R. A. as an agency of the Government, would see fit to print a paper in Japanese for dissemination throughout the United States?

Mr. MYER. First, let me say it is not being presented for dissemination throughout the United States generally.

Mr. STRIPLING. For evacuees, persons who have been relocated, situated generally throughout certain sections of the country.

Mr. MYER. This is not for the purpose of sending to the people who have been relocated.

This publication was meant to go to the relocation centers as a part of a program to interest the evacuees in relocating outside of the centers, in the areas of the country represented by this particular publication, and only for that purpose.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was also to be sent to the evacuees who had been sent elsewhere?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes; I think it was.

Mr. MYER. The reason why portions were put in the Japanese language, rather than the English language, was the fact that we have in the centers now many of the older people of the group of aliens who are available for relocation, who read the Japanese language better than they read the English language; consequently it is a better medium for getting information to them than it would be if we had the whole publication in English, or had submitted the whole publication in English; and that is the reason the Japanese language is being utilized.

Mr. STRIPLING. It says:

It is the intention to publish an edition every 2 weeks and to distribute not only to the residents of the relocation centers, but as well, to the more than 2,000 persons of Japanese ancestry who have settled in this area.

I assume that to be the Cleveland area, which embraces Ohio and Michigan; is that right?

Mr. MYER. I would have to recheck the facts on that.

I am assuming that that was the intent on the part of these people, but I am not sure that it is the intent of the Authority, because there seems to be some question about it.

Mr. STRIPLING. This is a publication of the Authority. When you say "these people," who do you have in mind?

Mr. MYER. The people who put this paper out.

Mr. STRIPLING. But they are officials of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MYER. They are; yes, sir.

I might say that publications of this type are expected to be submitted here before they are sent to the relocation centers. Through inadvertence, or some reason, this was not submitted ahead of time.

I would like to add that the distribution of this particular publica-

tion, since I have heard about it, has been suspended at all the centers, and we have asked that all copies be destroyed.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Mr. Dakan personally, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I have known Mr. Dakan for 23 years.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider him to be an authority on the subject of poultry or agriculture?

Mr. MYER. I consider Mr. Dakan to be one of the best authorities in the country on poultry. He was head of the poultry department of Ohio State University. He is on leave of absence at the moment, working for us. He is working in the State of Ohio; at least, has since 1920. That is when I first met him.

I worked with him in the agricultural field for a good many years. He is a man well-known throughout the State of Ohio for his knowledge of the agricultural industry in Ohio.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, would you like for me to read for the record Mr. Dakan's article?

Mr. COSTELLO. Read such excerpts as you desire.

Mr. STRIPLING. In the leading article of the issue of this publication he states:

We will not have to explain to you what we do in the wintertime. You will find out that our large barns are full of livestock, our cows must be milked, our chickens fed, our machinery repaired, and plans made for another year. Then, some of us sleep later in the morning in the wintertime and listen to the radio longer at night. You will discover that many of our houses were built in pioneer days. That rural electrification is mostly a new thing. That many tenant houses do not have bathrooms because they were built before bathrooms came into style. They have not been remodeled because the war has made it impossible to get material. Then, believe it or not, we have some few tenants and seasonal workers who do not bathe. They think it is unhealthy. We need you people to change our ideas about this. You have a lesson to teach Ohio and Michigan farmers in sanitation. It is a contribution you can make to our way of living.

We need to know something of your skill in packing and grading, your artistic sense of orderliness. We need your faithfulness to your task, your willingness to work, and your appreciation of a job well done. There are a lot of workers in the Middle West, in Ohio and Michigan, who are not careful, painstaking, and accurate. This you can teach them. You will do much for your fellow men and much for our section of the art of agriculture as well as science.

Do you have any comment to make on that statement of Mr. Dakan's, which appeared in the official publication of the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to comment.

In the first place, I would like to say that it appears Mr. Dakan became a little overenthusiastic in his job of selling the evacuees on the program in Ohio.

I would like to read for the record a two-paragraph statement regarding this publication, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is important that you have the information on it.

Midwest Frontiers is one of several publications, soon to be issued, by principal relocation offices of the War Relocation Authority, for distribution to evacuees in relocation centers. The only other similar publication already under way is issued by the Kansas City office. Approximately 5,000 copies were printed of the first edition of Midwest Frontiers. The cost is approximately \$70 per issue. The schedule is once a month.

In carrying on the relocation of evacuees whose loyalty to the United States has been investigated, one of the principal problems facing War Relocation Authority is lack of familiarity, on the part of the evacuees, with areas other than the west coast where they lived. Another is fear of their ability to make a living; a third is fear of antipathy on the part of the public generally toward

persons of Japanese ancestry, regardless of their loyalty or citizenship. Accordingly, Midwest Frontiers and similar publications carry material descriptive of agricultural and industrial conditions in the area concerned; examples of evacuees who are successful economically; and instances which demonstrate acceptance of evacuees in the communities where they relocate.

Now, one of the problems that we have had in many, many areas, in getting evacuees to relocate, is the fact that they do not have bathing facilities, believe it or not.

In spite of how they may live otherwise, most of the evacuee groups are daily bathers, and one of the things that they generally insist on is a place to take a bath, even though it does not have to be the type of bath that you and I may bathe in.

It has been one of the important problems in trying to get them to move into certain areas in Ohio, and I presume, after reading this article, which I had not seen until this morning—and I did not read the Times-Herald yesterday, but I understand it was quoted in an article in the Times-Herald—the only thing that I can assume is that Mr. Dakan was trying to impress these folks with the fact that we did have some of that problem, and that it would seem that he was somewhat indiscreet in two or three sentences he used that might imply that maybe other people were not as sanitary as they should be.

Mr. STRIPLING. I do not think there is any implication there, Mr. Chairman; I think it is a clear statement.

Mr. MYER. I want to repeat that it has been the policy and definite policy, that these publications will be reviewed in the future. It was supposed to have been done, and I do not know why it was not done; it was through inadvertence, I take it. I am going into the whole matter as soon as I can find time.

But I do want to repeat what I said about a half a minute ago. He is a person who is highly thought of throughout the State of Ohio. He has written for the Ohio Farmer for a good many years, in addition to his other duties.

I have no apologies to make for Mr. Dakan, excepting what I have already said. I would not have allowed the publication to go to the field with a few of these sentences in it, had I seen them myself.

On the other hand, I do not think it is as serious as might be implied from the trouble that has been indicated here to have it multiplied and brought out as a part of this hearing. I, at least, would question, Mr. Chairman, whether the statement would be called un-American.

Mr. COSTELLO. It may not be a very serious item in itself, and I guess there are far more serious items brought up, such, for instance, as the wastage of food, and things of that sort, that took place at Tule Lake, and the matters of theft that went unpunished.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, we will go into that in great detail.

Mr. COSTELLO. They are unquestionably far more serious than this statement on the part of Mr. Dakan.

Mr. MYER. No question about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it seems to me it is an indication of some of the things that are being done by W. R. A., the wasting of money, as well as putting out statements of that kind, which is a reflection on all the people of the State of Ohio, and I think it is unjustified and quite unnecessary.

Mr. MYER. I disagree that it is a reflection on all the people of Ohio.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a reflection on the people in the farming communities in Ohio. Had Mr. Dakan ever been in California, or had any association with the Japanese, with their habits of life?

Mr. MYER. I would have to check with Mr. Dakan on that, but not so far as I know. Mr. Dakan was selected because of his knowledge of the agricultural areas in Ohio, in trying to work with our farm program; in helping them to recruit people from the centers that would work in that area.

Mr. COSTELLO. What method of censorship of the articles written by the Japanese is being employed by W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. May I ask my reports officer?

Mr. Baker tells me that they have depended to date entirely on the staff in Cleveland, and at centers, who are able to interpret these materials.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are they white employees, or Japanese?

Mr. MYER. Some are white employees and some are evacuees.

Mr. COSTELLO. They are not sure what is written, then, in Japanese?

Mr. MYER. I think we have a reasonable check on that, Mr. Costello, and we can always have it checked with the Justice Department, if there is any question about them saying things that should not be said.

Mr. COSTELLO. In your statement read to the committee, you used the expression "another is fear of their ability to make a living." You mean that the Japanese people might not be able to make a living without some of the aids which they formerly received through the Japanese consular agents?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not. I simply had in mind people with smaller families going into strange communities which they are not well acquainted with, and that is all I had in mind.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you intimated, Mr. Myer, that the reason for issuing the Midwest Frontier was to encourage the Japanese evacuees to apply for their seasonal or permanent labor in other areas of the country.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. To sort of make it inviting.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. You said, too, that the Japanese were personally very clean, as far as their bodily habits are concerned, and so forth; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. That has been my observation, at least, and the observation of people who have worked with them.

Mr. MUNDT. And that seems to be the accepted fact?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you feel that it is going to be conducive to the enthusiasm on the part of the Japanese to move into agricultural areas in which the W. R. A. paper says:

Believe it or not, but some tenants and seasonal workers do not bathe at all.

It would seem to me they would be evasive; they would not care to go into that section.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, I think I have already said that we have killed this issue, and I am in no position to argue for the article that was presented in relation to its sales appeal.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you killed the magazine or just the issue?

Mr. MYER. We have killed the issue.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you issued new instructions that henceforth these articles should be passed upon?

Mr. MYER. Instructions have been issued verbally, and I am not sure whether in writing, but all similar articles are to be reviewed before they go out, and if that has not been done, been put in writing, it will be.

This whole development has taken place during the last 3 or 4 weeks, during which time I have been pretty busy, as some of you might understand.

Mr. Baker, who worked with the folks, and who sits here at my right, has worked with them and has been in the field until the latter part of last week. I have not been able to get up to date on all the details.

Mr. MUNDT. This issue, No. 1, volume 1, the December issue, was just issued for Michigan and Ohio?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you contemplate getting out additional issues in connection with the South Dakota farmers?

Mr. MYER. I have indicated there was one in process out at Kansas City. I assume that will not be of the type indicated by Mr. Dakan.

I want to repeat, gentlemen, I have no defense for the article, and probably it is not the type of article. I presume some of you are happy that it broke. I am not. I do not defend it.

I do not want to be spending time on any issue of this kind when we have already killed the issue, and I do not intend to have any statement of that type put out any place else.

On the other hand, I do want to repeat this: I do have a high regard for Mr. Dakan. He has done an excellent job out there. We had two publics to deal with at that time; the public outside of the relocation centers, and the public inside of the relocation centers, and I think it might be understandable that persons who are trying to get workers to come out will occasionally overstep in their enthusiasm, and I think that is about what happened in this particular case.

That is all I have to say about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, you made the statement there you thought somebody might be happy that the story broke. What did you mean?

Mr. MYER. Well, Mr. Stripling enjoys questioning me about it, so I presume it has made him happy. I consider it somewhat of a red herring.

Mr. STRIPLING. I am interested in seeing the next issue.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to submit it to you when it comes out, or any other issues that the War Relocation Authority puts out.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, do you consider Mr. Dakan as acting as an official of the Government, in making such a statement? Do you think it should go unnoticed and should be excused simply on the ground of saying, "We will have this killed"?

Mr. MYER. Did I say it was going unnoticed?

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you indicated that it should have gone unnoticed.

Mr. MYER. I did not say "indicated".

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, how many times have you been to the Tule Lake relocation center?

Mr. MYER. Four.

Mr. STRIPLING. When were you there last?

Mr. MYER. November 1 and November 2, 1943.

Mr. STRIPLING. What time did you arrive at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. About 10 a. m., in the morning of November 1.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you arrived, did you proceed to inspect the camp?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir. The first thing we did was to drive to the farm on our way out to the center to inspect the tents and the set-ups for receiving evacuees.

Some of them were already there to harvest the crops that the people in the colony did not want to harvest.

We spent a very short time there talking with some of the boys and rechecking the plans for getting potato diggers working, and proceeded immediately on to the center proper.

Most of the time between 10 and about 12:15 was spent interviewing members of the staff, and making plans for the rest of my visit, laying out plans for the agenda.

In the meantime I met Colonel Austin, who was the head of the military police unit. I talked with him briefly. I became acquainted with him and discussed a number of policy questions.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you called upon by any one representing or portraying to represent the segregates and asked to make a speech?

Mr. MYER. Not until after lunch.

Mr. STRIPLING. What time were you requested?

Mr. MYER. To make the speech?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. MYER. Along about 4:30 in the afternoon that I was actually requested.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that the first time that you were actually asked to speak to the Japanese?

Mr. MYER. Yes; it was at the end of the meeting with the committee, after they had presented the questions and after they had gone through the procedure which I think you have copies of.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there a plan to have you address the evacuees on the following day rather than the Monday?

Mr. MYER. No; there was no such plan. There was a plan the following day to meet with the committee upon their request, but that is all, as far as I recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. What time, then, did you learn that a group of the Japanese segregates were going to gather around the administration buildings?

Mr. MYER. At approximately 1 o'clock. I do not know the exact time because I did not look at my watch, but Mr. Best had gone home to his apartment for lunch and I had gone to the administration lunch hall for lunch.

We had taken a reasonable time to eat our lunch, and just about the time I finished, he came into the mess hall and told me he had heard from two different sources that this announcement had been made in some of the evacuee mess halls that I would speak at 1:30, asking the people to come to the administrative area to hear me make a speech.

At that time Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens and myself got into a car and drove around the area to find out for ourselves what was going on,

and we confirmed in our own judgment that this is about what had happened, because we saw people coming out of their apartments, of all types.

Some of them were women with little children by the hand; some of them were family groups.

In five or six of the blocks there were five or six groups gathered, probably five or six, just as though they were having a little football huddle. But they were coming from a number of portions of the center, and the three of us appraised the situation and decided that they had been invited to come and hear me speak.

Mr. MUNDT. Who made the announcement?

Mr. MYER. The representatives, I presume, of this committee of evacuees. It was not authorized by the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. In your subsequent check, did you determine who made the announcement?

Mr. MYER. I never heard any check on it. I presume it was made by different people in different blocks, Mr. Mundt, because there is a large number of blocks, and I do not think it could have gotten around to have any one or two people make it.

Mr. MUNDT. It was not made on the loudspeaker announcing system?

Mr. MYER. No; it was announced out there in the mess halls, rather than a general announcement over a loudspeaker system.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you were informed that they were going to gather, and you saw them in the process of gathering, what was your reaction to that?

Mr. MYER. My reaction to that was that the committee had pulled a smart trick.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you make any effort to stop the assembly?

Mr. MYER. We did not. We simply consulted among ourselves and decided that the crowd, for the most part, was coming as a friendly group in good faith to hear the director make a speech.

And we decided to await the next move, and we drove back to the office, and he immediately called Colonel Austin—that is, Mr. Best did, and reported what we knew about the situation, and asked him to have the troops alerted and to stand by, and we were in continuous contact with Colonel Austin's office from that time on through to the time—well, when they took over on November 4.

Mr. STRIPLING. You say you went back to the administration building?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. From where you were in the administration building did you have a view of the crowd approaching?

Mr. MYER. We had it from one or two angles; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many people would you say were approaching the administration building when you first saw them?

Mr. MYER. Oh, I have not made an estimate on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you say it was hundreds?

Mr. MYER. Well, I would say that they were coming out of a large number of apartments. I would not have any idea how many people were approaching at the time I first saw them.

Mr. STRIPLING. How far away was the crowd when you first saw them?

Mr. MYER. Away from where?

Mr. STRIPLING. From where you were. How far was it to the crowd?

Mr. MYER. Well, we were driving around. We were driving around amongst the crowd part of that time, who were beginning to move toward the center, up and down the blocks and up and down the roadways, to get a general view of the situation. Some of them were very close to us; right alongside of the car, in fact.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you advise any of them that you were not going to speak or had not intended to speak?

Mr. MYER. No; I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you went to the administration building. When you arrived at the administration building had the crowd assembled in the front of the building?

Mr. MYER. They were beginning to assemble by that time pretty fast. There were some already there, not a very large number, but they assembled pretty fast in the next 10 or 15 minutes following our arrival at the building.

Mr. STRIPLING. At what time did the committee of 17 call on you?

Mr. MYER. Again, I do not know the exact time because I did not look at my watch, but I would say that it was about 1:20 when a young man came in and asked if we would meet the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did any of these people, Mr. Myer, congregate around the hospital before you went into the administration building?

Mr. MYER. No. The hospital, of course, is just across the way from the administration building, and as far as I know, there was never any group as such that congregated around the hospital. It was simply a small group of Kibei boys that went into the hospital.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you advise the messenger who asked you if you would meet with the committee?

Mr. MYER. We told him we would meet with the committee.

Mr. STRIPLING. That was approximately at 1:20?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. What time did the committee arrive?

Mr. MYER. Well, most of them arrived immediately, or within the next 4 or 5 minutes. They gathered in immediately. There were two or three that looked to me to be members of the committee. They did not act, I suppose, for another 5 or 10 minutes. There was a period—oh, I do not know of how long, I suppose 10 minutes—when the group were gathering in the office.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you ever go and view the crowd in order to determine how many were assembled all around the building?

Mr. MYER. We were able to view the crowd from the building, as we saw it, and had a pretty good idea how many assembled, and also the nature of the crowd.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many would you say were in the crowd?

Mr. MYER. I think we stated that our estimate, based on the estimates of a number of people, was between three and four thousand. We have had estimates that ranged from 3,000 to 8,000, and I find more recently that our internal security who was there, who probably had more experience than any of us with the crowds, said it did not exceed 5,000, in his judgment, and he had a pretty good opportunity to size it up. I do not think anybody will ever know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Approximately one-third of the residents within the center.

Mr. MYER. I would guess about one-third of the residents were there; yes. A little less, perhaps, but not more than that. However, estimates of groups vary very greatly under such circumstances, and I do not care to try to argue on whether it was 4,000 or whether it was 5,000 or whether it was 3,000 or 6,000, Mr. Chairman, because I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Regarding this committee of 17 you say, that assembled there, almost immediately after the first messenger had come and asked if you would come and meet with them, did you take any steps to determine whether or not they were representing the four or five thousand people who were assembled outside?

Mr. MYER. The only steps that we took was to ask them before we started any conference at all, to all sign their names on a sheet of paper, which they did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they bring with them any resolution or written statement?

Mr. MYER. The only statement that I saw that was written were the notes that were in the hands of George Kuratomi, who served as the spokesman for the group, and they were in longhand, written out; simply as a series of notes that he handed to us.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you make any comment to the committee as to the crowd outside of the building, as to why they were there?

Mr. MYER. As I remember, the only comment made to the committee was when they started to put up the loudspeaker, and Mr. Black, assistant director, was on the outside, and told them where to put it, and someone got on the roof to help anchor the wire, or something of that kind; some of them asked what was going on and they said they were putting up a loudspeaker system. That was the only comment.

Mr. MUNDT. Aside from that, no member of the committee said anything to you, or you anything to the committee about the 5,000 people?

Mr. MYER. No; I think there was nothing said about the 5,000 people. I think you will find that the record indicates that Mr. Kuratomi, in his presentation to me, tried to be what you would expect him to be—to impress me with the fact that the crowd was up there protesting some of the treatment that they had had in the center, and were supporting the committee.

That was, of course, our judgment as to why they invited the crowd up. They were trying to make us believe, in my opinion, that the crowd was an angry mob, and if we did not meet their demands, that something very dire might happen.

That is about the only statement I know of in relation to the crowd. We made no statement regarding the crowd at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. This loud speaker equipment, did the War Relocation Authority furnish that?

Mr. MYER. No; that was equipment that belonged to the evacuees.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are they permitted to have a loudspeaker system of their own?

Mr. MYER. They have been, in most of the centers, and I think had this equipment, and it has been used by me, or by the War Relocation Authority, the representatives of the War Relocation Authority, and utilized for larger meetings that they had in the centers, for the simple reason that we have not been able to provide large meetings for the centers.

Those which we ever had, many of them were out of doors, and we have not relieved them of that equipment, and we have allowed them to have that in connection with authorized meetings in the centers.

This meeting was not authorized.

Mr. STRIPLING. Considering the situation, Mr. Myer, would you think a loudspeaker apparatus would be a dangerous weapon in a situation of that kind; the setting up of a loudspeaker apparatus to address a group of thousands of people?

Mr. MYER. I did not so consider it; no. As a matter of fact, I think it was very helpful to us.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not use the equipment until late in the afternoon, did you?

Mr. MYER. We were in a position to use the equipment as a signaling device, because it was connected at all times, had we wished to do so, in order to call up the troops, in addition to our telephone communication.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where was the microphone?

Mr. MYER. The microphone was set up in the doorway of the administration building. It is a double door. It was wide open, and it was set up within 4 feet of Mr. Black's desk, who was on the job during that whole period, at his desk, and was in touch with the situation in the outer office.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who was in charge of the actual mechanical operation?

Mr. MYER. The evacuees.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you could not have used it if they did not want you to. Could they not have turned it off or on? That would have been possible, would it not?

Mr. MYER. I do not think they would have gotten it turned off before we could have announced to the colonel that we wanted to get help.

Mr. STRIPLING. That was not the only system of communication, was it?

Mr. MYER. No; it was not.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were not depending on that?

Mr. MYER. No; we were not, but we were in a position to use it had we found that they were tampering at any stage of the game with the telephone wires. I did not consider it as a dangerous weapon. As a matter of fact, I considered that the loudspeaker was a good thing for the reason that I was able, at a later time, to address the crowd myself and had them hear what I had to say.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you were not the only one who made a speech, were you?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you will agree that the use of a loudspeaker apparatus, when thousands of people are assembled, may be used to incite the mob; do you not?

Mr. MYER. I suppose that is possible.

Mr. STRIPLING. As well as to placate the crowd.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. STRIPLING. But since the crowd, which had a tendency to incite rather than placate, was in control of the apparatus, you certainly must have recognized a dangerous situation.

Mr. MYER. I recognized a dangerous situation at every minute of the afternoon; yes. I have never denied that I did not recognize that.

It was tense. It was the kind of a situation where there could have been fireworks touched off that might have meant injury or even loss of life to a good many people. That is why we tried to handle it calmly and sanely, and tried to keep it so without that kind of an instrument; and I think the results indicate that is about what happened.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was there anyone else injured?

Mr. MYER. Dr. Pedicord was injured.

Mr. STRILING. Was there anyone else injured?

Mr. MYER. No one other than that that I know of.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you notice of your own personal knowledge, any disturbance in the assembling of the crowd, or after they had assembled?

Mr. MYER. No disturbance except an occasional shout by some one when they were putting up the equipment, shouting at somebody else or to others, up and down the line.

Just before the meeting started, I did notice certain people around the edges of the crowd guiding cars into centers, and I saw one car that was stopped; that was Mr. Geery's car, and they asked him to move into a certain parking space, as well as I could see. I could not hear what went on.

Well, Mr. Gerry did not do so. He backed up and turned around and went in the other direction, and I lost sight of him beyond the building. That was the only incident I was able to see from the building at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding the loud speaker equipment, when the W. R. A. would use that equipment for their own use, would they pay rental to the evacuees

Mr. MYER. I do not know about this particular equipment. We have rented equipment from the evacuees in some of the centers for our own use at different times.

Mr. STRIPLING. From your office could you see the hospital; from the building you were in?

Mr. MYER. Yes; we could see the hospital.

Mr. STRIPLING. Could you see the front entrance to the hospital?

Mr. MYER. I cannot tell you off-hand which is the front entrance to the hospital; I am not sure. I could not answer that question yes or no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you witness any disturbance at the hospital yourself?

Mr. MYER. I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. When was any disturbance first reported to you or Mr. Best?

Mr. MYER. It was reported during the time that we were getting the names of the committee on paper, and just previous to the time that Mr. Kuratomi started his discussion with us.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know who received the report?

Mr. MYER. Yes; Mr. Best.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did he state to you on receiving the report?

Mr. MYER. I have a record of what went on (reading:)

Mr. Best turned and said, "What is going on at the hospital?"

George Kuratomi said, "I don't know."

Mr. Best said, "They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord and they are tearing down property. Dr. Pedicord is badly beaten up and they are going from one ward to another destroying property."

Kuratomi said, "We will stop it."

Mr. Best said, "They have beaten up Dr. Pedicord and that will have to be stopped right away."

Mr. STRIPLING. That was at 1:30?

Mr. MYER. That was at approximately 1:30; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What happened then? What did you do, yourself, Mr. Myer, upon hearing this conversation?

Mr. MYER. I supplemented what Mr. Best said, which is not on the record, by saying that we will not have any physical violence in this center, and if we do, we will take other action.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you state that at this point, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Why does it not appear in the transcript?

Mr. MYER. Simply because the young lady evidently did not get it.

Mr. STRIPLING. If the young lady was taking down what Mr. Best and Mr. Kuratomi were saying, she certainly would take down what the director was saying, would she not?

Mr. MYER. I am repeating what I remember of saying. It is not in the transcript. Why it was not taken down, I do not know.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the young lady take down this other comment, or reconstruct it afterward?

Mr. MYER. I think it was reconstructed, but I am not sure about that. She came into the office just about that time as the names were being taken, and it appears she only got a portion of the comment. I think that is what happened.

Mr. MUNDT. That appears to be the only logical explanation, for having the statement of Mr. Best and Kuratomi and not yourself, that she did reconstruct it afterward.

Mr. MYER. I might say one other thing—

Mr. MUNDT. It was not a stenographic transcript of the conversation?

Mr. MYER. Not of that portion of it, because she came in in the midst of it, as I remember it.

Let me make one other statement. It was evident to Mr. Best and myself and the others in the room that this incident of the hospital was not a part of the plan of the committee, as we viewed their faces, and as we saw the agitation within the committee themselves when the announcement was made, it was evident. That was one of the reasons we did not take other action at that time, because we felt that they were as anxious to get it under control, and not themselves cause an incident, as perhaps we were.

I do not think the committee would have objected, had we touched something off, and that they were not interested in touching off physical violence that day.

Mr. STRIPLING. What steps were taken after you told them you would not tolerate such conduct?

Mr. MYER. As I remember it, three members of the group went over and said—the hospital was just across the road—that everything was under control.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, did you suspend the meeting?

Mr. MYER. I suspended the meeting until they reported back; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that three members of the group?

Mr. MYER. Of the evacuees.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of the evacuees?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. None of the white personnel?

Mr. MYER. That is right. A short time later, as I remember it, there were about three called from the hospital. I might say some of the folks in the hospital were pretty upset, naturally, as you would expect them to be.

Some time later I asked Mr. Schmidt—I don't remember exactly what time this took place—to go to the hospital. Mr. Schmidt is the head of our internal security program on a national basis and was at the center and was at the meeting. I asked him to check the question of both property damage and the situation as regarding Dr. Pedicord and report back to me immediately.

Mr. Schmidt then got up and left the room, went through the crowd. We waited until he came back and reported that it was not true, that there was none in the hospital at that time that were not supposed to be.

I might say that the reason that was done was this, that it was reported, as I remember it, that there were still people in the hospital running up and down the hallways, and somebody reported they were knocking down partitions and doing damage to property.

Mr. Schmidt came back and reported that the only property damaged that he could locate was a 2 by 4 railing which was in front of the outer office, in front of Dr. Pedicord's office that had been knocked over, evidently by Dr. Pedicord, or in the fight, and Dr. Pedicord was badly beaten, or badly bruised, but that he did not seem to be seriously injured, but he was in good hands, getting medical care, and there was no one in the hospital and everything seem to be under control, and somebody had just gotten a little excited about the situation.

Mr. COSTELLO. You made the statement that Mr. Schmidt left the meeting to go over to the hospital. Did he go alone?

Mr. MYER. I do not remember about that. He started out alone; at least, we did not request anyone to go with him. He may have had some people go with him out through the crowd, but in any event, he went. I did not ask anybody to.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is testimony of Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee going to check up on the hospital situation.

Mr. MYER. Perhaps he did. I do not remember as he did. I know he went at my request.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe it would have been possible for Mr. Schmidt to go through that crowd outside of the administration building if he had not been accompanied by an evacuee?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir; knowing Mr. Schmidt, I know it would.

Mr. COSTELLO. That seems contrary to all of the testimony of the other witnesses in the administration building.

Mr. MYER. I do not believe you know Mr. Schmidt, because some did pass through the crowd and back, though not many of them; but I do not think you know Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know the names of any witnesses who did pass through the crowd?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I can supply those for you—Miss Battat.

Mr. COSTELLO. She was free to enter the building or leave it?

Mr. MYER. Both.

Mr. COSTELLO. She went in and out of the building?

Mr. MYER. And Mrs. Silverthorne, and as I remember it, there were a few others. I would be glad to supply that for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I note a quotation in the paper which was called to my attention, because I am not a reader of it—P. M.—which appeared yesterday, which says, "The situation was tense for a time, he said"—referring to yourself.

But I was not a prisoner. I did think it unwise to attempt to pass through the crowd.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, that is almost a direct quote. I am not sure it is exactly correct. I think what I said was that I did not consider myself a prisoner. However, in a tense situation, as we had it at that time, I did not consider it wise to create an incident by trying to pass through the crowd unnecessarily.

Mr. COSTELLO. Notice seems to have been given generally to the press that Mr. Schmidt walked through the crowd quite freely and did not have any difficulty, and all the testimony—

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Given to the committee indicates to the contrary and the fact of the transcript indicates that an evacuee went with Mr. Schmidt to check up on the hospital situation, but mention of that fact did not appear in any comment you made regarding it, or in any of the news items.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I repeat that I did not know until I saw the transcript that an evacuee did go with Mr. Schmidt. It did not register with me at the moment. I think that is understandable that you do not catch every little movement that goes on in a situation of that kind. I do not deny what the transcript says. It is undoubtedly true. Neither did I ever deny that there was any problem at Tule Lake.

Furthermore, the record shows very clearly that there were certain people who tried to go through the crowd, in or out, and were restrained.

There is also some testimony that certain others tried to go in and out and were not restrained, so it varied.

I want to make it clear to the committee that the—if I have not already done so—that the situation was tense. It had the possibilities of flaring into trouble, though I think most of our staff conducted themselves in such a way that they did not touch off trouble; but I think the way we handled the situation proved to be the sound way.

We were in continuous touch with the Army. They had their vehicles warmed up. They were in a position to move in on a moment's notice. We make it a point not to call any forces unless we think it is needed.

Now, I would like to repeat that in addition to our own staff, many of whom were in the administration building—but not all of them—there were somewhere, let us say, between three and six thousand people on the outside who, in my judgment, or the most of whom, in my judgment, were there because they were invited there to hear me speak, and not because they were part of an angry mob.

Some of them were there because they were working with the committee, which seems quite evident, and to have played the situation in any other way than we did play it, in my judgment, would have led to injury and bloodshed, which would have been unjustified.

I think that we need to go back and remember that there was a manproof fence around that area; that there were several hundred

troops, between five and six hundred, as I remember it, available. They were well armed. They were alerted. They were only a few hundred feet back from the administration building where they could have moved into the gate, had we needed them. We did not call them.

Thank God, we were able to get by without calling them. We have never indicated that there was any action there that was not authorized by us. And I do not think we would have played the story down.

However, it appeared to some very good people that we did so. For example, recently we were called upon to deny story after story and rumor after rumor that was rampant with abuse that did not happen; consequently, it gave the impression that we were denying everything.

That was unfortunate. We are sorry. In fact, the statement which we issued is a factual statement as we were able to get out at that time. We hope, as soon as we can find out, and able to conduct the material completely, to get out another statement supplementing that, regarding certain other incidents that are alleged to have happened, some of which we are able to clarify now that we were not at that time, but so far we have not had the time to get it all accurate and get it properly analyzed, because when that story developed out there, you got all kinds of stories—as you always do under such circumstances, some of which are true, many of which are untrue, many of which are garbled.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure that I understood Mr. Myer correctly about a statement he made.

You were discussing the first information you received that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten up in the hospital. The transcript which you read said that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten up and property was being destroyed in the various wards.

Then I think you said that Mr. Kuratomi, the Japanese spokesman, indicated that their group was not responsible for this beating up of Dr. Pedicord.

Mr. MYER. No; I did not say that, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Or did you judge from the location of the office.

Mr. MYER. Yes; that was a matter of judgment, of being present and able to see the reaction of the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. And either you or Mr. Best, or both, said, "Well, we can't go on with this conference with that kind of thing happening," and George said, "We will stop it."

Then I think you said a committee of 3 from this committee of 17 went over from the hospital. What I am trying to find out for sure is this: I thought you said that no Caucasian employee accompanied them; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. At that time I think that is correct. They did not accompany them at that moment.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you not think that would have been a precautionary measure, to check on the accuracy of the statement, to have some one of your group accompany them?

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so. I do not want to argue that point with you.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you said that no one accompanied them.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Schmidt did go very quickly afterward to make a recheck on it, because there seemed to be some question. The reason I did not insist on it at that time was that I did not have any question in my mind, as I saw the development; that it was not a part of the

plan, and I was sure they would have it under control themselves, and we simply awaited the development and the report back.

Mr. MUNDT. About how much later do you think Mr. Schmidt went?

Mr. MYER. I do not remember on that. It was some little time because at that time, what they were reporting was that there were some people in the hospital running up and down the halls. I remember Mr. Best reported—he was in the office—that there were a good deal of commotions. He came back and reported that it was not true, and that somebody had gotten excited.

Mr. STRIPLING. Had the discussion begun between the committee and yourself and Mr. Best at that time?

Mr. MYER. That is right; it had begun.

Mr. STRIPLING. It had begun, even though you had been notified before it began that this situation was going on at the hospital?

Mr. MYER. We had a report both from the committee and from the people at the hospital, as I remember it, at that time. Mr. Best had held onto the phone in the interim period.

Mr. STRIPLING. Before anything happened?

Mr. MYER. Now, wait a minute. After they went over to check, then it was later that a report came in that they were still there; I mean, that they came back in.

Mr. STRIPLING. According to the copy of your own transcript, there are two pages of typewritten testimony, so to speak, and then Mr. Best says:

They have not stopped over at the hospital. Dr. Pedicord has been beaten very seriously and is asking for military police. What would you boys do in a case like that?

Now, he is speaking to the committee, I suppose. Kurtaomi says:

I don't know.

Mr. Best says:

What would you do about it?

Kuratommi replied:

Maybe if I read some more, you can see some of the reasons.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. And Mr. Myer said:

I think we need to know about this now.

In other words, the situation was not under control at that point, even though you had been discussing with the committee for two pages; you had begun your discussion without having knowledge of whether the situation at the hospital had actually ceased; is that right?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not think that is right. We had a report both from the hospital and there, and evidently thought there was another flare-up and had called again at that point.

Mr. STRIPLING. I will read further. Kuratommi said:

Some of the reasons, not the reason.

You said:

We need to know who is going to be responsible for stopping this situation at the hospital right now.

You left the responsibility up to them, I assume, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. Insofar as it was possible; yes. Because they were the boys we thought could do better getting it under control than we

could, because the only alternative would have been with us, to have called the Army in at that point if they did not cooperate with us, which I was reluctant to do.

Mr. STRIPLING. You testified a moment ago that this committee did not have any knowledge of what was happening at the hospital.

Mr. MYER. I said I did not think they had any plans. They had knowledge, though, because it was reported to me.

Mr. STRIPLING. One of the three people who was supposed to be independent of the group at the hospital would not be a sufficient number to stop any rioting or beating up in the hospital.

I would like to read further, Mr. Chairman. Kuratomi says:

Some of the boys have gone over to stop it now. They came of their own accord. We didn't know they were going to do that. I think they will stop everything if we shall continue to talk business over.

Mr. Myer said:

No question of talking it over now. You can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's life be jeopardized.

Mr. Best said:

Something has got to be done right now.

Kuratomi said:

Shall we wait?

Mr. Best said:

Yes; we will wait until it is stopped over there. That has got to stop.

Kuratomi says:

We will send more boys over.

Then, in parentheses:

(Waited for report from hospital.)

Now, Mr. Myer, according to this transcript, it goes on for 10 pages, and Mr. Best received a report from the hospital at this point.

Mr. Best says:

They are still having trouble at the hospital. What are you going to do about it?

Mr. Myer then said:

Let us stop this discussion until this sort of thing is stopped. We can't go on under that kind of a situation.

Then follows—

Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee go to check up on the hospital situation.

Now, did Mr. Schmidt go at this point which was after the discussion had been going on for 13 typewritten pages, or did he go in the beginning?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Schmidt went at my request and I am not sure whether it was in connection with the second report that you read from or this one. I cannot answer that question because I do not remember.

I do remember that he was definitely sent to the hospital and came back with the report that everything was in order at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. You made no steps to stop it yourself, however, until you did send Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. STRIPLING. Even though you had knowledge that property in the hospital was being destroyed.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Best was on the phone. I could not testify as to the details of that, as to what was said. He was the one on the wire and he was in touch with the people in the hospital.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you said here:

We can't sit here and let property be destroyed and Dr. Pedicord's life be jeopardized.

Mr. MYER. That is right. At what stage that was said, I do not remember.

Mr. STRIPLING. You said that on page 4, and 11 pages later——

Mr. MYER. I think I already indicated that there were two or three different reports from the hospital; I do not remember the exact number. It is here indicated there were three, and that steps were taken each time and that we had a report each time, that things seemed to be in order both, as I understand it, from the hospital and from the people who were checking it.

Now, I am not going to testify to something that I do not remember about, and I do not remember the details of that sequence and I am not going to say that the sequence is mixed up because I am not sure about it.

Mr. STRIPLING. The point is, Mr. Myer, whether or not you continued in your discussion with the committee during the time that there was property being destroyed and the chief in the hospital was being beaten up.

Mr. MYER. I had a report, Mr. Stripling, that there was no property being destroyed, except a railing pulled loose from the floor.

Mr. STRIPLING. I am simply quoting your statement here, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. Well, that was simply a quotation from the people in the hospital who evidently thought there was property destroyed when there was not.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time you thought so, that property was being destroyed when the Caucasian doctors in the hospital had reported to Mr. Best that it was being destroyed.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, the matter of whether the situation at that time was properly handled is a matter of judgment.

The only thing I can say for the record is that there was no damage done to Dr. Pedicord or the hospital or any other staff of the hospital which seemed that our judgment in the matter was justified in the action we took.

I want also to defend my action at that time, other than to state that fact for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. However, the fact is that the Japanese were intending to beat Dr. Pedicord, which they accomplished, and not anybody else at that particular time.

Mr. MYER. I made my statement for the record, Mr. Chairman. I would agree to that statement of yours. You have investigated the matter.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently not until after 10 or 15 pages of testimony had been taken, long before the W. R. A. employees actually made such an investigation, which seems rather late in the proceedings.

We will adjourn the hearing until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, the committee adjourned until tomorrow morning, Tuesday, December 7, 1943, at 10:30 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello presiding.

Present: Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; and Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. Clair Engle, California; Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Myer, will you please come forward?

Due to the fact you were sworn yesterday, it will not be necessary to swear you again.

Proceed, Mr. Stripling, please, with the questioning of the witness.

FURTHER SWORN STATEMENT OF DILLON S. MYER, DIRECTOR, WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, when we suspended yesterday, we were asking you about the meeting with the committee of 17. How would you describe the attitude of the committee of 17?

Mr. MYER. Well, I should say that the attitude of the committee of 17 was one of mingled fear—I do not know how you would describe it other than that—and one of making demands on the administration.

They had the feeling that the committee was very definitely on the spot in relation to some of the evacuees in the colony because of the fact that they had taken responsibility for the farm strike and the strike that vegetables had not been harvested, and that probably a great many of the folks were becoming hungry at that time for fresh vegetables.

That seemed to be the crucial issue, as far as the committee was concerned, and I felt they were trying to save face.

Naturally the committee was trying to appear as a representative committee for the whole colony and trying to make me believe that they had the complete backing of the colony voluntarily.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was there any arrogance demonstrated by any member of the committee?

Mr. MYER. I did not consider that any of them were arrogant with me; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you consider that they were threatening you?
Mr. MYER. I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you state at any time that you considered yourself to be under threat or duress?

Mr. MYER. I stated at one stage of the game along toward the end of the discussion, when they were suggesting that the Caucasian staff be taken from the hospital, and after Mr. Kuratomi, in essence, had said that they did not feel they could be responsible for the welfare of the staff there if they continued in the hospital, that we did not take action under threat or duress.

I think that is the only time I made that statement, and I was simply making plain to them that there was no necessity for their employing threats; that we did not act on the basis of threat or duress and neither did we act on the basis of demands, as we indicated earlier.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are the white members of the hospital staff at the present time back in the hospital?

Mr. MYER. Yes; they are all there excepting Dr. Mason, who, I believe you have met, and who resigned immediately after the incident, and who had only been on the job a total of 16 days, I believe.

I believe all of them are on the job now, and Dr. Pedicord has been on the job, and has been supervising for some time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, I believe you testified yesterday that the crowd was quiet; that there were no signs of violence.

Mr. MYER. I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, would you explain to the committee—

Mr. MYER. I testified yesterday that the majority of the crowd were orderly, and came to the meeting, in my judgment, in a friendly manner and remained so throughout.

I indicated that I did hear certain people shouting to one another, which I presumed were some of the strong-arm boys around the crowd, and I heard certain people talking in a rather loud voice at the time they were putting up the loudspeaker equipment.

I believe that is what I said. I did not indicate at any stage of the game that there were no loud noises. I did give the impression, I believe—and I would like to repeat the impression that I gave—that the crowd was orderly.

They were there, for the most part, in my judgment, because they were asked to be there to hear me speak. After they arrived I think many of them would liked to have gone home but felt that they were not at liberty to do so after they were surrounded by this—what our folks choose to call—the goon squad.

Mr. STRIPLING. They were surrounded by a so-called goon squad?

Mr. MYER. I believe I testified to that yesterday; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many members do you estimate composed the goon squad?

Mr. MYER. I believe our press release of November 13 indicated approximately 200. That is another estimate on which I could not estimate accurately, but that was the best estimate we could get.

I might say, Mr. Stripling, that all of that information is covered in our statement of November 13; the official statement which was made to the press at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. According to the transcript of the proceedings between the committee of seventeen and you and other officials of W. R. A., Mr. Kuratomi is supposed to have said to you:

Let me say this, Mr. Myer. I do not want to see any violence. However, unless you don't remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such time as an investigation has been held, I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. This is not a threat. I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and going after the doctors. I do not want to see any violence take place, but I cannot guarantee what the people will do if we have to give them this answer.

You replied:

I have never taken any action under threat or duress.

Then Kuratomi said:

It is not a threat. It is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

Then you said:

I realize what exists. Someone is responsible for that. The people are pretty well whipped up.

Now, Mr. Myer, what did you mean by "the people are whipped up—pretty well whipped up"?

Are you referring to the crowd?

Mr. MYER. I am referring to the group of people for whom they had been responsible, the strong-armed crowd, and it was evident that they were whipped up by the fact that some of them had broken over the bounds, in our judgment, and had beaten Dr. Pedicord.

I think, Mr. Stripling, that this statement that you have just read confirms what I said earlier in relation to the Kuratomi statement and what I said about it, and confirms the fact that, generally speaking, there was tension, naturally, after the crowd gathered there.

There was tension on the part of the crowd. There was tension on the part of anyone, and an expectant type of tension, not knowing what would happen.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, will you explain to the committee why you felt that Mr. Kuratomi, as spokesman for the committee of seventeen, could stop the beating up of Dr. Pedicord or the overrunning of the hospital, when he stated to you, "I cannot stop these people from swarming over to the hospital and getting after the doctors"?

Mr. MYERS. I would like to state first that the statement of Kuratomi's was made long after the hospital incident was well under control.

Kuratomi, in my judgment, was utilizing it as simply an incident to try to impress me with the fact that I might have blood on my hands if I did not meet their demands, and I think the facts prove that that was why he was stating that fact or making that statement; not stating a fact.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many Caucasian employees or individuals were in the administration building on the afternoon of November 1?

Mr. MYER. I do not know. It has been variously estimated from 100 to 175 people.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you see the crowd in there?

Mr. MYER. I saw some of the folks in there. Some were in the adjacent offices.

The administration building, incidentally, is a building which has two wings, which are connected. The wing beyond I could not see. I could see those offices that were immediately around me. It was divided into two parts.

And some of those folks, I presume, were over in the other part, which would have been a separate building at one time but which is now enclosed with a walkway.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately what percentage of the Caucasian personnel of the camp were in the administration building on that afternoon?

Mr. MYER. I presume about 50 percent, according to the estimates that have been given.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the total personnel, Caucasian personnel, of the center?

Mr. MYER. I believe around 250. Just how many were on the job that particular day? I don't know that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you understand in your own mind that these people were being restrained and held there?

Mr. MYER. No; I did not know at that time that they were being restrained and held.

We had some evidence in the meantime that some of them were asked to go into the building. We had some evidence that a few tried to leave the building and were restrained.

I saw no such cases, other than the one case that I mentioned to you yesterday, where I saw an automobile which was being driven by Mr. Gerry, where a man flagged him and asked him to drive into a parking space, when he turned around, driving in the other direction.

That is the only case I saw personally.

May I add to that testimony, on the basis of some interviews we made in the center in connection with 69 witnesses that were interviewed among the staff members who were present at that time, that 8 testified that they were verbally restrained by evacuees in a well-mannered fashion; 6 testified that they were verbally restrained by evacuees in a surly or threatening fashion; 9 of those in the two groups above testified that they were either sent to or kept in the administration building; 4 testified that they had seen a W. R. A. employee by the name of Breece being pushed roughly by an evacuee as he (Breece) attempted to leave the administration building; 1 testified to seeing a W. R. A. employee by the name of Donovan physically restrained by evacuees under similar circumstances; 1 testified to seeing a W. R. A. employee by the name of Slattery physically restrained by evacuees under similar circumstances; 4 testified that they had seen some evacuee guards posted at some of the doors of the administration building; 3 testified that some of the doors of the administration building were latched by evacuees on the outside; 2 testified that trash cans were placed against some of the doors; 2 testified that they thought evacuees were attempting to nail some of the rear doors of the building; 1 testified that she passed through the crowd from the leave office to her personal quarters and back without escort or restraint; 1 testified that she passed through the crowd from the leave office to the administration building, back to the leave office, and then back to the administration building without escort or

restraint; 2 testified that administrative personnel in the hospital were not permitted to use the telephones; 3 testified that they were provided by the evacuees with escorts in passing through the crowd.

I might say that it is not true that the personnel in the hospital were not permitted to use the telephones because they phoned the office at least two times, and according to the testimony, three times.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there more than one telephone in the building?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, I do not know. I would have to check. It just says "telephones." I am showing that they were allowed to use some of the telephones.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony indicates that the telephone on the front porch of the building was attempted to be used by one person and the Japanese—

Mr. MYER. All I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that one telephone was used.

Mr. COSTELLO. The particular testimony was, though, that the use of the public telephone on the front porch of the building was denied; that one of the persons visiting at the camp was not permitted to use it, who wanted to phone regarding his train reservation that evening.

Mr. MYER. O. K. I am simply pointing out that the telephone was used.

Now, as to whether they were all used, I am not sure.

Now, that is the best summary that we can get in relation to the restraint, as to what happened—a summary. We have tried to be objective about it and we have tried to interview a cross section of the people who were there and get their points of view, and that gives a summary on the matter of the people in the administration building.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were any of them asked or interrogated regarding the types of language used by the Japanese in speaking to the white employees?

Mr. MYER. I think they were asked all the questions that had to do with certain charges that were brought up, Mr. Chairman, and I do not remember the answers on that particular question.

Mr. COSTELLO. Various witnesses before the State senate committee investigation in California indicated that obscene language was used repeatedly by the Japanese surrounding the building, particularly in regard to persons trying to leave the building.

Mr. MYER. There is one other statement, going back to the previous question, if I might comment on it, regarding the nature of the crowd.

These same 69 witnesses, when interviewed generally, about their reactions, gave these general reactions: 31 of the 69 testified regarding the nature and the attitude of the crowd of whom they said it was a mixed group, with many women and children; 8 others described the crowd as quiet but expectant; 5 people described it as quiet but friendly; 5 referred to the holiday atmosphere that prevailed, particularly among the children; 3 described the crowd as partially hostile; 1 described it as sheeplike; 1 described it as orderly.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the children would not have any real apprehension of the events that were taking place, do you think?

Mr. MYER. I doubt whether they would, Mr. Chairman.

On the other hand, I think if their parents had come up there with the idea of really causing a riot, they really would not have brought the children with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was quite evident if the parents were not informed that there was going to be a riot, or the nature of the meeting there, that they would be led up to the administration building through a trick.

Mr. MYER. I am glad to have the record made clear and have you state that fact, because it was so indicated by some of the folks who first reported the incident.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that a large number of Japanese in the center were parties to the incident that took place and were ring-leaders in bringing the crowd there and causing the trouble.

Mr. MYER. That never has been denied, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently that number was a very large number, was it not; 200 or 300 Japanese?

Mr. MYER. I should say approximately that many were probably in on it.

Mr. COSTELLO. It would require approximately that many to keep the crowd there.

Mr. MYER. That was our estimate in our official statement of November 13.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, what action has been taken against those 200 people who were responsible for this?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, since November 4, the United States Army is in command of the center, until we agree that they move out.

I am not in a position to report the details of any action taken since that time.

I think I am at liberty to say that a number of people have been apprehended and are separated from the rest of the group, and that proper action is being taken; but I am sorry I am not in a position to answer for Colonel Austin as to just what the situation is at the moment.

Mr. STRIPLING. What action was taken by the W. R. A. for the period from November 1 to November 4?

Mr. MYER. In what respect?

Mr. STRIPLING. As to the group that beat up Dr. Pedicord; as to the 200 you referred to who kept the crowd there; as to the ones who exercised restraint upon the employees of the Federal Government, or in reference to any possible damage to property, Government property or private property.

Mr. MYER. The W. R. A. went about the business, as we always do under such circumstances, of documenting the facts, some of which I have outlined here and some of which we have not outlined here as yet, in relation to how many and who were the people that took part in different activities.

They immediately started the type of investigation that you would expect any responsible agency to start, by questioning people who were witnesses to incidents, such as Dr. Pedicord; his hospital staff; such as the members of the administrative staff who were in the different buildings, and secured information from certain evacuees, which was very valuable as a basis for questioning additional people.

That process was under way at the time of the incident on the evening of November 4, when the Army took over.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was anyone arrested during the period of November 1 to November 4?

Mr. MYER. I cannot say as to that, as to whether any actual arrests were made during that period or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who conducted that investigation?

Mr. MYER. The internal security force of the center.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would that be Dr. Jacoby?

Mr. MYER. No; Dr. Jacoby was not at the center. He was not a member of the internal security force at that time.

Mr. Schmidt, who was our national internal security officer, and who was assigned there, headed up the investigation, and he had, of course, the collaboration of the assigned personnel of the staff to work with him.

We sent some folks immediately from Washington, two or three staff people from here to go out there to help document those facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the facts as to those persons who beat up Dr. Pedicord at the hospital reported?

Mr. MYER. No. Dr. Pedicord was unable to supply the names, and neither was anyone else. I mean, if they have, I do not know it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the identity of the individuals who participated in the beating up ever known?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. No one was able to furnish that information?

Mr. MYER. Not so far as I know, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Dr. Mason interrogated?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure whether Dr. Mason was interrogated or not. He was by the State senate committee.

Dr. Mason left there very soon after the incident was over.

And I might say that the last time I talked to Dr. Mason his state of mind was such that I do not think his estimation would have been very clear on the subject.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you mean by that?

Mr. MYER. Dr. Mason was a very frightened person.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was he the only person at the center who was frightened?

Mr. MYER. No, sir. There were many frightened persons at the center.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think, because he was frightened, that that in anyway impaired his judgment or knowledge of the facts?

Mr. MYER. In my judgment, in Dr. Mason's case, it impaired his objectivity quite materially at the time I talked with him on Monday evening and on Tuesday morning.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you mean by "impaired his objectivity"?

Mr. MYER. The question whether he saw things as they actually happened. People sometimes do not.

This is not intended as an insult to Dr. Mason. It is simply a statement of a fact, as I see it. And I think it was true with a number of other people on the center, as it was at Poston, if you will remember a gentleman by the name of Townsend, who reported a number of incidents that proved not to be true later.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was just going to comment on that fact. It appears that any time there is any trouble at any of the relocation centers any witness who testifies regarding the facts that took place seems to have a lapse of memory due to extreme fright or fear.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, that is not a true statement of fact.

I think I testified yesterday that Dr. Pedicord, even though he had been badly beaten, was an extremely objective man. He was not frightened, in my judgment, and I think he made a very clear-cut statement of the facts as he saw them, and I think they were generally true.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you make the statement that Dr. Pedicord could not identify a single Japanese that attacked him?

Mr. MYER. That is not necessarily any reflection against Dr. Pedicord, because, remember that the people who were in that center, about 9,000 of them, had moved to the center within the 2 or 3 weeks previous to the time that this incident developed, and amongst 15,000 people, you would not expect Dr. Pedicord, or anyone else, to know every individual on the project, and certainly not those individuals who were causing this particular trouble, because most of them had not been living on that center previous to the time they caused the trouble.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the testimony of various witnesses indicates that even before this incident occurred, persons would be identified as having stolen Government property and caught red-handed in the act, and no punishment was meted out to them, so that it appeared to me the general procedure at the center was, when things like this took place, no punishment was meted out to those guilty of the offense.

Mr. MYER. That is not a statement of fact, Mr. Chairman. The records show differently.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony before the State senate committee indicates that one of the Japanese who had stolen meat from the warehouse was caught red-handed in the person of Mr. Cozzens and the person who testified, and although he was taken before Dr. Jacoby, who was then the security officer, no punishment was meted out to him.

Mr. MYER. Whose testimony was that, may I ask?

Mr. COSTELLO. I will identify it for you in time here.

Mr. STRIPLING. While he is looking that up, Mr. Myer, did you state that Dr. Mason testified before the Senate committee?

Mr. MYER. I understood that he had.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who advised you that he had testified before the Senate committee?

Mr. MYER. I cannot remember, and I want to state that as a fact; it is my remembrance that somebody advised me that he had.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where did you receive that information?

Mr. MYER. I do not remember.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, as a matter of fact, he did not testify before the Senate committee.

Mr. MYER. I am glad to be put straight on that fact.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, while the chairman is looking up the name of that witness, I would like to inquire whether you feel the objectivity of Mr. Warin is commendable?

Mr. MYER. Mr. who?

Mr. MUNDT. Scott Warin, or Warren. Who is your assistant farm supervisor?

Mr. MYER. I do not know Mr. Warin personally. I did not have any contact with Mr. Warin. I would not want to comment on that

until I have the testimony of Mr. Warin laid before me and had the facts to check his testimony.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if your records would not show anything about his reliability, quite apart from what he might have testified to?

Mr. MYER. I do not have it at hand, Mr. Mundt; I am sorry.

I should say this much, that Mr. Costello yesterday, I believe, mentioned the fact that Mr. Warin had testified that there were 250 acres of rutabagas in 1942 that were unharvested, and 50 acres of turnips.

I have not been able to get the full facts on that as yet, but I do have this one fact: That there were 132½ acres of rutabagas planted at Tule Lake and not 250, and I do have information that a rather large poundage of those was harvested.

I am giving those facts for the record now, and I do not have the final answer on it as yet, because I was not able to get a full check on it this morning.

Mr. MUNDT. While you are checking the record, will you also have your personnel department check as to what they consider Mr. Warin's objectivity to be?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have this whole information on Mr. Warin for the record right now.

I will merely state that Mr. Warin entered on duty at the Tule Lake project August 24, 1942, as assistant farm superintendent, at a salary of \$3,200 per year, the position which he held until he submitted his resignation effective April 10, 1943, giving as his reason that he had a 400-acre farm under cultivation, and due to labor shortage, his presence was necessary at home.

Prior to his employment with W. R. A., Mr. Warin was superintendent of a ranch at a salary of \$300 per month for Lisky Bros., Klamath Falls, Oreg.

The only comment I would like to make about that is that Mr. Warin has not been an employee of W. R. A. since April 10, 1943.

Mr. MUNDT. He resigned, did he?

Mr. MYER. He resigned; yes—so far as I know, of his own volition for the reason he wanted to go back and take charge of his own ranch.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, do you know Mr. Ralph E. Peck?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I have met Mr. Peck.

Mr. STRIPLING. What about his objectivity?

Mr. MYER. I read Mr. Peck's testimony and, in general, it is very good; I mean, I have read excerpts from it; I have not read the full transcript.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long was he employed by the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. I believe Mr. Peck was employed by the Authority from almost the beginning of the setting-up of the Tule Lake center until some time around the first week or 10 days in November.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately 15 months.

Mr. MYER. May I just review briefly, that Mr. Peck entered on duty at the Tule Lake project August 28, 1942, as project steward, at a salary of \$3,200 per annum.

On December 1, 1942, the position was reallocated to project steward at a salary of \$3,800 per annum.

On July 1, 1943, the title of this position was changed to senior institutional manager, at a salary of \$3,800 per annum. a position

which Mr. Peck held until he submitted his resignation, effective as of the close of business November 6, 1943, giving as his reason a desire to return to work for his former employer.

Prior to his employment with the W. R. A. Mr. Peck was employed by Twaits-Morrison-Knutson as camp manager, at a salary of \$350 per month.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I have here an affidavit submitted by Mr. Peck and with your permission I would like to read it into the record.

It has occurred to me that you might be interested in some pertinent facts in connection with the administration policy of the War Relocation Authority at the Tule Lake center, Newell, Calif.

Having been employed there as chief project steward for the past 15 months, I feel qualified to speak with no uncertain degree of accuracy. I might sum up the whole situation by enumerating a number of instances and backing them up with supporting documents that could not be questioned.

While the information I would have to offer might be lengthy and in great detail, I know of no other way to adequately describe the conditions that exist, other than to go into more or less lengthy detail.

I have been asked time and again by people on the "outside" as to what my ideas would be on the correct answer to a very unfortunate and mismanaged situation. To begin with, I would like to go on record by stating that I am not speaking as a disgruntled employee. If I am disgruntled at all, it is because of the policy, or rather, the lack of policy, that governs the administration of the War Relocation Authority. I don't mean only at Tule Lake, but from Washington down. The lack of policy and the attitude of the administration toward the responsibility to the people of the United States, who are supporting and paying for this venture, should be very severely scrutinized. I might say in all sincerity that the people who are actually doing the work in W. R. A. have no voice in the administrative policies. They are constantly reminded that they are Government employees and should take their orders from Washington.

I should like to cite some instances, of which I have positive proof and which should warrant your very serious consideration:

1. I, personally, in company with Willard E. Schmidt, national chief of internal security, now at the Tule Lake center, caught five or six Japanese youths peeping into the windows of white women in the dark of night. After Mr. Schmidt and I attempted to arrest them, but could not apprehend them because they ran in all directions, I personally reported the incident to Mr. Ray Best, the project director. His reaction and attitude were prone to levity, rather than serious consideration. He remarked that two men as old as Mr. Schmidt and myself should never try to catch up with youngsters of the age of these "Peeping Toms." He made no visible effort, to my knowledge, to apprehend these criminals who were, beyond the shadow of a doubt, out of order. It was 10:30 at night, and they should have been down in the Japanese area, where they belonged, rather than being allowed to roam at will in the residential area occupied by the Caucasian personnel. You can verify this by contacting Mr. Schmidt, the national chief of internal security, who is now at the Tule Lake center.

2. Not more than 2 months ago there were two instances where 7 or 8-pound roasts of beef were placed on Mr. Best's desk with evidence and signed confessions by the culprits, admitting the fact that the meat, bearing a Government stamp, had been stolen. The confessions were in the handwriting of the culprits. No action was taken by the administration other than to give the thieves a 30-day suspended sentence.

3. I personally know of an incident where a Japanese evacuee tried to force his way into a white woman's apartment. I personally reported this to the internal security division and Edward H. Borbeck, the internal security officer, who was beaten up by the Japanese mob, has this report in his possession, and this report was made to his superior in a regular form. No action whatsoever was taken by the administration.

4. During the whole tenure of my administration, I constantly fought against thievery in general, and thievery of food in particular, by the Japanese. I have documental proof on official W. R. A. memoranda, addressed to me by my superior, advising me again and again, that I should confine my efforts to mess

operations, and leave the stealing and thievery problems to the internal security division.

This is not idle gossip. I possess sufficient proof over the signature of my superiors, advising me to forget the incidents. I have, on very good information supplied to me by an evacuee storekeeper, evidence that will prove that at least 950 to 1,000 pounds of granulated sugar, a rationed item, were stolen by the evacuees between August 28, 1942, and December 30 of the same year.

5. I can enumerate incidents where either my staff or myself, or all of us together, discovered caches of stolen food hoarded in and about women's latrines, doorsteps, buried in the ground, hidden in locker and laundry rooms, hidden in private apartments, and in each instance, the attitude of the administration has been of a passive and ineffective nature.

6. The pacifistic influence of the sociologists and educational groups within the center, positively dominate the administration. Of this there is no doubt. I know of one instance where a school teacher made the remark at a luncheon table that the Japs were justified in bombing Pearl Harbor. The woman advocated the intermingling of the races. Her name is Van Buskirk. She has two adopted children whom she constantly threw into contact, socially, with the Japanese. She was never apprehended, and I very much doubt that she was ever reprimanded. She stayed on the pay roll and taught school until she was ready to leave. There are several school teachers at this moment still on the W. R. A. pay roll who, to use the vernacular of the street, can officially be termed as "Jap lovers," inasmuch as they entertained evacuees in their apartments at night.

(Further information regarding Mrs. Van Buskirk appears in appendix, p. 10127.)

7. The Caucasian personnel, some 3 months ago, anticipating the very thing that happened on November 1, and on November 4, as well as on subsequent dates, particularly when the project director at last felt it incumbent upon himself to call in the Army for the protection of the white people, petitioned the project director in a very formal and friendly manner to build a fence between the area occupied by the evacuees and that occupied by the Caucasian personnel. The project director, in open staff meeting, ridiculed the idea and called the attention of the workers to the fact that if they confined themselves to the work at hand, they would have little or no time at all to circulate a petition about a fence.

All of these incidents and many more, made no difference to the administration. People were beaten, ridiculed, and frightened. The administration took no corrective action whatsoever. However, on the evening of November 4, when the Japs threatened the lives of the project director and his family, he lost no time whatsoever in calling in the Army, indicating the problem was not a serious one to him until his own personal safety was in jeopardy.

I could go on and on, ad infinitum, and enumerate instances of sabotage of Government equipment, supplies, and subsistence items, and give you names and titles of unit and section heads who would, if properly questioned, verify my statements. This missive is merely an outline that will indicate the potential possibilities that are in evidence in connection with the mishandling of W. R. A. administration, that could be classed nothing short of criminal negligence, which, in itself, is an extremely serious offense.

I shall be happy at any time to elaborate and go into more thorough detail in this connection, if it will in any way aid you in bringing this matter through open investigation to the attention of the Government in Washington, your constituents, and last but not least, the 130,000,000 people of the United States who are paying for and supporting this agency that is guilty of so grossly mishandling public funds and so inadequately administering a Government function.

This was subscribed to before a notary public on December 2, 1943. I offer that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment in relation to that statement?

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Peck?

Mr. STRIPLING. He is the chief steward of the project.

Mr. MYER. May I comment on the statement, please?

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder whether Mr. Peck's record for objectivity is very impressive.

Mr. MYER. I would say from that statement it is not very impressive; no.

In the first place, that is a generalized statement of opinion without stating specific cases or names, except in one instance, which I do not happen to have the facts on and which I will be glad to check.

That has been a technique that has been utilized time and time again in relation to charges made against W. R. A., which people like to call coddling, pampering, and socialized activities.

We would be glad to have specifically the individual charges that Mr. Peck refers to in a generalized way.

Of course, in a group as large as this, you will find differences of opinions and attitudes toward these Japs, as he indicates.

Mr. MUNDT. How many social workers do you have at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. I think in the welfare staff there were two people. The people he is talking about as social workers, that he refers to here, are school teachers, as so indicated.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many did they have during segregation?

Mr. MYER. I think during segregation we had probably—well, I do not know exactly, but we had quite an increased staff, because they were brought in there to help to interview families as to their wishes and regarding segregation, on division-of-family problems, and we probably had, I think, seven, according to the information I have.

Mr. STRIPLING. I believe you will find that Mr. Best testified before the Senate committee that there were 12.

Mr. MYER. Well, that is possible.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many conscientious objectors—

Mr. MYER. May I proceed with my statement?

Mr. MUNDT. Before we comment on the subject of school teachers, am I correct or incorrect in my belief that the schools at Tule Lake were not open at the time?

Mr. MYER. They were not open at this particular moment; no—the first week of November for the reason that the schoolhouses and other buildings were being used for purposes in relation to segregation programs, such as the checking of baggage, and because of the fact that we had not quite completed some of the lavatories and because of the fact that we had not gotten the population settled down as yet. But the school teachers were being utilized, many of them, in connection with other activities.

Mr. MUNDT. Closed for a week or so, were they?

Mr. MYER. No; they had been closed during the period of segregation and the school teachers and everyone else were devoting their time to the segregation problem.

Now, if I may go back to Mr. Peck: Mr. Peck, in the first place, I would like to point out, is not an employee of W. R. A., and was not when he testified.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was he ever an employee of W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. I read into the record a statement that he was employed by W. R. A. from August 28, 1942, to November 6, 1943.

Mr. Peck resigned, after a discussion with one of our people, and after he had been intoxicated twice on the project, one of them in a Government car.

Now, gentlemen, Mr. Peck had, generally, been a very good employee up to a certain point, as regarding his ability to carry out the program, as has been testified.

For some reason or other, Mr. Peck ceased to be a good employee as the segregation program moved ahead.

Mr. Peck, incidentally, is the gentleman who—if I may go back to an incident for a moment for background; it was testified in one of the hearings out there, by Mrs. Cummings, one of our employees—had threatened to take over the hotel.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Take over which?

Mr. MYER. Take over the whole hotel, in case she did not rent rooms. And that has been thrown up at me as showing the attitude of the W. R. A. people.

It just happened that Mr. Peck was the man who did that and was reprimanded at the time as not being in line with our policy.

Now, I am not here gentlemen, to assassinate anybody's character; I much prefer not to. I would like to point out, though, that this particular type of testimony comes from a person who is no longer on the pay roll, who generalizes about the policies, who, on the one hand, said there is no policy and then, on the other hand, rebels against the fact that there is a policy that he is opposed to follow, and which he does not like.

I would like to state further that our main problems at Tule Lake and most of the other centers have been because of the fact that people ignore the policies and do not follow them, and consequently have gotten us into trouble.

Mr. MUNDT. While on the subject of Mr. Peck, did he resign after his resignation had been requested by the Japanese?

Mr. MYER. It happened that he did resign after his resignation had been requested by the Japanese, but not before we had definitely planned to ask for his resignation.

We did not get around to it, because on the morning of November 1, previous to the time this demand came, we had talked about a number of personnel problems we had, including Mr. Peck, and it was determined at that time, before this committee met us in the afternoon, between Mr. Cahn, who was acting out there in the capacity of supervisor at the time, and Mr. Best and myself, so that his resignation would be requested.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did it require, Mr. Myer, 15 months to find out that Mr. Peck was not a satisfactory supervisor?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I made the statement that Mr. Peck had been, up to a certain point, a very good employee, but for some reason, as people sometimes do, he began going back at a certain stage.

One of his main troubles was his dealing with people. That was true throughout.

But evidently he increased his drinking, and for other reasons, he was not a good employee during the period of the segregation program, and particularly during the period of the turmoil, in the last month or two, previous to the time the Army came in.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. The turmoil started on November 1, did it not?

Mr. MYER. No. The turmoil started in August when we began to move about 9,000 people out of that center, and moved about 9,000 people in, and we had a period of about 3½ months, Mr. Mundt, when we did not have a normal situation, and when people were working

day and night, trying to get a job done and to carry on an orderly program and at the same time try to move thousands of people.

And it was just at the end of that movement that the October 15 incident, that I mentioned, happened, and we went on into the problems that led to later events.

Mr. MUNDT. While on the general subject of objectivity, I would like to ask you about another individual.

Take Dr. Mason. You say his objectivity was impaired?

Mr. MYER. I said that at the particular time I talked to him. I have no statement about Dr. Mason at other times because I met him only on two occasions; one of them was the evening of November 1, while I talked with Dr. Pedicord and immediately afterward; and on the next morning he was the first man I saw as I walked into the office, and I talked to him briefly at that time.

That is the only time I saw Dr. Mason.

Mr. MUNDT. You would not put him in the same class as Mr. Peck, as a disgruntled former employee, would you?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, I do not know what Dr. Mason testified to before your group. I would say that he is a former employee of 16 days' duration.

Mr. MUNDT. It is a question of whether you are classifying him—

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, I am not here to classify people that I do not know anything about.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, will you please ask the witness to allow a committee member to ask a question?

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MUNDT. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Myer, is this—Whether you place Dr. Mason in the same category as Mr. Peck, from the standpoint of being a witness whose testimony might be subject to suspicion, because he was a disgruntled former employee; or whether you simply say that his objectivity was impaired due to the excitement of the situation, and consequently would tend to discount it?

Mr. MYER. I have no basis of judgment as to Dr. Mason's objectivity, excepting a meeting with him on November 1, around 5 o'clock in the evening, and another meeting with him around 8 o'clock in the morning of November 2.

At that time I am saying that his objectivity, in my judgment, was not very good.

As to his general demeanor, I am in no position to testify, because I do not know the gentleman well.

Furthermore, I would make just this comment, that simply taking the testimony of former employees is not getting a good cross section of testimony to serve as a basis for sound investigation, and in most cases that is the kind of testimony that is being presented here.

I do not know about Dr. Mason. I would not be able to make a statement.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your opinion concerning the objectivity of Clifford Kallam, your farm superintendent at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. I would say that Mr. Kallam was very much mixed up on certain things. He told about four different stories about whether he was beaten by the Japanese.

He told internal security officer, Mr. Schmidt—well, let me read from the teletype, Mr. Best's statement from different people.

From a teletype by Project Director R. R. Best, dated November 27, 1943—

Farm Superintendent Kallam seen by Zimmer, Best, and Opler immediately after alleged meeting with farm workers, showed no evidence of being beaten or roughed up, but told them had been pushed around in room and kicked in shins, then forced to sign paper stating that portion of farm crop harvested by Tuleans for use only of Tuleans. Few minutes later Kallam told Schmidt, of internal security, had not been beaten and had merely signed paper stating presence at meeting. Later different versions were given to Joyce, Engle, Cole, and Schmidt by Kallam. The alleged paper has never been produced.

That, gentleman, is all I know about it.

Mr. MUNDT. How about Mr. Gerry's objectivity, the procurement officer at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. The only time I have ever seen Mr. Gerry, or the only two times I have ever seen Mr. Gerry, gentlemen, was the one I mentioned, I believe, yesterday, when I saw him trying to leave the project at the time the crowd was gathering, and the only other time I saw him was at a staff meeting on the afternoon of November 2, when he made quite a speech, at which time I did not think he was very objective.

And I would not care to comment on Mr. Gerry's objectivity because those are the only two times I saw Mr. Gerry, and at that time I considered him somewhat hysterical.

Mr. MUNDT. He is at present employed?

Mr. MYER. He is a present employee; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. How about the objectivity of John C. Stubbs?

Mr. MYER. Very low.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just on occasions, or generally?

Mr. MYER. Generally, but particularly on that occasion.

Mr. COSTELLO. When was he first employed at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. Wait just a moment.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe it was in August 1942, and prior to that time he had been employed in the San Francisco regional office of the W. R. A.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. It seems strange to me that a person of low objectivity should be assigned to the regional office in San Francisco, and then at his own request be transferred to Tule Lake with a position carrying an increased salary.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Stubbs entered on duty May 1, 1942, as supply officer, at a salary of \$3,200 per annum, by transfer from the United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Administration, Los Angeles, Calif., where he was employed as junior administrative assistant at a salary of \$2,700 per annum.

Change in status and promotion effective August 22, 1942, to senior procurement officer, at a salary of \$3,800 per annum, a position which he held until his resignation effective at the close of business June 30, 1943.

His reason for resigning was given as personal reasons, but the administration has been informally advised that bad health was the real reason for his action.

On July 1, 1943, Mr. Stubbs was given a temporary 30-day appointment as hospital administrator at a salary of \$3,200 per annum, which expired July 31, 1943.

On September 27, 1943, Mr. Stubbs was appointed to a chart position of cost-accounting clerk, at a salary of \$2,000 per annum, which position he held until his resignation November 4, 1943, giving as his reason lack of confidence in Dillon Myer and his W. R. A. policies.

Now, Mr. Stubbs was a man who was not able, unfortunately, either for ill health or some other reason, to carry the responsibility which he earlier carried.

He was off of the job for some time on leave, and we did give him a minor position at \$2,000 because he had been on the rolls.

We needed people of his training and his type.

Now, a man might be reasonably good as a cost accountant and still not be very objective under these conditions, and certainly Mr. Stubbs was not.

Mr. COSTELLO. His objectivity was not bad simply because he objected to the fact that certain employees insisted that new clothing should be purchased for the Japanese at Tule Lake, and not utilize the Army clothing that had been tendered to the project, and of which there was a full warehouse at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. The trouble is that his objectivity on that is very bad.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the fact?

Mr. MYER. The facts regarding the Army clothing are there: That early in the development of the centers, a large amount of Army clothing was turned over to W. R. A. for distribution to evacuees, where it could be utilized.

As might be expected, most of it was too large for the evacuees, being of sizes larger than could be handled by the Japanese.

Some of it was utilized at a few of the centers, at the segregation centers as well as the assembly centers.

After the revision of our policy in August or September 1942, in relation to clothing issue and clothing grants only to those who worked, they were asked to dispose of the Army clothing, either by sale, at prices of original cost to the Army or at original appraisal, to those people who had funds, and out of the normal payment procedure to purchase clothing if they cared to purchase it.

Some of the clothing was disposed of on that basis.

The rest of it was surveyed off and was asked to be disposed of through the normal channels in handling such clothing, because much of it was too costly to revamp it and revise it in order to fit the evacuees and in order to put it on sale through the normal community enterprises.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me read a statement, taken from the sworn statement of Mr. Stubbs before the State senate investigating committee in California.

Question. That was men's clothing, in the three warehouses, that you already had on hand?

Answer. That was men's clothing that was shipped out, that was donated by the Army to be used on the various projects.

Question. What kind of material was it?

Answer. It was all good material, and there was men's clothing, and there was an abundance of underclothing. Some clothing was left down there yet, and underclothing, and when I requisitioned it from the Army at San Francisco, I took into consideration the smaller sizes, because the Japanese collectively is a smaller race, and it could not be said that all the clothing were misfits by any means.

Question. There were all kinds of sizes in the collection of clothing that you had on hand?

Answer. That is right, but the larger sizes of the uniforms and underclothes I did not ask for, but I asked for only the smaller numbers.

Question. They were used underclothes that you had on hand there?

Answer. Some had been used, but it all averaged up about like new clothes.

Question. You had in the warehouse plenty of clothing and underclothes in good condition?

Answer. That is right.

Question. But you would not issue new stuff, and wanted to issue that which you had on hand?

Answer. It was not my province to issue the stuff; it was my province to obtain that stuff, and I refused to obtain or purchase new stuff, when I had that supply on hand.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I make it clear for the record that when that policy was established regarding the clothing, there was no clothing given to evacuees.

Funds were provided only to evacuees who worked, not to exceed \$3.75 a month, to purchase their own clothing; consequently, of course, we did not give Army clothing away to evacuees who, under the policy, were not supposed to be given clothing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently the objection here in the testimony of Mr. Stubbs was not a question of giving the Army clothing away but a demand on the part of some of the employees that new clothing should be purchased and the Army clothing should not be used.

Mr. MYER. In my judgment, Mr. Stubbs was not objective about that; he did not know the answers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the warehouses were under his control, so he should have had some idea of what was contained in them.

Mr. MYER. I think I have already pointed out that Mr. Stubbs was a very sick man a portion of that period.

Mr. COSTELLO. Unfortunately, all the witnesses who testify regarding incidents concerning the W. R. A. and its administration of the centers always seem to have that.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, that you labor under that impression.

I think it is quite interesting to note that out of a good many hundreds of people we have employed, we have had a very small group of people who turned up, who were the type of Mr. Stubbs and Mr. Townsend, and a few others, amazing small, and I am quite pleased there were not more of them.

If we had had a few more, it would have been very tough on the program, but fortunately, there were very few people who were of that type.

Mr. COSTELLO. Since you have mentioned the name of Mr. Townsend once or twice here this morning, I might refer back to our hearings earlier in the year, on pages 9714 and 9715 of volume 15, of the investigation.

There is contained therein the testimony that you gave, apparently a transcript of a conversation that was held between Mr. Wade Head, project director, at Poston, and Mr. Townsend.

Might I inquire as to the authenticity of this transcript, of that conversation?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I have here, which I would like to place in the record, a photostatic copy of that transcript, which is signed by Henrietta A. Johnson, secretary to the project director, with the state-

ment that that is an exact copy of the conversation between Mr. W. Wade Head and Mr. H. H. Townsend, dated December 1, 1942.

May I supply that for the record?

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZ.

Conversation between W. Wade Head, project director, and H. H. Townsend, Supply and Transportation officer, on December 1, 1942

Mr. HEAD. Good morning, Mr. Townsend.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Good morning, I just got your memorandum and want to discuss it with you. Please let me apologize for my actions during the strike. I must have been so upset I didn't realize what I was doing. I was afraid that I and the other employees were going to be slaughtered by the Japs.

Mr. HEAD. Mr. Townsend, if you do not mind, I am going to keep notes on this conversation, inasmuch as your actions of the last few days have been such that they cause me to doubt your honesty and reliability. Do you object?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't blame you for wanting a record of everything I have to say.

Mr. HEAD. Now, Mr. Townsend, you said you were frightened; did you actually see, personally, any signs of violence on the part of the people or the destruction of any Government property?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Since having time to calm down, I realize that there was no sign of violence, and now that the trouble has been settled and I have had time to look around, it is easy to see the crowd must have been peaceful all the time and there was no sign of any damage to any Government property.

Mr. HEAD. Do you consider that sufficient reason for leaving the project and failing your duties during the time of trouble?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't know what I meant. I lost my head, I guess. I would have done more harm here than good in that condition.

Mr. HEAD. I think you have done more harm than good here ever since you came, and in the past few days it has been reported to me that you have been frightened ever since arriving, and that you have always carried a gun.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think every employee here should be armed at all times.

Mr. HEAD. If you think that, you absolutely have no business working here. This is no place for cowards nor unstable people. Besides, every Government employee who places more importance on his own safety than his duty to the Government is not fit to work for Uncle Sam. You were not only disloyal to your job, you were disloyal to John Evans, and disloyalty was displayed before all the project employees when he was in charge and was working under tremendous pressure. By the way, did you leave Poston in a Government car?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; I went to Parker in a Government car and from there I caught a ride with a friend to Los Angeles.

Mr. HEAD. I am extremely disappointed to find we have had an employee working here like you. It is easy to understand why you might have become upset, but I cannot understand why you became frightened and fled. You had a responsibility to the Government to look after its property. We have employed you in a responsible position and put our confidence in you to carry out that job, then you fail completely. And besides, look at the men here with their families who were not afraid. Ralph's wife was here alone. She had planned to go to Phoenix for the week end but when the sit-down strike started, she immediately saw that her duty was here, and she stayed. She is not a Government employee but she is a loyal American. Other men and their wives stayed with their children. To me, just at a time when you were most needed, you absolutely failed.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I guess I can't blame you for feeling that way.

Mr. HEAD. I am sorry to say this, but never have I been so disappointed with a fellow employee as I have been with you. You insisted that the Army be called in, not because you thought that was best, but because you were afraid. "Yellow" is a good word for it. That would have been an easy way to settle this thing. Thank God John Evans was not a coward. He displayed real character when he refused to follow you and a few other crackpots' advice. I want you and everyone else in the country to know that John Evans has my complete confidence and backing in every decision he made while here. If John had thought it was

necessary to call the Army into Poston to protect Government property or human lives, he would have done so, but at no time did he feel it was necessary.

You can see now, from events, that it wasn't. Had the Army come in, no doubt there would have been some people shot. Our Government knew what it was doing when it put these people here, and you know yourself that the strike wasn't due to anybody in jail, but due to the fact that we had failed to furnish some of the minimum necessities of life to them such as heating stoves and many other items, and we would have been a bunch of cowards in taking advantage of them by marching the Army in and having defenseless people shot.

There are many reasons he could not outline to you why the Army should not have been called in; I think it is unnecessary in your case to do it. I want to point out that the Japanese have many thousands of American prisoners and if anything happened here in which the Japanese would be shot or otherwise hurt, retaliation would no doubt have been taken against the various Americans held as Japanese prisoners.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I see now that Evans was right; he was level-headed.

Mr. HEAD. After your actions during the disturbance, as far as I'm concerned, it is too late in the day for you to change. To be perfectly fair and frank with you, I want you to know you would not have been allowed to return to this project had not John Evans recommended it to me, but I am convinced in my own mind that it was a mistake.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Would you like to have me hand in my resignation?

Mr. HEAD. Personally, I think you should, but probably it will be better, inasmuch as you are working with Empie, that you discuss the matter with him. My personal feeling in this is that although you might do a good job in some other position, you are too emotionally unstable to work on a project like this. Anyone who will carry a gun and who will go around trying to frighten the employees by telling them they are not safe, has no business working here.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I wish you could have seen how upset and disturbed I was and I think you could see my side.

Mr. HEAD. I have no more to say to you except this: You became emotionally upset and unstable at the time your services were most needed, so you have no business here. Mr. Townsend, in all the years I have worked, you are the first employee I have felt it was necessary to call a stenographer in to take notes on the conversation, and you realize as well as I why I feel this is necessary.

(This is an exact copy of the conversation between Mr. W. Wade Head and Mr. H. H. Townsend—(Signed) Henriette A. Johnson, secretary to project director.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason I raise that question is that I have before me a letter from Mr. Townsend, dated November 11, 1943, which reads:

I have just returned from a short leave from Central America and Panama where I have been engaged in public relations and advanced work with the natives in the dense jungle area where the Pan-American Highway is being constructed.

I have just read some of the news items and some of the record compiled during the hearing on the un-American activities of the Japanese war relocation center at Poston, Ariz.

May I congratulate you and your committee on this needed and splendid effort you have made in correcting this menace, national error, and extreme waste, as well as the exposure of the poor supervision, traitorous management, bringing to light and to the public's attention the type of men whom we now find are willing to perjure themselves to cover up their breach of public trust.

It is needless to say that I am more disappointed and shocked to read portions of this record that are as false and as deliberate a lie as could be fabricated. This is especially true covering some portions of my testimony given to your committee before leaving this country to render what service I could toward our war effort.

I am bewildered beyond description to find that while I was so engaged that appointees of this Government, especially those engaged in such a vital and important war emergency as handling alien enemies, many of whom should be prisoners of war, should stoop so low and waste so much valuable time during war, to endeavor to discredit an effort to set in order one of the most flagrant, un-American, disloyal cesspools of crime and mismanagement under our flag.

I keenly regret that I was not notified of this hearing and procedure so that I might have been present at least for rebuttal, as these men would not then have made the attack and gross charges of exaggeration and false statements in my testimony.

Mr. Steedman, there are no false or exaggerated statements in my testimony, if honestly and properly explained.

It was unfortunate that someone familiar with the facts could not have been present in Washington with rebuttal testimony when Mr. Dillon S. Myer, War Relocation Authority Director, was making his last desperate stand before your committee and had to introduce a completely falsified statement to bear out his malicious statements.

It is this flagrant, perjured statement and testimony that I particularly wish to call to your attention. This statement is set forth on page 9714 of the book entitled "Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, Volume 15."

This statement is supposed to be a statement or conversation between W. Wade Head, project director, and H. H. Townsend, on December 1942.

This purported, unsigned, stenographic transcript is wholly and entirely false, a deliberate lie, untruthfully fabricated, is perjury in every sense of the word. It never occurred then or at any time. Nothing of this type or nature has ever occurred between Mr. Head and myself and could never occur between Head and myself or any member of his staff, as he or they then or now would not have the guts to make such a statement in my presence.

This false and malicious effort on the part of Mr. Myer and his incompetent understudy, Mr. Head, is typical of the other lying statements and vicious attempts to overcome stated facts that might injure their opportunity to continue their unwarranted program with the Japs. Their whole activity in the War Relocation Authority is a direct slap and insult to our fighting men throughout the world.

Associated as I have been for the past 6 months with these real he-men, our real American fighters and military construction forces, watching men and boys from every station in life training, fighting, enduring hardships, and building to preserve America for Americans and the world and to then come back here to America, under the flag that means so much to all people in the war zone and to find this unchallenged, false, vicious, and unbelievable condition in our governmental family, is beyond my comprehension.

It would be well to send these men out into some of our military activities to prove to them how unworthy they are to be Americans.

This is not an attack against the W. R. A. or its intended good purposes, but against their personnel. After working with them, being continually forced into their pattern of Americanism and unwholesome antiwar ideas; demanding that I, too, build their willing Jap subjects into deeper future distress and against our ideas of democracy was bad enough but now to find that they are willing to perjure themselves to support their activities and out of thin air prepare a malicious false statement with no word of truth in its origin, causes me to revolt.

This being done should be conclusive proof that their entire program is operated accordingly.

I call your attention further to Mr. Myer's comments on purported memorandums or meetings with Mr. Head relative to my duties, etc. Mr. Head at no time either wrote me or advised with me relative to my duties as Mr. Empie was my superior and advised me he was the only one I should take orders from.

Mr. Head wrote me three memorandums during my work there. First, regarding passes I was authorized to issue; second, regarding statements I had made with reference to placing teachers' barracks in the center of the Jap camp and a mile from the Caucasian barracks; and third, relative to a report that Mrs. Findley had sent to Washington that I carried a gun at all times, which was another false statement.

These memorandums are attached for your consideration.

Regarding another rather enlarged purported exaggeration: In my original testimony you asked me how many warehouses we had in use and thinking of the total number of places we stored supplies and equipment, not separating the types, my answer was 180. This is correct, but half of that number are the supply warehouses in the mess halls, the hospital, the machine and repair shops and the agricultural supplies, etc. The major buildings total 90.

Regarding the 58 tons of food used daily: This was actual estimates made by the chief and assistant stewards and myself and can be verified from the supply records on file.

Regarding the car used on the Oklahoma trip rather severely attacked. This car was my regular car and was used with full knowledge and the consent of Mr. Empie and was used as all assigned cars for all purposes of the assignee. Mr. Empie had advised all employees under him to take their families away and leave if they wished, as the camp director had advised him that no protection could be furnished, regardless of how serious the riot became.

Mr. Empie stated to approximately thirty of his employees in his office meeting that any of us could leave without prejudice and return after the riot had settled down. At the time I left, things were just smouldering and nothing whatsoever was active and my reason for then leaving was because we were all tired out just sitting around waiting for someone to issue some orders to settle things.

Mrs. Townsend had just come out of the hospital, injured while employed. Immediately upon my return a record of the trip and all information was supplied Mr. Empie and travel orders were issued and approved.

At that time any Jap in the camp would be furnished a car and driver to go any place in the country to visit any sick member of his family and to take any sick member anywhere. I have personally driven a sick Jap from the hospital at Poston, making a trip of 700 miles, and then Dr. Pressman, of the hospital, made several such trips to attend him or to see him, etc.

This was actual practice, and I am still at a loss why my wife, one of the teachers at the camp, was not entitled to the same treatment that any Jap could receive by asking for it.

Regarding my overseas service attacked by Mr. Myer: My discharge shows that I sailed for Europe January 11, 1919, and returned to the United States August 1, 1919. Where Mr. Myer concocted the date of 1936 as being the time I was in France is another mystery, as I was not out of the country in 1936.

Regarding losses and destroyed property during the riot: After the riot a long list of damaged and destroyed property was prepared and brought to my office to be written off by my department for the bookkeeping and auditing department.

I asked if the list was in full, and I was told just to sign it as it was, and it would be completed later. I refused to sign this document and it was later returned from Mr. Head's office with notice attached for me to complete and sign it. I refused to sign or attempt to complete a list of the total losses, as I was familiar with only those things stolen from the warehouses and equipment from my department.

There are many other innuendoes and attacks too numerous to enlarge upon in this letter, but all of Mr. Myer's 37 points challenged are correctly testified to by me, and would be so understood when explained.

I am willing to return from Panama if your committee thinks it necessary if this hearing is resumed.

Yours truly,

HAROLD H. TOWNSEND.

He definitely indicates that this testimony is false and that the conversation never took place; that he had no such conversation with Mr. Head at any time.

MR. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I believe you admitted on July 6 or 7 that there were only 37 misstatements or bits of misinformation in Mr. Townsend's testimony.

I do not believe Mr. Townsend's letter now any more than I believe the statements he made in his testimony before your committee previously. I doubt if his word will stand up any better today than it did at that time. I think the documents speak for themselves.

MR. COSTELLO. Let me also read a letter dated December 23, 1942, addressed to Mr. Townsend and signed by Ralph M. Gelvin, acting project director.

MR. MYER. The date, please?

MR. COSTELLO. December 23, 1942. That was after he had been separated from the project at Poston. [Reading:]

DEAR MR. TOWNSEND: This communication will serve as notice that your services as supply and transportation officer, Colorado River war relocation project, will be discontinued effective at the close of business, December 26,

1942. Annual leave which has accrued to your credit during your duty on this project will carry you through January 3, 1943. Payment for your leave for December will be included with the December pay roll and the remainder will be paid on a supplemental pay roll issued on January 4, 1943.

The decision to terminate your services has been made after careful consideration from various viewpoints and is a decision which the director feels has been made in the best interests of the project. The director is not unmindful of the constructive work which you have accomplished during the period of your employment. It is felt that you have been conscientious in your efforts to initiate and follow a program which would result in the best use of Government supplies, materials, and equipment, and in the conservation of appropriated moneys. It is for this reason that this office would feel no hesitancy in recommending you for a similar position under different circumstances. It is for this reason as well that the termination of your temporary appointment is being made without prejudice.

Should you have occasion to require a recommendation in connection with future employment, please do not hesitate to use this office as a reference.

Yours very truly,

RALPH M. GELVIN,
Acting Project Director.

Mr. MYER. I should say that Mr. Gelvin was exceedingly kind under the circumstances.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that he definitely wrote a letter to him in very complimentary terms, praising the man, at the time of his being separated from the project, and the only reason for his separation, apparently, was the fact that he drove his wife from the project up to Los Angeles in a Government car, apparently without authority, although he alleges that Mr. Empie had given him authority, and Mr. Empie was his immediate superior.

He had given him authority to take the car and leave the project.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, you are reading into the record what you think was the only reason for separation, which I think I would have to disagree with.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the particular reason, or the particular incident, I might state, that brought about his resignation.

Mr. MYER. From what source did you secure that information?

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, that was the incident that occasioned the resignation in December, because that was the incident that took place immediately preceding his separation.

Mr. MYER. I should say that that was only one of the incidents that led to his resignation or dismissal from the project.

I just have this further to say, Mr. Chairman, I am very sorry indeed to have had to have been a party to calling attention to all of the misstatements that were made in Mr. Townsend's testimony.

It is not my usual procedure to try to crucify the character of any individual. So far as I know, that was the first time in my life I had ever done so. I am not interested in doing so today.

I would like to point out to any one who has had any administrative experience, that you do, under tense situations, for some reason or other, have people who go to pieces, sometimes mentally and sometimes physically, and are not objective about the things that they think they see and things that they think they hear.

We have had that situation happen every time we had a major incident, on the part of a few employees.

I think if you will check with anyone who has had similar experiences to ours, that that happens in almost any incident.

I think if you will check with the newspaper folks, when they go to a riot or go to a fire, or go to a wreck, that you can get half a dozen different stories as to what eyewitnesses saw.

They do not see the whole thing together, and you will get different stories.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. So I would simply like to point out this—excuse me for a moment, Mr. Mundt—that I am not here to throw off on employees or former employees the responsibility for anything for which we are responsible. I would like to keep the record straight, however, regarding specific incidents rather than talking in terms of generalities in relation to incidents of this type.

I would like to make one other statement, and that is that no administration is perfect, and, of course, there will be mistakes made by individuals, if they are human. And there has been mistakes made.

On the other hand, I think the record is pretty clear; if you are really interested in getting at the record, and if you are really trying to get at the facts as to what happened at Tule Lake, we will be glad to help you do so.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, from the standpoint of this physical phenomenon to which you refer so frequently, both in your testimony yesterday and your testimony last July, as to the difficulties which people have from the standpoint of objectivity under stress, I wonder if you feel that might not work both ways, not only at times that such physical phenomenon would cause people to think they saw things that were not there, but similarly at times it prevents people from seeing things that are actually there.

Mr. MYER. No question about that, Mr. Mundt; very true. That is one reason we sent people up from Washington who had not been on the job at the time, who had not been mixed up in the affair, to go about questioning the people on the project, to get a cross-section of this thing.

It takes time to check judgments and get facts.

And, of course, there is a tendency to rationalize and say, "I did not see certain things," as well as the fact that they see things that do not exist.

But the fact is that you do have confusion. I think we might as well accept that fact, and what we are trying to do here, I think, is to sift the facts that did happen and try to get at the facts rather than enlarge upon some of the stories which have not proven to be true or were alleged to have happened, by people that I do not consider very objective about the matter. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, you spoke about these various persons and your desire not to destroy anybody's character, and so forth, but I would like to read another letter here signed by Dr. John T. Mason, dated December 3, 1943, addressed to Mr. Stripling. [Reading:]

DEAR Mr. STRIPLING: The enclosed copy of a teletype is self-explanatory.

Mrs. Luckett instructed me to notify you of any and all communications which I might receive from the War Relocation Authority.

I should like to inform you that I gave no interview at any time to any newspaper or newspaper representatives in Klamath Falls or in any other town in the West. I have not seen, nor do I know the source of the article published in the Klamath Falls Herald News, but I have approved no article for publication which has not been strictly based on fact. As to any exaggerated accounts, I cannot be responsible for any newspaper embellishments.

Any effort you might make to correct the impression this teletype leaves or to prevent further inferences of this type from the War Relocation Authority will be a favor and a proper protection for me.

Yours very truly,

JOHN T. MASON, M. D.

The teletype to which he refers was sent from the Tule Lake Center, dated November 24, 1943, in answer to the following telegram from the United Aircraft Corporation signed by L. Olson, of East Hartford, Conn.:

Telegraph collect police record of John Thomas Mason, M. D., employed as surgeon at base hospital, Tule Lake relocation center, Newell, Calif., born June 5, 1908, Sparta, Tenn., 5 feet 11 inches, and 174 pounds.

UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION,
East Hartford, Conn.

(Attention L. Olson.)

Reurtell twenty-third. Have no police record on John Thomas Mason, Jr., M. D. However, misrepresented facts in interview published in Klamath Falls Herald News concerning trouble at Tule Lake center.

R. R. BEST, *Project Director.*

Mr. MYER. Apparently that was sent to Hartford, Conn., in response to their inquiry for a character reference on Dr. Mason.

Mr. STRIPLING. He had applied for a position there.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they had written to Tule Lake for a reference on him.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I assume that in this case Mr. Best fell into a common error that is very easy to fall into. He assumed that what was published was true. I am very sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am calling particular attention to the first line of that telegram, "Have no police record on John Thomas Mason, Jr., M. D."

Mr. MYER. I would like to check the facts in relation to the whole situation on that.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10127.)

And let me say further that I am delighted to hear that Mr. Mason, or Dr. Mason, gave no such interview that is alleged to have occurred by the press, and I want to make the record clear, if I have not done so already, that I am very sorry if I indicated that he did appear when he did not appear. I was misinformed.

Mr. COSTELLO. The particular objection that I have to this telegram is the statement made in there in the opening line, which would infer that the man has a bad record; that they out here at this particular project did not happen to uncover his police record.

And I think that is a very damaging method of trying to destroy Dr. Mason in the eyes of the public and the world-at-large.

Here is he applying to the United Aircraft Corporation in Connecticut, for a position, and in order to try to stop him from getting a position there, Mr. Best sends a telegram of that character.

And I think it is extremely reprehensible conduct on his part and thoroughly unjustifiable.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think you are reading something into the wire as to intent that may not be there. However, I will be glad to check the facts in relation to the item involved, and if it was written with that intent, I agree with you that it is not the thing to do.

I might add, however, that I do not want to destroy Mr. Best's character, or anyone else, on the basis of a couple of bits in the paper, until we have the full facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. I also have a telegram here addressed to Congressman Engle, dated December 2, 1943, signed by Mr. B. F. Gerry. It reads as follows:

In October received advance civil-service classification paid November 15 accordingly. November 19 project director advised reclassification being rescinded on account of being spokesman and also giving you information at Tule Lake meeting not on pay roll for December 1. Advise if civil service does not have some control of such matters.

What does that telegram indicate?

Mr. MYER. I should say that that telegram probably indicated that Mr. Best has decided that Mr. Gerry may not be longer useful at the project.

I would have to check the facts in regard to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, because he gives testimony before a State senate committee or before a group of Congressmen, he is not entitled further to remain on the rolls of W. R. A.

Mr. MYER. No; Mr. Chairman. I am sure it was not based on any such action.

Mr. COSTELLO. He just received an advance classification under civil service dated November 15, and paid November 15 accordingly, and on November 19 reclassification rescinded.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to get the facts on that, on Mr. Gerry's case which I do not have at the moment.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I say this, in re-reading the testimony the last time it was kind of hard to trace down all the facts that Mr. Meyer was going to supply for the record.

The reporter indicated each point where Mr. Myer was going to submit the facts, and that you would submit them at that point in the record.

Now, if you would do that, it will be complete.

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to do that. And I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, at this point, if it is possible, that I be supplied with not only a copy of the record being made this morning, but the record that anybody else has made, in order that I might be able to comment on any incidents that might be reported that we might have overlooked here; if that might be possible. Do you think that is possible?

Mr. COSTELLO. The only record that I have received is a copy of the testimony which was taken before the California State Senate committee, of which we only have the first half.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, you misunderstood me; I mean the record we are making here, of Congressman Engle's testimony, Dr. Mason's testimony, and any other statements that may have been made in relation to incidents at Tule Lake.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe that copies are available of that.

Mr. MYER. All right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just to keep the record straight, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think Mr. Myer asked permission to insert in the record a copy of the conversation had between Mr. Townsend and Mr. Head on December 1, 1942, and I do not think that authorization has been entered formally on the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. It can be entered in the current record, but it appears at pages 9714 and 9715 of the hearings before the Senate committee, in volume 15.

Mr. MYER. I simply would like to make it clear that that is a signed copy by the secretary who took the record, since the validity of the record has been challenged.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your statement will appear in the record.

Mr. MYER. As I understand it, it appeared in the press that I had made that story out of whole cloth, and I would like to make it clear that I did not make it out of whole cloth; that we based it on a signed statement by the secretary, who took the statement down at the time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, all we are trying to do at these hearings is to try to establish a true record of the facts.

To do that, of course, it is very important that the committee get all of the advice possible as to the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before the Senate investigating committee in California, and other witnesses who have made statements either before this committee or the members; consequently I want to ask you now how your evaluation of the objectivity of Ernest Rhoads, the fire chief, out at the Tule Lake, Calif., center, is based.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to comment not on the individuals involved, but on the testimony that they gave.

Mr. MUNDT. You will be given that opportunity later, but I thought it might be nice to know your opinion on it before we analyze the testimony.

Mr. MYER. Well, judging from the facts that we have gathered regarding Mr. Rhoads' statement, I should say that his testimony is very bad, but I will be glad to give the facts as to why I think so.

May I do so now? Would you first read what Mr. Rhoads testified to, and the particular point you are concerned about so that I might comment on it?

Mr. MUNDT. Among other things, Mr. Rhoads said that the Japanese had held his wife a prisoner during the riot.

Mr. MYER. I think that is a matter of opinion and a matter of judgment. I think he thought so and there were some other people who thought so. That has been pretty well discussed, I think.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your opinion; that she was not a prisoner, or that she was?

My judgment is that Mr. Rhoads resigned because of the fact that I was not. My opinion is that I was not a prisoner and I did not try to leave, so I do not know whether it will ever be known whether I could have gotten out or not.

Mr. MUNDT. He also testified he resigned from the position at Tule Lake because he could not get any fire protection there under the present W. R. A. set-up at the center.

Mr. MYER. I should say that that probably is a mistake. The fire protection at Tule Lake and all other centers has been very excellent. I think the record there, you will see, has been better than it has been at other places.

My judgment is that Mr. Rhodes resigned because of the fact that he was—that in the meeting on the afternoon of November 2, he made a very violent speech; that he felt perhaps we would not like to have

him continue on the pay roll, and in which he said many things that I am sure he would now regret saying.

Mr. MUNDT. He further stated that the valves in the fire plugs were filled with broken glass, and upon other occasions, filled with sand.

Mr. MYER. Here is a teletype from Mr. Best, dated November 27: (The telegram referred to is as follows:)

EXCERPT FROM A TELETYPE MESSAGE BY PROJECT DIRECTOR R. R. BEST, DATED
NOVEMBER 27, 1943

Check by Hoffman, national fire protection advisor, shows all hydrants in good condition except one on which valve nut is missing. No hydrants blocked or filled with sand or dirt, although they sometimes have been in the past, prior to segregation.

Fire-reporting telephone system operating satisfactorily, few lights on fire department switchboard burned out. No fire hose stolen from fire department. One hundred eighty-nine carbon tetrachloride quart-size extinguishers missing out of 1,700 since center began; appointed personnel as well as evacuees have access to these. No hose nozzles damaged. Five or six 2½-gallon and 4-gallon water-type extinguishers bent and three or four of same type filled with chicken louse spray and gummed beyond use. Fire truck damaged in turnover on way to fire October 13; now in use.

Mr. MYER. I believe if you will check the record, Mr. Rhoads testified that equipment worth \$50,000 had been damaged beyond repair by having phones taken off the hooks.

We have not only had it checked by the fire chief, our national fire chief, but we have had it checked by the telephone company who installed it, and they tell us that the only damage has been the fact that there have been a few bulbs burned out on the switchboard; that the equipment has continued to be in good shape.

At the time, shortly after the installation, they had some difficulty with the system which was rectified, and it has been in good shape ever since.

The valve situation, I think, was testified to by Mr. Lueck.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Lueck?

Mr. MYER. He was the assistant fire chief and who is now acting in charge.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he presently employed?

Mr. MYER. He is presently employed.

Mr. MUNDT. Objectivity O. K.?

Mr. MYER. Let me read it and let you be the judge.

Now, I am not going to pass on the objectivity of all these people, because I do not know. I will give you the facts regarding them. Some of them I do know.

I have indicated, Mr. Mundt, those where I think I have the answer, but really I do not, I do not usually give a statement.

Mr. MUNDT. It might be a good idea for W. R. A. to work out a new objectivity test.

Mr. MYER. I agree with you, and after having had three blow-ups in the nearly 20 months we operated, I assure you I would have been very glad to have had one ahead of time, because you cannot always anticipate who is going to blow up under such circumstances.

Mr. MUNDT. Go ahead with Mr. Lueck.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Lueck confirms Mr. Rhoads on one point. [Reading:]

DAMAGE TO FIRE-PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

G. B. Leuck, assistant fire protection officer testified that:

(a) Approximately 200 quart-size fire extinguishers had disappeared between project's start and October 1943 but expressed opinion that loss could not "be attributed to the Japanese or anyone else in particular."

(b) Nuts are frequently stolen from underground fire hydrants.

(c) Sand frequently gets into standpipes leading down to hydrants, but some of it is "kid stuff."

(d) There certainly has been abuse of equipment by the firemen—some deliberate and some due merely to youthful exuberance and carelessness. The evacuee firemen have never gone out on strike at any time.

(e) There was change in attitude of evacuee fire protection force after segregation movement—more surly and less cooperative.

Mr. MYER. Now, may I stop to explain a moment that the type of valve that we are talking about were sunk in the ground, and were operated with a key type of wrench, putting it down in; they were sunk down about $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 feet, and the testimony of all, with the exception of Mr. Rhoads, indicated that this was not a malicious filling up of these valves. It was simply the normal type of thing that would happen in any city, and particularly under conditions of that kind where kids were playing, and the sand had gotten into those, and they were inspected according to the rules, daily.

Now, I do not know whether Mr. Rhoads was properly quoted or not, but it was implied in one of the newspaper stories that I saw, that there were five fires that the evacuees had refused to go to, previous to the time that he resigned, and during the segregation period.

The facts are that there were five fires during that period, put out by voluntary helpers before the department arrived, and not because they refused to go to the fire.

Now, whether he made that statement, I am not sure; but it was alleged he was to have made the statement.

Mr. Lueck says there was a change of attitude. Well, we expected that. Nevertheless, gentlemen, I would like to point out again that I do not think that any group would maliciously burn up the center in which their own people were living.

That is a little gratuitous, but that is an opinion.

Mr. COSTELLO. Reading from some of Mr. Lueck's testimony here—

Question. How about damages to the fire hydrants, and damage to the trucks?

Answer. Yes, sir; some have run into the hydrants with the trucks and automobiles.

Question. Do you believe that was done maliciously?

Answer. Not knowing how it was done, I would not state. I would not be surprised, though.

Mr. MYER. May I comment? Mr. Lueck here says he thought perhaps some was deliberate. I have reported on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. I read further:

Question. Is there anything else you would like to relate as to your experience with the Japanese boys? We are all anxious to learn.

Answer. Well, possibly before the segregation the Japanese firemen were more willing and did better work than the crew of firemen we have since the segregation. During segregation, our crew of firemen were constantly changing, due to the fact that many were going out of the camp to useful work, or leaving under the segregation. The turn-off was very heavy, but we could always get whatever we wanted in the way of volunteer firemen. The senior camp firemen always stayed on the job.

Question. How about the fire hydrants, did you experience some difficulty by reason of damage to the hydrants?

Answer. Yes; we had some trouble over that.

Question. Were the nuts removed from the hydrants, so when the alarm came the water could not be turned on?

Answer. Yes; that is true.

Question. How many instances of that kind can you recall?

Answer. I cannot say exactly how many instances. There were reports made in regard to having the nut on the valve replaced. We have several hydrants where the nuts were not replaced on the valves, but would say there are perhaps a dozen or more instances. We had to have a special case made so we can use those hydrants without the large nuts on.

Question. Do you depend on the telephone system fire warning?

Answer. Yes, sir; we do.

Question. Those telephones were operated by batteries?

Answer. By batteries, and directly by power lines.

Question. Did you have false alarms turned in out there?

Answer. Yes; quite a number.

Question. Before or after segregation?

Answer. Before and after, consecutively.

Question. What would they do; leave the receiver off the hook?

Answer. No; this is a telephone system, and had a regular line and box, and they would open the box and remove the transmitter from the hook, and transmit the call and leave there. And when we would arrive there we would find no fire, and would try to check up, and would catch nobody. I cannot say the date, but Mr. Best did happen to catch one of our own firemen turning in a false alarm.

Question. Is it a fact that in some cases the entire group of Japanese firemen, in answering a fire alarm, they would operate the trucks very well, but would go in the opposite direction from the fire?

Answer. We had that happen in some cases, but not all of them. I remember one morning there was an alarm in the military area, from an overflow of oil from a heater, and the firemen ran all over the project before they came to the right place. They persisted in going in the wrong direction.

Question. Did you lose any of your equipment?

Answer. There was small things disappeared, but of course, there was always a lot of others besides the firemen that had access to it. Nevertheless, it was stolen.

Question. Besides the damage to the fire hose and hydrants, did they do considerable damage to the engines? Did they run the motors without oil?

Answer. Well, we were very careful about that. Each morning the Caucasian who is on duty for that day would be one man who would look after that. And after our runs, a complete check was made of the oil, the mileage, and so forth, each morning. There was some apparatus in No. 3 engine house damage, because it needed a new gasket, and when the man in charge went out to get a new gasket to put in it, when he came back the engine had gone out that way.

Then he goes on. I might refer to another line or two over here, talking about social workers.

He, himself, is still testifying.

Question. And did you ever see any indecent language that was written around in the buildings?

Answer. Yes, sir; a time or two I would see some of the buildings, and the night before the Monday demonstration, which was Hallowe'en, there were some people went in our area and used soap on one or two cars there, and wrote obscene words on the cars, and drew rising suns on some of them.

Question. Did you see any of that on the sides of the buildings?

Answer. I did not see it on the buildings.

Question. Did you ever hear about it down there, that some of the social workers down here told them if they kept on demanding and agitating, they could get anything they wanted?

Answer. Yes, sir; I heard that ever since I have been here.

Question. Did any Japanese tell you that?

Answer. Yes; one did, but he is gone now.

Question. And they were advised to that effect by some of the social workers in here?

Answer. And he told me that any time they were in difficulty they went to the social workers.

He also testified as to the display of Japanese flags and things of that kind in various celebrations and demonstrations.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I comment?

First, I would like to make it clear to the committee that I am not a defender of the Japs at Tule Lake. We have some American citizens there that are more like the Japs that we are fighting than many of the older aliens who have lived here for years, because of the fact that they were born in this country but moved to Japan at a very early age with their families, and for some reason they came back to this country, some of them as late as 1940, most of them in the late '30s, and we have, perhaps, at that center somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 people of what I choose to call 1940 kibeis, and that is not quite a correct statement, because it is an over-simplification, but they are people between the ages of 18 and 25 years, generally speaking, this particular category that I mentioned, that have had all of their training in Japan, practically, who, after the registration period in February or March of this year, were smoked out, were put in a position of where they had to declare their allegiance either to this country or decline to declare allegiance, the most of whom decided that they wanted to be Japanese and began to act the part accordingly.

Once having concentrated those people at that center, we expected trouble, and we have had trouble.

Now, may I repeat, I do not want to be placed in the position, or expect to be placed in the position of defending that kind of American citizen. They are Japs in the real sense.

We have, in addition to that, some other people at Tule Lake who are not of that class, who have become what are normally considered as Japs in the real sense.

So I do not want to be put in the light of saying that these people are all angels, that they did not run into fire hydrants, for some of them did. They did do things as they do in any normal city.

We had some false fire alarms. As indicated, an arrest was made in at least one case by a member of the fire department, who was a member himself. Why people do that I do not know.

It is a rather peculiar thing that W. R. A. is expected to run 10 perfect cities without having any of the normal crimes and normal reactions you would get in a normal city.

We do not condone that. We have had many, many, many cases of arrests for all kinds of petty crimes and misdemeanors, and we have had some arrests for violence, so I want to make that quite clear.

Now, let me go back to Mr. Lueck's statement for a moment.

I want to make it clear, though, because the implication has been made, it seems to me, throughout this questioning, that I am either throwing off on my own personnel or I am defending the Japanese at Tule Lake.

I am not doing either, if I can help it.

Now, Mr. Lueck, I think, has tried to give the facts. I question his statement about the social workers. It seems that anyone that disagrees with a particular point of view immediately becomes a social worker, public-school teacher, or anyone else.

My opinion is that that statement carries a connotation that it does not deserve.

We have a few social workers in each of the centers.

As a normal thing, we have from two to four welfare people whose job it is to work with family groups, in relation to triangle problems or other family problems that they have, that you would have in a normal city.

We have had, at times, additional staff members there.

We have had people who were concerned with community activities, which involved the matter of church activities and all the other organizational activities of the center, to assist in supervising and handling that part of the work.

Certainly, we have some of that type of people.

Now, we have differences in point of view as to how the job should be done. I have many employees that unfortunately do not agree.

Mr. COSTELLO. How are the social workers selected for employment?

Mr. MYER. They are selected through civil service as anyone else would be, for their qualifications in the field, for which they are hired, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The names are submitted to W. R. A. and they are selected from civil-service?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. After you get them, what official training or instructions do you give them before you turn them loose in the center?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to supply for the record a copy of our Manual, which gives the details on all such programs, if you would care for us to do so. I would not care to take the time now. They are given the same instructions as any other employees regarding the policies of the organization and their job and how to handle it.

Mr. COSTELLO. We would appreciate, Mr. Myer, if you would furnish us a copy of that Manual.

Mr. MYER. Of the total Manual?

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there a copy available?

Mr. MYER. I think we can make a copy for you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just one copy would be sufficient.

Mr. MYER. All right; we will be glad to do that.

I would say, in my judgment, it was one of the most complete manuals of any agency of government, for the reason that we have had to have a complete Manual, and built up to cover many things or regulations that you normally would not cover, because of the particular type of program with which we are dealing.

Our biggest trouble comes when inexperienced employees, or employees who do not seem to think it worth while to follow the Manual, act off the policy. That causes us trouble every time.

Now, Mr. Chairman, to go back to Mr. Lueck's statement, and Mr. Rhoads' statement, if I may, I do not want to argue with Mr. Rhoads' testimony regarding the fire department. I think he knows something about it.

I am not sure that he knows about the question as to who are social workers and who are not, or that he distinguished very carefully; I do not believe he did.

I want to go back to Mr. Rhoads—

Mr. MUNDT. It does not make any difference whether it is a social worker or school teacher or Mr. Best or the custodian—if somebody in the camp is urging these Japs to engage in insurrection, it is bad.

It does not make any difference who it is.

Mr. MYER. I agree with you, and anybody who is caught at that will be immediately fired, if we can find out about it, Mr. Chairman. We do not put up with that kind of thing.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Lueck testified to that effect, and I think you should check it.

Mr. MYER. We certainly agree and we have checked cases, and the most of the cases referred to have been off the pay roll for a good many months.

Now, I would like to go back to Mr. Rhoads for a moment, because I think that this is important.

As I remember it, Mr. Rhoads testified—and I am not sure of my memory and I would like to have it checked—that there was oil poured over the cars at certain times; that there was oil poured around the tires of cars during the week of November 1 to 4; and that there was oil-soaked straw, I believe, placed in the corner of private garages.

And I believe he also testified that there was some placed around the administration building at the time of the November 1 incident.

Am I correct in that?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Approximately correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Several witnesses testified to oil being placed around the cars in the garage and around the administration building on November 1 at the time of the disturbance.

Mr. MYER. We have been able to find only two people who were willing to say that there was oil placed around cars and other places. One is the former reports officer, Mr. Cooke; and the other is Mr. Rhoads.

There were other people who thought they saw boxes that they assumed had straw in them, or that they saw bags or sacks with straw in them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did not Mr. Paine testify to that effect?

Mr. MYER. What I saw about Mr. Paine's testimony I read in the press, in this manner—that he saw people carrying sacks which he thought had straw in them, and he assumed it was soaked with oil, or something to that effect. I do not think Mr. Paine ever testified that he saw oil-soaked straw; at least, if you saw what I saw in the press.

Now, if I may go back—we checked every garage and every parking space and we checked with people regarding their cars, and we found no evidence at any time of oil being poured over cars, nor no evidence of oil being poured around tires, either on November 1 or any other day during that week, or any other time, by evacuees.

We have found no evidence of any straw that had been soaked with oil.

We did find two sacs with straw in them that were serving as pillows for old men who were serving as watchmen in one of the buildings.

We did, in checking the 69 witnesses that I mentioned a while ago, have these comments in relation to this particular item:

Three stated that they had seen evacuees carrying boxes, the contents of which were not identified. They were simply carrying boxes or cartons.

I might say that one or two of them said that they assumed that they were coming from the post office, but that is gratuitous.

Two testified that friends had told them about seeing evacuees carrying straw. None of them testified as having seen any straw.

Mr. MUNDT. May I inquire, do you have a list there of the 69 witnesses?

Mr. MYER. We can supply that for the record.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask that the names of the witnesses and their positions be submitted to this committee?

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to do that. I am simply summarizing this cross section.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just a moment, please.

To get this straight, you want all of the testimony that was given throughout the investigation inserted in the record; the testimony of these 69 people?

Mr. COSTELLO. That need not be inserted in the record.

Mr. MUNDT. Just the names and positions of the 69 witnesses.

Mr. MYER. You do not want the testimony?

Mr. MUNDT. Unless it is too voluminous.

Mr. MYER. It is pretty big.

Mr. MUNDT. Just put the whole list in, and you include whatever testimony you want.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to put the whole thing in, if you want it, but it is pretty voluminous.

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder if you could furnish to the committee a copy of the testimony that was given and then we can determine later whether to make it a part of the hearing or not.

Mr. MYER. I would appreciate it if you would make the kind of testimony presented here by people off the project and who resigned and testified, a part of the record also. If you are not going to make it a part of the record, I would not insist.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to know, first of all, if your witnesses were testifying under oath.

Mr. MYER. I am not sure about that, Mr. Chairman; I think not. They are simply statements gotten from these people. We can go back and reswear them on their statements, if you would care to have it.

Mr. MUNDT. We do not want to have any testimony entered in this hearing that was not taken under oath. I would like to have the names and positions.

Mr. MYER. We will be glad to supply it.

Mr. COSTELLO. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(Sixty-nine statements referred to above are printed in full in appendix, p. 10127.)

Mr. COSTELLO. I might also comment that many of the witnesses you interrogated are still employed on the project.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. From that standpoint, of course, their testimony is likely to be biased in favor of the project and the administration, and that others of them, the discouraged employees would be adverse to it.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, that is possible. All we tried to do was to gather a cross section of witnesses, of people who were in the ad-

ministration building, or nearby, or in the leave office during that period. It did not seem advisable to talk to all of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Among your 69 witnesses you have interrogated, are any of those persons now no longer with the W. R. A. at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. I think we have considered that the testimony that they had given before the State senate committee and otherwise had been pretty well covered by the time we got to these witnesses.

Mr. COSTELLO. But by taking a cross section, you did not take any former employees who had left the project.

Mr. MYER. Most of those had left the project and were not available at the time we got the record checked.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the matter of this record straightened out.

Is that a record that you made of these witnesses and their testimony, a typewritten record?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How was it made up?

Mr. MYER. It was simply a record in which they were asked to make statements as to what they saw, and about the different conditions at that time. And as a general rule, it is a statement—not a question and answer statement, and out of those statements we have tried to take these factors that have come up.

Mr. COSTELLO. You will, then, furnish that complete testimony to the committee?

Mr. MYER. If you wish it, we will be glad to.

Mr. COSTELLO. We would like to have it for the committee.

Mr. MYER. Very well.

May I go back to this particular point, that I had not finished?

Three stated that they had actually seen evacuees carrying boxes, the contents of which were not identified.

Two testified that friends had told them about seeing evacuees carrying straw.

Fifteen specifically denied seeing incendiary materials.

Forty-nine offered no comment on this particular matter.

Now, I would like to say further—

Mr. MUNDT. Just a minute, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. Pardon me.

May I make one or two more comments on the oil-soaked straw story?

Again, I want to say that it was in their interest—I would not put it past some of the folks at Tule Lake that they would do this sort of thing.

However, it was not in their interest and I do not think any of it was done in this case.

Mr. Rhoads, as it happens, was not on the project from early morning of November 1, the day of the first incident there, until 6:30 that night, so he was not personally present during that period.

About an hour after the crowd broke up on November 1, I heard this story for the first time. Mr. Cozzens had picked it up from someone as a rumor.

He went out and checked around the building to see if he could find any evidence of straw. We talked to about a dozen people in the immediate territory to see if they saw any evidence. We found no evidence.

In my judgment, that is one of those things that was a figment of people's imagination, and imaginations have worked under such circumstances.

I might say that after Mr. Bigelow arrived at the project he asked Mr. Cooke, who was one of them who had reported it, and presumably hearsay, to take him to the point where he had presumably seen oil.

Mr. Cooke was notified to point out on November 5 to Mr. Bigelow any place where there was oil.

Now, we did do this: We found, as you would expect occasionally, rags with oil on them in private garages, the same as you would in any private garage.

We found occasionally on the floor a spot of oil where somebody had spilled it or where a car had leaked, but nothing beyond the normal situation that you would find in private garages.

So gentlemen, I would say that the story was the figment of someone's imagination, and there is no evidence any place that would indicate on anybody's part, other than the statement of Mr. Rhoads, who was not there on November 1 during the day, and perhaps Mr. Cooke, that they had seen oil-soaked straw.

They did indicate that they had seen boxes.

Also it was true that there were two or three cartons with dead weeds in them around the building, where some of the maintenance people had pulled out weeds and put them in the boxes, and they were left there.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state, Mr. Myer, that Mr. Borbeck, the assistant chief of internal security, alleged he saw cartons filled with excelsior on which gasoline or oil had been poured, and Mr. Wilkinson made a similar statement.

Mr. MYER. Did Mr. Borbeck say that oil had been poured on the excelsior? I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am trying to find his exact language.

Mr. MYER. I do not believe Mr. Wilkinson said that oil had been poured on it, if the testimony I saw was correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. I will read his testimony here, leaving out the reference to the language that was used:

Question. Did you see any sacks filled with straw placed around the building?

Answer. No, I did not see any sacks of straw. I saw some pasteboard cartons, and they were filled with straw. I found out later they were saturated with fuel oil and gasoline.

Question. How did you find out?

Answer. I saw the boxes, and was told by the fire chief.

Question. How close were they spaced about the building?

Answer. It seemed to me about the width of each door, guarding the door, and a couple by the window.

Question. How close were those boxes of straw that you saw, to the building?

Answer. They were right against the building.

Questioned. How many of them did you see?

Answer. The ones that I saw they carried around with them, or set them at the west corner or the other north corner of the building.

Question. You saw other Japanese carrying boxes of straw in their hands?

Answer. Yes, sir; they had two bonfires built, one out probably 60 feet and the other probably a little farther.

Question. What were the bonfires built of—wood?

A. They brought boxes and different things, and sticks—stuff to build fire.

Question. And those bonfires were going?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Mr. MYER. I might say that I had not seen that particular testimony, but our investigation indicated that there had not been oil poured around the tires or in the garages, other than the normal spillage that you would have.

There is another bit of information I now have that I would like to place in the record, if you would like to have it.

I do not want to switch the subject but it just came at hand, regarding the turnips and rutabagas.

The record shows in 1942 there were 54 acres of turnips planted at Tule Lake, and 54 acres harvested, yielding 843,359 pounds of turnips; 244,570 pounds of these turnips were used at the Tule Lake center; 425,599 pounds of these turnips were shipped to other centers for use there; 173,790 pounds were sold on the market.

Of rutabagas, in 1942, were planted 132½ acres. That produced a total poundage of 1,322,630.3 pounds.

Used at the center 361,958 pounds.

Shipped to other centers, for use there 216,690 pounds.

And sold on the market, 419,900 pounds.

The storage inventory at the time this report was made indicated 324,080 pounds in storage at that time. This was a report from June 1 to December 31 of last year.

I think that will clarify the record regarding the rutabagas and turnips of last year.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How about the records for 1943?

Mr. MYER. This is what I understood Mr. Costello was referring to; last year's production.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is right.

Mr. MYER. Because Mr. Warin was not there this year. It was in relation to last year's production.

Now, I am getting the records for 1943 on all of those crops that were not harvested on October 15, but that has not come in as yet. I am making a recheck of that, because those final figures have not come in.

Mr. COSTELLO. Earlier I discussed with you this testimony of Mr. Wilkinson regarding the incident about the ham and the food dropped in front of Mr. Cozzens when he was on the project.

It took me a little time to find in the record where his testimony was.

I would like to read from Mr. Wilkinson's testimony before the California Senate committee, page 32. [Reading])

Answer. * * * The first day that Mr. Shirrel came on the job, of course, he made the rounds, and, of course, the boys was at the heads of those different plants.

He came up to the plant with Mr. Zimmer and Mr. Kallam, and the boys happened to work that day. He said, "How are you getting along?" I said, "As well as can be expected with what I have to do with." I said, "I have a lot of trouble." I said, "I have to butcher 100 hogs to get the required amount of meat and he wanted only 50, because if I get the first of the kill, the Japanese takes the second. And before the day was over, they would give out meat to all their friends, and there would be so many."

One day it was so bad I had to close up and get Dr. Jacoby to come and get a warden there. I had times when there would not be a spare rib left at night, they gave away so much.

Now I will go back to the day when Mr. Cozzens arrived. I told him our story, about our meat, and about our strikes and our labor troubles, and just then there was a big Japanese came running around, and I thought he looked kind of stooped.

We overpowered the boy, and he had on a pair of big bib overalls; and we made him take his breeches off in front of Mr. Cozzens; and when his overalls dropped, he had in the back of them a big slab of meat, about \$11 worth, and the meat dropped in the mud at Mr. Cozzens' feet.

Well, he could not understand that, and he went into the door and asked Mr. Cole what to do; and he said, "You should take him to Dr. Jacoby." Mr. Cozzens said, "Oh, well; take him to Dr. Jacoby."

So we loaded him into the car and went to the internal security department, and Dr. Jacoby excused me and my assistant, and he took charge of the bacon, and we went back and closed up the plant for the day.

Question. What did Mr. Jacoby do about that?

Answer. Well, I came back in once to check up, and he called me into the office, and he said, "Well, we have that matter all straightened up." I said "I hope so." He said, "I have got a signed confession that he stole the meat." I said, "That is fine."

Well, the next day that Japanese was driving a truck back up into the farm, and that was the end of the bacon story.

Question. You say that Japanese was restored to liberty and was driving one of the trucks?

Answer. Yes, sir; he punished him by turning him loose and letting him do what he pleased.

I had at one time a lot of bacon and bacon rinds stolen that had been smoked. We had a large smoke house built, and had the bacon about ready to take out, and a large quantity was stolen. This happened a number of times, and I would write to Dr. Jacoby about each incident, and told him further that I would not take the responsibility of any such thefts as that any further. I don't know how it came about, but this last night the bacon was stolen I had written this letter telling him that I would not be responsible any longer, as I was assumed to be responsible for the value of all that bacon.

Question. How much bacon was stolen?

Answer. About 500 pounds was stolen that night. They did not come through the door that time; there was a skylight, and they had come through that and had taken it out up above.

Question. Was any effort made to find the bacon?

Answer. No; myself and my boys kind of looked around to see where it had gone or who had a key. I never had a key. I cannot recall any time that I had a key to open the plant or the butcher shop.

Well, I sat down with the traveling salesman and ordered new locks for the warehouse, the butcher shop, and the packing houses, but my keys would not work. He never did get me any keys that would work.

But I am saying to you, that every Japanese on that project had a key for the warehouse, butcher shops, creameries, clothing stores. In fact, they had one, Bill Matsmoni, he was a Japanese, who could open any building there.

Question. Who opened the warehouse or the plant over which you had charge?

Answer. The Japanese. They had keys.

Question. Where did they get the keys, do you believe? Do you have any idea? Did they make the keys?

Answer. Well, sir, they must have made them.

Question. Did the authorities at the project there know that the Japanese had access to those buildings?

Answer. Yes, sir; they did know.

Question. And they made no effort to keep them away from the warehouses and other buildings?

Answer. No; they did nothing about it.

Question. Did the project officials fear the Japanese?

Answer. No; they were not afraid of the Japanese, but this project was more like a reformatory. They even started Sunday schools, and wanted me to teach a class in the Sunday school. They told me it was our duty to try to make these Japanese over into good American citizens, and that we did not want to reprimand them, or to question the honesty or dishonesty of any of the Japanese.

Similarly, whenever cases of thievery were reported to Dr. Jacoby, apparently no effort was made to apprehend the culprit, or when he was apprehended to in any way punish him for it.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to point out that we now have our third project director at Tule Lake. No reflection on anyone from the standpoint of their general ability.

We moved Mr. Shirrel from Tule Lake because we did not feel he was as well qualified to administer that center as another job.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where is he now?

Mr. MYER. He is now in Chicago in charge of our relocation office, and as far as I can find out, is doing an excellent job.

Mr. Jacoby is no longer at the project. That is no particular reflection on Jacoby. I think there were probably cases that were not well-handled.

The implication is being made, however, that no arrests were ever made in relation to any thievery.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, the statement I make is——

Mr. MYER. Well, the implication was, in some of the testimony, that arrests were not made.

Mr. COSTELLO. No punishment was meted out, and in view of the fact that the officials at the project were lax in not meting out punishment where it should have been given, naturally they thought they could get away with anything, and that probably led up to the situation of November 1, calling in the Army at the request of the administration, and I think that caused these disturbances that took place in the centers.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, you are drawing a judgment. I assume you feel you have all the facts before you.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think because of the series of incidents of this kind that went on, without any apprehension——

Mr. MYER. You are willing to judge on Mr. Wilkinson's testimony and two or three others, that there has been lax administration without getting the other side of the story, I presume.

Mr. COSTELLO. The repeated testimony of various witnesses to the effect that cases of this kind were reported to the internal security and nothing was done about it, seems sufficient to draw such inference.

Mr. MYER. I only have the record here from May 16 this year until November 26 of this year, which shows that there were 20 cases of theft reported to internal security and there were 13 arrests made during that period.

I submit that simply to indicate that they were not all ignored and that there were thefts.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was the internal security officer at that time?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Jacoby, during most of the period, excepting from about the latter part of October. Mr. Jacoby left the project previous to the first week in November, but he was on the job most of that period. I might say in addition to that——

Mr. COSTELLO. You are sure the records of Mr. Jacoby are accurate, and that all records of theft were reported to him?

Mr. MYER. I am not absolutely certain. I am saying simply that we have reports of 20 cases of theft and 13 arrests made.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many convictions?

Mr. MYER. There were four cases in which items were returned.

One occurred outside the project; non-evacuee.

One case in which small boys were involved.

One case in which food was taken by boys working there—this practice stopped.

Three sentenced to report to project director once a week for 1 month.

One 30 days' suspended sentence, report to internal security once a week for 60 days.

Ten persons harvesting crop for own use—case pending.

And that happened, I might say, during the period of this incident, and at the time the cases had not been handled and the boil-up came in the meantime.

Mr. STRIPLING. No one has been punished, according to that record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thirteen arrested.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I am not here, again, to argue about Mr. Wilkinson's testimony. We will check the facts, certainly, with Mr. Cozzens, for whom I have a very high regard and whom I have known for a good many years, regarding the incident you mentioned.

I have not heard this testimony before. We are glad to have this sort of information brought out.

Now, it is true that there have been cases of theft. And I do not think they have been properly handled in some cases at Tule Lake and at some of the other centers.

Most of them are minor cases, however, and the most of them are kids.

I would like to say this on the matter of food wastage generally, that our budget this year provides for an allotment of \$1.20 a day for the total operation of the center, based on the per head cost of evacuees in the center.

The cost of the operation of the Tule Lake center throughout the period from its beginning up until, I believe, November 1, possibly October 1—I will have to recheck that figure—has been \$1.17½ a day for evacuees.

I submit that simply to indicate that while there may have been some inefficiencies and there may have been some thievery that, as a general rule, the inefficiency could not have been too great or the cost would have gone much beyond the figure that we had figured very closely for the budget.

Now, our biggest problem in food wastage at Tule Lake was in the colony itself. Our general program for issuing food is to issue it to the individual mess halls, based upon the cost figures, the menus. And at that center—and it was true of a number of the other centers—we had some of the evacuee cooks who did not serve all the food that was provided for them. They held out, for some reason or other, on the evacuees and cached the food at numerous places, some of them in one project, in the attics, you may remember.

That was at Heart Mountain, and if you want to know that story, read the Denver Post. We have documented that one in detail.

We had somewhat the same problem in Tule Lake during the registration period, during last February and March.

In making some of the surveys, we discovered food cached in a number of places, and asked that it be returned. And there were a good many pounds of it returned.

Every once in a while, I think Mr. Peek testified, he would run onto food that was not supposed to be at a certain point, and go and get a truckload.

Now, that did exist, but when it did exist, it was not a matter of stealing food; it was simply a matter of not utilizing the food that was handed out, and it was one of these things that led to the kicks on the part of the evacuees that they were not getting good food.

And it was one of our very real problems.

So I want to make that clear so that there will be no misunderstanding about it. We had other problems of that type that we had to deal with, as I think you would have in any community.

Now, why these people did that sort of thing, I do not know. One reason, I am sure, that did exist, particularly early in the period, there was great fear, there were lots of fears, but there was fear in particular about food shortage, that maybe they would not get enough food in there to feed the whole colony, and at Tule Lake, in particular, we had even people at one stage of the game that were taking home bits of rice that had been cooked and dried it out and saved it in their apartments, fearing the time would come when they would be hungry.

And I think it is the kind of fear you would find in that sort of a situation.

I am pointing out simply that they did hoard food, for some reason or other, and we have had to go out, time and again, to inspect and recheck and bring it back to the warehouse.

I have heard of one mess hall where there were 250 people to be served, where the cook was only serving the amounts that were served under the menus that we laid out for 120 people.

I am simply presenting that so that you might know some of the problems that we ran into. I am sure Mr. Wilkinson had some problems in connection with his slaughterhouse.

Mr. Wilkinson was not at the slaughterhouse very long. I presume part of it was due to the fact that he had problems of that type, and part of it was due to the fact that he did not prove to be a very adept manager of evacuee help.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the slaughterhouse being operated at the present time?

Mr. MYER. It was not operated during the summer, Mr. Chairman, because the slaughterhouse that he was handling at that time was one that could be operated only during cool weather.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has it ever been operated since Mr. Wilkinson left the project?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I think so, Mr. Chairman. We closed the slaughterhouse along in June, as I remember it, because of hot weather, and because we did not have the facilities for killing under sanitary conditions at that time, and hogs were not slaughtered for a period of time.

There have been hogs slaughtered this fall and since that time, but just when they opened the slaughterhouse, I am not sure.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think, possibly, Mr. Myer, your statement regarding the loss of food and so on, is putting it a little mildly, judging from the testimony of Mr. Peck, as well as Mr. Wilkinson. I might read page 143 of the testimony of Mr. Peck. [Reading:]

Question. Did Mr. Best or anybody in high authority tell you what your attitude in getting along with the Japanese should be; that you should be firm or lenient with them?

Answer. Yes, sir; there was an instance last year, when Mr. Robertson from the regional office—he is now project director at Leupp, Ariz.—was there in another capacity, and our Mr. George Hudson, marketing expert, personally arrested an evacuee for stealing 5 pounds of cheese. They took the culprit, and the cheese as evidence, and laid it on the desk of the chief of internal security, Dr. Jacoby; and I patiently awaited the action that would be taken.

One week—two weeks—and three weeks passed, during which time I asked

Dr. Jacoby, "Will you please give me a written report on that? After all, it happened in my department, and I am responsible for several thousand dollars worth of food that is owned by the people of the United States."

"Well," he said, "it is a small matter, and we have not got around to it yet."

At last, one day I asked him, in here: "Am I to understand you will not give me a report on that in writing?" He said, "You can have that this afternoon."

That afternoon there came to my desk a writing from Dr. Jacoby, that this man, I have forgotten his name, was arrested for an alleged theft of 5 pounds of cheese, and had confessed his guilt, and he was tried before a justice's court, and the results were as follows:

No. 1: That he should be immediately relieved of his responsibility. He was head storekeeper of warehouse number whatever it is.

No. 2: That the above sentence be suspended, and that he be put on probation for a time, and if he ever did it again, some action would be taken.

I said, "Thank you, sir," and I immediately dictated to my stenographer a termination for this man.

Whenever we dictate a termination we must state a cause and I purposely dictated these words, "Theft of Government property." Then part of my organization began to bring pressure. "He was a good fellow * * * a good boy," they said. Then I was approached by some Caucasians about the same matter.

At last I was called in by the project director—incidentally, it was not Mr. Best; he was not here—and I was told that I had acted outside of my jurisdiction because I had discharged a man in the administration against the recommendation of the evacuee judiciary committee, or whatever it is.

I said, "Have I to understand that I have no right to discharge a party who, in his own handwriting, and without coercion, admitted stealing something that was the property of the Government of the United States?"

"Well," he said, "this is a self-rule here, and you have just to get along with them."

And so I put the man back on my pay roll. That is a matter of record.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think I have already said that I do not condone that kind of a situation if true, and I assume that it is essentially true.

I have stated that we have had three changes in administration at Tule Lake, one of which I have given the reason for.

Now, I do not know of any further statement I can make on the matter.

I do think this, and I want to repeat, that, generally speaking, when you consider all of the problems dealing with that many evacuees in a center, that the administration has been good. It has been generally efficient. There have been people who have not followed the rules. There have been people who have not done it as I would do it, or, I am sure, as you would do it.

On the other hand, I think the instances of the type that you have mentioned just here are far and few between and are minor items.

I want to repeat that I do not condone, and we have not condoned that sort of thing when it has been brought to our attention.

This is the first time, I mean. I saw this item, incidentally, a few days ago—that it had been brought to my attention.

We are checking every fact in relation to those items as far as we can get a check on them to see who is responsible and just what did happen and try to get all the facts together.

So I am sure that any group can go into any project and they can find things that have not been done to your liking.

All I want to say is that I think generally a good job has been done, in spite of the mistakes that may have been made, and I do not think 5 pounds of cheese is going to be the issue on whether or not we are un-American or whether or not we are American.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is just the point, Mr. Myer; the 5 pounds of cheese is not the issue, or the 500 pounds of bacon stolen out of the warehouse is not the issue.

Let me read briefly from page 131, and I will state that even this testimony here is not the issue.

Mr. MYER. But we are making a lot of fuss about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. I quote:

Question. Have you had any great quantities disappear?

Answer. Well, I operate with the Caucasian staff of three stewards and one storekeeper. I have had from 19 to 2,300 people on my pay roll and it is rather difficult for one man, or a small Caucasian group to control warehouses where foodstuffs are stored. There had been innumerable instances of theft ever since I had arrived.

Question. Was it any greater after segregation; did you have any more trouble?

Answer. No; I would not say that it was. I have made numerous discoveries down in the colony of hoarded food addressed to the project directly, and have taken my staff and the internal security down there and picked it up, and took loads of it back to the warehouse. That was prior to the segregation. I might add, there was quite a lot of it during the registration period. You see, we have periods down here, first the registration period, and then we have the segregation period.

Question. Then the unrest period lasted quite a long time?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you had a good deal of trouble over that?

Answer. Yes, sir; we did.

Question. Now, did you have any food that was destroyed, sacks ripped open, anything of that kind?

Answer. We had; yes, sir. In our warehouse we had instances like that.

Question. What would they do?

Answer. I was called by one of the foremen to look at some sacks of beans that had been cut with knives across over half the length of the back, and the beans allowed to run on the ground. That was something like a month ago.

Question. How many sacks were ripped open?

Answer. I should say 10 or 12 sacks.

The point I am trying to make is that there were repeated cases of theft, not just the one piece, not only the piece falling at the feet of Mr. Cozzens, not the 500 pounds of bacon stolen out of the warehouse, or the food addressed to the project that had never been opened, and I am not only commenting on the fact that a dozen bags of beans were deliberately ripped open so that the food fell on the floor and spoiled that way, but these repeated incidents occurring time and time and time again, with no evidence of any appreciation or any reprimand on the part of the project directors, which created a condition in the minds of the Japanese that they felt they could do anything.

The laxing of control there is the thing that brought about the November 1 incident, and I think it is just a series of things of this kind where there was failure on the part of the administration to properly administer the project that was the occasion for bringing about the disturbance that did transpire; and that is the thing of which I am complaining.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read three or four paragraphs of a statement made by Mr. Seymour Cahn of our Financial Section in Washington, who is in charge of the general administration and of Tule Lake, or was, about August 23, until about mid-November, and who was sent out there to assist Mr. Best on such matters, because we were getting a lot of this type of reports.

Mr. Cahn says:

The final analysis of our investigation into the food situation revealed that there were numerous discrepancies in the property records. However, all evidences pointed toward inefficiency in accounting and noncompliance with procedures rather than thievery. The noncompliance with procedures definitely relates to the count of meals served on a strength [population] basis rather than a head count. In other words, the claim of thievery was based almost entirely on the accumulation of food in the kitchens rather than an actual evidence of thievery. This accumulation of food in the kitchens was primarily due to the fact that many evacuees did not eat in the kitchens and many evacuees did not eat in the kitchens in the blocks in which they resided.

This is a result of two conditions: (1) Certain chefs would purposely prepare their meals poorly in order to discourage the population from eating there and thus encouraging them to go to other kitchens. The purpose being to feed fewer and therefore have more food themselves. This resulted in people of some blocks not receiving adequate food and a few of the people directly connected with work in the kitchen received the advantages. However, the issuance of food from the warehouses was controlled. The poor bookkeeping was primarily in the method of maintaining stock record cards and evaluating quantities on incoming shipments.

The claim of thievery in connection with other forms of property was not entirely substantiated, although there were many stories involving specific cases, most of which were not documented.

The final conclusions in this case also had to deal with poor records, noncompliance with established property procedures, personnel incapable of handling the magnitude of the job, and the physical construction of the warehouses which were highly inadequate to house the type of property which the center had to maintain and dispense. Adequate plans had been made for proper warehousing. However, installation of this conversion was delayed because of the segregation program and the large volume of incoming freight in connection therewith, which required the utilization of the new warehouses. An inventory had been taken and property records and procedures revised to correctly reflect incoming and outgoing property and balances on hand.

I think that gives you the general statement.

Now, I want to repeat that I do not want to be placed in a position of denying that there was some thievery. There was. There has been in nearly every one of the projects.

It has not been the policy of W. R. A. to wink at that thievery. It has not always been handled the way I would like to see it handled, but the facts come to you long after they are reported, and very usually, for some ungodly reason, do not come out until this sort of incident happens, and then they pile up in your lap.

Now, we are investigating every case. We are trying to document them now, and I am very sorry, indeed, that those things have happened.

I would like to repeat, Mr. Chairman, that I think they are minor as compared with the total problem that we are facing, and I think they are being used, in part, as red herrings in relation to this investigation, if it is intended to investigate the general efficiency of the administration, and I assume from the way we have been talking this morning that that is the intent of this committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think, Mr. Myer, that the sequence of these minor things that are neglected lead up to the major things?

Mr. MYER. They certainly do, and that is why we have made, at least in one case, a major change in administration.

And we have made other changes in administration to try to improve that.

And Mr. Chairman, we do not condone them, and I think our manuals will show in connection with that, and I think our actions will so indicate, if you will look into the record.

However, we have been criticized, presumably, by representatives of this committee, for criticizing people who have been inefficient in their jobs, and it seems to me the general procedure of certain representatives of this committee to call on the most ineffective people we had and accept their word against the more efficient people we have had on our rolls.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony that I read from here, of course, was testimony taken by the California State Senate investigating committee.

Mr. MYER. That is right; and it is being very effectively used here by the committee.

And I would like to point out that their testimony was taken, as I understand it, approximately—I am not sure; I have a complete record, Mr. Chairman, but my records indicate from the information I have that there were 21 people who testified either in the town of Tule Lake, people outside of the project, or people who had formerly been on the project or now on the project, before that committee.

Of that group there were five people that might be considered, or might have been considered not people on our staff namely, Mr. Kallam, Mr. Gerry, Mr. Donovan, Dr. Pedicord, and Mr. Slattery.

And I might say that Mr. Kallam is no longer on the staff.

There are five more people who testified, that I would consider minor employees, Mrs. Adams, Miss Battat, Mr. Lueck, and Mr. Campbell.

In the third group there were nine people who were former employees of W. R. A. and, in addition to that, there were three people that lived in the town of Tule Lake.

So I would like to point out that there were nine people, former employees, nine employees at that time, and three people on the outside.

Most of the testimony that has been submitted here, though not all of it, has come from the former employees of the project.

Now, that does not necessarily mean that they are bad stuff, but it does mean that we have not had in that testimony a very good cross section of information.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that a former employee, having no obligation to W. R. A., is therefore free to speak his mind and his opinion, because of the fact that his pay check does not depend on anything he might say, or his continuance on the project.

Mr. MYER. Indeed they are, and some of them do it very freely.

Mr. COSTELLO. Whereas those who are retained on the project and are actually employees would be inclined to be a little hesitant about criticizing their superiors, in view of the fact it might mean cessation of their employment and cessation of their pay checks, so I think the fact that many of the witnesses called by the senate committee happened to be former employees is no condemnation of their testimony.

As a matter of fact, the personnel of that particular committee are men beyond question of very high repute in the State of California, as has been testified before this committee at this hearing. I do not think that they can be impugned as trying to throw mud or to destroy the administration, the Federal Government, or anything of that character.

On the contrary, they are simply out to try to find out the facts regarding the matter of the Japanese. They are interested in the question of Japanese resettlement now and after the war, trying to establish a definite program in the State of California that would be beneficial to the Nation.

Mr. MYER. I doubt whether that is their interest.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I think that is a very definite fact. That was the purpose of the committee and the reason it has been set up, and their only purpose in inquiring into this particular thing is to determine what bearing this may effect on that whole problem.

I might ask one other question before we quit.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time of the November 1 trouble, there was a statement released through the San Francisco office to the effect that there was no doubt that this incident was caused by subversive elements. Do you know who was the author of that particular story?

Mr. MYER. That matter is still being investigated, and I still do not have the facts.

I have asked the reporters to be interviewed and I don't have the facts, so that I have no information to give you on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Although a month has passed since this thing took place.

Mr. MYER. That is correct; for the very reason that Mr. Cozzens, who is responsible for that office, has been most of the time at Tule Lake working with the Army, and we have assigned other personnel to work out on that job, and he has not had time to get the full facts or the reply.

In the meantime, he is not operating the San Francisco office.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know who released that story in the press?

Mr. MYER. I understand Mr. Joyce did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Myer brought up the question of witnesses that we have had so far, and I might make the suggestion, and I hope it will be acted upon, that Mr. Myer give a little thought to the question of who he would like to have up here before this committee, in addition to witnesses who have already appeared, and request the committee for leave to have those witnesses testify, and then the committee can act upon the question of whether or not they desire to hear them.

Mr. MYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have given no thought to that. I simply assumed that the hearing here was a matter of trying to clarify the record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. MYER. And we have tried to gather the information from all sources on that. I will give some thought to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene tomorrow morning, Wednesday, December 8, 1943, at 10 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello presiding.

Present: Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. Clair Engle, California; Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Myer, will you please come forward?

You were previously sworn, so that it is not necessary to reswear you.

SWORN STATEMENT OF DILLON S. MYER, DIRECTOR, WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY—Resumed

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, may I start by correcting the record on two or three items this morning on things you asked about yesterday?

Mr. COSTELLO. I think so.

Mr. MYER. The question was asked yesterday as to the number of people who were arrested between November 1 and November 4. And answer is, none.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have that memorandum that you read to us yesterday regarding the number of convictions?

Mr. MYER. I do not have it with me this morning, Mr. Chairman. I can get it for you.

This had to do with the question on whether there were arrests between November 1 and November 4 of this year.

There is another item on which there was an error made yesterday and which makes my face a little red, but I would like to correct the record quickly.

I rechecked at the project in relation to the rutabagas and the turnips. The facts are that there were 132½ acres of rutabagas; 78½ acres harvested instead of all of them. The poundage was the same as given; I mean that acreage gave the yields that I gave yesterday.

As to turnips, 54 acres was correct on the acres planted; 44 acres were harvested and 10 were not harvested.

I am very glad to have the opportunity to recheck that record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was for the year 1942?

Mr. MYER. That was for the year 1942, in relation to the testimony by Mr. Warin that you mentioned the previous day.

Mr. Mundt raised the question yesterday as to whether the slaughterhouse had been operated since Mr. Wilkinson was terminated. The answer is that Mr. Wilkinson was terminated on April 22 and the slaughterhouse was operated until June 21, following his termination in the spring and early summer, and during that period 210 hogs were slaughtered and processed. The slaughterhouse is now in full operation again and has been for the past 2 weeks. I do not have the exact details on this fall's operation.

One other item which came up yesterday of considerable importance: You raised the question, Mr. Chairman, as to why Mr. Best wired the United Aircraft Corporation, of Hartford, Conn., as he did regarding Dr. Mason having no police record, and in so doing implied that Mr. Best was seemingly trying to smear Dr. Mason's character with no good cause.

The answer to that question is this: That on the date of November 23 Mr. Best received from the United Aircraft Corporation a telegram signed by L. Olson, of East Hartford, Conn., which stated:

Telegraph collect police record of John Thomas Mason, Jr., M. D., employed as surgeon at base hospital, Tule Lake relocation center, Newell, Calif., born June 5, 1908, Sparta, Tenn., 5 feet 11 inches and 174 pounds.

Mr. Best wired Mr. Olson as follows:

Have no police record on John Thomas Mason, Jr., M. D. However, misrepresented facts in interview published in Klamath Falls Herald News concerning trouble at Tule Lake center.

I asked Mr. Best to supply me also the basis on which the latter part of that statement was made, and he sent me this wire in response. I would like to read the wire for the record.

It is a wire directed to me under date of December 7, 1943:

Following is a telegram received from Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator, Special Committee Un-American Activities, December 6, at 4:13 p. m.: "On November 24 you wired the United Aircraft Corporation, East Hartford, Conn., that Dr. John T. Mason misrepresented facts in interview published in Klamath Falls Herald News concerning trouble at Tule Lake center. Please advise this committee immediately on the facts Dr. Mason misrepresented. The date of the article in the Klamath Falls News Herald and air mail a copy of this paper if you have one in your possession." Following is our reply to the above telegram which was sent today.

"Reurtel December 6 re misrepresentations by John T. Mason in interview published in Herald and News, Klamath Falls, Oreg., November 23, 1943. 'That 160 American citizens were left without protection for more than 3 days at the mercy of a mob of Japs.' Over 1,000 military were prepared to come in at a moment's notice as well as W. R. A. internal security guards on duty continuously. 'Assisted Dr. Reece M. Pedicord in barring the door but was pushed aside by the crowd which broke down a partition.' Dr. Mason made no attempt to assist Dr. Pedicord. No partitions were broken down. A railing was broken. 'They dragged him (Dr. Pedicord) outside and after he lost consciousness they kicked him.' Dr. Pedicord was not dragged outside the building and was not kicked during momentary unconsciousness nor thereafter."

That happened previously. Pardon me. That statement was my statement, that that happened previously. [Reading:]

"'Dr. Mason said he gathered some of the white nurses in the hospital and locked them in a room.' No one was locked in any room at the hospital. One of

the white nurses came to Dr. Pedicord's assistance when Dr. Mason failed to. 'Dr. Mason said that for the next 3½ days the interneers took over the hospital and told the American doctors not to enter.' At no time was the hospital taken over by interneers. White doctors and nurses were in and out of the hospital every day without protestation by the evacuees. 'He said members of the staff were taken to nearby towns for security but returned on Thursday night.' No members of the staff were taken to nearby towns. Two or three members of the staff voluntarily went to nearby towns to spend the night returning each morning for work. 'That night he (Dr. Mason) said he and his roommate heard a 'thud' outside their door and when they went out found a guard had been slugged.' It is improbable that Dr. Mason heard a 'thud' because the internal security guard had not fallen down in front of Dr. Mason's room. He was picked up by members of the staff and given first aid by Dr. Mason in a nearby apartment."

That is the end of the telegram.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask, if you will, to delete from the record the aspersions which were thrown on Mr. Best, in relation to your statement yesterday, and I am sure, as chairman of a presumably judicial committee, you will be glad to do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. I will be very glad to put the telegram of inquiry of the United Aircraft Corporation into the record ahead of the telegram of reply, which was received from Mr. Best, although I think you will admit that the second sentence of that telegram was purely gratuitous on the part of Mr. Best.

Mr. MYER. It was not the second sentence I am referring to. It was the first sentence in which you passed your judgment and in which you indicated that Mr. Best had cast aspersions on Dr. Mason's character by gratuitously furnishing information which, by implication, was not requested.

Mr. COSTELLO. And, in order to correct the record, the telegram of the United Aircraft Corporation will be inserted ahead of that to indicate exactly the nature of their inquiry.

Mr. MYER. I still think, Mr. Chairman, in all fairness, as chairman, presumably of a judicial committee, that you might be willing to withdraw from the record your judgments which were passed before you had full information as regarding Mr. Best's action.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the record should be an exact transcript of what was said and of what took place here, so it will not be deleted.

Mr. MYER. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STRIPLING. I would like to make the point—what Mr. Best reports here is not of his own personal knowledge. What Dr. Mason testified to was to his own personal knowledge. And I see no reason to accept the statement of Mr. Best as to what happened at the hospital or as to what happened in front of Dr. Mason's apartment. It seems to me that Dr. Mason's sworn testimony yesterday should be accepted before a telegram from Mr. Best, who was not present and cannot testify to those facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. I intended to ask Mr. Myer regarding that, as to the basis on which Mr. Best has obtained the information that he sets forth in this particular telegram.

Mr. MYER. As I indicated to you yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I assume Mr. Best accepted the statements made in the Klamath Falls paper alleged to have been made, at least, by Dr. Mason, as factual, and on that basis supplied the information to Mr. Stripling.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he categorically denies the statements made by Dr. Mason.

Mr. MYER. He categorically denies the statements that were made in the paper alleged to have been made by Dr. Mason.

Mr. COSTELLO. But Mr. Best does make the statement that Dr. Mason made no attempt to assist Dr. Pedicord.

Now, I would like to ask you on what foundation of fact does Mr. Best make that statement or allegation?

Mr. MYER. He is making it on the basis of testimony, I presume, of the people who were in the hospital at the time. I would be glad to have written statements of witnesses, if you would like to have them for your file, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe you are going to submit to us the testimony that you obtained from the 69 witnesses out there, are you not?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir; that is now being typed and we will supply it for you.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is that testimony, or statements?

Mr. MYER. Statements by these witnesses.

Mr. STRIPLING. Has Mr. Best put any one under oath?

Mr. MYER. We would be glad to put anyone under oath that you would like to have put under oath.

Mr. STRIPLING. The statements made there, were they formed on information; the statements made under oath?

Mr. MYER. I think not. We accept the word of the people in whom we have confidence as being, at least, reasonably factual.

I think you will agree with me that the matter of truth is not always a narrow line. It sometimes broadens out, because we have different points of view, and it is hard to be strictly factual.

However, the statement that I have presented to you is based on information, checked and rechecked, at the project, and I think I have given you my source in all cases.

And I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to have sworn statements in connection with any of this testimony that you would like to have presented in the form of sworn statements.

Mr. COSTELLO. Many of the statements Mr. Best makes are direct denials of anything Dr. Mason may have said; testimony which Dr. Mason actually gave to this committee under oath.

Now, it is definitely indicated that Mr. Best was not present at the hospital at any time during the altercation; in fact, he was in the administration building for 3 hours in the afternoon. And I think his denial of the statement regarding the partition being broken, and then immediately stating that a railing was broken, is quibbling over words.

The fact is, that it was a railing across the hallway, as I understand it, as you enter the hospital, that was torn down.

Mr. MYER. A 2 by 4 railing; yes, which has been testified to in relation to the story there at every stage of the game.

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean, the question as to whether it was a partition or whether it was a railing is, on the part of Mr. Best, purely quibbling, I think.

Mr. MYER. No. It is not quibbling, in my judgment, and for this reason, because at one time there was a report—unfactual report, as it proved—that they had come back into the hospital and were breaking down partitions in the hospital, after the Dr. Pedicord incident, which proved to be untrue.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the telegram quotes there the statement that no partition was broken.

Mr. MYER. That is correct. The telegram does.

My point is that the reason Mr. Best makes a point of that is because of the fact that he knew that there were these reports regarding partitions and that he has based that on his knowledge.

I would be very glad to check and I will follow up with Mr. Best, and ask if we have written statements—

Mr. MUNDT. May I see the telegram?

Mr. MYER. I started to say, Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to follow up with Mr. Best and ask that he take testimony under oath from the witnesses in the hospital in relation to these alleged statements, which were alleged to have been made by Dr. Mason, in the Klamath Falls paper, and the reply to that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would Mr. Best be authorized to take statements under oath?

Mr. MYER. I will arrange so that somebody who is authorized to take statements under oath will take them; at least, they can be sworn statements as to what they saw.

Would that be satisfactory, if they were sworn statements?

Mr. STRIPLING. If they would be acceptable and subject to the penalties of perjury, Mr. Chairman, I think they would be acceptable.

Mr. MYER. I resent the implication that Mr. Best has been untruthful and in a malicious manner—

Mr. STRIPLING. But, Mr. Myer, you are accusing the witness before this committee of making untrue statements.

Mr. MYER. I am not accusing the witnesses of making untrue statements before this committee.

Mr. STRIPLING. And one of your former employees, by the way.

Mr. MYER. I am stating that this is in reply to alleged statements having been made in a paper in Klamath Falls, and supposed to have been made by Dr. Mason. I question very much whether Dr. Mason intended to be untruthful.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, we have here a letter from Dr. Mason, signed by him, and your telegram is signed by Mr. Best, in which Dr. Mason denies that he made such a statement.

Mr. MYER. All right; that is why I am perfectly willing to accept it, if he is willing to withdraw all the statements that were alleged to have been made in the press, and that is clarified in the press, I would be very happy.

The unfortunate thing is that when such statements are published, they are usually not denied later in the press. You know it. I know it. It is unfortunate that they are already out.

I do not know what source they came from, to begin with. They did quote Dr. Mason, unfortunately, and I am understanding enough to know that some times people are not quoted correctly. I am sure it is not intentional.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10127.)

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, when inquiry is made concerning the background or the personnel record of an employee of W. R. A., is it the practice that the project director forwards the information, or is that request forwarded to the headquarters of W. R. A. in Washington for reply?

Mr. MYER. In connection with this particular type of situation, Mr. Best was thoroughly justified in answering the wire as requested.

Mr. STRIPLING. What are the regulations of the W. R. A. with respect to that?

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to give you a copy of the regulations and you may look that up yourself.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are not those requests forwarded to the national office?

Mr. MYER. Not in all cases; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did not Mr. Best refer that to the national office and did not they write you on December 1 and request a record on Dr. Mason from you?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure, Mr. Stripling. I will check into that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, that was a reply to their request.

Mr. MYER. I will have to check the facts in regard to that.

Mr. STRIPLING. I think that is very important, Mr. Chairman, that the procedure be determined as to whether or not Mr. Best, in the first instance, should have referred the inquiry to the headquarters in Washington, or whether he took it upon himself to send the telegram or teletype direct, because he did advise United Aircraft Corporation to submit their request to Washington.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I am very interested in Mr. Stripling's statement for the reason that this is the first time I know of that he has shown any real interest in what the regulations of the W. R. A. are, and I am very pleased that he is showing such an interest after all of these months.

He has put out statement after statement which would imply that regulations were not as they are, and I am glad to have the opportunity to present to him a complete set of our regulations so that he might study them in detail. I think he might have done it before he started this investigation.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think you promised to send those yesterday, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

I would like the opportunity at this point to read a statement, Mr. Chairman. May I do so?

Mr. COSTELLO. While we are on Mr. Best's telegram, may I comment on one other thing here?

Quoting from the telegram:

That night he [Dr. Mason] said he and his roommate heard a thud outside their door and when they went out found a guard who had been slugged.

It is improbable that Dr. Mason heard a "thud," because the internal security guard had not fallen down in front of Dr. Mason's room. He was picked up by members of the staff and given first aid by Dr. Mason in a nearby apartment.

Now, that, I think, is the finest type of quibble that you could possibly have.

Mr. MYER. All right; let us call it a quibble.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that Dr. Mason said he heard a thud outside of his door. Whether it was 2 feet from his door or 10 feet from his door, I think is immaterial.

He was taken to a nearby apartment. He might not have been brought into Dr. Mason's apartment; he may have been brought into the next one.

He does not say who the members of the staff were who picked him up, but he is trying to make Dr. Mason appear as having testified falsely to matters that Dr. Mason was present at and at which Mr. Best was not present.

So, that I think what we are criticizing Mr. Best for is what he attempted to do. He is testifying——

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think——

Mr. COSTELLO. And he is making allegations regarding the facts, which Dr. Mason was personally present and witnessed, but which Mr. Best did not.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I insist what you were criticizing Mr. Best for yesterday had nothing to do at the moment with Dr. Mason's so-called testimony in the papers. It had to do with his statement about a possible police record, in which you impugned the motives or at which time you impugned the motives of Mr. Best by sending such a telegram and implied that he did it with that reason.

My point is that he did have reason, because they asked specifically about a police record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I will say I was in error if I impugned motive.

Mr. MYER. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. But I was not in error using the second sentence of the telegram, because that was entirely gratuitous and had no relation to any question asked by United Aircraft Corporation. I think the first sentence was, but the second was merely added to give an inference.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to allow you to make the shift of your criticism.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that while they had no police record on Dr. Mason, he was guilty of making false statements to the press, and perhaps he should have had a police record.

That is what you would infer from the second sentence contained in his telegram.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, what I would like to point out is that you said yesterday that you were concentrating on the first sentence of the telegram.

Now, may I read my statement?

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the statement in reference to?

Mr. MYER. It is in reference to the matter of regulations, about which Mr. Stripling was talking.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you want this statement?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think I should have the right to do so.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, before he does that, he should certainly tell the committee whether or not it is the usual practice of the project director to answer those inquiries direct or to refer them to the Washington office.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Best was fully authorized to answer such personnel inquiries, as are all project directors. He has more information on that subject at the project than we have here. The answer is the answer.

Now, may I read my statement?

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that statement in relation to regulations?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may read the statement.

Mr. MYER (reading) :

In the opinion of the War Relocation Authority—

Mr. MUNDT. Pardon me. I wonder if you have a copy?

You may have presented it to the committee before I came in. I am referring to the telegram that the United Aircraft Corporation sent to Mr. Best.

Mr. MYER. This is the only copy that I have, and I would like to have you read it and return it to me. It is in the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed.

Mr. MYER (reading) :

In the opinion of the War Relocation Authority, the measure of its effectiveness as a wartime agency will be determined by the degree of success which is achieved in providing minimum standards of decency in living conditions for the evacuees in the relocation centers; maintaining in the evacuees a faith in the democratic way of life and in America, where the majority of them were born; maintaining incentives to work, to contribute to the national economy, and to be self-supporting; maintaining self-confidence on the part of the evacuees; determining with the greatest possible degree of accuracy the national loyalties of the evacuees and separating those who are loyal to Japan in order that those loyal to America may live with confidence as Americans; restoring those who can be self-supporting to normal life in ordinary American communities; doing these things with proper regard for the national security, with a minimum expenditure of public funds, and with a regard for the provisions of the American Constitution and American law.

It is our objective to come to the end of the war period with the greatest majority of relocatable people already having left the centers, and with the others who are able-bodied as well prepared as possible for resuming normal life.

In achieving the foregoing objectives, it has been necessary to establish or to make available in the relocation centers practically all the services and facilities found in ordinary communities of comparable size, plus mass feeding arrangements, plus a carefully administered system of relocation of individuals and families, a system which must operate within the centers and also in the parts of the country where relocation is possible.

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The War Relocation Authority has not achieved perfection in its activities. There are many minor flaws in administration which have occurred. The administration of the agency is always on the alert for these and attempts to correct them as rapidly as possible. On occasion, correction of administrative errors has involved changes in personnel. There has been no hesitation to make these changes when they have appeared to be necessary.

A thoughtful, statesmanlike consideration of the task before War Relocation Authority will indicate the disservice that is done to the Nation in focusing national attention on trivial matters, the great majority of which would be rectified by the agency itself in the normal course of events, if they had not already been corrected long before the investigation.

A complete set of the W. R. A. instructions on policies and procedures is available to the committee or to any other body of the Congress. These have been arrived at gradually, and thoughtfully; they have been modified as the agency has gained experience in the actual operation of its program.

While they are fairly well established, they are still subject to adjustment as changes in conditions indicate. A thorough and painstaking study of the W. R. A. Manual of Instructions by the committee is invited. The W. R. A. staff will be at the committee's disposal to discuss policies and procedures in general and in detail.

The War Relocation Authority is delighted that the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in its second hearing, is giving consideration to the fundamentals of the W. R. A. program as outlined in the statements of policy and procedure. We welcome suggestions and criticisms on these basic items and feel that any investigation of the program should start with these. Then if the policies and procedures are accepted, the effectiveness of the organization should be measured in terms of compliance or noncompliance with the designated procedure, rather than by empirical standards arbitrarily and hurriedly created by investigators on the basis of inadequate understanding of the subject.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to present a copy of our manual and policies to the committee for their files, and will be glad to keep it up to date as we make our changes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would appreciate your doing so.

Do you have the list of 69 witnesses available at this time?

Mr. MYER. We have the names and the positions of the witnesses. We only had the one copy. We are getting it retyped, Mr. Chairman, and will have it up here for you before the day is over.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement to make to the committee?

Mr. MYER. There are certain other things that are needed to clarify the record, but we are getting the information.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed with the questioning, then.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, will you detail for the committee what happened following the discussion with the committee of 17 on November 1?

Mr. MYER. You mean what happened on November 1?

Mr. STRIPLING. After the meeting adjourned, what happened, according to your own knowledge?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure I can give you the exact sequence, but I can give you generally what happened during the rest of the afternoon and evening.

As I remember it, the first thing that happened, immediately after the crowd dispersed, was a conference with Colonel Austin, who came in to Mr. Best's office, in which we checked judgments in relation to what had happened during the afternoon and why it had happened.

We checked judgments as to further provisions, if any, that should be made in order to safeguard the employees, and the situation generally out at Tule Lake.

As soon as we had completed that conference, Mr. Best, Mr. Cozens, and myself—I am not sure there was anybody else—proceeded immediately to the hospital to talk with Dr. Pedicord and his staff.

We talked with Dr. Pedicord regarding what happened.

Mr. STRIPLING. May I interrupt you, Mr. Myer?

Did you not address the meeting first?

Mr. MYER. Oh, I beg your pardon; I thought you said after the crowd had dispersed.

After the committee had completed their statement, I asked them if they were through, as I remember it, and told them I had a short statement to make.

And I got up out of my chair and walked over and sat down on the edge of the desk. It was a small room. And I told them about this—I am not sure of the exact wording, naturally—I turned to Mr. Best and pointed to him and I said:

There is the project director. I brought him here and put him in charge, because I had full confidence in his ability to run this project. I have no criticism

about the way he has been running the project. He is going to receive my every support, and I want that definitely understood.

I further stated that Mr. Best had stated to them, and I was repeating it, that we were not going to operate that project on the basis of demands, but we were willing, of course at all times, to consider suggestions or requests, if they were reasonable and within the policy.

That, in brief, I think, summarizes the short statement that I made to the committee. They immediately turned to me and asked me if I would address the crowd. I told them I would be very delighted to do so.

So we moved from there to the outer office where the microphone was set up. I was introduced to the crowd and I got up—

Mr. MUNDT. Who introduced you?

Mr. MYER. Kuratomi, the man who had been spokesman.

Mr. MUNDT. Who?

Mr. MYER. George Kuratomi, the man who had been spokesman for the group.

Mr. MUNDT. Did not that sort of give him some unfortunate evidence with the crowd that he really was the leader?

Did that not sort of build him up with the crowd?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, I will leave that with you to judge. I would not care to comment on that. I am telling you what happened. I do not think so; no.

Now, let me complete my statement and maybe you will see why I do not think so. I think maybe you will find there is something in it to indicate that.

I was introduced to the crowd by George Kuratomi. I got a pretty good hand before I started talking, scattered throughout the crowd. I talked perhaps for 5 minutes, or 10 minutes; I don't remember. I made three or four major points in my talk.

I told them first, that I was glad to be back at Tule Lake again on my fourth visit.

I told them that we had a meeting with the committee who had made certain demands and I repeated the fact that W. R. A. did not operate on the basis of demands.

As I remember it, I indicated to them that one of the demands was that we would drop certain people from the roll. I indicated that I had confidence, again, in Mr. Best, the project director, and why I had confidence in him. I pointed out to them that the full population of Tule Lake had not yet arrived, and when it did, I hoped there might be a committee with whom we could deal, that would really represent the colony, and indicated that I did not think that they had such a committee as a representative committee at this time.

I also told them that I felt quite sure that the most of the people at Tule Lake wanted to live peaceably, and if they cared to do so, that could be arranged; but if they did not care to do so, they would probably be living with somebody else.

That, in essence, Mr. Chairman, is my speech.

Immediately after I spoke, they called for Mr. Best, who was in the other office.

I went in and asked Mr. Best to come out and he made a short speech, probably 2 or 3 minutes, reiterating, generally, what I had said, and particularly regarding the demands.

Immediately following Mr. Best's speech, as I remember it, Kuratomi spoke to the crowd in Japanese.

Dr. Webber, who was present, took notes, and told us that Kuratomi had translated, briefly, what I had said and what Mr. Best had said, and then went on and summarized in a much more conciliatory manner than he had shown in the other room, what had gone on; that certain demands were made.

And I know he did refer to that, because I heard him call the names of the people that they had requested to be dropped from the pay roll.

That did not take so very long, and then Kai, who was a member of the committee, addressed the crowd in Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Kuratomi speak in Japanese, too, or did he speak in English?

Mr. MYER. Yes; they both spoke in Japanese. I thought that I made it clear that Dr. Webber took notes and translated for us what was said, in general. Dr. Webber was the man we had on hand and he had had experience as an interpreter, one who knew Japanese well, and is a Caucasian.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, what is Kai's first name, do you know?

Mr. MYER. I will have to recheck.

Mr. STRIPLING. Shizuo, I believe.

Mr. MYER. Kai is the last name.

Mr. MUNDT. He is a Shinto priest, is he not?

Mr. MYER. He presumes to be a Buddhist priest. It is the judgment of some of our folks that he is probably a Shinto priest. However, we do not have any evidence except judgment on that, Mr. Mundt. He certainly acted like one.

He addressed the crowd rather briefly. I should say, for my judgment, his attitude was one of a rabble rouser, although I could not understand what he said. He did not take very long.

Dr. Webber said he ended by saying they would have to sacrifice for the good of Japan. The crowd was then dismissed.

Mr. MUNDT. Did not the crowd bow down at the end of the ceremony?

Mr. MYER. Just a moment. Let me finish this, Mr. Mundt, in sequence.

The crowd was dismissed and they started away, and then just in an instant, Kai stepped back to the microphone and, according to Dr. Webber, he told them to bow, and a portion of the crowd in front took off their hats and bowed.

One man—and I saw this myself—who was right up near the microphone, right up front, did not take his hat off, and the man handling the microphone pulled the hat off his head.

The total of the crowd did not bow; just a certain portion of the people near the microphone, as we saw it.

Mr. MUNDT. What did Dr. Webber report, in greater detail? Didn't Kai say anything—

Mr. MYER. The only significant thing he said, of any real importance, was the fact, well, they did some talking about agriculture, and some review of the problem—

Mr. MUNDT. You started answering the question before I finished it.

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to know what Dr. Webber said in detail about what this priest had said concerning the bow. He did not just tell them to bow.

Mr. MYER. He did say it was not the type of a bow you would make to the east. It was the type of a bow that is normally made following such a meeting, showing general respect.

Mr. MUNDT. That does not answer the question.

Mr. MYER. Just a moment. May I read in a statement for the record?

Mr. MUNDT. Whose statement is that; Dr. Webber's?

Mr. MYER. This is Dr. Webber's own statement, which he signed. Since it is only about a page and a half, I would like to read the whole statement. This is the testimony concerning bowing to the Emperor.

As interpreter for the W. R. A. I was in Mr. Best's office on the afternoon of November 1, even before any members of the Japanese committee entered. During the actual negotiations with the committee only in a few instances was the Japanese language used. This was between the spokesman, Mr. George Kuratomi, and other members of the committee, especially at the times when National Director Myer and Project Director Best refused the demands of the committee.

From time to time Mr. Kuratomi asked members of the committee, especially Reverend Kai, what they should do in face of a refusal to meet demands. In every instance he was told to go on to the next item.

After the negotiations were over, Mr. Myer and then Mr. Best spoke briefly to the crowd assembled over the public address system. Both of these speeches were fairly interpreted by a member of the negotiating committee. Then a brief résumé, perhaps lasting between 5 and 10 minutes, was given in the Japanese language telling the crowd briefly concerning the negotiations and the results.

I will state that these remarks were very much more conciliatory than the attitudes often assumed by the members of the negotiating committee during the afternoon negotiations.

Reverend Kai spoke very briefly to the group, reminding them that they were Japanese citizens and that they should conduct themselves as such and that they should be ready to stick together for the Emperor and for Japan.

Immediately after this, the crowd began to disperse but they were called to a halt and at a given command which is, in Japanese, as follows, "Orei" (bow). In this command there is no mention of Emperor or Japan or anyone in particular. When in Japan, when obeisance is made to the Emperor it usually follows the following statement which is led by some leader: "Ten no heika banzai" (To the Emperor * * * hurrah). No such procedure was followed in this instance.

In testimony which has been given before the California State Senatorial Investigating Committee by witnesses which know nothing about the Japanese language they state that the bow was made toward the east and to the Emperor. My judgment is that this is wholly untrue and is just simply a figment of the imagination.

When a meeting of this kind is held, it is the ordinary custom for the Japanese people to take off their hats and bow and disperse. This was the very thing that happened at that time. The Japanese very quickly dispersed and the entire area was vacated within a very few minutes after the final formal bow.

Now, Mr. Stripling, that covers the period up until the time of the dispersal of the crowd.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you met Colonel Austin?

Mr. MYER. Yes. Almost immediately after the crowd dispersed, Colonel Austin walked into the office and sat down and we held a conference. I do not know how long it lasted; I did not look at my wrist watch, but I presume for 30 minutes, reviewing the events, bringing up to date and rechecking on the immediate things that needed to be done, to be sure we had everything in order.

Then we proceeded to the hospital to see Dr. Pedicord and get his story and to talk with members of the staff.

I am trying to remember what my next step was.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, at the hospital, when you first saw Dr. Pedicord, did you consider his condition to be serious or minor, or what was your opinion?

Mr. MYER. I considered Dr. Pedicord to be very badly bruised but not in a serious condition. This was based on reports both from Dr. Pedicord and the other doctors who were in attendance.

He looked pretty badly battered; I think we have already stated that.

If you would like the very details, I will tell you what I saw. Dr. Pedicord was sitting in a chair. He had this leg [illustrating] up on another chair, stretched out, because the leg had been rather badly scratched and battered.

He had a patch over his left eye. I saw it the next day without a patch and it was pretty black.

He had scratches on his forehead and he had scratches on this side of his face [demonstrating] that looked as if he might have slipped down on the side of the wall and scratched his face as he went down. It was that type of scratch.

He told me that his most painful injury was to his stomach muscles, which he said were kicked. He saw a kick aimed at him, and he said, "Fortunately I had time to tense them, but it was still a pretty stiff kick, and they are pretty sore and probably will be sore tomorrow."

That was, in general, the condition of Dr. Pedicord, as I saw him. I asked him if he was all right, and he said, except for being sore, he was perfectly O. K. And his testimony certainly indicated that he was thinking straight.

I might say that Mrs. Pedicord was there, the nurses and doctors were there, and I rechecked.

I asked Dr. Pedicord what he wanted to do, if he wanted to go into Klamath Falls or Tule Lake, or some other place immediately, or what we should arrange, and he said he did not.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, it seems that Mr. Best, in his telegram must have been trying to deceive you and deceive the committee, or somebody, in view of what you just said Dr. Pedicord told you, because I find this statement in the telegram.

It says that Dr. Mason said:

They dragged him [Dr. Pedicord] outside and after he lost consciousness they kicked him.

Then the telegram continues:

Dr. Pedicord was not dragged outside the building and was not kicked during momentary unconsciousness nor thereafter.

Mr. MYER. That is right; he was kicked before. That is the only point he is making.

Mr. MUNDT. Wait a minute. First, he said he never lost consciousness.

Mr. MYER. No; he did not say that.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; he says so.

Mr. MYER. I do not believe that he said that. I do not believe he said that.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, let me see:

They dragged him [Dr. Pedicord] outside and after he lost consciousness they kicked him.

Mr. MYER. Well, that may not seem important to you, Mr. Chairman, but it was important to us for this reason: If Dr. Pedicord had been kicked as hard as he was kicked while he was unconscious, he probably would not be living today. It was an important fact that Dr. Pedicord saw the kick aimed at him and was able to tense his muscles before it arrived; consequently he had only sore muscles, otherwise he might have had something much worse happen to him.

Now, it may be quibbling, yes; but that is the fact.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me give you my interpretation of this kind of evidence.

Mr. MYER. Now, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, without being interrupted?

Mr. COSTELLO. Let him finish the statement.

Mr. MUNDT. If I may be permitted to interpolate a word here and there, I would appreciate it very much.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to read a part of his telegram because it comes to a congressional committee investigating the situation, and I think it throws some light on the understanding of this. After all, it is a strange sort of testimony, in my opinion.

This telegram comes in in an attempt to, I presume, indict Dr. Mason for unreliable testimony.

It says that Dr. Mason stated:

They dragged him [Dr. Pedicord] outside and after he lost consciousness, they kicked him.

Then it says:

Dr. Pedicord was not dragged outside the building and was not kicked during momentary unconsciousness, nor thereafter——

which would seem to imply, at best, that he must have been kicked before he was unconscious and became unconscious because of the kick.

And I cannot see how, in any sense of the word, that disqualifies Dr. Mason's testimony.

If the kick was serious enough to cause unconsciousness, that is a pretty serious kick. Whether it came before he was unconscious or after he was unconscious, seems to me to be entirely immaterial to the case.

Mr. MYER. You are reading into the statement, Mr. Mundt, a statement that the kick caused the unconsciousness.

I am not sure that that is true, and I do not believe you can be sure that is true.

I did say he received a hard kick in the stomach muscles.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you not think an employee who is trying to give information in a telegram should say that he was kicked and not try to hide behind——

Mr. MYER. That was pointed out time and time again, and I think he had a right to assume that the committee knew that. I testified to that. I have stated it in the newspapers.

Mr. Best, I think, had a right to assume that the investigation had been made and that the committee understood that; he was simply trying to give the sequence; to get the sequence straight.

It may be a quibble, so we will write it off as such.

I have already written it off as such, Mr. Mundt, as far as that is concerned, before you came in.

Mr. MUNDT. You read off some more of the telegram as quibbling, since I came in.

Now, I ask you whether this is quibbling or whether your evidence is substantiated on this, that Dr. Pedicord was at any time dragged out of the hospital. Dr. Mason said that he was. Mr. Best implies that he was not, or at least, at some particular time.

Mr. MYER. Maybe it is just a matter of timing. Mr. Mundt, I believe it was before you came in that I had stated to the committee that I would ask for sworn statements from witnesses in the hospital at the time regarding these items so as to clarify the record.

Mr. Costello and Mr. Stripling questioned the authenticity of Mr. Best's statement, because it was not a sworn statement, and on what he bases it.

I told them I would be glad to have witnesses, from whom I presume he got this information, testify under oath and supply it for the record, as to these particular points.

Will that be satisfactory?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes. I would like to have one of these points specifically mentioned—whether Dr. Pedicord was dragged outside of the hospital during this period.

Mr. MYER. We will be glad to have that specifically asked and checked, in relation to the testimony.

Any other points that you would like to have cleared up, specifically?

Mr. MUNDT. Not at the moment.

Mr. EBERHARTER. May I ask a question right there?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, from your experience, or have you had it told to you, by a doctor, that it makes a difference whether a man is kicked when he is unconscious or when he is conscious, or did Dr. Pedicord say anything about that?

Mr. MYER. No; he did not say anything about that.

I assumed that in relation to this because it was important. I asked the doctor specifically as to how he happened to be kicked that hard without being hurt worse.

He said, "I saw it coming. I was able to tense my muscles before he hit, or otherwise it might have been worse."

Now, that is all I am basing my judgment on there, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. This telegram says that Dr. Pedicord was not kicked during momentary unconsciousness, nor thereafter. I think that is a very plain statement which indicates that Dr. Pedicord, according to the information you received, was kicked before momentary unconsciousness.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. He was kicked unconscious.

Mr. MYER. He was kicked; period.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes, and unconsciousness followed; double period.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, at the hospital, when you were there in conversation with Dr. Pedicord, did the question arise as to whether or not the Caucasian staff would remain at the hospital?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir. I asked Dr. Pedicord after we had inquired thoroughly into his condition what he wished to do personally, as to what would be his judgment as regards the Caucasian staff continuing at the hospital that night and beyond.

Dr. Pedicord, with his usual thoughtfulness, said, "Mr. Myer, I would like to have the opinion of my staff about that."

He turned to his staff, and the first reaction was from Dr. Mason, whose comment was "I never want to see another Jap as long as I live."

I do not remember exactly what I said, but I said, "All right, Dr. Mason. I can understand how you feel." or something of that sort.

And Dr. Pedicord said, "Now, Mr. Myer, I would like to have Dr. Mason withhold any statement, or his judgment until tomorrow morning, until he can look at this thing a little bit differently."

I said, "Fine. We will forget that that statement was ever made," or some such statement; I do not remember exactly what I said.

I talked further with Dr. Pedicord and his staff, and after sensing the general feeling, I told them I thought they should all retire from the hospital that night, except we would arrange for one person to be in charge, as far as the Caucasian group was concerned; that they had been through a pretty tough day, and we would discuss it further in the morning, asking them to report the next morning at the office after we had made some further determination.

I left it to Dr. Pedicord, as I have already indicated, as to whether he would like to go into Klamath Falls and whether we should try to make arrangements for a place he wanted to go, or whether he wanted to live in his apartment that night.

As might be expected of such a man, he stayed all night in the project, as I did, and as most of the other people did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Mason remain there that night?

Mr. MYER. I cannot tell you about that. As I remember it, I think Dr. Mason did go into Klamath Falls or Tule Lake to stay all night, but, Mr. Stripling, I do not have the exact facts on it, and I would rather not testify as to that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Mason testified he did go to the home of Dr. Pedicord, returned to his room, and spent the night and called on Mr. Myer the following morning.

Did he call on you the following morning?

Mr. MYER. He did call on me the following morning. I think I can reconstruct the conversation between Dr. Mason and myself the following morning.

As I walked into the administrative office the next morning, I think Dr. Mason was the first man I saw. He stepped up to me and said, "Mr. Myer, I have been considering further the matter which was discussed last evening, and I decided if you have another place that I can go and feel that my family can be safe, I would like to be considered for it."

And I said, "Well, I am glad to hear that, Dr. Mason. I am not in a position to make any commitments at this time. That is something that Dr. Thompson, who is our head physician and generally in charge, will have to pass on, but I am glad that you are feeling that way about it."

He then said, "I do not feel that I want to bring my family here."

Then he paused a moment and said, "Would you—"

I said, "Dr. Mason, if I were going to work here, I would bring my family here."

And Dr. Mason said, "I think a great deal of my family."

And I looked him straight in the eye and I said, "Dr. Mason, I also think a great deal of my family," and walked on into Mr. Best's office.

That is the only time, that and the night before are the only times I ever talked to Dr. Mason. I left it with Dr. Thompson, Mr. Best, and others.

The next thing I heard Dr. Mason had resigned as of November 6, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. What Caucasian doctor was left in charge of the hospital on the night of November 1?

Mr. MYER. There was no Caucasian doctor left in charge. Miss Shipps, who was attached to our Washington staff, of the medical unit, was there for a time, and from that time on an internal security officer was placed at the hospital until some time late in the night, in the front office, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, was not one of the principal demands of the committee that all Caucasian doctors be removed immediately from the hospital?

Mr. MYER. That was one of the demands of the committee; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. That was the demand which Kuratomi stated to you that if it was not made, he could not be responsible for the action of the crowd outside.

Mr. MYER. I would like to ask, Mr. Stripling, are you trying to imply by your questioning that I met the demands of the committee rather than basing my judgment on having the people leave the hospital, or something else?

Mr. STRIPLING. I am not trying to make any implications. The fact is that they demanded all the Caucasians leave the hospital, and the fact is that they did leave.

Mr. MYER. That is a fact; yes. The answer is, yes, they left, but not because the committee demanded it, but because I felt there was a group of people that had been through a pretty nerve-shattering experience, and I felt it was important that they have their rest and that they should be asked if they wanted to stay there or wanted to live some place else for the time being; not because the committee demanded it.

The next day, after we had considered this matter—well, at this point let me reread what I said in relation to this matter at the time the demand was made, from the testimony.

We will go into the matter thoroughly. This case and any other case you may have will be investigated thoroughly. We cannot do it in the face of demands. I think you folks are interested in having a peaceful center. The War Relocation Authority is interested in giving it to you, but we cannot operate on the basis of demands and scenes of the type we have had here today. We just cannot operate like that. Generally speaking, the record has been pretty good on medical service, and we will go into that matter, however, just as soon as we get to it. We cannot go into it today. And I am no judge of the particular type of thing that was presented here. I will be glad to have all the facts and I am not going to make any commitment until I get them. A judge never makes a decision until he gets both sides.

Now, I would like to go back. The next day we discussed the hospital situation in some detail. At the moment Dr. Pedicord was not present, but I discussed it with him later in the day before I left the project.

We decided that we would leave the hospital without Caucasian doctors and nurses for a few days for one simple reason; that was that there were only two Japanese doctors, I believe, and two Japanese nurses. The committee had made demands. It was our opinion that not only did the nurses and doctors need some rest, but that it was probably the best way in the world to have that committee lose face with the evacuee colony if they were not getting proper medical care for a few days, and to help to cure the situation that existed in the hospital, where one of the Japanese doctors had been playing up the idea that he should be in charge; so there was a period of time when we asked the folks not to go back to the hospital.

We had in charge, at all times, some one person who was responsible for such things as narcotics and the things for which we had to be responsible, but we allowed them to operate.

Now, more recently the whole staff has returned to the hospital with the exception of Dr. Mason who, as I say, resigned on November 6, according to my information.

That is the reason.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they return before the Army took over?

Mr. MYER. No, sir; they did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. What about face of the administration, Mr. Myer, in bringing about a situation where the demands could be interpreted—

Mr. MYER. I say to you, Mr. Stripling, as I say to your committee, that we intend to take whatever action we think is sound action, regardless of demands of the committee, but not on the basis of demands of the committee.

And to imply that we took action because the committee demanded it is absolutely a false implication.

Mr. MUNDT. Is it your position, Mr. Myer, that the Caucasian doctors would have gone from the hospital, even though there had been no disturbance on that day, and no conference in your office?

Mr. MYER. I think there is a possibility. In order to cure that situation they might have determined that; yes, in order to cure the situation.

I do not say that we would have, Mr. Mundt, because that would have arisen in an entirely different context, and it might not have occurred otherwise.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words, if the Japanese evacuees were satisfied to be attended by Japanese doctors at a wage of \$19 a month, that you would have been willing to relieve the white doctors who were receiving salaries anywhere from \$4,000 up.

Mr. MYER. That is right, Mr. Eberharter. And let me say further that we found that one of the best ways to cure a committee, who are presuming to represent a group in the center, if it happens to bear on things which involve the service to the evacuee themselves, is to occasionally let them have their way.

We have done it in this case. Pressure in the community will cure that situation, if you give it a little time. We have done it in relation

to unloading coal, in cases where we have had coal strikes, and we have said to them, "All right; we will ship the coal some place else," and we have had volunteers turn out and unload the coal. And we cleared up the situation rather quickly.

We have done it in relation to food and food handling on occasions, so certain activities of that type are used.

I want to repeat that I resent the implication that we did this to meet the demands. I think the record will show that Mr. Best and my other assistants and everyone else connected with that incident indicated we were not meeting demands and were doing it on the basis of our judgment rather than that, if you will read the record.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there any possible danger of some adverse repercussions on the part of the Japanese resulting from the fact—

Mr. MYER. There is always possible danger when you take action of that type, Mr. Mundt. You have to make your judgment on the basis of which is the most dangerous. Yes, there was possible danger that there might have been charges brought that we were remiss in our duty and that somebody died because of lack of medical care.

Mr. MUNDT. If you will permit this little single word of criticism of the administration—

Mr. MYER. We are used to it.

Mr. MUNDT. I might suggest I am afraid that you have at least one fault and that is trying to answer questions before they are asked. I did not ask that question at all.

Mr. MYER. I thought I heard a "period." I am sorry. I apologize.

Mr. MUNDT. There was no "period" coming. There was a question mark coming, but you did not give me time.

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon again.

Mr. MUNDT. I will start all over. I wonder if there was any possible danger of unfortunate repercussions resulting from the fact that while your explanation sounds rather plausible for complying with these demands without granting them, that Mr. Kuratomi and the Buddhist or Shinto priest, interpreting it to their people, would not use that angle and they would say, "See? We went in and held this conference with them and we got the results that we asked for."

That was my question.

Mr. MYER. Well, there is that possibility. I do not think, however, if you were on the ground and checked the situation, that you would find that that would be the way the thing would react.

I think that we have learned out of some 20 months' experience something of the psychology of that kind of a group and that kind of a situation.

I would like to point out again, if the hospital service was bad, after we did not allow the Caucasian staff to go in for a period, it puts them smack on the spot. That is what we intended to do, and that is the reason for withdrawing the staff immediately, as well as to give them badly needed rest.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you get any reports back, either from the committee of 17 or other Japanese, at the end of your experiment, suggesting that the Caucasian doctors be reinstated?

Mr. MYER. I had a report from my chief medical officer, who went out there in the meantime, and who reported to me from San Francisco, after he left Tule Lake, that they were all back in the hospital,

and that the evacuee doctors and everybody else were delighted to have them back in there, and that everything was going on serenely.

I think that is the best answer to it, Mr. Mundt.

At that time they did not have a chance to talk to Mr. Kuratomi and Mr. Kai. I will let the military tell you why.

Mr. MUNDT. While we are on the subject of the psychological reaction on the part of the Japanese, to the W. R. A. group complying with the demands without meeting them, you say, but taking action in compliance with the demands, and whether that would have unfortunate repercussions, let me ask whether the committee of 17 or other Japanese suggested that Mr. Kallam resign?

Mr. MYER. It was suggested that Mr. Kallam resign.

Mr. MUNDT. Did his resignation occur prior to that suggestion?

Mr. MYER. No; it occurred after that suggestion. I might say, however, that Mr. Kallam was in the same class as Mr. Peck that I mentioned yesterday, one of the cases discussed on the morning before the incident ever happened, and we had agreed that Mr. Kallam would not fit the scene under those conditions.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not implying that you let him go because the Japanese made the suggestion—

Mr. MYER. Well, we did not let him go for that reason.

Mr. MUNDT. But whether Mr. Kuratomi could say they did comply with the demands?

Mr. MYER. It gave them a chance. There are three or four cases of that kind that seem to be complying with their request. I think, though, if you will check the total of the testimony and the things that they requested, it is quite evident we were not complying.

The major request was, of course, that I fire Mr. Best. And I will say I did not fire Mr. Best, and I do not intend to fire Mr. Best. One of the reasons I have not worried myself about the situation too much is because I have great confidence in his ability—and if he had a chance to get a little rest, which he needs very badly—to handle that situation. And if he gets a chance to get on the administrative problems, he will get the job done, which he has not had much chance to do.

Mr. MUNDT. Will the Army replace Mr. Best for the time being?

Mr. MYER. Temporarily; yes. But in the meantime we are carrying on there, at Mr. Best's supervision of most of the normal functions, feeding and fiscal affairs, but under their general check on policies.

Mr. MUNDT. As of today, if anything goes wrong, at Tule Lake, it is the responsibility of the Army, and as things will go right at Tule Lake—

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Let me say, while Colonel Austin is in charge, we are operating cooperatively and checking judgments at every stage of the game, and they are normally in charge, as far as general supervision is concerned.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, who were the other officials at the Tule Lake Center that the Japanese demanded the removal of.

Mr. MYER. I will have to check. I believe you have that in the statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a matter of fact, did they not contend that none of the officials of the Tule Lake center understood the Japanese psychology?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. They contended the same thing as I have heard charged here on the Hill in the past few days—that none of us understood the Japanese psychology. They agree with some of the folks who have testified here. I find them in agreement on many points, as a matter of fact, which is a very peculiar relationship.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you would explain that statement a little more.

Mr. MYER. Yes; I will be glad to explain that statement.

Mr. MUNDT. I wish you would.

Mr. MYER. It is quite evident to me that Mr. Kuratomi and Mr. Kai, and some other folks, had definitely decided to be Japanese in the real sense, as well as a lot of other people who lived at the Tule Lake center. They were willing to cause any incident that they could do, without having blood on their hands, to get publicity in the press, which would let the people in Japan know that they were on the job and which would help to create disunity throughout this country.

They are still working at it and will continue to do so. And anybody who allowed themselves to be tricked into repeated misinformation and exaggerations and to play up the trivialities that came out of that situation, played directly into the hands of Kai and Kuratomi and the leaders at Tule Lake, including some of the representatives of this committee.

That, Mr. Chairman, is my statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think Mr. Dakan played into the hands of Mr. Kai?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. In writing the ridiculous story which appeared in the W. R. A. publication?

Mr. MYER. I made my statement, Mr. Stripling, and I have no further statement to make.

I think I made a very complete statement on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is his rating on objectivity now with the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think I have admitted that Mr. Dakan's statement was an indiscretion. I think I have admitted that we are all human and we have made some mistakes.

And I have already stated, and I repeat, that every one of those mistakes have been played to the utmost by Mr. Stripling.

He has not at any point that I know of, up to this time, ever asked for a copy of our regulations or our policies; neither has he given any consideration, as I can remember to the good job that is being done.

Mr. STRIPLING. I am not running the W. R. A. That is your job.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us not indulge in any personalities here.

Mr. MYER. I am very sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. We must remember that we are investigating the W. R. A. and not Mr. Stripling.

Mr. MYER. If Mr. Stripling and the committee will remember that, I will be glad to cooperate on that basis.

Mr. MUNDT. Would it not be a fair basis to assume if Mr. Dakan can make a mistake in good faith, that others can make mistakes in good faith?

Mr. MYER. That is right. I assume that that was the case, and that other people have made mistakes in good faith.

I am not sure that this all happened in good faith.

Mr. MUNDT. But you are awfully sure about Mr. Dakan being in good faith.

Mr. MYER. I am; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. We are just as sure of others as you are of Mr. Dakan.

Mr. MYER. I understand, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, since we got on to the question of the publication in the centers, to what extent are they actually censored or supervised after they are published? I have reference to the papers in all the relocation centers.

Mr. MYER. Any papers in relocation centers for which we provide any funds for the operation of the paper, are completely checked and censored by the administration.

If it is an independent paper, financed entirely by evacuee enterprise, they are in a position to write editorials and to say things as any other paper would be.

Mr. COSTELLO. How is the paper at Heart Mountain operated?

Mr. MYER. That is an evacuee-operated paper.

Mr. COSTELLO. Entirely supervised by themselves?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And hence the W. R. A. is not responsible?

Mr. MYER. Well, we give general supervision to it, and we generally check on it, but they do finance the paper themselves through their own enterprise.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not assume any responsibility for the editorial comment or the suggestions made?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason I was asking that, I understand in the issue of November 22 they make a recommendation that the Tule Lake project be taken over by the Department of Justice.

Mr. MYER. Yes. Mr. Tozier just handed me a copy of the editorial. I had not seen it before. No; that is not an official issue.

Mr. COSTELLO. I wondered if that was the W. R. A. or simply an editorial coming out of the Heart Mountain center.

Mr. MYER. That is simply an editorial coming out of the Heart Mountain center staff; that is right.

I would like now to give for the record the names of the people that were requested by Mr. Stripling, whose resignations were requested.

Mr. Best, project director; Mr. Zimmer, assistant project director; Mr. Schmidt, head of internal security; Mr. Kallam, head of the agricultural division; Mr. Peck, who was the chief steward; Mr. Kirkman, of the warehouse division.

Then all of the Caucasian doctors, and I believe they said five of them, and all of the Caucasian nurses to be dismissed from the administration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What percentage was dismissed?

Mr. MYER. How?

Mr. EBERHARTER. What percentage are not now on the job?

Mr. MYER. I think the only people of this group not now on the job are Mr. Kallam and Mr. Peck.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And they demanded the dismissal of how many?

Mr. MYER. Well, I do not know. I don't remember how many nurses there were. I think, as I remember it, there were around five or six nurses, and they say here, five doctors.

Let us assume that there were not more than 10 in the hospital. Of a total of 16 people, there are 2 that I know of that are off the pay roll at the present time.

I am not sure about the 10. I would have to recheck the number of nurses.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long had Mr. Schmidt been out there?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Schmidt was there at the time Mr. Best had been assigned there, and had been there for a period since early August.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was taken over, then?

Mr. MYER. Yes. He had charge while he was there because Dr. Jacoby left. While Mr. Cole was really acting head, Mr. Schmidt was in general head of the division, and will be, I think, definitely assigned to that project.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does Mr. Schmidt still have the title of national head?

Mr. MYER. Yes; but he is also acting head out there, and has been on the job almost continuously.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the evacuees of Tule Lake permitted to publish a camp center newspaper of their own, financed by themselves?

Mr. MYER. Not since segregation; no.

There was a mimeographed paper there that was supposed to be reviewed that, of course, could be very useful in getting information to the project, but not as an evacuee paper, and will not be run as an evacuee paper unless it is checked at Tule Lake, of course.

Mr. STRIFLING. On Tuesday, Mr. Myer, you had had a discussion with Dr. Mason. After Dr. Mason left, and you say you went into Mr. Best's office, what occurred that morning; on Tuesday morning?

Mr. MYER. I do not remember the exact sequence. We spent a good deal of time during that morning.

We went over to Colonel Austin's headquarters, which is just back of the administrative area, and spent a good deal of time doing two things:

First. Talking with, I believe it was, Colonel Mueller, who had flown up that night to be with Colonel Austin from the Ninth Corps Area—talking to Colonel Austin and members of his staff and trying to get through some long-distance calls from his headquarters to Washington, to San Francisco, and other places.

Among other things, we called the Federal Bureau of Investigation at San Francisco and reported the incident up to that time. Mr. Cozzens came on. I tried to get Mr. Barrows, who was acting here, because we had not been able to make a thorough recheck to see if there was any tampering with our phones.

We talked at length with Colonel Austin and Colonel Mueller, again going over our plans, rechecking at every stage in the game, whether we had left any loopholes in relation to any other incident.

We told Colonel Austin, of course, that an announcement was being made immediately that there be no further gatherings in that area, and any further gatherings would be considered out of bounds.

We arranged and reported to him, which we had done the night before, to recheck it, that if during the nighttime he needed a request from Mr. Best for the military to come in, it would be satisfactory if he got word from any of our internal security officers.

And we gave him the names that could call on the military, if they needed help, under those conditions.

We made provisions for rechecking on the signalling devices, in case anything went wrong with the telephone wires, and for the sequence of directorship in case Mr. Best left the project, or anything should happen to him, as to who the people down the line were to call in order.

That type of thing was covered in detail. We discussed a number of other things.

As I remember it, we spent probably, all-told, 2 or 3 hours.

Mr. STRIPLING. Had any announcement been made to the public or to the press as to the occurrence of the night before, at that time, Tuesday morning?

Mr. MYER. Yes; we had had a number of calls. I might say we were so busy the night before, up until about 11 o'clock, checking and rechecking.

Among other things, Mr. Best and I, after we had completed our rechecking with the staff, along about 10:30 spent about half an hour driving clear around the project, up and down the blocks, to see what was going on, during the night, before we went to bed.

I might add that we were pretty tired—at least I was—by 11 o'clock that night. It had been a rather strenuous day.

After having taken care of the placing of the internal security officers and for making provisions for the proper guard in the interim period, as I remember it, we had two calls from the press. I had one call from the San Francisco Examiner, which I personally answered, and one from the A. P. at Portland.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you confirm that there had been a disturbance?

Mr. MYER. I did confirm it, in both cases. I was not able to confirm, let me say, Mr. Stripling, though, a number of statements that they gave to me at that time, that they had heard, and which I had to either deny or say that we had not been able to verify it.

Mr. STRIPLING. When did Mr. Joyce issue his statement from the San Francisco office?

Mr. MYER. I cannot tell you exactly. It was some time, I presume, on Tuesday, because my talk with Mr. Joyce and Mr. Webster was sometime Tuesday. Mr. Cozzens called the office Tuesday morning.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you explain to the committee why Mr. Joyce should have made the statement that it was a subversive lie?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Joyce makes the statement that in his conversation with me that he raised the question as to whether I thought it might have been the work of enemy agents. He indicated my reply was that it might have been. I have a faint memory of having heard such a question. I was thinking, of course, of the group of agitators in the center and the discussion there.

Mr. Joyce was evidently thinking of the things we just previously discussed, which had to do with all of these reports which I had not been able to verify.

He states that on the strength of that, when he was questioned, he indicated that, and one of the reporters asked him, "Well, probably it

was not the Japanese. Might it not have been Nazi agents?" "It might have been."

That is the story as I got it.

I told you yesterday that I was having that matter checked further. I have asked to get the full facts on it because I have asked Mr. Cozzens to interview the reporters who talked to Mr. Joyce and get the complete story from them, which he has not been able to do as yet, I am sorry.

I made the statement previously and I want to repeat it, that the statement was not made on any authorization from me, so far as I know. There could have been a misunderstanding and I think perhaps was a misunderstanding as to what the intent was.

Under those conditions, over a long distance telephone, after having discussed about a dozen reports that had come to them, that they wanted a check on, I think it is very possible that there was not a meeting of minds, in the sense of having the meaning clear as to what each one meant.

That is the only thing that I can say about it.

I might say this, further, Mr. Webster and Mr. Joyce were both on the phone, and they said that the reporters were putting questions to them which they wanted me to check.

And I said, "All right; list them."

As I remember it, there were about a dozen questions. I do not have them here, but I will try to reconstruct them, or some of them.

One of them was that it had been alleged that the military had had to be called in and the people dispersed by tear gas on the afternoon of November 1.

I of course categorically denied that because I was able to see it.

There was another one that I remember that trucks were running into fences in an attempt to break through the fences. As I remember I replied to that one by saying that I had not heard such a story; I am not able to verify it.

Well, the stories went on, including a lot of the stories that were finally published, and about half of them I was able to deny categorically, because I was where I could see, such as the calling in of the military.

There were about half of them on which I had no knowledge, on which I simply had to say that they had not come to our attention and that it was something we would have to check, but we doubted in some cases, whether they were true.

Unfortunately, later in the day, when the story was broken in San Francisco—and I suppose this might be expected—the headline, as I remember it, read that we denied the story generally.

What we denied were certain alleged incidents. We carried at the bottom of the story a short statement in which we said that the group had been called there on a hoax by the committee and Dr. Pedicord had been beaten, and we denied everything else.

Now, I say that is unfortunate for the simple reason that we did not deny that there was an incident. We did deny that there was an angry mob of the type that was indicated. We did not deny that there was a tense situation.

We did not deny the meeting of the committee, the demands of the committee, the beating of Dr. Pedicord, or anything we knew about at that time. We made a recheck of a number of things and were

able to comment on them. Some of those things it took days to recheck the facts.

That is the reason, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to have the opportunity to recheck the record as to what has been put into the record.

And incidentally, while I am on that subject, I would like to have a copy, if possible, of Mr. Cavett's report to the committee, that I might recheck any information he might have gathered. It will be helpful to our administration.

May I have it please? Mr. Tom Cavett, I believe, represented the committee at the center, in your investigation.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will make a copy available to you, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. One of the reasons that I would like to see Mr. Cavett's report is this: That Mr. Cozzens reports to me that in the presence of Mr. Best, Mr. Black, and myself, Mr. Cavett made the following statement on the night of November 7:

It was a good thing nobody lost their head. If they had, the things that would have happened would have had repercussions around the world.

I hope Mr. Cavett put that statement into his report to you. I would like to check that along with other things, so that we can help to keep the record straight.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There has been a good deal said, Mr. Myer, about this release by Mr. Joyce in San Francisco. I thought I might just comment here that many times important Government officials in Washington, on the same subject, make statements which appear to be interpreted differently by the press and the public, and in Washington, under the supervision of O. W. I. and the censorship of people and all that, so that if Mr. Joyce did make a statement which might have been misconstrued, that he is merely, perhaps, following some of the procedures that have happened here in Washington.

Mr. MYER. Yes, Mr. Congressman.

I want to say this further, without any implication or blame on Mr. Joyce at all, I would say that the fact that the statement was publicized and the fact that the reporters who talked to me and to Mr. Best early in the game, and to Mr. Cozzens over long-distance telephone, who got the impression that we were trying to play down the incident, simply because we could not confirm all of the rumors that were rife, led to a very bad public relation situation on the west coast, which really we are sorry about.

We are probably more sorry than anyone else, because it is going to take time to build back into the confidence of some of the people that I think felt we were doing an honest job and who doubted it for a time. I think it is unfortunate.

And I want to repeat, we are very sorry that it happened.

I am very sorry it was construed, in those statements I made, that we were trying to deny that anything happened, because we did not try to deny that anything happened.

It was covered up by the fact that there were so-called eyewitness stories that were much more rumor than we could tell them at the time.

Now, we have stated in our November 13 press release the essential facts as they existed, as we saw them at that time. We hope to supplement those facts, now that we are able to gather them up, in relation to other incidents and to provide additional facts on it as soon

as we can sit down and put it in order, so that the public may know what the facts were regarding those, as far as the investigation we have made.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am impressed by the statement you made that this incident here, which was publicized, lost confidence on the Pacific coast.

I might comment on the fact that the Los Angeles Times printed in the paper a box score and asked the readers to mark it and send it in, and on that box score there were seven questions. And I think the result of their voting on that issue emphasizes just how far public confidence has been lost on the Pacific coast, particularly I am confining it to the Los Angeles area.

Let me read it.

1. Do you think the War Relocation Authority has capably handled the problem of Japanese in the United States?

Yes..... 639
No..... 10, 773

3. Do you favor Army control of Japanese in this country for the duration?

Yes 11, 203
No 372

3. Do you approve of the policy of freeing avowedly loyal Japanese to take jobs in the Midwest?

Yes 1, 159
No 9, 750

4. Would you favor "trading" Japanese now here for American war prisoners held in Japan, if it could be arranged?

Yes 11, 249
No 256

5. Do you favor a constitutional amendment after the war for the deportation of all Japanese from this country, and forbidding further immigration?

Yes 10, 598
No 732

6. Would you except American-born Japanese if such a plan as the above were adopted?

Yes 1, 883
No 9, 018

7. Would you permanently exclude all Japanese from the Pacific Coast States, including California?

Yes 9, 855
No 999

I think that pretty definitely indicates what the public sentiment is, particularly in the Los Angeles area, regarding the entire matter of the Japanese problem at the present time.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, there is one point which the committee and I agree on, at least. I have not checked the facts carefully—and that is the willingness to trade some folks at Tule Lake for some war prisoners. I would like to do it tomorrow.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think we all would, if the Japanese Government would only consent.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, on Tuesday morning did you meet with the Caucasian employees at the center?

Mr. MYER. Not on Tuesday morning. I met with them between 1 and 2 o'clock on Tuesday afternoon at their request. We had a meeting scheduled for 4:30 and we met earlier.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you give the committee the facts concerning the meeting?

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to reconstruct it, as best I can. I am not sure I can give you the facts, because that meeting was about as tense as the one the day before.

I was eating lunch in Mr. Best's apartment along about, I presume, 1:15 on Tuesday. I might say, in passing, I was eating some of the famous Tule Lake goose which had been shot by one of the members of the staff.

Mr. Arthur Muir, who is a member of our Washington staff, who happened to be at Tule Lake during this period, knocked on the back door, immediately came into the room, came up behind my chair, and said that a portion of the administrative staff were meeting in the administrative recreation hall and they wanted to know if I would come over and meet with them.

I told Mr. Muir that I had understood there was a meeting scheduled for 4:30 and I was planning to be there on schedule.

And he said, "No; they want you to come now. They are afraid to meet at 4:30, at the scheduled meeting in the hospital."

I said, "All right. You tell them if they can wait a few minutes until I finish my lunch, I will be glad to join."

Mr. Muir returned to the building. I finished my lunch and along with Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens, and I don't remember who else went with us; we went over to the meeting.

As I have indicated, I found, naturally, a pretty tense group of people.

I did not know what had gone on previously. It has been reported to me that there had been some discussion as to what requests they were going to make of me or Mr. Best, and that they had arranged for a spokesman to present them.

As I walked in to the meeting, the group stood around the outer portions of the room, some of them behind me.

Nobody said anything and I looked at Mr. Best and he nodded his head, and I started to make a short talk to the group. I am sure I cannot reconstruct all of that talk, but I will try to tell you essentially the things that were said:

I started my talk by saying that: "I am sure we understand, all of us, that there is a war on, otherwise we would not be here. And in time of war the security which we all like so well becomes a rather illusive thing, and none of us is very secure. You folks and every one here have been through a very tense situation in the last few hours, but I am sure you will agree that none of us has faced anything such as the boys are facing on the Italian front or Guadalcanal or the other fronts. So far, at least, we have not faced guns."

And then I said, "I want to express the appreciation to 'his staff' for a job that has been unparalleled in the history of W. R. A. I am referring to the night and day work that most of you have done since the period of about August 1, in relation to the terrific task of moving thousands of people from this center, talking to internees, helping them get packed up and loaded on trains, and moving additional people in and getting them settled. And I have not had a chance to express my appreciation to you. It is a job that nobody else in W. R. A. can ever quite appreciate, but I want you to understand that we do appreciate it."

And I said, "And I want you to understand also that in expressing that appreciation, I realize that many of you who have been through a strain, you are tired, and consequently, when the incident happened yesterday, it was a tense incident, and some of you became, perhaps, hysterical. The human mechanism, for some reason or other, does funny tricks."

I am trying to reconstruct, gentlemen. I am not sure that I said these exact words.

"I can understand why some of you have reacted the way you have, and I am not mad at anybody. But I do want to say that there is a job to be done and, in fairness to Mr. Best, if you cannot take the situations you have here, I hope you will go out the front gate and stay until you can get yourself in hand and get the rest you need and then come back."

And then I went on to repeat some of the things I had said about the job that had been done at Tule Lake, the unparalleled situation that had existed.

I tried to reiterate the fact that what I was saying was not any criticism of any individual; it was simply trying to face the facts as they existed, and that Mr. Best had a job to do and if a person was not in condition to do that job, that we were going—or that they were going to be off the job, and that they, themselves, would be better off; and I hoped that they would keep that in mind.

The speech was a combination of tribute to the staff and a combination of a type of request that I could not help but make under the circumstances, even though it sounded hard.

Now, when I finished my short speech there were probably six or seven people who talked. I cannot recall all the names, and I am not going to try to reconstruct in detail what happened.

The first spokesman made a general statement and asked what we were doing in regard to protecting them and their families.

I told them that we had a conference—that we had conferences—and had gone over the details the night before with Colonel Austin and had rechecked all of our plans, and we had planned a large portion of the morning with Colonel Austin and Colonel Mueller, and we had taken what we felt were adequate steps.

And I said, "I am sorry that I cannot tell you in detail just what our next move is going to be, and I cannot tell you for only one reason: There are 15,000 people in this colony that do not belong to the administrative staff, some of whom met with us yesterday. I feel quite certain that they would like to know what the next move is, and when you are dealing with this kind of a situation you do not tip your hand, and all I am asking is that you take it on faith that we are making provisions for your safety, but in the interim period if you do not feel safe, if you do not feel that your family is safe, there will not be one bit of blame if you live off the project at any time until the situation is worked out, and you are at liberty to go."

Well, after I made that statement there were a number of rather fiery statements, I might say, on the part of a few people. One person I remember, by the way, it was Mr. Rhoads who talked, and another was Mr. Gerry. I do not remember the names of all of the folks.

Finally, after hearing the discussion for some time I stepped forward again and said this: "Folks, this is twice within 24 hours that I have been faced by a group of people making demands through a spokes-

man. Unfortunately I am going to have to say to you the same thing I said to the group yesterday afternoon, that I cannot operate on the basis of demands. We are going to do the best we can to protect you and everyone else here, but you will have to take it on faith. We will work it out. We are glad to have your point of view."

That, in general, is the essence of the meeting, as I remember it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, there was a statement reported in the press to the effect that you said, "If you can't take it, get out." You did not make such a statement?

Mr. MYER. I think I said here what I did say, on which that probably was based. If I did say any such statement, it was in a context statement before and afterward.

It is very easy to pick a statement out of its context and make it sound very malicious, and I am afraid that is what happened in this case.

Mr. MUNDT. How many Caucasians, subsequent to that meeting, followed the suggestion and left camp?

Mr. MYER. There were quite a number, Mr. Mundt, that went to Klamath Falls or Tule Lake and spent at least the night, a number of nurses and the people in the hospital who, as a matter of fact, were advised doing so if they had any question at all, because we told them it was important that they be on the beam.

They had been through a strong strain, and we really preferred that they do so.

There were some other people, Mr. Gerry, I believe, whom I mentioned, who spent his nights at Klamath Falls until the time that the military came in, as I remember it.

I cannot tell you offhand how many did, but if you consider that important, I will be glad to recheck that for you.

Mr. MUNDT. This meeting was on Tuesday, was it not?

Mr. MYER. That was on Tuesday afternoon shortly after lunch. I would say sometime between 1 and 2 o'clock. I do not remember the exact time.

Mr. MUNDT. The reason I wanted to know, I think Mr. Best was a little displeased with the committee in his telegram in condemning Dr. Mason, because the telegram says:

Members of the staff were taken to nearby towns for security but returned on Thursday night.

Mr. MYER. They were not taken there by the W. R. A. They were allowed to go. We suggested we would be glad to help them make arrangements. We did not take them.

Mr. MUNDT. They went in W. R. A. equipment, I presume.

Mr. MYER. I was not there on Thursday night; I do not know what happened on Thursday night, in that connection, Mr. Mundt, off-hand.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me that Best is quite an artistic quibbler himself, trying to deceive the committee, and he may deceive a poor little Western farm boy like me, but I accept your word as correct, and I believe that is true.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, he may have learned that from some of the folks here; I really do not know.

Mr. MUNDT. He says:

Members of the staff were taken to nearby towns for security but returned on Thursday night.

Then he says:

No members of the staff were taken to nearby towns. Two or three members of the staff voluntarily went to nearby towns to spend the night returning each morning for work.

You say that is quite substantially true?

Mr. MYER. I did not say substantially true. I think I mentioned two or three cases, but I do not remember how many there were. I do know that I talked to Dr. Pedicord on Tuesday. I talked with him on Tuesday evening before I left the project. I went to Klamath Falls.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not want to get into a controversy with you. Will you read the answer that Mr. Myer made to my statement; I asked him whether very many people availed themselves of the opportunity. (Record read by the reporter.)

Mr. MUNDT. Your statement was that there were quite a number and Mr. Best's statement was that there were two or three.

Mr. MYER. I said that there were a number of nurses; I do not remember how many nurses. I think I stated a while ago there were four or five in the group.

If I made that statement, I retract it and correct the record and say it was my memory that it was some of the nurses. Will that correct it?

Mr. STRIPLING. Did not all of the Caucasian doctors go, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. I do not know about that. I will be glad to check that. I know Dr. Pedicord did on Tuesday evening. He did not on Monday evening, because I saw him both late on Monday evening and saw him Tuesday before I left the project.

Mr. Chairman, on November 25 you wrote me a letter that I would like to comment on now, if I might.

You made some suggestions and I would like to comment on them, because I think it is important to the group that I do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is Mr. Rhoads still with the W. R. A. project?

Mr. MYER. No; Mr. Rhoads resigned, I think, the day following our meeting in the recreation hall, as I remember it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is Mr. Gerry still at the project?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. He is the one who was reclassified downwards?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not think that is the case. I think this is the case, Mr. Costello:

Mr. Gerry had been recommended from the project for a promotion. Because of the civil-service rules it was not possible to make that promotion. Even though it were possible, he might not have been promoted after the situation there. I do not know, but that is the situation, as I understood it.

I have not been able to have the full facts on that record as yet, because we are going to have to recheck the situation.

Mr. COSTELLO. According to his telegram, he had already been paid for the higher classification.

Mr. MYER. If that is the case, somebody assumed too much.

Mr. COSTELLO. You will remember I read the telegram into the record.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to recheck that.

And I wonder if we might have a copy of Mr. Gerry's telegram so that I could have my personnel folks check it over carefully.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason for asking that is that two of the spokesmen were discharged.

Mr. MYER. There were six or seven people who talked.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was wondering whether any of the other spokesmen had either been separated from the project, or had their classification revised.

Mr. MYER. I will say this, there has been no action taken in relation to Mr. Gerry because of anything I did.

I do remember this, that when Mr. Rhoads made his speech, he said, "You can fire me if you wish."

When I got the opportunity, I said, "Mr. Rhoads, I am not firing anybody from this project. There is the man," and I pointed to Mr. Best.

I said, "If there is any firing to be done, it will be done by him, and I will support him."

Mr. MUNDT. Best took the hint and fired him, or did he resign?

Mr. MYER. No; he resigned the next day, I think, on his own, about which I am very glad, I might say.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Gerry's classification was being rescinded because of the fact that he was the spokesman for the group.

Mr. MYER. Well, that is his indication. I will recheck the facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. It seems to be the policy to take it out on members of the administration there who are out-spoken at a meeting of that kind and express their views.

Mr. MYER. I think I have made my statement; on that; as far as I am concerned, no.

Now, there may be other factors that enter into the situation, that is, whether or not a man in a responsible position, after making that type of statement could hold the confidence of his immediate staff who may not agree with him, and so on.

There may be a number of factors that enter into it that way, finally, rather than anything he might say about me.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I might observe that sometimes, in my opinion, we cannot form a good judgment of people until they have been put to the test, and then under some stress.

Mr. MYER. We certainly found that out, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So you could very well conclude also that anybody would break down in a camp such as Tule Lake where it is expected that there might be incidents occur, and that the staff could very well conclude that it was not the proper type of person to be employed at a camp of that sort.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(Following recess, the committee reconvened at 2 p. m.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. We will resume our hearing.

Mr. Myer, you had a letter of some kind you wanted to present to the committee.

Mr. MYER. All I want to do, Mr. Costello, is to refer to the fact that I did receive your letter of November 25 in which you expressed some concern about the possibility that incidents might happen on Pearl Harbor Day at the centers, and pointing out the possible dangers if that did happen.

I simply wanted to report to you that I have had a check made of all the projects this morning, before I came up here, and that everything was quiet, and they went about their business normally in all of the centers yesterday, and there were no incidents that would indicate any Japanese, pro-Japanese, activity at any of the relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Frankly, I am very glad to hear that.

Mr. MYER. So am I.

Mr. COSTELLO. With a hope for a continuance of the same sort of report.

Mr. MYER. You do not hope that any more than I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think it is mutual.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, going back to the meeting between you and the Caucasian employees on Tuesday afternoon, I believe you said in your speech to them that you promised them that steps had been taken, of which you could not advise them at the time.

Could you tell the committee now what those steps were?

Mr. MYER. I would be very glad to tell the committee of what steps were taken up to that time. However, I would like to preface my statement by saying that in going back over the whole procedure, I am not sure of the complete context of when certain things happened, so I am giving you the best of my memory.

First, we had taken steps, as I have already pointed out, on Monday evening, to check with Colonel Austin and made arrangements whereby, if there was any movement at all needed within the administrative area, including the area where the administration people were housed, that in the internal-security officers, all of whom were on the job late that night and some additional people, that any internal-security officer might call in the troops without further reference to the project director, which would be the normal procedure, and ask them to take over and to help to clear the area.

Second, we made special provision, of course, for arrangements for signaling and for the sequence in case anything did develop, or if Mr. Best was not available.

Third, we discussed the question as to whether or not we should bring troops in at that time and decided against it for obvious reasons, which I have already mentioned.

Whenever that was done, it would mean, in our judgment, that we would move into a period where it would be a much more costly period of administration and would affect the whole administration of the camp.

I made provisions whereby Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens could determine on a moment's notice whether they needed a fence down between the administrative area and around the hospital which would fence off from that portion of the colony where the evacuees live the portion of the colony that had in it the living quarters of the administrative staff, the hospital, and school.

We did not make immediate provisions for the building of the fence until we could watch for the developments again, for obvious reasons.

However, it was authorized and I might say that when I arrived at Klamath Falls on the evening of November 2 I called Washington regarding a number of things, and among other things I told them that I had authorized the fence and asked them if there was any question came in from the west coast regarding the engineers building the fence that they were authorized to go ahead with it and raise no question, because I put that in the hands of the local project officials.

We made provisions for additional guards to be sent in immediately, trained people, from the other relocation centers, until we could expedite our recruiting program, and secure more internal-security officers.

As already pointed out, we made provisions to assist anyone who cared to do so, to leave the project if they felt their life was in jeopardy, or if any of their family members wanted to leave, we would assist in trying to find a place, if they so desired.

I think that summarizes rather briefly what happened during the period of the evening of November 1 and a recheck on November 2.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following your conference with the employees, did you leave the project on Tuesday?

Mr. MYER. I left the project on Tuesday evening at approximately 6:45, as I remember it, to go to Klamath Falls, where I later caught a train to Portland and Seattle.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you left the project, did you feel reasonably sure that the situation was well in hand and under control?

Mr. MYER. I felt perfectly confident when I left the project that the situation was in good hands, and that everything had been done that I felt needed to be done by me there.

Mr. Best is a competent employee. Mr. Cozzens, my assistant director from San Francisco, was to continue on there at least for another day to advise and check with him.

We had worked out our plans between the military and Mr. Best. We had covered all of the points on which he needed immediate backing and assistance, and I felt that any further continuation of my presence on the project would simply get in the way of good administration.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you have a regular itinerary that you had to keep?

Mr. MYER. I had an itinerary which I did keep.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Cozzens issue a statement in which he gave that as the reason you left?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, I do not know if he did. That was just one reason why I left.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where did you go from Klamath Falls?

Mr. MYER. I went from Klamath Falls to Portland en route to Seattle and I spent about 2 or 3 hours in Portland between trains and arrived in Seattle on the following evening, as I remember it, about—I will have to check my schedule, but, as I remember, it was around 6 or 6:30 on the evening of November 3.

Mr. STRIPLING. Could you state to the committee the purpose that you went to Seattle for?

Mr. MYER. The trip that I was on at that time had been planned for a month ahead of the time that I arrived at Tule Lake.

First, let me say that it had no reference to Tule Lake. I went to Seattle because I was planning to come back by the northern route, anyhow, to stop off at Minneapolis on my way back, for another engagement that I had made there.

I stopped off for a day. I went to visit our office in Seattle and to talk with our folks there further about the problems in relation to evacuee property and any other problems that they might have, and incidentally, to follow up on any other contacts that they felt desirable to make while I was in Seattle.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would it be in the nature of an inspection tour by the director of the various centers?

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to tell you about my trip, which I think I can give you the schedule of, and let you judge for yourself as to what the nature of the trip was.

First, as I remember it, I left Washington on October 16. I went West by way of Lawrence, Kans., where I stopped off for a day and spoke to the Rotary Club of Lawrence, Kans., at their request.

I went from there to Salt Lake City, where I spent a day with our personnel in Salt Lake City, in the office that is responsible for the relocation program in the Salt Lake City area, which involves the States of Utah, Idaho, eastern Oregon, eastern Washington, and certain other western areas.

From there we went to the central Utah project and spent 2 days, which was a general inspection trip—yes—at that project.

From there we drove to the Minidoka project in Idaho, where we spent 2 days on the project, and from there I went to San Francisco where I had two or three previous engagements, and I believe I was in San Francisco for 4 days.

I am not sure how all this adds up. I am giving you, generally, my remembrance of the trip and how it was planned and carried out.

In San Francisco my main job was to work with our property officer and with the other folks in the San Francisco office in relation to any problems that they might have, and to discuss certain administrative problems.

From San Francisco we went to Tule Lake on schedule, leaving on the evening of the last day of October and arriving, as I have already stated, on the early morning of November 1, and spent the rest of that day and the day following at Tule Lake.

From there I went to Seattle, spent 1 day that was not originally planned in the schedule, but because of the fact I was going that way it seemed desirable that I stop off there and spend some time with the staff, meet my staff, help to bring them up to date on the problems involved in the national program, and to get better acquainted, again, with property problems.

I visited Seattle, the Seattle office, once before.

From Seattle I came back by way of Minneapolis, and spent 2 days. Most of 1 day was spent at Camp Savage, which is the camp where they are carrying on the training for military intelligence of young men of Japanese ancestry who are rendering service on the Pacific front, after they are trained with Colonel Rasmussen. Colonel Rasmussen is in charge.

And I spent that time with him on his invitation.

Then the following day I spent in conferences with a representative at Minneapolis and with the local representative of a volunteer committee there who had been working on a relocation program.

I was in St. Paul and Minneapolis.

I left Minneapolis and came back by way of Chicago and spent a portion of a day between trains in our Chicago area office on problems that they had to present and returned to Washington.

Mr. STRIPLING. In going to Tule Lake, did you have in mind helping to straighten out the strike situation and other matters which had occurred or was that entirely up to Mr. Best?

Mr. MYER. I would like to repeat that my plans to visit Tule Lake had been made at least 30 days previous to the time that I arrived at Tule Lake and it was planned at this time for the reason that I wanted to visit Tule Lake soon after the major movement of segregates had been completed and have the opportunity to sit down with Mr. Best and his staff to review, in some detail, the new problems that they felt they had faced, after they had had a couple of weeks after these segregates had arrived, in order that we might work out jointly any recommendations that they might have for any further change in the policies, change in personnel required, as to number of people on different types of jobs and as a general inspection of the area, as regarding further developments that might be needed in the way of construction that was not then authorized, such as the use of jails and the type of thing that might be needed in connection with the project that might not normally be needed in connection with other projects.

I think that pretty well covers the answer to the question.

Mr. STRIPLING. After you left Tule Lake, Mr. Myer, when were you next in communication with Mr. Best?

Mr. MYER. I talked to Mr. Best from Portland. I talked to him twice from Seattle.

Mr. STRIPLING. What date was that, in Portland?

Mr. MYER. November 3. I called him immediately when I arrived at our office in Portland, at approximately 11 o'clock on the morning of November 3, as I remember it, to recheck with him.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did he report to you that the situation was still well in hand?

Mr. MYER. On Wednesday morning he told me that everything was calm and everything was going ahead as it was on Tuesday.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you now give the committee, Mr. MYER, the events leading up to the calling in of the Army and who called the Army in and all the facts surrounding that?

Mr. MYER. I would like to state first that I was not there when the Army was called in. The best information that I have on that is contained in our press release of November 13, which I think is essentially correct, and I would like to read from that, rather than talk from memory.

I would like to give one bit of information first, which is not in here, which I started to give before.

At Seattle, on the following morning, which I believe was the morning of — Thursday morning, in any case, Mr. Best, when I talked to him there, said that they had had this incident over in the area where the new construction work was going on; that he had discussed the mat-

ter further with the Army, with Mr. Cozzens, and they felt that they should start the fence down through the area.

I said, "Ray, you have had my authorization to go ahead with that at any time you felt it was necessary. Go right ahead."

He said "O. K. I just wanted to keep you informed."

I also informed him that I had made the call from Klamath Falls and told Washington not to get in the way and raise any question about it.

It is my understanding—however, I am not quite clear because there is conflict on this point—that the fence was started on Thursday afternoon, digging the holes.

However, I have one statement which says it was started Friday morning, so I am not clear as to that point.

In any case, this is what the statement says:

On Thursday evening a crowd of about 400 evacuees, mainly young men—many of them armed with clubs—entered the administration area. Most of the crowd entered the warehouse area. A few entered the motor pool area and some surrounded the project director's residence. The advance of this crowd was resisted by several War Relocation Authority internal security officers, one of whom tripped, struck his head on a stone, and was then struck by evacuees with clubs. No other persons were injured. As the crowd closed in around Mr. Best's home, he telephoned Lt. Col. Verne Austin, commanding officer of the military unit outside the center, and asked the Army to assume full control of the project area. Troops entered the center at once.

Now, I would like to supplement that with some additional information that describes chronologically the development as reported to us from out there.

This is a statement as it has been presented to me within the last few days by the folks from the project.

And I might say, Mr. Chairman, it was not taken under oath. It is simply a report. It is headed "Chronological Account of the Occurrence."

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE OCCURRENCE

8:15 p. m.: William T. Jarrett, farm superintendent, went to the motor pool about 8:15 p. m. to get three cargo trucks to be used to meet outside evacuees at Klamath Falls and transport them to the project farm where they were to work. There were four Japanese in the office and they ignored him.

After about 5 minutes another Japanese boy came in, looked at Jarrett's requisition and said something in Japanese to the others. He then told Jarrett that the dispatcher would have to issue the trucks. When Jarrett asked who the dispatcher was, he received no reply. He asked when the dispatcher would be back and again the Japanese ignored him. Jarrett then left to find C. E. Zimmer, assistant project director in charge of operations.

8:30 p. m.: Mr. Cahn and Mr. Zimmer were driving around the warehouse and rail siding areas, and at 8:30 p. m. talked with two Japanese internal security wardens on duty with a car near the rail siding. They saw no other Japanese until on their way back to the administration building they saw Tom Toshio Kobayashi, an internal security warden recently segregated from the Hearts Mountain relocation center, walking from the high school area toward the motor pool.

Kobayashi is heavy-set, weighs about 200 pounds, is about 5 feet 10 inches tall, has a round face, high cheekbones, looks almost like an American Indian, combs hair straight back.

8:45 p. m.: Best, Zimmer, and Cahn parked at the rear of the administration building. They saw Schmidt and Jarrett walking nearby and blinked the car lights to attract their attention. Borbeck, who was on duty guarding the administration area, came from the direction of the recreation hall and joined the group. Jarrett related how he had tried to get trucks at the motor pool.

JAPANESE AT HIGH SCHOOL

Buell, guard at the high school, telephoned Cole at this apartment near the military area and told him there were some Japanese taking lumber. Mahrt, who was on duty guarding the staff residential area near the military area, was parked in front of Cole's house at the time. Cole sent him to the high school.

9:10 p. m.: Zimmer, Schmidt, Jarrett, and Borbeck went to the motor pool. While Schmidt and Borbeck waited outside while Zimmer and Jarrett went in and presented the requisition for trucks. When the Japanese ignored them, Zimmer and Jarrett went into the office and took the keys for the trucks off the dispatch board. The Japanese said nothing in English. Jarrett gassed up the trucks and left with two other Caucasian drivers.

COLONY HEARS ABOUT TRUCKS

As Zimmer, Schmidt, and Borbeck left the motor pool one of the six or seven Japanese lounging in the office jumped into a truck and drove at high speed toward the Japanese colony.

Anticipating reaction to the truck incident—in line with the colony's concern over the transfer of food to the farm on October 29—Schmidt went to the room of Theodore Lewis, internal security chief of the central Utah relocation center, and assigned him to watch the open area between the administration district and the colony for signs of large numbers of Japanese moving toward the administration area.

Schmidt then went to the military area and informed the sergeant of the guard of the situation. He saw that they were ready to act on short notice.

He went to a certain building in the military area where A. H. Brodie and J. K. Crobin of the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting an investigation of an illegal radio transmitter in the Japanese colony.

ASSEMBLY AT MOTOR POOL

Borbeck remained in the vicinity of the motor pool and from a point near the staff recreation hall saw six or seven trucks drive up and unload men. He saw flashes of light in the warehouse area as if from flashlights.

Going to his post, Lewis walked close to the motor pool and also observed the unusual amount of activity. He estimated that at least 50 Japanese were congregated there. He saw a covered Dodge convoy truck accompanied by a black pick-up—identified as one of the trucks assigned to the electrical department—drive up and unload men. Both then sped away. He saw the pick-up make a second trip to the colony and back with men. This black pick-up was seen on three different occasions later in the evening, and each time it was driven by Kobayashi.

Mahrt, who had seen Japanese around the high school, came along and picked up Lewis and Borbeck on the road near the staff canteen.

Lewis and Boerbeck got into the back seat. They drove down by the high school area to tell Buell that it was not safe for him to stay there. A couple of I. S. wardens were helping him chase some Japanese back toward the colony.

In the gate of the fence at the east end of the warehouses they saw six or seven young Japanese with clubs. Lewis thought one was a 3-foot length by 2 by 4, and another 4-foot cane with a large knob on the end.

When Mahrt asked them what they were doing, one Japanese replied that they were looking for a couple of friends in the warehouse district. When Mahrt replied that they would find the friends and send them back to the colony, the Japanese said they find them themselves. Mahrt told the group they had better go back to the colony, but they did not move.

The three internal security officers drove around the high school building and contacted Buell, advising him to drive up to the administration building. From there they drove back around the school to the road along the end of the warehouses.

KOBAYASHI APPEARS

As they were traveling toward the administration area, the black electricians pick-up came down the wrong side of the road toward them, forcing Mahrt to stop. The pick-up came bumper to bumper against the internal security car. Mahrt backed between two warehouses to turn around and the pick-up followed, blocking the way the same as before. Kobayashi was driving the pick-up.

When asked what he was doing there, he replied :

"We're not letting any produce trucks out."

Mahrt asked : "Who assigned you to that job?"

"Nobody ; I assigned myself," Kobayashi replied.

There were some remarks about why he was not wearing his warden's uniform, and he replied that he did not wear it while doing volunteer work.

Borbeck reported one Kobayashi statement as follows : "This thing makes me mad. We will find out where those trucks are, if we have to get the guy that knows."

Lewis stated that he saw 10 or 12 Japanese armed with clubs and sticks standing in the shadows between the next 2 warehouses and 25 to 35 around warehouses near the butcher shops. Kobayashi finally got in the pick-up and backed out, allowing the internal security officers to drive to the administration building. They went into the telephone office and called Cole.

ZIMMER STARTS FOR KLAMATH FALLS

After leaving the motor pool, Zimmer went to the administration building and sat in his office talking with Best and Cahn. Zimmer kept looking at his watch because he wanted to leave for Klamath Falls at 9:30 p. m. About that time he got into a car and drove to his apartment, 211½-1, near the motor pool, picked up his overcoat and drove around the motor pool to the project gate. He noticed an unusual number of young Japanese men congregated at the motor pool and trucks coming and going.

Instead of leaving, he came back to Best's house to discuss the situation and stood with Best and Cahn outside Best's house looking at the activity at the motor pool and noticing groups of Japanese drifting around in the shadows. Having decided that nothing was going to happen immediately, Zimmer returned to the gate. Cahn went out to the gate to see him on some matter and then started back to Best's house.

Zimmer saw another car coming up from inside the project and moved his car to the side to let the other man pass. The driver of the other car, Buell, the high-school guard, came up to him in a state of excitement and reported that he had gotten out just in time, that hundreds of Japanese were coming toward the administration building, armed with sticks and clubs. Zimmer pulled his car to the side of the road and walked back to the gate.

9:25 p. m. : The Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped suddenly at about 9:25 p. m. and Schmidt thought it might be a signal of some kind. He left the military area after advising the soldier on guard in front of the officer of the day headquarters to inform the sergeant of the guard that a request for the Army to move in would probably be made within a short time.

As Schmidt drove toward Best's house, he stopped about 75 yards from the military area when a car came down the middle of the road toward him shining a spotlight in his face. Thinking it was an Army radio patrol car that had been informed of the situation and was making a check, Schmidt got out of his car and walked over.

KOBAYASHI AGAIN

It was Kobayashi again, driving the pick-up with four or five Japanese in the back of it. After an exchange of questions and answers about what he was doing there, Kobayashi informed Schmidt that he—Kobayashi—knew about the trucks being taken and that he, as a leader, and his gang, were going to see to it that the trucks were not going to leave the project ; that he represented the people of the center and that they were going to give the War Relocation Authority a lot of trouble. Kobayashi and another Japanese tried judo on Schmidt, who out-judoed them and got back to his car, heading again for Best's house.

SCHMIDT IN FIGHT

Schmidt parked on the far side of the road from Best's house and had started walking over when he saw between 30 and 40 Japanese in the shadows around Best's house and between nearby barracks. They were armed with yellow-colored clubs about 2½ to 3 feet long. They appeared to be round, but not as large as baseball bats. Five or six of the Japanese attacked Schmidt. He used the same hold on two of them, wrenching the left arm of one

Japanese and the left arm of the second Japanese, from their shoulder sockets. The scream of pain of one was heard by Zimmer at the gate, Cahn, between the gate and Best's house, and by Best in his house.

"Get Best! Take Best!" As Schmidt got back into his car during a lull in the battle he heard the Japanese yell in English, "Get Best! Take Best!" Best and Cahn also heard the words. Cahn was returning to Best's house from the gate when the Japanese were brought out of hiding by the fight with Schmidt. Cahn ran for Best's house, but the doors had been locked and lights turned off and in the excitement Best's son, Jack, could not get the door open. Cahn crouched in the shadows between the door and the screen while the Japanese ran past, waving clubs.

9:45 p. m.: Best had witnessed Schmidt's fight from a window, could see the Japanese milling around his house and therefore put in a call for Colonel Austen to ask him to take over the center.

When Schmidt started in his car for the military area to call in the Army, Kobayashi tried to cut him off with the pick-up. Schmidt eluded him.

Mahrt, Lewis, and Borbeck, who had been in the telephone office and had heard Best call Colonel Austin—about 9:30 p. m.—went out to the main entrance of the administration building and saw Kobayashi drive down from the direction of the post office to the leave building, and then circle around apparently when he saw the road was cut off by posts.

As he turned back toward the post office and Best's house, the three internal security men ran into the road and tried to flag him down. Kobayashi stepped on the gas and headed for them.

Borbeck said, "We'd better get up there. It looks like they are going to get Best."

They jumped to the lawn. He drove past the fountain, turned to the right and stopped.

MAIN FIGHT STARTS

Lewis opened the door on the right side, raced across to turn off the motor and picked up a copper-colored flashlight that was on the seat.

Kobayashi jumped out of the left side and began shouting in Japanese. There were three or four other Japanese in the back of the truck and they jumped down and started fighting with the internal security officers.

Borbeck testified that he grabbed Kobayashi; that Kobayashi said he was going to kill him. Borbeck said he hit Kobayashi, who ran screaming toward the motor pool.

Mahrt reported that Kobayashi let out a weird yell, similar to that of a coyote to call other members of the gang to his aid. The cry and the yelling of the gang, in general, was heard by several of the War Relocation Authority staff who described it as similar to what is the general idea of Indians on the war-path.

Mahrt stated that about 20 evacuees attacked them, armed with clubs and wooden swords shaped like kendo swords. Borbeck said 2 boys attacked him with clubs while Mahrt fought 1 at the rear of the pick-up, and Lewis used a little one as a shield against a big one at the right side of the car.

BORBECK INJURED

Borbeck testified that he saw 2 other boys coming from another direction with clubs "which I believe were 2 feet long, and after that I couldn't recall anything." Mahrt saw Borbeck trip over a large rock bordering the roadway and when he fell 3 evacuees with clubs jumped on him. Mahrt was unable to help him because "about 10 members of the goon squad, armed with clubs, were between us."

Mahrt stated that he struck one evacuee, wearing glasses, in the eye and felt the glass shatter. Another Japanese kicked Mahrt in the back, while a third tried to choke him. He broke away and ran into the administration building where he met Cole. They grabbed chairs and went back outside.

Lewis, on the opposite side of the car from Borbeck, did not know what was happening except that Borbeck and Mahrt were also fighting.

ZIMMER BRINGS SOLDIERS

Zimmer, at the gate, saw the scuffle Schmidt had, which lasted perhaps 45 seconds, and saw Schmidt drive off. Zimmer saw the pick-up circle around in front of the administration building, and in the dim light saw that fight start.

When he saw the Japanese beating Borbeck he shouted, "Come on, boys. They're beating a white man."

Two of the 4 soldiers stationed at the gate ran forward with him. Zimmer and the 2 soldiers met Cahn who had slipped away from Best's house when there was general confusion among the Japanese surrounding the place when Zimmer and the soldiers started down from the gate. The Japanese seemed to think that the Army was moving in. Lewis also went toward the gate, unaware that Borbeck was seriously injured. He saw 15 or 20 men between barracks. They carried what looked like 1 by 6's, 4-foot long, split on one end to make a handle.

When Cole and Mahrt came out of the administration building with chairs to help Borbeck, they could not find him. The area was shadowy and dark. They returned to the building to hear that he had come in unassisted.

Dr. Mason was in the building and treated him temporarily until he was taken to the medical dispensary. Eight stitches were taken in a large gash on the top of his head, four stitches in a cut over the left eye, and three stitches in a gash on his chin. He was bruised from head to foot.

Schmidt had contacted Army officials when he reached the military area and had gotten to Colonel Austin just at the time that the colonel finished talking with Ray Best.

That, I think, about cleans it up. At that time the Army arrived and surrounded the crowd and they took over.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, when the Army took over, did they take over all of the functions, technically, of the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. The agreement, Mr. Chairman, that we have with the Army is this: That when they are called into a center, when needed under such circumstances, they take full responsibility at the center. We work with the Army. The Army, of course, does not carry out all of the functions of the center in the sense that they substitute personnel for ours.

In this case, as I understand it, they placed a man at the desk of each of the key assistant directors to check on policies, and asked us to go ahead about our business in the normal way, but to check with them when any question came up other than routine questions.

In general, they are responsible. We work with them, carry out the routine functions normally, but they may, if they wish, take over every function in the center at that time, in line with our agreement.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, while you were reading the statement, I believe you read a statement to the effect that the Japanese broadcast over the illegal transmitter was stopped.

Mr. MYER. That is right. Mr. Chairman, to give you a little background in relation to that whole incident, we recognized a number of months ago that there were rumors that there were certain places where they might be broadcasting. One of them was Tule Lake.

By arrangement with the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. Schmidt secured some equipment which was installed in his car, and he started out on a trip to Tule Lake—a trip to all of the relocation centers, ending up at Tule Lake, as he moved west, in order to check the possibility that that might be true.

On October 28, which was, I believe, 3 days previous to the November 1 incident, a letter was sent to the Federal Communications Commission's office at San Francisco, indicating that we had located, we thought, a transmitter at the center, and asking—by the way, our correspondence with them was April 28; that was the date I was looking for in arranging for this equipment.

They immediately sent two men to the project.

They were there working at the time that I arrived on November 1. As a matter of fact, they arrived on October 30. We got very quick action.

These men were checking, as I understand it, and I think I do understand it, because I have a full report on it—were checking the nature of the broadcast with monitoring equipment, and checking distance and any information that they thought might be valuable to them in relation to what was going on in the center and what they were trying to do with it.

That was in process October 30, through until 9:25, or thereabouts on the night of November 4, at which time this incident happened and the Army took over.

I questioned, when I heard about the incident, immediately when I arrived, why they had not picked up the equipment.

They told me they had not done so, because the Federal Communications Commission had advised them that they did want to monitor and check it and see what they could find regarding the equipment, the sending equipment, and what was being sent over it.

And they were monitoring at that time.

I might say I listened myself on Monday evening, November 1, to some of the Japanese music that was being played on records. Up to that time they had not played anything on the equipment excepting Japanese records; no voice or nothing.

Now, I have not been able to get a check since that time as to whether it was utilized, but we will have records on that through the monitoring service of the F. C. C.

That is the answer to your last question.

Mr. COSTELLO. There was an illegal transmitter of some sort there, however.

Mr. MYER. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether they ever did make any statements over it?

Mr. MYER. I have not got a final check. I did hear the statement—I do not want to put it into the record as the truth, but as mere hearsay—that sometime during the Tuesday evening after I left, and I am not sure I now have the facts, that for the first time there was some kind of statement, but if so, we will have a check on that from the official records.

But that is one of the things I have not been able to learn.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of receiving sets are the Japanese allowed to have in their possession at the center?

Mr. MYER. Any receiving set except short-wave radios.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether they did have any short-wave receiving sets at the center?

Mr. MYER. No; I cannot tell you that. However, you can ascertain at a later date, I presume, because I understand that that has all been checked in the interim period, but, again, that is something that has been checked since the military took over and I would rather not testify to that at the moment, because I do not have the full facts about it and I have not tried to get them. That will come out.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether there were any transmitters at any of the other centers?

Mr. MYER. We have not ever located anything else at any of the other centers, and we have made checks.

We worked closely with the F. B. I. We checked every report that has come up, not only on transmitters but if short-wave sets were in centers.

And I might say we have taken over many short-wave sets—I won't say very many, but several short-wave sets in the centers, and have either put them in contraband or pulled the short-wave bands in case the F. B. I. did not pick them up, and perhaps will arrange to return them to the folks if that is recommended.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are periodical inspections made?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes; we make checks on them at anytime we have any suspicion that there is anything of that kind going on in the centers.

Mr. STRIPLING. In that connection, Mr. Myer, there have been several statements in the papers to the effect that there were some whisky stills found in the Tule Lake center. Did the W. R. A. officials ever locate any, or do you know whether the Army has located any?

For instance, here is a clipping which says that the California State Liquor Administrator said that moonshine stills and activity in liquor and sake have been discovered by the Army authorities at the Tule Lake segregation center.

Mr. MYER. I read the same story, Mr. Chairman, and in view of the fact that the story was broken quite some time after the Army had taken over. I have not checked the story in detail, simply because it is something for them to check on.

I might say this, as a general statement, that we have had some bootlegging and we have had some liquor come in the centers, as you do in any other cities. It is the sort of thing that you do not seem to be able to stop, and there have been several people arrested throughout the last year and a half for such activities, and tried and convicted.

Mr. COSTELLO. No liquor of any kind is allowed in the centers, is it?

Mr. MYER. On most of the centers; no.

However, we have not put an absolute ban on liquor in areas where liquor is allowed otherwise. We have very little trouble with drunkenness, but, of course, some of the areas are on Indian reservations where the use is absolutely illegal. Some of the other centers happen to be in areas where it is legal.

We have not tried to put a ban on liquor or any other activity in the centers out of the affected area, or outside of the Indian reservations that normally would not have a ban on, because we felt that it would probably lead to more difficulty than if we did put in restrictions, and since we have not had a large amount of difficulty with it, we did not think it was something on which we should pass a regulation.

I want to repeat that we have had very little trouble, generally speaking, with liquor.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Meyer, were there ever any conscientious objectors employed or located at the Tule Lake center?

Mr. MEYER. There were never any employed, as such. What I mean by that is we have never had any people who were conscientious objectors assigned from conscientious objectors camps to the Tule Lake center.

Mr. Best tells me in a conversation I had with him over the phone that there was one person who has been drafted into the Army, who

was sent to a conscientious objectors camp, and beyond that we have no basis for any knowledge about conscientious objectors for this reason, that we naturally do not discriminate in the hiring of people because of religion or politics or beliefs of that type.

We have had certain people who have been Friends, Quakers.

I have a wire from Mr. Best in response to a wire from me, regarding the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He tells me that there are two people on the pay roll as teachers who indicate that they are members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, but who have never done anything about it as far as affecting their teaching on the center.

There are others who have left the project.

Mr. COSTELLO. How about their other activities, apart from their teaching?

Mr. MYER. They have not used it in connection with their other activities.

Mr. COSTELLO. Some of the witnesses indicated that there were other activities.

Mr. MYER. Now, let me read the teletype from Mr. Best in relation to this item, because it did come out.

This is dated November 26.

Teletype from Project Director R. R. Best, dated November 26, 1943: "Roudabush and Robbins still on pay roll as teachers. Both say they are members of Fellowship of Reconciliation and have never hidden the fact. In State Senate committee testimony Mrs. E. Adams, not Seemah Battat, named Roudabush and Robbins as asking her to join Fellowship of Reconciliation. Roudabush and Robbins deny ever asking either Adams or Battat to join. Robbins says Jean McKay and Mariette Lum, former teachers on project, distributed literature of the Fellowship to Mrs. Adams. Lum and McKay resigned from War Relocation Authority and were taken off pay roll in July 1943."

That is all the information I have on that particular item. So far as I know, Mr. Chairman, there are no conscientious objectors, as such, on the project.

If they are, they are there because they came off the civil-service rolls, and they are there because of the fact that we do not discriminate in relation to people's religion, and if there are people of that type who allow their thinking to enter into activities, either directly or indirectly, on the project, we have asked them to leave the project, I believe, in all cases where it has been definitely determined that they have taken an active part.

Now, I am going to make a further recheck on these two cases that I just mentioned here, because I am not satisfied with just their statement. I want to interview further Mrs. Adams, and find out what there is about that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the American Friends Service Committee get into the various relocation centers at the request of W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. No. I am quite sure they did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. The W. R. A. did not request their assistance?

Mr. MYER. Not so far as I know; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Either in relocation work, or work outside of the centers?

Mr. MYER. Previous to my position as Director of W. R. A., during Mr. Eisenhower's regime, I believe in May of 1942, after some discussion about the problem of students who were in college, American citizens, who wanted to go ahead with their college work and about

that problem, it is my understanding that Mr. Eisenhower asked Mr. Clarence Pickett, who is active in the Friends Service Committee, to organize a committee to study the relocation problem in relation to students, not as a Friends Service Committee, but as an individual who is generally familiar with the problem.

And Mr. Pickett, after consulting with a number of people, did suggest such a committee.

As far as I know, that is the only activity in which the Friends Service Committee has ever been officially related, or indirectly related, and I say again, it was not done as a Friends Service Committee job. It was done as an individual, as I remember it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, what is the status of the internal police at Tule Lake now, since the Army has been in control?

Mr. MYER. I cannot answer that question. That is one of those questions that I have not raised with Mr. Best and the folks out there, so I would not be able to answer it.

Mr. EBERHARTFR. I did not hear that question.

Mr. STRIPLING. I asked him what the status of the internal police at Tule Lake was since the Army took over; whether it was functioning as it had.

Mr. MYER. I might say, further, it is my understanding that the Army is doing not only the external policing but the internal policing, generally, while they are in the center.

That has been generally true. It is possible that they are asking our internal police to assist in the job, but I do not know the answer.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, do you recall when Dr. Pedicord took over the duties as chief of the hospital?

Mr. MYER. Some time in January of 1942. I think we have exact data on that some place.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was he brought there to reduce the number of employees that were employed at the hospital, or to cut down in the expenditures; the expense of the hospital?

Mr. MYER. Not so far as I know. Dr. Pedicord was brought there as chief medical officer at the hospital, following the call to the Navy of Dr. Carson, I believe, who was in charge of the medical program previous to Dr. Pedicord's arrival.

I believe that was the sequence. I do not recall that he was brought there for any particular reason other than to administer the hospital—January 7, 1943, he entered on duty; that was the date.

Mr. STRIPLING. I have a résumé of his testimony before the Senate committee. It indicates that Dr. Pedicord said that when he arrived at the Tule Lake center there were 867 employees in the hospital, and that he had reduced this number to 240.

Mr. MYER. That is possible. I will be glad to recheck those facts. I do know that Dr. Thompson felt that there were many things that could be done to better the administration of the hospital at that time, and that Dr. Pedicord proceeded to help get things in order, which he felt were not orderly.

Dr. Thompson is the head of our medical program on a national basis.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10208.)

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, in a recent interview or speech in New York, on December 3, I assume, you made the following statement,

and I read from an article which appeared in the New York Daily Mirror December 4, 1943.

Discontinuance of War Relocation camps for Japs in the United States with the possible exception of Tule Lake was foreseen by War Relocation Authority Director Myer yesterday.

Mr. MYER. Well, that statement is not adequate, I should say, to cover what I did say.

When I was questioned on that matter, I told them, as I have always said, that our major objective was to get the people who were not to be located at Tule Lake outside of the centers, and when I was asked whether we would close the centers, I told them just as fast as we had moved out enough people to close the centers, we would begin closing them.

I went on to say that I doubted very much whether we would be able to close all of the centers before the war was over, because I hoped the war would not last that long.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are there any plans now under way to close any specific center?

Mr. MYER. There are plans under way to close some centers, not specific centers. The decision has not been made as to what centers will be closed.

Mr. STRIPLING. About how many evacuees have been relocated?

Mr. MYER. Just a moment. I would like to get the exact figures on that.

The latest figures I have are for the week ending November 20, 1943. There were 16,163 people on indefinite leave, a total of 22,362 that day, of which 4,605 were on seasonal leave; which makes the rest of the total, other than, I think, 594 people who were out on short-term leave, which meant emergency leaves of different types.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is that paper from which you are reading a general résumé?

Mr. MYER. Yes; this is what we get out weekly; a sheet we get out weekly. We usually have a lag of a week or two in summarizing the whole population figures in centers, and giving the total of indefinite leaves and seasonal leaves, and makes comparison with the previous week.

Mr. STRIPLING. May that be made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. It may be inserted in the appendix.

Mr. MYER. I might say, Mr. Chairman, if any of you are interested, we would be glad to supply these to you regularly. That is something we get out for our own use on a weekly basis, in order to keep tab of the population monthly.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, going back to Tule Lake for a minute, did the W. R. A. ever receive any reports regarding the traffic of drugs?

Mr. MYER. I did not receive any such reports personally until I began to hear in the newspapers and other places that there might have been traffic in narcotics. I have not been able to get the facts on that situation as yet.

I stated to another committee something that I have said here, that may have no bearing on the situation whatsoever.

I remember distinctly in the summer of 1942 that the first problem that came to me regarding the acceptance of people in relocation centers who had been serving prison terms came up in relation to the case of a woman who was being released from a Federal prison some place in Texas, who had been serving a term on a narcotics charge.

I found out a few days later that her name appeared in the Readers Digest in relation to a story on a narcotic ring, and while I was very reluctant about it, there seemed to be no recourse except to accept her, because there was no place else for her to go, and she went to Tule Lake.

Whether that has any relationship to the reported incident, I do not know, because I have no facts on it.

This is simply a gratuitous statement about the remembrance I have of her having gone there.

I do not even remember the name of the person, but we could check on that.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10208.)

Mr. STRIPLING. Has the W. R. A. ever searched the apartments of the center residents at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. The W. R. A., as far as I know, have never searched all of the apartments of the residents at Tule Lake.

Of course, where we get information that something is suspected, we search the apartments, as you would in any other city. We have not made it a practice to search all of the apartments in any of the centers on a general type of generalized raid.

We feel that that is an invasion of the sanctity of the home, unless we have good reason to believe there is some good reason for searching them.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, why did the evacuees persist in the practice of tearing down the partitions which were placed in their quarters?

Mr. MYER. Well, unfortunately, I am not able to read the minds of any of the evacuees.

They do not think like I do. I do not know.

There were some partitions that were being placed in new buildings that, for some reason or another, we had difficulty keeping them in, because they would tear them out at night. I suppose they wanted to place them in their own apartments for their own use, or to some other use. That would be the only guess I would have.

Mr. STRIPLING. It was rather the general practice though, for a while, was it not?

Mr. MYER. There was a period, so I understand, during this 2 or 3 weeks' period, when they were having trouble keeping their partitions in place, when they were trying to develop new housing for the other people.

As I understand it, it was a part of this general disorder that existed during that period, around the middle of October, after the segregation came in, and the time of the incident.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, I notice in here from the statement you read that apparently Borbeck at the time that he fell—

Mr. MYER. Well, both of those statements were based on Mr. Cole's testimony, as to what he saw at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand, according to Dr. Mason's testimony, that he actually had a gash over his eye and also on the side of his face, incisions that most probably came from knife wounds rather than from clubs or stones.

Mr. MYER. I doubt that very much. However, I was not there. All I can base my information on, of course, is the testimony of Mr. Cole and the other people who were there immediately. And I have not seen Dr. Mason's testimony so I have not been able to recheck it.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might also refer back to this telegram that was sent in by Mr. Best, commenting on the fact that Dr. Mason did not go to the aid of Dr. Pedicord. It says here that Dr. Mason made no attempt to assist Dr. Pedicord, which, of course, Dr. Mason admits, that he was unable to go in because of the fact there were so many Japanese around Dr. Pedicord at the time.

Mr. MYER. The facts are, however, that one of the nurses did go in and assist him.

Mr. COSTELLO. But not at the time he was being beaten up.

Mr. MYER. That is right; she did, according to the statement that I got.

But, again, I wanted to repeat what I said this morning, that I will have those statements rechecked and if you care to have them, I will have them taken under oath, as to the witnesses there.

Mr. COSTELLO. I should like to have them in that regard, and just at what point the nurse actually did go in to assist Dr. Pedicord.

Mr. MYER. That is my understanding.

Mr. COSTELLO. Here is a statement in regard to that.

Mark was unable to help him because about 10 members of the goon squad, armed with clubs, were between us.

That is the quotation in the transcript.

It seems to me the situation was identical in both cases, both in Dr. Mason going to the rescue of Dr. Pedicord and Mr. Marks to the assistance of Mr. Borbeck; a case of stepping in, perhaps, where angels feared to tread.

Mr. MYER. That is possible. There is no question there was some danger involved, but there were no clubs in the hands of the evacuees, in Dr. Pedicord's case, so Dr. Pedicord testified.

Mr. COSTELLO. This transcript, which was submitted to the committee as a transcript of the proceedings which took place there at Tule Lake, when you were present—is that a full and complete transcript of the entire transactions that took place at that time?

Mr. MYER. Excepting, Mr. Chairman, for the things that happened at the beginning. Miss Lucas, who took the first part of the transcript, did not arrive at the scene there until the meeting was under way, and she did not get all of the meeting. I think, except for that, it is a reasonably complete transcript, about as good as most anyone could do, under the circumstances.

As to its 100 percent accuracy, I am not able to testify, because it is quite possible to have mistakes made under a tense situation of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. The meeting started at approximately 1:30?

Mr. MYER. That is right; about 1:30.

Mr. COSTELLO. About what time did the meeting end?

Mr. MYER. 4:30.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that this is practically the complete transcript of the proceedings that took place during a period of 3 hours?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. I notice, in going through it, that it consists of 27 pages, and even reading it slowly, consuming no more than 1 page in 3 minutes, would account for only an hour and a half's time, so it would seem to me it is not a complete transcript of the entire proceeding, because I do not think it would cover a full 3-hour program.

It may be they did not talk all of the time.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I think I already pointed out that they did not talk all of the time. There were at least two occasions when the meeting was held up for several minutes because of trips to the hospital and back.

And I have already indicated that type of hold-up.

And it is possible that it may not be a full transcript. As I remember it, it is a pretty accurate transcript.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as it goes.

Mr. MYER. Yes. I might say that Mr. Kuratomi went very, very slowly in his presentation of his demands. I remember at one time—whether it is in the transcript or not, I do not know—Mr. Best asked him if he would not hurry up; that we had other things to do. And he did go slowly.

But I feel quite certain that it is a reasonable transcript of the hearing, a reasonably accurate one.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to make a suggestion that in view of the fact that it has been very strongly recommended from certain quarters that the Army should take over all of these camps and operate them, that it is incumbent on this committee to get the attitude and viewpoint of the War Department in that respect, and I suggest, therefore, that we call as a witness before this committee Major General White, who, I understand, testified before the Senate, that is the United States Senate, and that he give us the benefit of the views held by the War Department on this important question, in open hearing, and testify, so far as it is possible for him to do so, along the lines that he thinks will not be inimical to the interests of the Government.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state that I already made that suggestion, to Mr. Stripling, yesterday, and today, that the War Department be contacted and some officer who is fully cognizant of the facts give us some direct testimony regarding the matter and that he be sent down here to the committee in order that we might get the War Department's viewpoint and get information from them regarding the War Department's activities in this connection.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have you had time to do anything regarding that, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. No. In the previous request, I included that angle in the request to Captain McCloy's office, but he sent Captain Hall, who gave limited testimony, you may recall. But I will be glad to communicate with him.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think we ought to have Major General White, because he is, as I understand it, the superior of Captain Hall, and he could speak with more authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. We did not ask for Captain Hall.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is up to the Department to find out who is the proper officer to send down, who can best testify. I do not know whether General White is directly cognizant of the facts in that connection, but we should get a proper witness from the Department.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Inasmuch as he appeared before the United States Senate committee, I suggest that.

Mr. Chairman, along the same line, I think it is recognized by everybody that there is a legal question involved in the handling of these Japanese, and I therefore suggest that we call the Attorney General, Mr. Biddle, to testify, insofar as he is willing to do so publicly, so that the public can have the benefit of his testimony.

Mr. STRIPLING. There is a representative of the Justice Department here, Mr. Chairman, who previously appeared before the committee. He might take that up with the Attorney General.

Mr. BURLING. I will be glad to convey the committee's request to the Attorney General, if I am so directed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you authorized to speak for the Attorney General?

Mr. BURLING. No. I am here merely to observe for the Department, but I will be glad to convey any invitation from this committee to the Attorney General.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, there is recognition on the part of a good many people that there are international aspects in connection with this problem, so I suggest the State Department be requested to send a witness here who will give the views of the State Department, so that we can get a complete picture for the consideration of the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. That also has been contemplated to do. We will have the State Department appear before the committee in order to give us their reaction.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think yesterday I suggested—or the day before—that if the director, Mr. Myer, desired to call any witnesses, or request the committee to call any witnesses, he would let us know.

Mr. MYER. I have only one suggestion, Mr. Chairman, and I have no specific individual in mind.

I think it might be desirable to have a representative of the Federal Communications Commission come before the committee to testify in relation to the type of broadcasts which have been monitored out of Tokyo, resulting from the Tule Lake incident and resulting from the kind of information that has been publicized in relation to that incident, because I think that it is of great importance that we have an understanding as to how that affects our whole international problem.

That is the only suggestion that I have, Mr. Congressman, and I do not have any specific individual in mind.

Mr. COSTELLO. The best way to cure publicity is not to have incidents.

Mr. MYER. I agree with you. If we can avoid any occasion for publicity, we certainly shall do so. We are not seeking it.

On that point I might say that riots are not stimulated by us. They happen.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, I have been making notes here during the process of the examination, during Mr. Myer's testimony,

and I should like to ask a great number of questions with respect to different details, in order to clear them up in my own mind.

I do not like to go into the thing with respect to a lot of different incidents which might appear minor, of no great consequence, although all taken together they may indicate a certain type of administration, certain problems, and so forth.

I am going to ask you a general question, and see if we can get to what I think is the crux of the whole problem, that this committee is attempting to solve, and that is this:

I wonder if you would be able to tell the the committee what, in your opinion, Mr. Myer, are the causes, the underlying causes, for this trouble that occurred at Tule Lake on November 1 and 4, and how long it had been in progress, and whether or not you think any steps could have been taken, any specific steps or general steps, to have avoided that trouble?

And perhaps you could implement that a little bit with what plans were made, or what plans were being contemplated, with respect to avoiding any trouble at Tule Lake; the general security basis of it.

Charges have been made, of course, that the internal security was loosely administered; that it was inadequate.

That would save me asking a lot of detailed questions.

Mr. MYER. All right, Mr. Congressman, I will be very glad to comment on that general question.

First, I would like to say that it is not an incident of this type itself which creates the danger of the type of reprisals that the Japanese talk about, the fact that some of the evacuees were disorderly.

They were disorderly at Tule Lake, and order has been restored.

The incident, unfortunately, as the chairman has pointed out, offers a peg on which to hang reprisals, or, rather, the proposal to tighten restrictions on the evacuees at Tule Lake, which offers a peg on which to hang reprisals.

If we attempt to administer them by force of arms and bayonets, together with wild threats, not allowing the evacuees to return to California, and so forth, that is the kind of statement that gives Japan the opportunity for reprisal.

Now, as to the cause of the incident, that is not simple. It goes back, naturally, to the evacuation and even beyond, because it is evident that there was a small proportion, comparatively, of the people of Japanese ancestry in this country that maintained close ties with Japan.

There were some in this country, as I pointed out yesterday, that have been here a comparatively short time, who had lived all of their lives in Japan up until 3 years, 4 years ago, and 5 years ago, from the time they were very small youngsters, and came back here, presumably to capitalize on their American citizenship and, in my judgment, to avoid service in the Japanese Army, and perhaps for other reasons.

Nevertheless, they came. While this is a small element in the total population of evacuees, it was a very important element in our whole problem of internal security, both throughout the country and our problem of internal security within the relocation centers.

In addition to these 1,500 or 2,000 of what I choose to call an oversimplification of 1940 Kibei, who are more Japanese than are

most of the other people in this country, from the standpoint of their culture, and who, at the time of their registration in February and March, were confronted with the question of whether or not they were willing to swear allegiance to the land in which they were born or whether they were going to be Japanese, most of whom naturally plunked for Japan.

Along with those there are a few of the older aliens who lived here for some years, who hold that point of view, and who are convinced that even though they have been here for years, that they cannot continue to live in the United States and make proper adjustment here after the war is over, and will decide to go back to Japan.

There are a few youngsters, very few, but a few who are not of the type of Kibei, but American citizens, who have become embittered because of the treatment that they have received in this country, who have gone to Tule Lake.

So basically, the whole sequence of events has to be considered: First, they were evacuated from the Pacific coast, most of them into assembly centers, where they will be for a period of 2 months, 4 months, some of them nearly 6 months, in temporary quarters, under the supervision of the United States Army, then moved to relocation centers, where they live under the general supervision of the War Relocation Authority.

In all cases they were presumed to be behind barbed wire and living in an atmosphere where agitation goes on, or did go on during that period, on the part of certain embittered individuals and others who may have been, in a small number of cases, actually agitating for Japan, conjuring up pictures for these people during July, August, September, and October.

We transferred to Tule Lake approximately 9,000 people who had been living in other relocation centers, and among them a rather large group of the type of Japanized Kibei boys that I have mentioned, whose parents live in Japan while they, of course, were concentrated in much larger numbers than we would ever have had them otherwise.

There were amongst that group not only people from the United States but a few from Hawaii who had been transferred to our centers during the early part of this calendar year. Some of that group were involved.

This particular type of group of course made very easy prey for any individuals who were smart enough to try to cloak into power at any stage of the game.

As I said to you before, because of their maladjustment generally, in their frustration, both in their social status and because of their social background, because they spoke Japanese and the other youngsters did not speak it well, and because their culture was Japanese, and most of the others was American, they became very easy prey, because they were looking for an outlet for activity which they did not have otherwise.

Consequently we began to have difficulty, as you know, in certain of these sections, as far back as August 1942.

In the Manzanar center we had the first so-called Kibei meeting. I might say it was not the only place that we had difficulty.

There are three incidents that have happened in evacuee centers in California that have been called riots.

The first one was in midsummer of 1942, at the Santa Anita assembly center, which was under the control of the United States Army; the second one was at Manzanar a year ago, day before yesterday, which was under our control, and in which the Army was brought in; and the third one was at Tule Lake the 1st of November of this year.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I ask you how you would characterize the incident at Poston?

Mr. MYER. I would characterize the incident at Poston as a general strike.

It is rather an interesting thing that the only time we have called the Army into any of the centers has been at the two centers out in California—Manzanar and Tule Lake.

I mentioned the Santa Anita affair for only one reason, and that is to indicate the fact that riots may happen even though the W. R. A. is not in control, and not because of any criticism of the Army.

They went in, just as we have done when the thing did happen, and cleaned it up. We cleaned it up at Manzanar immediately after the riot happened.

It is one of those things that you cannot anticipate immediately.

And I might add that the Manzanar center, after the first few weeks after that incident, has become and has continued to be, one of the most peaceful and quiet centers that we have.

There are still 1,900 segregationees to be moved to Tule Lake from Manzanar, yet in spite of that we had no celebration either on the anniversary of the Manzanar incident on December 6, or on Pearl Harbor day yesterday, which might have been expected, and I frankly thought there was a fair possibility on the part of the pro-Japanese—

Mr. COSTELLO. Pardon me, Mr. Myer. In view of the fact that there is a roll call vote on the floor of the House, I think we will declare a recess for about 15 minutes.

Mr. MYER. Fine. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Myer, you may continue.

Mr. MYER. I think I might summarize my opinion about the basic causes there at Tule Lake by saying (1) that I think some of the leaders of this group who started to climb to power, with the help of a group of strong-arm boys, had some face-saving to do, and tried to do it by pulling a smart trick or hoax in getting the crowd to come up at the time I was there, hoping that they might weaken my spine and get some of their demands answered.

(2) I think that some of the group are the type of people who really would like to interfere with the administration there, as I have already indicated, and consequently create disunity in the country, and to give a basis for Japanese propaganda from abroad in relation to the type of treatment.

(3) We have a situation in the centers such as you have at almost all cities, where people like to be in power.

And of course they were making a bid for power; for varying reasons they would like to be in power. Now, those reasons I am unable to determine.

Specifically, on the night the Army was called in, it was quite evident from the testimony the particular reason they moved in that night

was because they were trying to interfere with our taking trucks out from the motor pool to bring in more evacuees from the outside in the harvest work which they were planning to do.

That was a very crucial matter, we think, because, in my judgment, that was a thing on which the committee might get some concession, if they were going to get any concession, because they thought we would not let the crops go to rot.

Consequently, it was a very warm point.

Of course, there are a number of reasons in a mixed population that contribute to that sort of thing. It is not simple.

I have read a number of analyses on it, all of them very good. It is impossible, in the short period of time we have here to reconstruct all of the complexities and all of the embitterness and tie-ups that these different types of people have, and the different reasons why different people respond to that kind of a situation. But they do have them.

Now, very briefly, I would like to tell you again what I think about the internal-security problem. I think the evidence will show that we did a reasonably good job of protecting the lives of people and all the other people in there.

There was a chance, of course, that people might be injured, as there is always a chance in any city, and particularly in that kind of a situation, where they will be injured.

I would have liked to have a more adequate security force there at the time, and we were in process of recruiting additional people at the time. Some of the people were new and rather inexperienced, but they did prove to be very helpful.

I would like to repeat briefly, the fact that we had a Division of Labor with the Army, where if a force was needed, they could be called in on a few minutes' notice, and were called in on a few minutes' notice.

Consequently we had not felt that we needed the large force of heavily armed people on our own internal-security force to handle the situation as long as we had the Army, who were better-trained to handle the situation or help to handle it.

Now, very briefly, as to what we are doing about it:

I do not have the details of the final program that is being worked out, because I have authorized Mr. Cozzens to work with General McCoach, in charge of the Ninth Corps Area, and he has been in Salt Lake rechecking the details in connection with security matters and the tie-in between the internal and the external security.

But, briefly, this all is in process; the fence between the evacuee colony and the administrative area, I believe, has been completed. However, if it has not been, it will be before the Army withdraws from the center; consequently the movement in and out of the administrative area will be controlled from here on by gates with guards at each of the gates to check people in and out as they check you in and out of the War Department here—you have to have a reason for going in and out—and that area, which includes the warehouses, the administrative staff area, the administrative offices, and the general administrative program, of course, includes, as I have indicated, a special compound which I hope is concluded by this time, for the motor equipment, which, unfortunately was not completed, and after the November

1 incident we asked to use it anyhow and were turned down. Consequently it was one of the crucial problems that we had on November 4.

You may wonder why all the trucks were running around. It was because we did not have the controls which we needed and which were provided for many weeks ago; in addition to the fence down between the areas we are fencing off about nine blocks down in an area which lies right next to the military area and across from what we call the fire-break, which is a wide strip of unoccupied land from the rest of the evacuee colony, where we anticipate we will locate the trouble-makers that cannot be sent legally to internment camps.

Any aliens that may be involved in the trouble, of course, can be documented and turned over to the Justice Department, who will take them to internment camps without further trouble, because that can be done under the law very easily.

United States citizens cannot be interned on that kind of a basis under our law, and consequently we will have to have some center there, or some place else, where we can handle them.

For administrative reasons, the cost of guarding, matters of general convenience or administration, we are making a proposal to have it at that center.

It will have a double fence around it and will be guarded in addition to the other area, by the Army on the external boundaries of the compound, night and day.

I think I have already mentioned that we have authorized the allocation of, I believe, 66 positions on the internal-security force, which would mean a tremendous increase, of course, in the number of our own internal security guards.

That partly is occasioned by the fact we will have the additional fence, more gates, and we will have to have men there every part of the day, checking people in and out.

We will have people besides the military checking men on each shift, in addition to the inner gates on the inner part of the area.

We will have additional patrol cars, and we are asking them to provide radio equipment where we can keep in constant contact with the Army, as far as those cars are concerned, by administrative people, and not by evacuees.

I don't mean we won't have any evacuee police. We probably will have some for the type of thing they can do. Some depend on them, however, entirely, in relation to the portion of the evacuee colony. How many people there will be in this special compound I am not able to project as yet.

I made the statement recently before another committee that it would be my guess, from the information I have secured up to date, that there would be somewhere—and this is a pretty wide range, but that there would be somewhere between 500 and 2,000, depending on the investigation and the check-up.

And, of course, we may move in two or three times to pick people up. If we do not get them all the first time, we will take another dip.

However, in my judgment, that can be pretty well handled.

I might say in passing, Mr. Chairman, I do not think I have announced this generally, but some of the folks have asked me, we are planning to abandon the center at Leupp as an isolation center there. We have moved the people who belong in Tule Lake who have been

at Leupp in that isolation center, those of the same general type, and they will be moved there, and we will abandon that center in order to cut down the cost, because we anticipate we will not need the special isolation center and that the program at Tule Lake will take care of it.

Now, Mr. Congressman, here is the general answer to your question. I only have one more comment to make. Tule Lake is not a relocation center. We call it the Tule Lake center. We are not planning to relocate people out of Tule Lake.

I think I mentioned the appeals procedure in case anyone wishes to make an appeal, that in general would be set up.

There will be about 18,000 at Tule Lake. We still have 9 other centers, where there are approximately 70,000 people who I presume will be eligible for relocation. All of them will be after we get the final processing completed.

Our major objective will be to proceed with the relocation program, and those people are a lot more important to the United States, in my judgment, than the 18,000 people who will be at Tule Lake.

I hope we might be able to get a reasonable part of that job done, and I want to repeat to Mr. Costello, I hope we can keep Tule Lake on the beam and float serenely down the ways from here on, because we do not want trouble any more than he does.

We do not go out to instigate trouble. We will do our best in collaboration with the colonel in charge there to see that trouble is kept down, if that is possible.

I will not guarantee it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, could you give us now any approximation on how many of these troublemakers are probably going to internment?

Mr. MYER. No; I cannot, offhand, Mr. Eberharter. I have not been able to get an analysis of the percentage of aliens and citizens.

I would say this, that there will be a much smaller number of those who will go to internment than there will be that will go into the special compound, in my judgment, because the majority of the troublemakers are of the Kibei type that I described, and a few older Kibei, with just a few aliens.

Now, the law is such that you can assign aliens to internment camps with no special court action, as you know.

There won't be a large number, but I won't make an estimate at this time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Since the Army took over at Tule Lake on November 4, have they issued any statement which could be of benefit to this committee with respect to their operation?

Mr. MYER. I have only seen one statement that was issued from the Army. I am not sure whether I have a copy of it here or not. It is a press release in relation to the story which alleged that they had picked up firearms, home-made bombs, et cetera, in which they denied that, and as far as I know, that is the only general public statement that was made.

I do not happen to have a copy of that release with me. I do have a copy in my office.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Could you give that to—could you give the committee any idea when you think the W. R. A. may be able to relieve the Army?

Mr. MYER. Well, the only estimate or guess I have on that I have gotten from Mr. Best and Mr. Cozzens about a week or 10 days ago, and the estimate was pretty general, but they said within the next 30 to 60 days, in their judgment, that that could be done.

However, that is something that will be worked out jointly between the Army and ourselves, depending on the progress made, and getting all of these fencing facilities and getting our recruitment of our internal-security force under way, and completing that job reasonably well before we take over again, and in getting the culprits all into their right stalls, and possibly other considerations, but those are the main considerations.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have you given any special consideration to a revamping of the fire department? You just mentioned the police department.

Mr. MYER. I have not discussed that with the folks. However, we did leave that open to have that situation presented.

My own personal judgment is that we will have no serious trouble with the fire department, as we have not had in the past, because that is something of very serious concern to the evacuees.

Now, it is possible, and probable, that there may be recommendations come in on that, but I have not gotten them as yet.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is just one more question, Mr. Myer. I think you said that the Army and the W. R. A. had sort of an agreement with respect to Tule Lake before this occasion on November 1 that was different than the agreements concerning the other centers.

What was the important difference with respect to Tule Lake, particularly, Mr. Myer? Was the Army authorized to march in there at their own discretion, or was it incumbent upon the W. R. A. to request them to come in at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. This, what I have in my hand, is the standard operating procedure for military police at the Tule Lake center. It was issued by the headquarters of the Western Defense Command for the Army, office of the commanding general, on the 12th of September 1943, which was just previous to the time that we received the first segregationees from other centers.

I am not planning to read all of this because it is rather voluminous but I will just glance through and mention those points that have to do with the differences that I can think of that are different in the other centers.

Under the first general statement having to do with the use of troops within the residential area, there is this statement: When in the opinion of the commanding officer the situation within the residential area has reached such a degree of disorder that it endangers external security.

That is a provision that does not exist at any of the other centers. That was in existence.

I might say that that was discussed with Colonel Austin.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words, the Army, on the afternoon of this occurrence—

Mr. MYER. — could have moved in under their provisions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Under their provisions, they could have moved in at any time?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. I am glad that they did not, but they could have under our general plans of operating there.

I might say, while we had accepted this tentatively, I had objected to that provision because I did not feel it should be in, but it was in just the same and it had been accepted tentatively, until we could work out the program.

There are many other differences, Mr. Chairman, of which one is a detailed outline for the inspection for contraband, packages, and other things that come into the center, or anything else excepting first-class mail. This was an extract from the agreement.

If you would care to, I would be glad to supply for the record a copy of this operating procedure.

There are provisions in relation to contraband which do not exist now at any of the other centers with the possible exception of Manzanar. This is more in detail at this center, because we have taken special precautions, with provision for registration and identification of everybody who goes in and out, by the Army, in relation to their records, so that they can be checked; detailed provisions on check of badges of workers that go in and out to the farm where they had to go through turnstiles, and be checked and re-checked before they went on duty.

There was a provision for guarding the farm workers in that area by troops, which was not true in the other centers. With a special provision about checking travel permits in that area, in and out, which does not exist at the other centers.

I think those are major provisions. However, it is covered in detail, and if you wish, I will be glad to supply it for the record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am not interested in all of the provisions, but I am just interested in the difference between this center and the others so far as security is concerned, how it differs from the other centers.

Mr. MYER. Let me see if I can summarize it briefly.

At the other centers the agreement is comparatively short and it has been in existence right along and it was true in relation to Tule Lake previous to the time of the segregation center, and that is that the agreement was that the Army was responsible for the external guard of the area which provided, of course, for keeping the people in the area, that were supposed to be maintained in the area, and keeping people from coming in from the outside who were not allowed to come in unless they had a pass.

In most of the centers they had a larger area to guard in the day-time than they had at night, and they threw their guard immediately around the center area at night.

We had the provision whenever an issue of force was needed, the W. R. A. project director could call the Army in, and in that case, as was indicated, they would take over and was responsible until they withdrew.

That, very briefly, summarizes the agreement at all the other centers. There have been, in addition to that, in the California centers, provisions for the searching of contraband at both Manzanar and Tule Lake previously, which was not true at the other centers, and which still exists at Tule Lake.

Now, in addition to this provision which I mentioned at Tule Lake, the procedure at the time that this incident happened provided that the Army could come in on their own if they cared to do so.

That was one very important thing.

Secondly, that the Army checked all work passes in and out of the center, which is not true at the other centers.

Third, that the Army registered and fingerprinted all the people, and checked all the people in and out, and as I remember it, they had a provision——

MR. EBERHARTER. Did they fingerprint everybody that went out?

MR. MYER. I mean, as they came in, as they came into the center, so that they could check it against any case.

In addition to that, they had a provision, I believe, whereby they might designate people that could not even go out to work on the farm, if they so wished, after checking the records.

At the Tule Lake center they built a man-proof fence with special provisions for one main gate where they would pass in and out, previous to the time the movement started, which was not true at the other centers.

They enlarged the guard.

I think the first assignment there was one battalion of troops where normally at the other centers they had one company of troops, and with special equipment provided at Tule Lake that they did not have at many of the other centers.

I am getting a little brain fagged, Mr. Congressman. I am not sure I have called all my shots, but I think those are the major differences, as I can remember them.

MR. EBERHARTER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

MR. COSTELLO. Actually, Mr. Myer, the Army has no authority at any of the other centers, the relocation centers, to go in until they are called by the director of the project?

MR. MYER. At the other centers, no. They are not authorized to go into the center unless there is an actual call by the project center director, at any of the centers, excepting Tule Lake.

MR. COSTELLO. That is all.

MR. MUNDT, do you have any questions?

MR. MUNDT. A few.

I think you told us the first day you testified, Mr. Myers, that this committee of 17, with whom you conferred at some length on the 1st, represented themselves to be spokesmen for the camp, but that you had considerable doubt in your own mind as to their actual representative capacity. But I think you said further that these 17, together with perhaps two or three hundred others, had succeeded, more or less, in establishing control over the center population through terrorizing the rest of the inhabitants of the camp.

MR. MYER. That is my judgment.

MR. MUNDT. What methods of terrorization and terrorizing did these people use?

MR. MYER. I do not know what methods they used at Tule Lake, because I have no definite evidence of it.

I assume it was threats, which is the normal procedure used by that type.

We have run into that earlier in other centers. The group who carried on those activities, for the most part, were at Tule Lake, and I assume that was the method that they continued to use.

However, Mr. Mundt, we simply saw evidence that they were under general terror, and just what was being utilized, I am not sure, other than to give you an opinion on it.

Mr. MUNDT. Had this same group, or approximately the same number of spokesmen, represented themselves as authority in the camp for the Japanese, and conferred with Mr. Best, prior to your arrival, or was it the first attempt?

Mr. MYER. They conferred with Mr. Best, most of this group, the week previous to my arrival, with Mr. Best, under date of October 26.

There were 10 of them at that time. There were 17 of them later, but I think all of the 10, with but 1 exception, were in this group that conferred with me.

Mr. MUNDT. Looking at the situation to see whether anything could have been done there to avert the trouble which finally resulted in bringing in the Army, and to determine whether or not future policies of the camp might avert the necessity of calling in the Army into the camp, I want to enumerate, if I may, and check with me as to accuracy, five different points on which, it seems to me, the center administration complied with the requests or the demands of this committee of 17.

I do that, not to try to state that the camp directorship capitulated to the Japanese, but to establish the fact that these demands did bring about compliance—"compliance" may not be the right word, but I am just trying to establish a matter of fact.

It is correct, is it not, No, 1, because of this committee of 17, the meeting which you had planned to hold was stepped up approximately 24 hours from the time it was originally scheduled?

Mr. MYER. Yes; the meeting was originally scheduled with the committee at 1:30 on Tuesday, November 2, and we met with them beginning about 1:30 on Monday, November 1.

Mr. MUNDT. And it is correct, of course, because we discussed that this morning, that you spoke to the assembled crowd after having been introduced by George Kuratomi.

Mr. MYER. Kuratomi; that is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. It is correct that for a few days following the disturbance at the hospital, the Caucasian doctors were withdrawn from the hospital, and then afterwards reinstated.

Mr. MYER. For a portion of that time; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. And it is correct, in the fourth place, that Mr. Kallam's resignation was demanded by the Japs before it was effectuated by the camp administration.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is true, also, with Mr. Peck?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. The reason I mention that, My Myer, is this, that it occurs to me that if an attitude of firmness on the part of the center management, the project management, had been manifested when this series of five events began, from the standpoint of the meeting, from the standpoint of your speaking as the guest speaker, so to speak, of George Kuratomi instead of Mr. Best, do you not feel that it is possible that that manifestation of firmness would have served as sort of a soothing sirup on this situation and the Army not have had to be called in, because the riot would not have continued?

In other words, I think it is a conceivable hypothesis, it may or may not be true, but indirectly a conceivable hypothesis, that Mr. George Kuratomi and his 16 associates in the barracks and around the places they met and talked got discussing these 5 different complaints, say-

ing "Here is what we did, see? We got them to set this thing up. We got this man Myer to come out and talk. We did not tell him what to say, but we made him talk, we finally got him to get these doctors off again; Kallam is gone and Peck is gone."

I am showing how they built themselves up with the Japanese population and how that tended to create disturbance rather than curtail it.

Mr. MYER. Is that a question?

Mr. MUNDT. Any comment?

Mr. MYER. My only comment is this, Mr. Congressman, that it is much easier for a kibitzer, after a thing is over, to call the shots than it is for a man on the job to call the shots.

I may have been wrong. I do not think so. I think had you been in that situation, knowing you now as I think I do, you would have handled it about as I handled it. I am paying you a compliment, because I think that I handled it well.

I think you would have agreed, had you been sitting there, that we handled the situation firmly. I am getting a little tired of hearing the generalities of firmness and social-mindedness.

However, I do not——

Mr. MUNDT. That is why I mentioned specific points.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate that.

Now, let me cover each one of them. I think I pointed out to you this morning, and I want to repeat, that I was very glad to have Kuratomi introduce me and to announce to the crowd before I got through with my talk that I did not think he and his committee represented the crowd. And remember they were standing at my back when I said that.

Now, would you consider that lack of firmness?

Mr. MUNDT. That statement, I think, was very commendable on your part, but I think it would have been more effective had it been followed by the camp director, Mr. Best, and——

Mr. MYER. I will say, No. 2, I am willing to admit, by the smart trick they pulled, that for the time being they held the cards; sure, I will admit that.

We could have held them at any time we wanted to, if we wanted to bring the troops in, with the chance of bloodshed.

I did not think it was necessary at that time, and I think events proved that.

I do not think that any general would tell you that the best time to attack is when the enemy seemed to be in reasonable control of the situation. I would rather call my own shots.

I was not in a position to call——

Mr. MUNDT. This was a peaceful assemblage.

Mr. MYER. It was a peaceful assemblage.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not see how there was much greater danger of bloodshed by calling them in then than if you had waited and called them in.

Mr. MYER. The gentleman is breaking his own rule, which I tried to follow this afternoon.

Mr. MUNDT. Go right ahead.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, I said that the majority of these people came very peacefully. I never did say that all of these people

were there in a peaceful movement. I never have said that. I want to make that clear.

We had a bunch of toughies around that crowd, and even after they came very peaceably, it is very easy to develop a situation where you could have difficulties arise, and I think I have explained that. So I would not argue with you about that.

You have a right to draw your judgment on it. My judgment is that I did the right thing in allowing Kuratomi to introduce me and to have an opportunity to tell that group what I thought about their committee and the general procedures that had gone on that day.

Now let me say, secondly, I can understand how you may draw conclusions by the fact that there were 2 people out of 16 whose surrender they demanded and whose resignations were accepted, that maybe we were meeting their demands.

The fact is not true.

Mr. MUNDT. To keep the record straight, I was not drawing any conclusions. I say you put yourself in the position with the Japanese to reach that conclusion.

Mr. MYER. I believe there is an implication there, though.

Mr. MUNDT. I have a question.

Mr. MYER. All right. I assume you are implying it, and I want to get it in the record that I think you are, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not object to that.

Mr. MYER. All right. The implication is wrong, if you are implying that I met any demands on the part of the Japanese because they made demands. That was done for other reasons. That takes care of Mr. Kallam and Mr. Peck.

Mr. MUNDT. That was not the point I made in relation to that. My point was that the reaction of the Japanese was made and not that you were making compliance. I was not implying that you had weakened in your opinion, other than you were giving them some propaganda information and ammunition to use with their associates. It seems to me that you have, to that extent, given them ammunition to use.

Mr. MYER. That is a matter of opinion. You have a right to your opinion, and I will not argue with you further on it.

On the hospital case, I think I explained that in detail as to the reasons that lie behind it.

In my judgment, the best way in the world to put a committee like that on the spot is to put them in a place where the community is not getting the kind of service and that touches them right close to home, and there is nothing other than the hospital that will do that better.

I do not remember the other point.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you had any reports since the Army took over, of any disturbance on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I would rather not report on what has happened since the Army took over, because that is theirs to tell. If you ask me and insist on it, I will give you an answer to that question, but I would rather not.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I do not insist on it, but it would be helpful to the committee and helpful to me, because in my opinion a firm attitude, such as I imagine the Army is manifesting, is likely to deter beatings and disturbances. Now, I do not know.

Mr. MYER. The answer is, "Yes; I have had some reports."

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as Mr. Mundt was not here, it was agreed, I think, to call a representative of the War Department, and I think it is perfectly proper for Mr. Myer to ask to be excused from answering that question.

Mr. MUNDT. I will not insist on an answer.

Mr. MYER. I am willing to say "yes."

Mr. COSTELLO. We will ask the War Department, which has charge of that center officially at the present time.

Mr. MYER. I am willing to go this far, Mr. Chairman, on the record. The answer is "Yes; I have heard reports."

Mr. MUNDT. Just one other thing, Mr. Chairman, that goes back quite a ways.

Are you still teaching judo at any of these relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. Are you still beating your wife?

Mr. MUNDT. You admitted you were teaching judo, but I never admitted beating my wife. Are you still teaching judo?

Mr. MYER. No; I am not teaching judo.

Mr. MUNDT. Or the members of the War Relocation Authority still teaching judo? Or any of the Japanese still on the pay roll?

Mr. MYER. We have not banned judo entirely from the centers. We are not teaching judo, as such.

I think the provisions, as I remember it now, provides that there may be one at each center who might give instructions in judo, on the evacuee pay roll; not more than that, as I remember it. I would have to check that.

Mr. MUNDT. I wish you would check that and put that into the record.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to do so.

Mr. MUNDT. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have as well the total amount which has been spent by the War Relocation Authority, to date, for the teaching or instructing or supervising of judo; both by the Japanese and the Caucasians; the total amount of American taxpayers' money which has been devoted to judo in the last 20 months.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to do that.

Mr. MUNDT. Because I am against that.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10208.)

Mr. MYER. I understand you are. Yes.

I would like to make, and repeat the statement, that there has been quite a bit of money expended in the United States Army teaching judo to soldiers in the United States Army outside of relocation centers, some of it by evacuees.

Mr. MUNDT. You believe, perhaps, the soldiers of the United States Army could make better use of judo than the internees in these camps?

Mr. MYER. I understand some of them are making very good use of it. I do not want to be misunderstood; I am not standing here saying that we should generally teach judo.

I will say what I have said before, that I do not think judo is necessarily an indication of the type of thing that has been implied. There is that possibility, and there is in some cases the ritual involved. We do not allow the ritual in relation to judo if we give it.

We do allow it as a part of our general community matters in the centers, along with baseball and basketball, and all the American games.

Mr. COSTELLO. All you are allowing at the present time is ju-jitsu but not the ceremonies that usually accompany it.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would it be difficult, Mr. Myer, to indicate how many of the boys from these relocation centers went to the United States Army, who taught ju-jitsu in these relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. I do not have information on that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would that be difficult to ascertain?

Mr. MYER. Although I will be glad to check and see if we can't get the information on it; some of them have, I am sure.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, in the course of the discussion here it was indicated that they went down to the motor pool in an effort to obtain two or three trucks and had a great deal of difficulty.

Was there no Caucasian in charge of the motor pool who had the authority—

Mr. MYER. Yes; there was a Caucasian in general charge of the motor pool. He did not happen to be on hand at that particular moment, and of course, Mr. Zimmer and the other man—I have forgotten the name—was in general charge, and went and got the keys himself.

Mr. COSTELLO. The indication is, of course, on the night of Thursday, November 4, trucks were running around because of the fact you had not put in the proper controls which were desired at that center.

Mr. MYER. I thought I made that clear that one of the provisions worked out between the Army and ourselves was a new compound for the whole motor-pool lay-out, which was supposed to have been completed before we moved in, but because of a lag in the contract job, that was done, it was not completed, even on the night of November 4.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently all these keys to the trucks were—

Mr. MYER. Were on the boards.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were kept right there on the boards.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And were made available to the Japanese or any person who came into the motor pool and desired to take the keys; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. The trucks were not entirely under control; that is all I can say about it. I am not sure about all the keys.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you planning to change the control over the motor equipment in the relocation centers in the manner you are at Tule Lake?

Mr. MYER. No; we do not see any reason to.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the event of any occurrence of a similar character, then, taking place at any other center, motorized equipment would be available to the Japanese for use as they saw fit?

Mr. MYER. No; I would not say that it was. It was not available to the Japanese generally, as it was as they saw fit, in this case. However, it was available to certain individuals. There was certain equipment available to the evacuee police for patrolling purposes, and it was evident that two or three other trucks were used that night.

How they got the keys I am not able to tell you.

I am not sure that they know, but it did happen.

I think I have admitted, Mr. Chairman, that the trucks were not under proper control. The major reason they were not was because the compound had been worked out and it was not yet in operation and we were taking a chance; we knew that but we had no difficulty in relation to that matter, as far as I know, excepting on this particular evening.

Mr. COSTELLO. It appears to me that if the same type of handling of the motorized equipment as was in effect at Tule Lake is to be retained as a method in the relocation centers, then the same thing could happen at any future time if the circumstances arose.

Mr. MYER. I might say this, Mr. Chairman, that we have assigned to us a lieutenant colonel from the Army, who is in general charge of the motor pool operation, who has recently completed a complete tour of all the centers on a recheck of the provisions for handling motor equipment and we are putting in on the basis of his recommendation a detailed recheck of the whole matter.

That has been under way for some weeks. He is back here now, I think. I am not sure if the final check or final instructions have been signed, but if they have not, they will be in a very few days.

I think adequate care has been taken, and generally speaking, it will be taken, I will assure you. I have no particular concern, because of the fact that we are taking care of that matter, about the motor equipment, about being utilized in this way in connection with other centers.

I see no reason why we should have any difficulty of that type in other centers.

I will say it was a vulnerable point at Tule Lake, and we knew it, and after November 4 we went to the Army and the contractor and asked if we could move the equipment in in spite of the fact that the compound was not completed, and unfortunately we were not able to do so after November 1 to November 4.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The Army refused to do it after this disturbance?

Mr. MYER. I presume it was because of the fact that the contractor who was responsible would not allow them to do so but we asked that it be done and it was not allowed. We felt it was near enough ready to be used and should be used.

Mr. COSTELLO. In my humble judgment, the supervision of the motorized equipment at all these centers evidently is not adequate, if it is going to be available to the Japanese to be used, even a part of that equipment, under circumstances of this kind.

It would seem to me that some provision should be made to make certain that at no time should any of the evacuees or, in fact, any of the persons within the center, be allowed to make unauthorized use of any of the Government equipment located at such a center.

Mr. MYER. I want to repeat, Mr. Chairman, it is perfectly easy for people to pass judgment who have not examined the provisions carefully as to whether or not they are complete enough to safeguard the situation.

I am perfectly willing to let you pass that judgment. I doubt whether your judgment is sound on the matter. I think perhaps ours is sounder, just as a matter of opinion.

Mr. COSTELLO. The indication is whenever the white personnel wanted to use the equipment, they had a great deal of difficulty doing

it because the white person in charge was not there to turn it over to them, and the indication also is that when the Japanese wanted to use the equipment, they were able to get their hands on certain kinds of equipment without being interfered with in any way, so at least, to that extent at Tule Lake at that time, the handling was not good.

But the handling at Tule Lake, apparently, was the same type of handling that had been there prior to segregation, and is similar or identical with the handling of motorized equipment at all the relocation centers.

Mr. MYER. The only comment I have to make on that, Mr. Chairman, is that it is very generalized, from one specific instance.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will leave that item at that point.

Mr. MYER. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. There was some indication in the testimony that the Japanese, at least on one occasion, used some of the tractors to play polo games with.

Do you have any information in that regard?

Mr. MYER. I have some information on a tractor incident; not on polo.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might also add, in the same connection, there was also indication that they used the trucks to scare the geese out of the fields; both of a similar character.

Mr. MYER. This statement was submitted by the Project Director Best on November 17:

On September 18 a collision occurred at the farm area attached to Tule Lake center, between two tractors—a Farmall and a Fordson—driven by evacuee workers. According to the report submitted by National Internal Security Chief Willard E. Schmidt, the collision was probably a result of irresponsible driving by two youngsters who were not authorized to operate the equipment. One of the boys was injured in the collision. Damage to equipment consisted of a rip and blow-out on the left rear pneumatic tire on the Fordson and the bending of metallic farm implements on right side of Farmall. In addition, a considerable amount of damage was done to crates of garlic, some of which were knocked over, and to planted onions.

Regarding the boy who was injured, I might interpose there that he had two or three toes amputated as the result of the collision.

It was one of those things that happened. I have not all the details as yet. I will be glad to supply them.

For the polo game as reported, it was a bunch of unauthorized kids and it all happened as it might happen on any large farm operation, Mr. Chairman, where you had a group of youngsters involved.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you inform the committee as to where the trucks and tractors, and so on, were purchased by the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. I cannot give you all the facts on that. I do have some information here on the trucks.

War Relocation Authority at Tule Lake purchased no trucks with the exception of two pickups. All other trucks were obtained by transfer from other Federal agencies. At least 40 trucks were obsolete and worn out when they were received. In ordinary times such equipment would have been condemned, but in wartime any truck that could be used in any way was put in service. Ten trucks were so worn out they were scrapped for parts. Passenger cars were purchased from evacuees through the Federal Reserve bank.

Now, I do not have information at hand with reference to tractors. I will be glad to get that and supply it for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like it because there was some indication had at one of our hearings that a great amount of second-hand automotive equipment had been purchased, particularly trucks, and the trucks were not fit for use at the time they were brought in.

One or two, it was indicated, were towed in and had to be repaired.

The testimony here indicates that some of the tractors which were purchased were second-hand tractors, purchased through some farm in New York, and the testimony further indicated that the inventories showed that they had been purchased through the Midwest.

The particular point I want to bring out is that one of the International trucks—International tractors—required \$1,500 worth of repairs before it could be used, and another required \$1,200 worth of repairs before it could be used.

Mr. MYER. On whose testimony was that?

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the testimony of one of the persons in charge of the automotive equipment.

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to recheck all of those facts, if you will supply me with the testimony, and I certainly will be glad to supply the information on where the equipment was purchased, and the cost of repairs.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10209.)

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe that the witness was Floyd Stone, in charge of equipment maintenance, machinery repairs, and blacksmith shop.

Mr. MYER. That is in the State senate investigation?

Mr. COSTELLO. The State senate investigation; yes.

Mr. MYER. By the way, do you happen to have an extra copy of the State senate hearing? We never had a copy.

Mr. COSTELLO. All I have here is the first volume, which is only apparently half of the testimony, which I received. That is the only copy which we have.

Mr. MYER. In order to recheck some of that, we may want to borrow it temporarily to check the testimony. In the meantime we will ask the State senate committee for a copy of the hearing.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not know whether they have had their hearings printed up or not. This is one of the preliminary typewritten copies. It has not been corrected or proofread.

Then there was some additional testimony by Mr. Wilkinson regarding feeding at the farm, and I will read a paragraph from the testimony out there in California on page 60, which he gave in that regard.

This is a question by State Senator Quinn.

Question. Tell us your experience about hogs.

Answer. Well, what got me more than anything else was feeding garbage. I would see loins of beef, whole sacks of cabbage, whole sacks of lettuce, so fresh the ice still had not melted on it; 25 pounds of lard; and I remember 2 turkeys, 2 whole turkeys, marked "No good," and sometimes whole hams, and slabs of bacon.

Have you had any report to you, as Director of W. R. A., regarding any such wastage of food in that manner?

Mr. MYER. We are trying to get this together so that we can make a recheck of it.

That is the first time I have heard of any such thing, and I might say if Mr. Wilkinson reported it at the time, I never heard of it. I doubt very much whether he did make such a report.

Mr. COSTELLO. The very next question reads?

Question. Did you make a report of that?

Answer. I reported it about 12 times.

Mr. MYER. Did he say to whom?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not think he was asked that particular question. [Reading:]

Question. Was there any result evident after your report of those things?

Answer. There was no way to get results and what came out there in the garbage did not change. I helped to haul out 12 tons of fish down here, that the Japs refused to eat; it was frozen fish. L. Hinzel helped haul it off.

Mr. Hinzel, I believe, purchased the fish, and used them for fertilizer purposes.

Mr. MYER. I have not had that particular evidence, Mr. Chairman, so I have not been able to check on all of these items referred to by Mr. Wilkinson. We have checked on some of the items we have known about, and found Mr. Wilkinson, I might say, very voluminous in his testimony, and in some cases not accurate.

Mr. COSTELLO. On page 62, the question was asked:

Question. Who did you report it to, Mr. Warin; whom were they reported to?

Answer. To Dr. Jacoby.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Warin, Mr. Chairman, then reported to Dr. Jacoby.

Mr. COSTELLO. This was the testimony of Scott Warin that I was reading from, and not Mr. Wilkinson; Mr. Warin now of course being the farm superintendent.

Mr. MYER. I might add at this point, Mr. Chairman, that if there were hams and turkeys got into the garbage, it was probably the responsibility of the chief steward to check on that type of thing, and it is unfortunate if that is true, but we will check it.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10209.)

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean, the testimony is from Scott Warin, who was in charge of the farm, that there was that type of wastage.

Then we have the testimony regarding the slaughterhouse, that there was similar wastage there in the slaughtering of hogs. As a matter of fact, the testimony there indicates that so many hogs were thrown out by the Japanese who said that they were no good, that they took a big batch out there and had what they called their hog cemetery.

The statement was made in the testimony that as many as 100 were buried out there and they had a bulldozer to cover it up and start a new graveyard.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement regarding that testimony because I heard that statement.

Mr. COSTELLO. Whose statement is this?

Mr. MYER. This is a statement from Mr. Best and Mr. Zimmer, from the project.

In his testimony before the California State Senate committee, on November 8, 1943, Mr. Wilkinson gave the impression that swine were killed without legitimate reasons. If a hog had only a bruise it was killed and the whole carcass discarded. He said that he saw more than 100 hogs in one graveyard and that there were 6 such graveyards when he resigned from the War Relocation Authority. The attached figures taken from the records of the Agricultural Division show that swine losses from October 1942 through July 1943 were 155. The swine herd averaged around 900 with approximately the same number of sucklings.

Mr. Wilkinson testified also that the hogs on the project farm were dying of overweight. He testified that no hogs had been butchered since July.

The records attached show that no hogs have died of overweight. From a commercial standpoint, some hogs are heavier than they should be for economical butchering for retail sale. However, since these hogs are fed entirely on garbage from the project mess hall, and the entire carcass is used in the project mess halls, there is no waste involved in allowing the hogs to get heavier than usual.

Slaughtering of hogs on the project began in November 1942, and was halted on June 21, 1943, by hot weather. The slaughterhouse was not properly equipped for adequate sanitation and plans were made immediately for a new slaughterhouse adjacent to the hog farm. Construction on this plant was delayed by war conditions, including the necessity of acquiring second-hand equipment. This plant had not been completed as of November 8, 1943.

I have here, if you care to have it in the record, a complete breakdown on each individual hog that was lost, with the weights, that were supposed to have been in this graveyard.

Let me say that during this period approximately 100 of these hogs that I have mentioned were pigs weighing less than 50 pounds, which would mean approximately 55 were older hogs, and under garbage-feeding conditions, that, in my judgment, is a very small loss.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement may be appended as an exhibit to your testimony.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

Swine loss reports—Agricultural accounting division

Date	Loss	Weight	Cause of loss	Disposal
		<i>Pounds</i>		
1943				
Jan. 1	1 suckling		Weakness	Buried.
	1 gilt	180	Pneumonia	Do.
Jan. 4	1 sow	300	Killed for autopsy	Do.
Jan. 5	1 barrow	40	Pneumonia	Do.
Jan. 7	1 hog	269	Erysipelas	Do.
Jan. 8	1 suckling		Weakness	Do.
Do	1 suckling, 6 weeks		Pneumonia	Do.
Jan. 18	1 weaner		do.	Do.
Jan. 28	1 sow	166	Weakness	Cremated.
Jan. 29	do		do.	Do.
Do	Black tinted hog	240	Enteritis	Buried.
Jan. 27	1 sow	190	Cholera	Do.
Jan. 9	1 barrow		Erysipelas	Discarded.
Jan. 3	do	270	Discarded from slaughterhouse	
Feb. 2	1 pig		Crushed by sow	Cremated.
Feb. 4	1 suckling, 3½ weeks		Weakness	Do.
Feb. 8	1 barrow	270	Suffocation	Buried.
Feb. 7	1 gilt	120	Stomach disorder	Do.
Feb. 13	1 pig, 2½ weeks		Weakness	Cremated.
Do	1 gilt	205	Killed because in bad condition	Buried.
Do	1 pig, 3 weeks		Weakness	Cremated.
Feb. 15	1 barrow	290	Erysipelas	Buried.
Feb. 17	1 pig, 1 week		Crushed by sow No. 57	Cremated.
Feb. 18	1 pig		Crushed by sow No. 159	Do.
Feb. 24	1 gilt	200	Killed for autopsy	Buried.
Feb. 10	1 weaner	45	Malnutrition	Do.
Do	do	65	Intestinal troubles	Do.
Feb. 25	do	40	Runted	Do.
Do	do	35	do	Do.
Feb. 26	do	30	Runted (shot by Warin)	Do.
Do	1 feeder	130	Ruptured	Do.
Feb. 28	1 weaner	65	Malnutrition	Do.
Feb. 26	1 gilt	500	Brucellosis	Do.
Do	1 barrow	220	do	Do.
Do	do	200	do	Do.
Mar. 4	1 gilt	290	Choking	Do.
Do	1 barrow	280	Stomach disorder	Do.
Mar. 2	1 weaner	65	Pneumonia	Do.
Mar. 12	do	45	Runted	Do.
Mar. 15	do	50	Malnutrition	Do.
Mar. 18	do	35	Pneumonia	Do.
Mar. 24	do	45	Malnutrition	Do.
Do	do	40	Tuberculin lung	Do.
Do	do	25	Malnutrition	Do.
Mar. 26	1 gilt	250	Acute anthrax	Do.
Mar. 15	1 sow (bred)	350	Anthrax	Do.
Apr. 2	1 weaner	15	Runted	Do.
Apr. 5	do	35	Strong dose of worm-dose	Do.
Apr. 13	do	25	Pneumonia	Do.

Swine loss reports—Agricultural accounting division—Continued

Date	Loss	Weight	Cause of loss	Disposal
		Pounds		
1943				
Apr. 24	1 weaner	20	Intestinal trouble	Buried.
Do	do	25	Malnutrition	Do.
Do	do		do	Do.
Do	do		do	Do.
Apr. 5	1 fat	275	Anthrax	Cremated.
April 10	do	200	Heart attack	Buried.
April 12	1 barrow	125	Infected testicles	Do.
April 21	1 fat	120	Dura-typhoid	Do.
Do	1 sow	350	Posterior paralysis	Cremated.
May 2	1 hog, fat	250	Unknown	Buried.
May 9	1 barrow		Paralysis	Do.
May 1	1 hog	90	Pneumonia	Do.
May 11	do	75	do	Do.
May 16	do	80	do	Do.
May 31	do	90	Emaciation	Do.
June 17	1 weaner	30	do	Do.
June 18	1 hog, fat	100	Pneumonia	Do.
June 15	1 Hampshire weaner	30	Unknown	Do.
June 17	1 weaner	40	Pneumonia	Do.
June 25	do	40	Unknown	Cremated.
Do	do	40	do	Buried.
June 10	1 sow	250	Eupepelas	Cremated.
July 14	1 Hampshire weaner	40	Emaciation	Do.
Do	do	15	do	Do.
Do	do	30	do	Do.
July 15	5 Hampshire weaners	125	do	Do.
Do	3 Hampshire weaners	45	do	Do.
July 16	5 Hampshire weaners	122	do	Do.
Do	1 Hampshire weaner	75	Run over by auto	Do.
July 17	do	25	Emaciation	Do.
July 18	do	25	do	Do.
Do	do	30	do	Do.
Do	do	25	do	Do.
July 19	1 Chester White weaner	20	Heat	Buried.
July 20	1 Hampshire weaner	20	Emaciation	Cremated.
Do	1 Chester White weaner	20	do	Do.
July 21	1 Hampshire weaner	20	Drowned	Do.
July 22	5 Hampshire weaners	200	Emaciation	Do.
Do	2 Hampshire weaners	40	do	Do.
July 23	1 Poland China	20	do	Do.
Do	1 Hampshire weaner	40	Run over by auto	Do.
July 24	do	40	Emaciation	Do.
July 25	2 Hampshire weaners	40	do	Do.
Do	1 Hampshire weaner	35	do	Do.
Do	1 Poland China	30	do	Do.
July 26	1 Hampshire weaner	30	do	Do.
Oct. 2	1 hog	90	Accident	Buried.
Oct. 8	1 boar	275	Rupture	Do.
Oct. 14	1 hog	300	Sickness	Do.
Oct. 18	do	180	do	Cremated.
Do	1 suckling		do	Do.
Oct. 26	1 sow	350	Hog cholera	Buried.
Oct. 28	1 hog, 2½ months		do	Do.
Oct. 29	1 gilt	150	Cholera and pneumonia	Do.
Nov. 1	1 sow	300	do	Cremated.
Do	1 gilt	150	Cholera	Do.
Nov. 9	1 barrow	250	Pneumonia	Buried.
Nov. 10	1 hog	20	Malnutrition	Do.
Nov. 12	do	20	do	Do.
Nov. 14	do	20	do	Do.
Nov. 15	do	50	Narcotic growth	Do.
Do	1 runt	15	Stomach worm	Do.
Nov. 20	1 hog	20	do	Do.
Nov. 21	do	20	do	Do.
Nov. 22	do	20	do	Do.
Nov. 23	do	20	do	Do.
Nov. 26	3 pigs		Sow laid over them	Do.
Do	5 pigs		Too weak; poorly cared for	Do.
Dec. 1	1 barrow	100	Diarrhea	Do.
Dec. 4	1 pig, 7 weeks		Weak and cold	Do.
Dec. 6	1 hog	20	Infectious enteritis	Do.
Dec. 7	do	20	do	Do.
Dec. 9	do	175	Prolonged illness	Do.
Dec. 11	1 suckling		Unknown	Do.
Dec. 15	do		do	Do.
Dec. 17	1 hog	100	Suffocation	Do.
Dec. 19	do	350	Choking	Do.
Dec. 22	1 suckling		Pneumonia	Do.
Dec. 24	1 pig, 1 week		Crushed by sow	Do.
Do	1 suckling		do	Do.
Dec. 29	do	20	Runted	Do.
Dec. 31	do		Weakness	Do.

Mr. MYER. I did check this verbally, and I am making further recheck on it, that there have been carcasses of two hogs entirely destroyed on the basis of inspection, and there have been parts destroyed because of inspection, and a check that they might have been affected by tuberculosis, lesions, or something of that kind, which is not at all unusual, but the fact seems to be that Mr. Wilkinson's testimony goes far beyond the facts in relation to both the number of hogs and the implication is that thousands, of hogs, if you read his testimony, in general, have gone into the graveyard.

That is not true, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the thing I wanted to bring out was the variability of testimony along this line; in other words, it comes from the butchershop, it comes from the farm; and the testimony regarding the maintenance of equipment comes from the garage and the blacksmith shop as to the general wastage that did take place in that regard.

Mr. MYER. We have had, I think I have stated before and I want to repeat it, real difficulty in the handling of equipment, more so than we have had at all the centers.

We have had breakage, we have had losses, but I do not think it has, generally speaking, been beyond what you would expect under such circumstances. It is higher than what we would have liked to have it. We have taken every means possible to bring it into line.

Now, there were, particularly during the time that Mr. Wilkinson was there, during the early part of the program at Tule Lake and two or three of the older centers, weeks in which we had not had a chance to get our regulations into effect, and I do not raise any question but that there were some things true.

However, what I am saying is that, generally speaking, Mr. Wilkinson's statements do not hold together as to the facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might also ask as to how many Japanese will eventually be transferred out of Leupp, Ariz., to Tule Lake.

Mr. MYER. I believe there are 53 that have already been moved to Tule Lake as of this week.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there more there to be moved?

Mr. MYER. No; that is the number that has been transferred up there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether any aliens have been taken out of the Tule Lake camp by the Department of Justice and placed in internment camps?

Mr. MYER. There have, in times past. Whether any moved out since November 4, I cannot report on that; no. We have had aliens taken out of there, though, during the period of existence of the camp by the Department of Justice.

In one case, following the registration last year, when we took out a number of people, including some that went to Leupp. I think there were five or six aliens that were turned over to the Department of Justice at one time by ourselves at that particular stage.

Mr. COSTELLO. In response to a question by Mr. Eberharter, I believe you made the statement that you did a reasonably good job of protecting the employees there, referring to the period before November 1. Do you not feel that actually there was no protection within the center itself during that time?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, if I had felt there was no protection, do you think I would have slept on the project on the night of November 1?

Mr. COSTELLO. I was referring to the time that the group was around the administration building and so on. Actually in the center there was no means of protection. In other words, if the Japanese at the administration building had started a genuine riot or started throwing sticks through the window, a real outbreak, in other words, worked the crowd up to a real frenzy—

Mr. MYER. And about 100 yards from that building the Army was warning up their equipment to move in at any time. We were in entire contact with them at all times.

Now, there may have been trouble, yes, and there may have been danger, and I already stated that had the Army come in I think there would have been bloodshed.

It was our judgment there was not going to be unless we started it, and I think our judgment has been confirmed, with the exception in relation to Dr. Pedicord, which I think I have indicated.

I feel that is one of those sporadic things that would have happened, and was not intended, as far as the leaders were concerned. Beyond that your opinion probably may be as good as mine. I have given you my opinion.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact the administration building was a temporary wooden building, if the Japanese had actually set fire to it, as the testimony indicates they might have done, do you think the Army outside would have been able to prevent the loss of life under those circumstances?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, that is a matter of judgment. I do not care to express any opinion on it because, in my opinion, there was no attempt or no intention to set fire to the place. There is no adequate evidence on hand that would indicate that they intended to do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you or did you not see two bonfires adjacent to the administration building?

Mr. MYER. I did not see them.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony indicates that within 60 feet, and another a little farther away, were two bonfires that were actually lit and burning during the time the crowd was about the administration building.

Mr. MYER. May I ask who gave that testimony?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not have that card index here. Apparently you have indexed—

Mr. MYER. I have tried to index the material that I have at hand. I do not have all the material you have at hand and that is one which I do not have an index on.

Mr. COSTELLO. Somebody on the force must have slipped.

Mr. MYER. We slipped because we were not as fortunate as you were in having copies of the California hearing handed to us. I presume that was where it was carried.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will have to thank Congressman Engle for it.

Mr. MYER. If the Congressman has an extra copy, I would be glad to have it.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not find the reference at the moment.

One other thing—was there not a tense situation continuing at the center even after the crowd dispersed on Monday?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, you cannot have that kind of happening without having a tense situation. I think we reported on November 3 that from that time on until November 4 everything was quiet, but there was a feeling of surface tension, if you want to call it that, throughout the center naturally; of course there was.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact that that did exist, and in view of the fact that subsequent circumstances indicated that it became necessary to bring the Army in, you feel that you were justified in leaving the project under those circumstances?

Mr. MYER. I certainly did, and I think I have explained that adequately.

I would like to point out again that I had done everything that I felt that I could do, under the circumstances, and that my best contribution I could make after having done that was to get out of the area so those responsible could go ahead and get their jobs done under those conditions.

I have no apology to make for leaving the center Tuesday evening, and I feel that adequate precautions were taken and I think the facts will bear that out.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think your leaving the project at that time was a little different than Mr. Townsend leaving the Poston project under similar circumstances?

Mr. MYER. I resent that implication, Mr. Chairman. I did not run off from the project under fire and under a matter of fear, as did Mr. Townsend.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was not insinuating any attitude of fear or anything of that kind, but what I meant was—

Mr. MYER. Well, the implication was there.

Mr. COSTELLO. No; there was absolutely no intention on my part, I assure you.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate your making that statement.

Mr. COSTELLO. And I am sorry you drew that implication from it. The only point I wanted to bring out was the fact that Mr. Townsend was criticized for leaving the Poston project at a time when there was trouble there, and my question was whether your leaving the Tule Lake project under similar circumstances was not likewise, therefore, subject to criticism?

That is the only inference I wanted to make in my statement.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to clarify it. I will be glad to answer your question.

Mr. Townsend's job was to head up the transport and supply and mess operation at Poston, which are very crucial functions. His job was on the project.

My job is National Director of the War Relocation Authority and not as director of the Tule Lake center.

Having completed the job that I went there for, and under the circumstances, having done everything that I felt we could do, that I could make a contribution to, my job was some place else and not at the Tule Lake center, where they felt they had to have me in the way while they went about their business.

I did not see it was any director's job, unless he was going to take over and set the director aside.

I want to repeat that I left the Tule Lake center with complete confidence in Mr. Best and with the advice of Mr. Cozzens, whom I

have confidence in, also, and with his assistants in command, and with Colonel Austin, whom they had been working with hand-in-hand, and I felt that I could do a better job some place else than being around at a time when they needed to get to work to get things in order.

I see no comparison between Mr. Townsend's leaving and my leaving.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand that at some time past, some Japanese prisoners of war were brought into Lordsburg, N. Mex., and were allowed to meet with some of the Japanese evacuees who were located there; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, I would not know. We have nothing to do with Lordsburg, N. Mex. That is an internment center, under the auspices of the Department of Justice.

Mr. COSTELLO. Purely a Department of Justice matter and not a relocation center?

Mr. MYER. I believe I am correct in that; at least, it is not a relocation center.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If they are prisoners of war, that would be under the Army.

Mr. MYER. That is right, and if it is an internment camp, it would be under the Department of Justice.

I think I should correct the record and say, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, Mr. Myer——

Mr. MYER. May I correct the record just a moment? I would rather have my statement taken off the record and say that we have no relationship to the Lordsburg center rather than go into the detail I did because I do not know the facts.

Mr. BURLING. May I state, Mr. Chairman, you are referring to the incident which was reported in the report of the California committee. The incident there reported took place in a camp operated by the Provost Marshal General and not by the Department of Justice.

There were persons, male Japanese, interned, and at the time the incident took place the Army has custody under the Provost Marshal General's supervision, and a handful of prisoners of war were, for a time, lodged in the same military camp as the civilian internees, but the only relationship of the Department of Justice to it was that the Attorney General directed the interment of the civilians.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as you know, Mr. Myer, were any of the Japanese evacuees ever allowed to have any contact with any of the Japanese prisoners of war by going to visit them and leaving the relocation center?

Mr. MYER. Not so far as I know in regard to prisoners of war. They have been allowed to go to internment camps, to visit people, civilians in internment camps but so far as I know, not to the others.

I might add, Mr. Costello, I am a little bit surprised at you not knowing that we did not have a relocation center at Lordsburg.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe also at the California office you have the various centers listed on a map showing the exact location.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, are the segregates permitted to leave the Tule Lake segregation center at any time? I am referring to them working at the farm.

Mr. MYER. We have in our plans for Tule Lake provisions for emergency short-term leave from Tule Lake as they would from internment camps or any place else, if the emergency requires, for such

reasons as family relationships, and things of that kind; beyond that, no, unless there are people who are still at Tule Lake who should be moved out to other centers, of which there are still a few at Tule Lake, and will be for some little time, perhaps.

Let me see if I can think of any other exceptions through the appeals board procedure.

Mr. STRIPLING. For instance, you said, or I understood you to say that in the case of whisky, if whisky was legal within a State, as it is in California, I understand, if for example a segregee obtained permission to leave either on emergency or some other cause and he returned to the camp, say, with two bottles of whisky, as he entered the camp would that be taken from him?

Mr. MYER. It would at Tule Lake; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. By the Army?

Mr. MYER. By the Army.

Mr. STRIPLING. By the Army or the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. By the Army, I presume, because they do the searching at Tule Lake when it comes to packages of any kind.

Mr. STRIPLING. But he would not be allowed to take the whisky into the camp?

Mr. MYER. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I have one other question. Somewhere in the testimony it was indicated that some of the office employees had gone on strike subsequent, I believe, to November 1. Have you any information on that or do you know whether they have returned to employment?

Mr. MYER. As far as I know there are no office employees that were on strike. I will be glad to check it and see whether there is any information on it.

Mr. COSTELLO. It might be a minor matter coming out of the general disturbance, but I believe somebody did make that statement, in the course of the testimony, that some of the office employees did go on strike.

Mr. MYER. All I would know about that would be this, on the afternoon of November 1, the evacuee employees who came to work left the building, some of them on the advice of our people.

Mr. COSTELLO. This did not have reference to that. This was an indication that subsequently there was a strike of office employees.

Mr. MYER. As far as I know, I have heard of no strike of office employees, but I will be glad to check it.

(Refer to appendix, p. 10209.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I ask if you will make available to us the statements of the 69 witnesses out there?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I think we have that here now. We only have one copy of the statement that was handed up to you that I read from, in relation to the incident of November 4. If I could have that back, I will be glad to supply you with another copy.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Myer, for coming down here for 2 days and going through the gruelling, grinding examination. We appreciate the testimony you have given here, because it is of interest to the committee to obtain the facts regarding the situation.

This committee is, of course, interested in remedying the various difficult situations and in trying to improve them so as not to have a recurrence of these bad disturbances.

That is what we are interested in trying to arrive at.

We appreciate your cooperation, and want to thank you for your testimony and the documents that you have submitted to the committee.

We will adjourn at this time until 10:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon at 5:30 p. m., the committee adjourned until tomorrow morning, Thursday, December 9, 1943, at 10:30 a. m.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 12 a. m., the Honorable John M. Costello, presiding.

Present: Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania, and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator.

Also present: Hon. Clair Engle, California; Hon. Richard J. Welch, California; and Hon. Francis Biddle, Attorney General.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Attorney General, we appreciate very much your coming down here on such a short notice. The committee would like to have from you some information in connection with the problem which we are discussing, particularly the question as to the possibility of the Department of Justice handling the Tule Lake camp.

It is my understanding that the Department of Justice does have a number of camps which they operate at the present time.

First, please explain to the committee the nature of those camps.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS BIDDLE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. BIDDLE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen; I have not prepared any formal statement.

We, in the Department, have given a great deal of consideration to this very difficult problem of the Japanese.

It would be impossible to discuss it intelligently by discussing merely the Tule Lake problem as separate from the other camps and from the other problems of the Japanese.

Now, first, in direct reply, Mr. Costello, to your question about the Department of Justice, the administration of the Japanese is not a very popular program for any department.

I had not envisaged taking it over, nor given it any thought of taking it over. However, I will do what I am told.

If the Congress or the President directs me to take it over, of course I will take it over and do the best I can with it. I do not want it. That is clear. So, that is the answer to your question.

I am a soldier and I do what I am told. I take orders.

When the war broke out I took up with the Secretary of War the whole problem of handling internees. I suggested to him that although in the last war the Army had handled the male internees, nevertheless I thought that the Department was equipped, on account of the familiarity with the Immigration Service, and with the handling of large groups of aliens, to handle all of the internments.

He thought, however, at that time, and it was so decided, that the Army should control the male internees, that is, aliens of the nations fighting the United States, in internment camps.

We, of course, acceded to that, but recently, last summer, he felt that he would prefer to turn over all of the internees to us.

We had been operating our camps with a good deal of success with no escapes, if I remember properly—or substantially none.

And the Army was perfectly satisfied.

Another advantage of that was that the operation was much cheaper; our unit costs are very low, so that we now have charge of all the internees, Italians, Germans, and Japanese.

We have, if I remember correctly, 10 internment camps now scattered throughout the United States. The Commissioner has visited all of them, and I have visited some of them.

I went up to Bismarck last year, where there are 1,200 Germans in camp, to inspect it personally.

They are, in many cases, under the direction of the Board of Patrol, or men who have come up through the Board of Patrol, and who make able administrators of that type of internment camp. So much for that.

Now, let me address myself to the background of this Japanese situation and the different aspects of it.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, there was no particular expression in the papers, or otherwise, for the internment of the Japs.

That started up about 3 months after Pearl Harbor. The actual exclusion, as I remember, started in May of 1942.

The problem was a problem of defense; a mixed problem of defense and law. What, precisely, could you do?

In view of the danger of a possible attack on the west coast, with rumors of submarines—and probably, in some instances, there were submarines off the west coast—and a possible attack by air, it was their determination that it was unsafe to permit the concentration of large numbers of Japanese, whether Americans or Japanese in citizenship, in the great western centers, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, and other centers.

They consulted us with respect to the legality of it.

As the result of these consultations, the President issued an Executive order or proclamation, under which he permitted and directed the Secretary of War and the commanders of the various areas, to exclude persons, not specifying Japanese, but to exclude any persons who were inimical or dangerous from a given area.

Now, the legal basis of that was very clear. You can exclude from any comparatively small area, like a plant with a fence around it, citizens or noncitizens, alike. That is perfectly sound.

However, as that area is enlarged, the matter becomes more questionable.

In any event, approximately 110,000 Japanese were excluded from the west coast. All that the Army wanted done was to exclude them.

The Army was not interested with what would be done with the Japanese after they were excluded. The War Relocation Authority was organized for the purpose of handling the Japs, giving them a place of asylum after they had been excluded, and eventually finding homes for them throughout the country.

Now, of those 110,000, approximately 75 percent are American citizens by reason of birth in the United States, and approximately 25 percent are Japanese.

Of the 25 percent of the Japanese residents, the average age is 50, so that you will see that that group is steadily being decreased and that the American group is being steadily increased.

Consequently, our recent problem, I will have to emphasize again, is the handling of the American citizens, and particularly the so-called Kibei Japanese, who were born in the United States and who were sent to Japan for their education, who were inculcated with the Japanese Imperial ideals, and who have come back here with their first loyalty to Japan, their only loyalty to Japan, in many cases.

Now, before going on to some of the other questions here—and I will be as brief as possible and then you may wish to ask me questions—let me refer for a moment to the legal problem, because that is a very serious one and goes largely to the basis of this whole thing.

One case, one test case, has come up to the Supreme Court; the *Hirabayashi* case. That was decided last spring. The Supreme Court sustained it.

That case decided solely and only this, that an order issued by the commander of the west-coast area requiring that the Japanese should be in their houses at a certain time, it being a curfew order, was, under all the circumstances existing at that time when the order was made, at about the time that the exclusion started, constitutional.

However, several members of the Supreme Court, including Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy, went on record with a concurring opinion, saying that the legality of the order depended on the circumstances at the time, and, if those circumstances were changed, indicated that the Supreme Court might take a different view.

Mr. Justice Murphy said that the decision went up to the brink of constitutionality, and there was strong language in Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion, also.

They did not decide whether the Japanese could be excluded from the west coast in large numbers. I am speaking now of citizens.

It is obvious you can do anything you want with an alien.

You can intern him. That question will probably shortly come up to the Supreme Court, because the ninth circuit has very recently sustained the exclusion of the Japanese under those circumstances.

And, in my opinion, I think that would be sustained.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Japanese citizens?

Mr. BIDDLE. No. I am talking about an American citizen.

That is not the case with the Japanese citizen. You can do almost anything you want to with him. You can lock him up without any trial. He is an alien. He can be interned. That is clear.

The real problem is the American citizen, with which we have difficulty.

Can you take an American citizen out of his home for the purpose of national defense? I am inclined to think that that will be sustained, on account of the difficulty, but I say that with a great deal of doubt.

The next problem is very much more difficult, and that is the problem of holding or interning an American citizen in a camp after he has been excluded, and that I have the very gravest doubt about, the very gravest doubt, that any Government could pick out a citizen on the general ground that his race is a dangerous race and shut him up. I think it is very, very doubtful, constitutionally.

I do not want to go further into that, because I may have to argue that case, so I do not want to commit myself too much. That is a legal question.

Now, the War Relocation Authority has no legal, technical right of interning any American citizen. I think that is one of the profound misunderstandings of the nature and function of W. R. A.

They were set up to afford these people a place where they could go temporarily before they found somewhere else a place where they could live.

It is, if you want to call it such, an authority based on relocation, a social service to the Japanese. That was the purpose and essence of it.

And I know of no authority in any Executive order giving them the authority, the right, to hold a man against his will in the centers.

Now, actually speaking, they are so held. The reason, so far as I know, that there have been comparatively no writs of habeas corpus is because the Japanese are worried, they are frightened by going into other parts of the country and understand, in most cases, that this is being done for them.

All right. Now, let us come to the problem of the administration of those camps by Mr. Myer or W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I interrupt at this point, Mr. Attorney General?

Mr. BIDDLE. At any time; surely.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say they are so held. Is it not a fact that the War Relocation Authority is endeavoring to relocate the Japanese elsewhere, and the main reason the Japanese are retained in these existing centers is because of the inability to find places where the Japanese might be relocated?

Mr. BIDDLE. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or the lack of desire on the part of the Japanese to go into strange communities?

Mr. BIDDLE. Exactly. And it is a slow and patient thing. It is a mass movement. You find homes for them in dozens of communities where they are absolute strangers. You must remember that 130,000 Japanese is a drop in a bucket in a population of 130,000,000 if they are not concentrated.

Being concentrated, that is the shocking thing. Obviously they cannot be concentrated in any large number, so it must be a slow, patient effort to handle these men.

Please, gentlemen, do not hesitate to interrupt me at any time I am not clear.

Now, a little bit about the W. R. A. I think it is fair to say, then, that their effort is relocation. It is not their job and their authority to do a policing job. It is a relocation job, fundamentally and essentially, and I think a misunderstanding of that function has been the basis for a large part of the misunderstanding of what they have been able to do.

Is Mr. Myer here?

Mr. COSTELLO. No.

Mr. BIDDLE. If I am wrong, he will correct me on this, but I think they have relocated about 20,000 in the whole program. That is a very substantial number.

I understand that they now relocate them with two things happening: One is that they screen them to see if there is danger in relocating them; to see whether they are loyal Japanese, to put it very simply. The other is that they do not force them on the community. They are very careful to check with the community and work out the problem so that they see the program will work in the community centers before they are sent out.

Now, let me say, gentlemen, that I have not made any study of the administration of W. R. A. and I have no opinion whether it is good or bad, or anything else.

I do know that Mr. Myer is putting into effect the policy of the United States to relocate these Japanese, and it seems to me that he is doing it patiently and carefully.

As to the administration of the individual camps, I have no opinion because I have not got the facts before me and, until I have the facts, I do not know. I cannot give you an opinion.

Now, the problem is a long-term one. It is one that must be considered not simply in what you are going to do one day and at one camp.

Tule Lake has become a symbol of a great deal of excitement over this problem, but the problem goes into all of the camps and goes into our future policy.

Now, in order to determine that policy, you must first have a decision on facts. My own opinion is that there are loyal Japanese and disloyal Japanese; that there are both kinds. I have had very little dealings with Japanese and therefore am a little chary about giving my opinion. I do not know very much about them, but I am basing it largely on the opinion of men who do know.

For example, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, who has been barnstorming the country, telling the people what a brutal, tough enemy we have in Japan, ruthless, hard, and cruel, says this about the Japanese in America [according to newspaper article]:

Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, pleaded in an address last night for fair treatment of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent.

He further said:

Pleading that a distinction be made between enemy aliens and loyal Americans of Japanese extraction, Mr. Grew maintained that "like the Americans of German descent, the overwhelming majority of Americans of Japanese origin wish to be and are wholly loyal to the United States, and not only that, but they wish to prove that loyalty in service to their native land. * * *

"What I wish to say is merely this," Mr. Grew declared, "those Americans of Japanese descent have grown up in our country, in our democratic atmosphere.

Most of them have never known anything else. Among those few who have been to Japan, most of them could not stand the life there, and soon returned to the United States."

That is particularly the Kibei he is referring to there.

The overwhelming majority of those men want to be loyal to us, and perhaps, surprisingly, the few who don't want to be loyal to us often say so openly. It does not make for loyalty to be constantly under suspicion when grounds for suspicion are absent.

Therefore you have to determine first your fact as to whether there are loyal Japanese and disloyal Japanese, and I am convinced that there are loyal Japanese and I am convinced that there are disloyal Japanese.

When you determine that, you must secure the loyal from the disloyal.

Now, that can easily be done with Japanese citizens, people who were not born here, because they can be interned, and we are interning them. We are interning them on the basis, however, of natural safety.

If we consider that a man's background shows that he is unsafe or should be interned, we intern him.

And we will not always give him the benefit of the case.

If it is a doubtful case, we intern him.

Now, we do that through a procedure of F. B. I. examinations, which are taken to a review board in his community, and the review board makes a recommendation to me and I make the final determination or recommendation.

In most instances I follow the review board, but in a small percentage of cases I overrule them.

A man can either be interned, he can be paroled, or he can be discharged. We are constantly sifting and watching and going over those records as thoroughly as possible, the first consideration being the defense of our country, so as to take no possible chance under any circumstances.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many aliens have been interned, all told?

Mr. BIDDLE. About 6,000, Mr. Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. And of those, how many are Japanese?

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, of them, 1,500 to 2,000. If the committee would like, I can furnish them with exact figures.

Mr. COSTELLO. I just want a general estimate.

Mr. BIDDLE. Now, those include, however, quite a good many Italians and Germans sent up from South America, the troublemakers we have taken because of the dangerous situation in South America, and some from Hawaii.

We felt better, after a very careful screening process, to put them in our concentration camps, because South America at one time was a hot bed of espionage and propaganda, and through very careful work with the State Department and the Latin-American republics we have interned some of those, so they are included in that group.

Mr. COSTELLO. These aliens who are interned are not mixed in the centers, are they?

Mr. BIDDLE. No; separate centers. There are 1,798 Japs who have been interned, 1,853 Germans, and only now 111 Italians; which is rather interesting.

Well, that is the problem.

Now, there is one other point that I would like to make, particularly, and that is the point which doubtless the State Department has made in executive session, and I do not think it would inappropriate for me here in a public session to at least touch on the outline of the effect of treatment of Japanese in this country in relation to its impact on Japanese treatment of Americans.

I think there is no doubt, from men that I have talked to, and I talked to Mr. Edgar Hoover about this this morning, and he confirms what I am going to say, that the treatment by the Japanese authorities of our interned citizens—and I am not speaking of soldiers, but of our interned citizens particularly—from the reports of the men who came over on the *Gripsholm* a week ago, has been good; good food, good lodging, fair treatment; strict discipline but fair treatment.

There is absolutely no doubt that Japan is watching very closely our treatment of the interned Japanese. There have been radio broadcasts from Tokyo within the last few days by Japan, saying they were watching the Tule Lake situation with grave concern.

For instance, one reason I would think it would be inadvisable for the Army to take over these camps, as was suggested, is that that might, and probably would mean that the Army would take over the interned Americans in Japan. And that treatment would be very much worse, as is known, and therefore, I think that ought to be averted.

All of these things can be exaggerated. It is a matter of balancing the various factors in as cool and level-headed a way as you can, and seeing the whole picture.

Take the situation at Tule Lake. Tule Lake comprises a population of approximately 15,000 Japanese, of which perhaps a couple of thousand are Kibei, and therefore are certainly disloyal.

Whether they are dangerous or not is an entirely different question.

It is a problem of whether or not that very large group of Japanese, doing substantially nothing, should be concentrated in that area or whether or not a special area for the disaffected Japanese should not be very much considered.

It is pretty serious, having a large number of men with nothing to do, walking around with their hands in their pockets. That might be considered.

It is a difficult problem of administration, I think. There is one thing that, as Members of Congress, you might consider worthy of consideration.

A number of bills have been introduced for the treatment of Japanese, many of which are doubtful constitutionally, and some are close to the edge.

This, however, I think, might be considered: Take, for instance, Japanese-Americans who have said, as these men openly say, "We are loyal to Japan and do not want to be Americans." There is no reason why their citizenship should not be renounced under an appropriate statute. There is no statute for that purpose, but there is no reason that should not be done.

In other words, in wartime, gentlemen, it is inappropriate for a man to choose loyalty, and where he wishes to choose the Japanese loyalty he should be able to renounce his United States citizenship.

His citizenship would then be removed and he would become an alien and could be interned, and there would be no legal problem left with that.

If that approach were made, that might be the proper approach to the very nucleus of this problem, which comprises the Kibei.

It seems to me, from my point of view as a lawyer, and from the point of view of you gentlemen who are looking at it from the practical problem of protection and community dissatisfaction, that may be a practical approach.

I have not developed it, and it might be very interesting for some of you gentlemen to consider that approach.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you have a personal opinion, Mr. Biddle, that a person born in America can be deprived of his citizenship?

Mr. BIDDLE. Oh, yes; by voluntary expatriation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is no present act under which that could be done?

Mr. BIDDLE. No act; quite right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But if Congress passed an act to that effect—

Mr. BIDDLE. Now wait. We have acts now which provide that where a man, born in America, lives a certain length of time abroad, he automatically loses it. We have acts clearly indicating where he joins the army of a foreign nation he loses it, or where he declares.

But I do not think we will have any constitutional difficulty. It is purely a matter of proper drafting.

I might add two items. One is, I understand, that every one of these war relocation centers, not only Tule Lake but all of them—and again, if there is a representative here, he can correct me for, as I say, I am not very familiar with the details—is protected by the Army.

They brought in additional troops at Tule Lake because they needed them.

I might say, also, the F. B. I. does not sit on any board. We furnish W. R. A. with the information we have and then they use it. They get that information. But the men are not furloughed out of the camps without the approval of the representative of the Army sitting on the board with the W. R. A. I think that is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, Mr. Biddle, the Army is devoted mainly to the external protection.

Mr. BIDDLE. External entirely. And I am speaking of external protection. In other words, there has not been much danger or difficulty of the communities themselves suffering. The main thing is in the camps.

Now, gentlemen, I think we ought to remember that in any large concentration of men you are going to have trouble.

This illustration, I think, is very interesting. Somebody asked General White that question at that executive meeting we had, and he said: "You put a lot of men in a center and they get in line at a post office or a cafeteria, and one steps on another's toes, there will be some beating up going on. I would like to compare the physical encounters in relocation centers with a given number of Army camps and see where there has been the most disturbance."

There was trouble in Manzanar last year and two or three fellows shot; but I think there has been comparatively little physical threat.

I say it with some doubt, because I am not thoroughly familiar with it, and you gentlemen know more about it, even at Tule Lake just the doctor was beaten up and he beat the Japanese up in the hospital.

I do not know of any other physical injuries in all that disturbance out there, though there may be some.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A total of three, I think.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the big problem in most of the centers is that internally there appears to be a lack of policing force to guarantee the safety, both of the Japanese who are concentrated in the camp as well as the employees who are employed to administer the camp, even though the Army is outside of the camp.

I think that is one of the big defects.

Mr. BIDDLE. That may be, and that may spring from Mr. Myers' approach to this as his job in the resettlement and perhaps having put emphasis on that and not working the other problem out quite completely yet.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe you said that American citizens are held by the Japanese under strict disciplinary control.

Mr. BIDDLE. Very.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is one thing that is most important. It does not have to be brutal or harsh, but it has to be strict.

Mr. BIDDLE. Oh, they are very, very careful, Mr. Costello, about adhering to the Geneva Convention in reference to feeding these people and housing them under the Geneva Convention, which establishes matters of wages, and all of that. It is very strictly followed, and followed by us very carefully.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand the scale of feeding and clothing is in keeping with the people of the country, rather than that of the people of the country from which they came.

Mr. BIDDLE. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Which means that the Americans held by the Japanese are administered by Japanese standards.

Mr. BIDDLE. No; that is true in the Army. As I understand it, one of the difficulties with the Army is that they are given so little food. They are given rice and a few other things, but not the internees. The Japanese have given them adequate food and adequate housing, to all accounts.

They have given them housing and clothes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that required by the Geneva Conference for citizens?

Mr. BIDDLE. I would say that the Japanese have gone, in the treatment of internees, far beyond the requirements of the Geneva Conference.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you cannot criticize the Japanese Government because the food which they do give to American citizens over there is not the same standard, and so forth, that the American citizen would be accustomed to here in America?

Mr. BIDDLE. Well, I think that is true. They probably have not got it, but they give them much better food than they are required to give the soldiers under the Geneva Convention; there is no doubt about that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Biddle, if one of these Japanese-Americans in the Tule Lake center, say, American-born, would bring a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal court, the Department of Justice would

then be under the necessity of showing to the Federal court the reason why he is being detained at Tule Lake without the privilege of freedom of movement outside of the camp?

Mr. BIDDLE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What would the Department of Justice do under those circumstances?

Mr. BIDDLE. As I say, there is a test case that will probably come up, involving that very question.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the Department of Justice would have to prove that in open court?

Mr. BIDDLE. I do not like to prophesy too much as to just what my record and brief will be, Mr. Eberharter, because you understand that. But I do say that it is a very tough case to try; I mean, I do not really want to be bound down by just what I am going to prove, just what judicial notice will be taken, just what arguments I am going to use.

I do not want to put myself in a position where one of the eminent justices will say, "You said before a committee of Congress such and such. You are saying the opposite now."

I want to have a little freedom, if you do not mind.

But it is a tough problem.

Mr. EBERHARTER. At any rate, you would be under the necessity of presenting in open court, the facts upon which you base the right of the Government to detain that person?

Mr. BIDDLE. Precisely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know of any instance, Mr. Biddle, of a Japanese desiring to leave any of the other relocation centers, who has been restrained from doing so?

Mr. BIDDLE. I do not know of any, off-hand.

There are one or two test cases which seem to be coming up.

I might say this, and I think this is very significant.

We have told W. R. A. where a man was parolled and let out of camp and then it turned out, on subsequent information, that he was a man who perhaps ought to be in camp, that we would not arrest him because not having committed any crime we would be powerless to arrest an individual and send him back to camp; powerless; no jurisdiction.

I am assuming he is a citizen, of course.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement you care to make, Mr. Biddle?

Mr. BIDDLE. No, Mr. Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your taking time out from your lunch hour, Mr. Biddle, to come here and give this committee this information.

Thank you very much.

The committee will now adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee adjourned.)

INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., the Honorable John M. Costello, presiding.

Present: Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Hon. Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; and Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator. Also present: Hon. Clair Engle, California, and R. R. Best.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

The purpose of our hearing today is that I understood Mr. Best, the director of the Tule Lake segregation center, was going to be in the city, and I thought it might be well for the committee to have his statement regarding the events that transpired out there at that time, in view of the fact that Mr. Best was the director of that particular project.

Will Mr. Best please come forward?

SWORN STATEMENT OF R. R. BEST, PROJECT DIRECTOR, TULE LAKE CENTER

Mr. COSTELLO. Please state your full name to the reporter.

Mr. BEST. R. R. Best.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Stripling.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, what is your present position with War Relocation Authority?

Mr. BEST. Project director, Tule Lake center.

Mr. STRIPLING. Project director of the Tule Lake segregation center?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; the Tule Lake center, as we officially term it.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long have you been employed by the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. BEST. Since April 23, 1942. I think it was on the 25th; I beg your pardon. April 25.

Mr. STRIPLING. What different positions have you held since April 25?

Mr. BEST. Transportation and supply officer, project director at Moab, Utah, and at Leupp, Ariz., before coming to Tule Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. And on what date did you take over as director at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. August 1, 1943.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, will you give the committee a brief outline of your educational and professional background?

Mr. BEST. I graduated from high school, Los Angeles, Calif. I had no further education in colleges or schools from that time on.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you also outline to the committee your professional background; what positions you have held?

Mr. BEST. From 1913 to 1917 I was assistant cashier of the Bank of Clallam, Port Angeles, Wash.

I served 4 years in the United States Marine Corps.

Upon coming out of the Marine Corps I was president and general manager of a general merchandise store in Salvation, Idaho.

I continued as such until, I believe, it was 1929. I then became associated with the Continental Oil Co. and an automobile agency, Chevrolet Motor Co.

I worked for the United States Department of Commerce, and the United States Weather Bureau in southeastern Idaho, at the time the National Parks Airways was initiated or organized between Salt Lake City and Great Falls, Mont.

In 1934 I worked for the Federal land bank at Spokane as land appraiser in 17 southeastern Idaho counties.

On February 6, 1935, I went to work for the Department of Agriculture at Malad City, Idaho, as chief appraiser for all land that was acquired under submarginal land purchases.

I was then made project manager for the project that optioned all of that land, and we relocated 105 farm families from that area to other areas. The land was then converted to a grazing area and was put into grazing operation, all of which was under my supervision and direction.

I was, on April 25, 1942, at that position, when I was called to San Francisco to take the position with War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you assumed your duties as director of the Tule Lake center in August, what was the population of the Tule Lake center?

Mr. BEST. Fifteen thousand, one hundred, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the present population?

Mr. BEST. Fourteen thousand, eight hundred and some.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you assumed your duties there, were there any strikes in process among the evacuees?

Mr. BEST. At the time I arrived?

Mr. STRIPLING. At the time you arrived.

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. When did the first strike occur?

Mr. BEST. Possibly, it could have been 2 weeks. It was possibly a week or two after I got there.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was that strike about?

Mr. BEST. Coal; the unloading of coal.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many evacuees were involved in that strike?

Mr. BEST. I do not just recall, but I believe it was around 70—65 or 70, at that particular time.

Mr. STRIPLING. How was the strike settled?

Mr. BEST. I terminated everybody that was on the coal crew after they refused to work for 3 days. I called the foreman into my office and we discussed the matter and settled the matter.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was the foreman an evacuee or Caucasian?

Mr. BEST. Evacuee.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did any of the 70 men return to work?

Mr. BEST. Yes. So far as I know, a lot of them did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were they paid during the period of the strike?

Mr. BEST. Oh, no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is it the policy of the W. R. A. to pay the evacuees during the period of a strike—during the negotiations?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether they have ever been paid during such a period?

Mr. BEST. No; I do not know that they have.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the next strike which occurred, Mr. Best, at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. It was on the farm.

Mr. STRIPLING. And when did that occur?

Mr. BEST. October 15.

Mr. STRIPLING. What brought on that strike?

Mr. BEST. A truck accident.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it settled?

Mr. BEST. Well, there has nobody worked at the farm since, so, answering your question, I would not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many evacuees were involved in that farm strike?

Mr. BEST. I think that was in excess of 400.

Mr. STRIPLING. Four hundred. How many acres of various vegetables and crops were under cultivation at the Tule Lake center?

Mr. BEST. I do not have those figures exactly in my mind, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Approximately how many?

Mr. BEST. Well, there are roughly 4,000 acres of agricultural land. It was not all in crops, so I would say possibly 600 acres were involved in which they were striking at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that during the period of the harvesting season?

Mr. BEST. No. The harvest had been started as far as potatoes were concerned. Other vegetable crops were harvested daily for consumption.

Mr. STRIPLING. What steps did you take as project director to save these crops after the strike was in progress?

Mr. BEST. I made an attempt to discuss why they did not come back to work.

Mr. STRIPLING. Your negotiations were not successful, then?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was eventually done to save the crops?

Mr. BEST. We brought in around 200—250 Japanese from other centers.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they completely and satisfactorily harvest the crops?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Without any loss, or unusual loss?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. On October 26 did a delegation or a committee purporting to represent the evacuees call upon you?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you state for the committee, briefly, their requests or demands or grievances which they presented to you?

Mr. BEST. On October 26?

Mr. STRIPLING. On October 26.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; they made several demands. Among them was the improvement of road conditions, the improvement of porches on their houses, the improvement of the latrine service, improvements in the hospital, to the effect that the Caucasian doctors and nurses were to be dismissed.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they submit these in the nature of a request or demands?

Mr. BEST. I assumed that they were demands.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you interpret them as demands?

Mr. BEST. I did, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you accede to any of their demands?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they demand your resignation?

Mr. BEST. The transcript of that meeting is the best evidence. I do not believe they demanded my resignation until the November 1 meeting; I am not sure. I have not read it lately. They may have demanded mine at that time, but I rather think that was when the director was there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you consider the demands which this committee made upon you to be reasonable?

Mr. BEST. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think all of the demands were unreasonable?

Mr. BEST. That was my interpretation.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, the coal strike and the farm strike—were they the only two strikes that occurred?

Mr. BEST. Since I have been there; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following your meeting with the committee on October 26, did you get in touch with the National Director, Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Regarding this matter?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And it was in conference with him that you decided to bring in the outside evacuees to harvest the crops?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you feel, by this committee making these unreasonable demands, that they were attempting to stir up the evacuee colony?

Mr. BEST. Did I think they were?

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you consider that?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time, Mr. Best, how many men were on the internal security staff?

Mr. BEST. I believe there were seven.

Mr. STRIPLING. Does that include Mr. Schmidt?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. The director of internal security for the entire W. R. A.?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, he was not a permanent member?

Mr. BEST. Well, he came with me; I brought him here with me.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean seven Caucasians?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you consider that to be sufficient to maintain order within the center and to keep you apprised of what was happening?

Mr. BEST. At that particular time; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You considered seven people sufficient to police and report as to any underground activities of some 15,000 people?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time you say you considered it?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you now consider it to be sufficient?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What number do you think would be sufficient now?

Mr. BEST. Well, there are now 66 positions approved, of which we are trying to fill those positions as fast as we can get men.

Mr. STRIPLING. You think that the addition of the 66 that you expect will be sufficient?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Prior to November 1, had you ever requested any additional Caucasian guards?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. No request was made?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. When did you conclude that the 7 were insufficient and 66 were desired?

Mr. BEST. At the time it was found out what their approach was.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean after the so-called riot or disturbance?

Mr. BEST. On November 4; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Up until November 4, then, you had not contemplated increasing the number of Caucasian guards?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How about on November 2; did you still consider that seven were sufficient?

Mr. BEST. No. On November 2 we had definitely made plans to have more.

Mr. STRIPLING. Immediate plans?

Mr. BEST. By "immediate plans," what do you mean by that?

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, were you convinced after the happenings of November 1 that seven internal-security officers were not sufficient to maintain order within the camp? Did you arrive at that conclusion after November 1?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did you take any definite immediate steps to bring in more officers for the 2d, 3d, and 4th?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many more were brought in on the 2d?

Mr. BEST. They did not arrive on the 2d, but I think we asked for either 10 or 11. They did not get there on the 2d or 3d.

Mr. STRIPLING. Or 4th.

Mr. BEST. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Or now.

Mr. BEST. Yes; there was one there on the 4th, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. So you had 8 on the 4th?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. It is under the control of the Army now; is that right?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many internal officers are there at Tule Lake at this time?

Mr. BEST. Now? When I left I know there were 9; and there are several in the process of reporting. We are attempting to recruit from three different locations, and I can not tell you how many are there today.

Mr. STRIPLING. Prior to the occurrence of November 1, did you have any knowledge, either from informers or from the security officers, or from any source, that there was a so-called underground movement within the camp to stir up discord which would culminate in a riot or in the occurrence which happened on November 1?

Mr. BEST. Only with my contact with the committee; knowing what they were attempting to do is all I had.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you anticipate the occurrence of November 1?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Before we leave the number of guards you are trying to recruit, which you stated was 66, I am intrigued by the number 66. How did you happen to determine that that particular number should be 66 instead of whether it should be 60, 65, 70, or 75? There must be some reason why you had 66.

Mr. BEST. Mr. Schmidt, our national security officer, worked out a program for relief, an hourly, daily, and weekly schedule clear through a monthly period, and with the program that he initiated to go into effect, arrived at around 66, and at that time that is why we asked for 66 approvals.

Mr. MUNDT. How many does that contemplate will serve on any one shift?

Mr. BEST. I am not sure, but it means there is someone on 24 hours a day with the proper relief.

Mr. MUNDT. Around 20 to a shift, would you say, coupled with the relief?

Mr. BEST. I would say that; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And when you had only seven men employed in that capacity, did that mean that you had in some shifts only two or three white Caucasian guards?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. What did your experience indicate as to the shifts in a camp of that kind; that you need the maximum number of guards during the day, during the night, or when?

Mr. BEST. It will not matter after we get the guards, if and when we take it over, because there is a central fence through the colony through which only so many will ever go under Army passes at any

time, so it does not make any difference whether it is day or night, or when.

Mr. MUNDT. A central fence through which?

Mr. BEST. Through the colony.

Mr. MUNDT. Which divides the Japanese and white people?

Mr. BEST. It divides the administration area from the evacuee area.

Mr. MUNDT. You contemplate having a white police force in that Japanese enclosure, do you not?

Mr. BEST. At times, in patrol cars; radio patrol cars.

Mr. MUNDT. But not as a matter of general policy. You plan, then, as I understand it, is, if and when you assume complete control of the camp, that within the Japanese enclosure, the Japanese will set up their own security force?

Mr. BEST. We will set it up for them.

Mr. MUNDT. You will set it up for them?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. But it will be comprised of Japanese?

Mr. BEST. In that area.

Mr. MUNDT. And you do not contemplate having any white security officers, permanently stationed inside of that partition? The whites will simply go in there in patrol cars occasionally to see how things are handled?

Mr. BEST. Right.

Mr. MUNDT. Therefore your 66 internal security officers of the Caucasian race will function on the white side of the fence for the protection of the staff and the W. R. A. personnel?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, coming up to the events of November 1, will you describe briefly to the committee the circumstances under which the evacuees gathered around the administration building on November 1?

Mr. BEST. I do not know how to answer your question.

You want to know how they came up there?

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the first knowledge you had that they were, so-called, moving on the administration area?

Mr. BEST. One of our Caucasian employees told me that it was announced in the mess hall at 12:20 that they were to all come to the administration building to hear Director Myer speak.

Mr. STRIPLING. At what time did you hear that?

Mr. BEST. 12:30 or 12:40; somewhere along in there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you take any steps to prevent that?

Mr. BEST. To prevent them from coming?

Mr. STRIPLING. That is right.

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Had Mr. Myer announced that he would speak?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You knew that he had not intended to speak, did you not?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Nevertheless, you proceeded, or you permitted them to proceed with their plans of congregating there?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that your decision or the decision of Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. No. I think we probably decided that together. I informed him and we probably decided it together.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you give the committee the reasons for your decision to permit them to continue to gather, even though you knew in advance that they planned to do so?

Mr. BEST. I do not get that question; please repeat it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you explain to the committee your reason in permitting the evacuees to come and congregate at the administration building when there was no purpose for them doing it; in other words, if Mr. Myer was not going to speak, why were they coming there? You said you made no steps to stop them.

Mr. BEST. No. I would not have known how to do it.

Mr. STRIPLING. You would not have known how to do it?

Mr. BEST. That is right. They were on their way up by the time that I knew it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you, as the director of the camp, were helpless to keep them from it; is that true?

Mr. BEST. But the Army could have been called in.

Mr. STRIPLING. I know, but I am speaking now of the camp; of the center.

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were helpless to do anything about it?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not think it was advisable at that time to call in the Army?

Mr. BEST. No; I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. There has been considerable testimony before the committee, Mr. Best, about the crowd gathering around the administration building area. Estimates have ranged from 3,000 up to 10,000, as to the number of people there.

But, after the crowd gathered there, and the committee of 17 called upon you and Mr. Myer, did you consider that the evacuees were in physical control of the camp, of the center, at that time?

Mr. BEST. At that time, no; I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were the Caucasian employees of the center free to go and come as they wished at that time?

Mr. BEST. As far as I knew; yes. I have heard conflicting stories since that time. As far as I knew, I had reason to think that they were, because the young lady who furnished our transcript of the meeting came from another building.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you notice anything unusual within the administration building?

Mr. BEST. No; I did not. I was only in my office, you understand.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did you not go out of your office at any time?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; only when the meeting was over, when I spoke on the microphone.

Mr. STRIPLING. You made no examination yourself to determine the state of affairs in the administration building?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. As to whether people were being forced into the building?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not know whether anybody was forced in the building?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, from your subsequent investigation, which I am sure you have made since that time, have you concluded that people were there against their will?

Mr. BEST. There were some people that stated very definitely that they were there against their will.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many people do you know who stated that they were there of their own accord and could have left if they had wanted to?

Mr. BEST. Well, we interviewed the people who were in the building, or had any intimate knowledge of this and we have that information.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how many that you know of stated to you, when you interviewed them, that they did not consider themselves to be prisoners of the evacuees in the building, and that they could have left when they wanted to, and that they did not have to go there in the first instance; that is, according to the statements which you supplied to Mr. Myer, the 69 interviews?

Mr. BEST. There are two that testified that they were permitted to leave and return.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who were those two individuals; the names?

Mr. BEST. One I know was Miss Battat.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is her position at the camp?

Mr. BEST. She is a secretary.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who is the other person?

Mr. BEST. Mrs. Silverthorn.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are they the only two that you know of who stated that they were permitted to leave?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many do you think were brought there and placed in the administration building?

Mr. BEST. Two, to my knowledge.

Mr. STRIPLING. Only two people were brought there?

Mr. BEST. That were actually brought there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who were they?

Mr. BEST. They were school teachers; I do not recall their names.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how many Caucasian employees were in the administration building on the afternoon of November 1?

Mr. BEST. I do not know that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what did your investigation disclose as to how many were there?

Mr. BEST. I would say there were probably 100 in there; maybe less. I do not know exactly.

Mr. COSTELLO. Speak a little louder so that we can hear you.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Normally, how many would be there?

Mr. BEST. I do not know, sir. You see, our offices are scattered and I do not know how many are in the administration building. You could say there were probably 100.

Mr. STRIPLING. Leaving the administration building for a minute, do you think or do you consider that the Japanese were in control of the hospital at any time after 1 p. m. on November 1?

Mr. BEST. It has never been said that they were in control of the hospital.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether the Japanese were ever in control of the exits in and out of the hospital?

Mr. BEST. Just one exit.

Mr. STRIPLING. Which one was that?

Mr. BEST. The entrance to Dr. Pedicord's office.

Mr. STRIPLING. I mean the exits in and out of the center; the gates.

Mr. BEST. Oh, the gates?

Mr. STRIPLING. Of the center.

Mr. BEST. I thought you said "hospital." I beg your pardon.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, I am speaking now of the gates.

Mr. BEST. The gates of the center?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. BEST. No; the Army has control of all gates at the center.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, at that point I would like to read from the statement which Mr. Myer submitted to the committee when he testified of Mr. Frank D. Fagar, personnel officer, at the Tule Lake center. He says:

I have been on the project for 18 months as placement officer. The title of acting personnel officer is just a few days old. In answer to your questions as to what I observed concerning the recent incidents I can tell you the following stories:

At 2, Monday, November 1, comes the first affair. I phoned the office and Schmidt suggested that I leave by way of the back gate. I took my car and went to the back gate at the opposite end of the project and found it locked. A soldier was on regular guard duty.

Within 10 minutes of my arrival a truckload of young Japanese boys came up in a stake truck. The soldier asked me what to do. The Japanese boys said to him that they had come to guard the gate and see that no one came in or left. The boys didn't say a single word to me. Within 15 minutes two more truckloads arrived, making three trucks in all. I judged that there were about 15 fellows on the back of each truck. They ran one of the trucks back against the gate to prevent anyone from leaving, and during this time, also, not one word was said to me. They ran the truck up apparently to keep me from going out the gate.

Soon after the arrival of the first truck a jeep arrived and saw what was happening and they got in touch with headquarters. It took about 15 minutes for an Army truck of 6 men with tommy guns to arrive. They were ordered to the tower and soon after their arrival, an officer arrived in a jeep. In the meantime the Japanese boys had sat on the ground. They were all there and under the aim of the tommy gunners.

The colonel who had arrived asked the tommy gunners if they were ready and then opened the gate. The truck was pushed away from the gate by the soldiers. Then I went, with two soldiers, to my car which was about 20 feet away. No person on the ground did anything. I drove the car out of the gate and drove to the front of the project area where I remained until the November 1 meeting was over.

Do you know whether or not similar incidents occurred at the other entrances to the center, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. No; I do not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what did your investigation disclose?

Mr. BEST. Well, there are only three gates. There are only three gates to the center. Two of them are locked. The other has an Army

guard on it. The two locked gates have a walking guard. We do not have anything to do with the gates.

I might explain the other two gates. One is where they take the garbage out and the other is where they go to the sewer system. They are both locked by the Army.

Mr. STRIPLING. Going back to the hospital now, when was it first reported to you that something was happening at the hospital?

Mr. BEST. Shortly after 1:30.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who informed you of that?

Mr. BEST. I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how did you receive the information?

Mr. BEST. Telephone call.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not know who called you? What did they state?

Mr. BEST. They were very excited. They said Dr. Pedicord had been beaten, property was being damaged, and boys were running up and down the hall; send somebody over right away. I think that was the telephone call.

Mr. STRIPLING. In response to that, what did you do?

Mr. BEST. I turned to the committee, and my statement in the transcript is in evidence, and that is what I said to them; that Dr. Pedicord was being beaten, and it had to be stopped.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had the meeting started at that time?

Mr. BEST. I beg your pardon?

Mr. COSTELLO. Had the meeting started at that time, when you got this first call?

Mr. BEST. We were all in the room, and whenever I have a meeting, I always get everybody's signature and their address, their name and address before we go any place, and that was being done at that particular time, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You had officially started the meeting, then, at that moment?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; and I took the signatures. They were all on the tablet.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask one other question right at this point. You and Mr. Myer took a ride around the project before you came to the administration building for this meeting?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had any crowd gathered at the administration building when you returned?

Mr. BEST. They were just coming up to the area when we drove up, and we left our car right by the office.

Mr. COSTELLO. You then went right into your office?

Mr. BEST. We went right into our office, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And from that time you paid no more attention to the crowd?

Mr. BEST. We watched the crowd come up; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you paid no more attention to them after you went into the office?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You paid no attention to what they were doing or inquired why they were coming there?

Mr. BEST. Well, I knew why they were coming; at least, I had been informed of that.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. When this crowd gathered, following the noon hour, did the evacuee employees in the administration building leave?

Mr. BEST. They had come to work, and in some departments the Caucasian people told them to leave, and I am told in another wing the Japanese boys came in and asked them to come outside.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether or not a number of them received phone calls from Japanese outside, instructing them to leave?

Mr. BEST. No; I do not know anything about that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Has that been brought to your attention?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I never heard of that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you examine the statement that was taken from Marian Francis?

Mr. BEST. I do not think I read that one; no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Of November 13, 1943?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is Miss Francis' position?

Mr. BEST. She is in the school system, but she was serving as secretary in the offices.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in her statement which Mr. Myer submitted, which statement is dated November 13, she says, and I quote:

In the administration building evacuee office girls were hurriedly getting into their coats. One girl say, "It's a general strike!" Another exclaimed excitedly, "Hurry! The boys phoned up; we must all leave right away!" I saw one young man urging several stenographers to hurry, and hustling them out of the back door.

You did not examine the statement of Miss Francis?

Mr. BEST. No; I have not read her statement.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know of any other instances where the employees stated that the evacuee personnel had received phone calls from the outside?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I have not heard of it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Here is the statement of Rose Mary Spoonemore, of November 18, 1943, which was submitted by Mr. Myer:

I was working in the statistical office on Monday afternoon. I was in there about 1. Suddenly they were beginning to call over the telephone, calling for the girls who worked in the office. They were telling them to leave. At least three received telephone calls. I noticed that the girls acted disturbed. They had brought their lunches and had eaten them in the administration building. One of them said before they left, "I'm very sorry that the girls have to go, but I guess they had better." They didn't leave in a group but in bunches of two or three.

Mr. Best, did you examine these statements which were taken?

Mr. BEST. Not all of them, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who directed that they be taken?

Mr. BEST. I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you forward them to Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who, on the project, did examine all of them?

Mr. BEST. I had three people detailed to do that work, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you give the committee the names of those three people, with the titles, please?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Spicer—I do not know his title, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not know Mr. Spicer's title?

Mr. BEST. No; he came to the project from Washington, I believe, an analyst, community analyst. And Mr. Bigelow, John Bigelow, reports officer from Minnedoka; and Kent Silverthorn, project director at Tule Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, you said that you, yourself, did not consider the Caucasian employees in the administration building to be prisoners; that they were at liberty to go and come as they saw fit.

Mr. BEST. I thought so; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You thought so?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, referring again, Mr. Chairman, to the statement of Marion Francis, which was submitted by Mr. Myer, dated November 13, 1943, she states:

I watched appointed personnel herded into the back doors of the administration building, without ceremony, by evacuees. The doors were closed early in the afternoon. Someone said that the door to the new wing was nailed shut. I saw later that the door to the middle wing was latched on the outside and barricaded with three large refuse cans.

Do you know whether that is true or not?

Mr. BEST. No, sir. I assume it to be true, if she saw it. She was in that part of the building, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You believe her testimony would be reliable, do you?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You did not leave your office, as I understand it, from about 1 o'clock until 4:30 or 5, or whatever time it was, when you and Mr. Myer addressed the crowd?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Did anybody, any Caucasian in the employ of W. R. A. leave your office, to your knowledge, to go over to the hospital and examine conditions over there during that interval, and come back and report?

Mr. BEST. They did.

Mr. MUNDT. Who was that?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Schmidt—Willard E. Schmidt.

Mr. MUNDT. He was the security officer?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. About what time did he leave your office?

Mr. BEST. I do not know the exact time. It is reported in the transcript of that meeting. The director insisted that he go over there, and he stopped the meeting, and he said there would be no more meeting until Mr. Schmidt returned. It is in the transcript, I believe, sir. And the time, sir, I would not just exactly know.

Mr. MUNDT. The transcript was a little confusing as to just when he went and how long he was away and what transpired while he was gone.

Mr. BEST. Nothing transpired while he was gone. We just sat there.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he go by himself?

Mr. BEST. He left the room by himself and I just assume he went by himself; I do not know that.

Mr. MUNDT. That was not, was it, at 1:30, when the call came?

Mr. BEST. Oh, not at 1:30; no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That was the result of some subsequent phone call?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. What happened at 1:30? You had turned to the committee and reported to the committee what you had heard over the phone, and then Mr. Stripling got into a matter with you regarding the gates.

What happened in response to your report to the committee at 1:30?

Mr. BEST. The chairman said, "We will stop it," or something to that effect, and he sent two evacuees out of the room. They reported back shortly. There was nothing done while they were gone. I imagine they were gone maybe 5 minutes and they came back.

They said there was no more trouble over there.

Mr. MUNDT. And it was after that that you got another telephone call?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And how long was Mr. Schmidt gone?

Mr. BEST. I think he was gone maybe 10 minutes or a little bit longer. He looked around the hospital.

Mr. MUNDT. And he reported everything under control?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were those the only two breaks that you had in your proceedings there?

Mr. BEST. No, sir. There was another break of some several minutes.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the occasion for that interruption?

Mr. BEST. They asked that some Japanese secretaries be brought in; that the boy taking the notes got tired. They had to get the girls out of the crowd, and it took some 10 or 15 minutes, I believe, to get the girls and their notebooks and pencils.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the transcript of that meeting a full and complete transcript of everything that transpired at that meeting?

Mr. BEST. To the best of my knowledge, it is, sir.

However—no; I think it was practically all there. It could be at the time we were signing up that some little thing was said.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the body of the transcript—

Mr. BEST. The body of the transcript is absolutely correct, I would say.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a complete transcript of the proceedings that took place from the very beginning of the meeting, with the exception of some of the remarks that may have been passed while they were signing?

Mr. BEST. I would say, sir, that that happens when you have a meeting of that type.

Mr. MUNDT. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Myer spoke to the crowd, and Reverend Kai, I believe, spoke to the crowd. Did you also speak to the crowd?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. At whose invitation?

Mr. BEST. The committee. I followed Mr. Myer. The committee asked me. I followed Mr. Myer; after they had the translation of what he said the committee said to speak, and I did.

Mr. MUNDT. Were you introduced by Mr. Kuratomi?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; nobody introduced me.

Mr. MUNDT. Nobody introduced you?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. George Kuratomi introduced Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. That is right; he introduced him.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were you out there on the platform at the time Mr. Myer spoke?

Mr. BEST. The microphone was inside a double door, sir. It was just in a little office. There wasn't anybody outside. It was just right at the edge of the door; and it was elevated above the crowd, I would say, about 2 feet; the floor level of the office.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you see the crowd when you were talking to them?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; in one direction; only in one direction.

Mr. STRIPLING. In connection with Mr. Schmidt's going to the hospital, Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum dated November 15, from Harry L. Black, to Mr. Edward H. Spicer.

This memorandum was submitted by Mr. Myer when he was before the committee.

Will you identify Mr. Black, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Black is assistant project director.

Mr. STRIPLING. While you were meeting with the committee, was Mr. Black present?

Mr. BEST. In the room?

Mr. STRIPLING. No. Was he where he could view the situation; hear the conversation?

Mr. BEST. No; he could not hear the conversation; no, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where was he?

Mr. BEST. He was in another office.

Mr. STRIPLING. How far from where the committee was meeting?

Mr. BEST. Twenty-five or thirty feet.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in the statement of Mr. Black, he says:

Within a few minutes after the session in Mr. Best's office had begun, a report came to me that there had been a disturbance at the hospital and that Dr. Pedicord had been badly beaten. Through the windows I could see a large group of people about the hospital with a denser group nearest the door. I called Mr. Best in the meeting by phone in the welfare office so that I would not be overheard by the evacuees. I reported to him what I had heard about Dr. Pedicord. I held the phone while he addressed the committee to the effect that he had had a report that there had been a disturbance at the hospital and that Dr. Pedicord had been injured. He went on to say that the meeting would progress no further until he had assurances from the committee and from the outside that the situation at the hospital was in hand.

Later I made a second report to Mr. Best by phone that order had not been restored at the hospital; that Japanese who had no connection with the hospital were entering and leaving at will; that they were running through the wards and generally disrupting the routine of the hospital. Thereupon, it was arranged for Mr. Schmidt to go with representatives of the group to the hospital, and they later came back and stated that everything was under control. Even later I saw from the window individuals and groups going in and coming out of the hospital entrance opposite ward E. I had been told that Dr. Pedicord had received first-aid attention in his office and that he was remaining there. He had not been put to bed.

Now, Mr. Best, Mr. Black states that he reported to you the hospital incident once, and apparently nothing was done.

He reported it a second time, and then it was arranged that Mr. Schmidt go with representatives of the group. I believe you testified to the committee that Mr. Schmidt went alone.

Mr. BEST. He went out of my office alone.

Mr. STRIPLING. And also went when it was first reported to you?

Mr. BEST. No; I did not say that, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did no one leave with Mr. Schmidt at some time; none of the Japanese?

Mr. BEST. Not out of the room where we were in. I did not know that anyone went with him, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Why then does the transcript state that?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Black was in another room.

Mr. COSTELLO. No; I mean the transcript of the proceedings submitted to the committee by W. R. A. indicates at that point that Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee left to go to the hospital. I believe that is the way it is phrased in the transcript, about the thirteenth or fifteenth page of the transcript.

Mr. STRIPLING. It says:

Mr. Schmidt and an evacuee go to check up on hospital situation.

Then there are four lines of conversation, and it says:

Returned with report from hospital that situation under control.

That is on page 17, I believe, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The transcript would indicate that Mr. Schmidt did not leave the office alone, but that one of the Japanese must have gone with him.

Mr. BEST. It is entirely possible, sir. It is entirely possible. If that is what it says, that is what happened.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think it would have been possible for Mr. Schmidt to go out of the administration building and go to the hospital alone? You think the Japanese would have allowed him to pass through their group?

Mr. BEST. I think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as you know, there were only two women who were allowed to pass in or out, or do you know of any others?

Mr. BEST. No; I do not know of any others.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know of any others?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, will you explain to the committee why you, as the responsible official at the Tule Lake Center, did not go yourself to the hospital when it was reported to you that the head of the hospital was being beaten up, that the hospital was being overrun by evacuees; why you yourself did not go to determine what was wrong and what could be done about it?

Mr. BEST. I did not think of it in that light, sir. I thought Mr. Schmidt was better qualified to go than I would be.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you not think that a report that the chief of the hospital was being beaten and the hospital was being overrun would be of sufficient consequence for you to suspend your conversation with the committee of 17 segregees?

Did you not consider that important enough to devote your personal attention to?

Mr. BEST. As a matter of opinion, I thought I did the right thing, sir, and I did it.

Mr. STRIPLING. In continuing the negotiations with the committee?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Even though it had been reported to you that the chief of the hospital was being beaten up?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And what did your investigation show as to the extent of Dr. Pedicord's injuries and the manner in which he was handled during the disturbance at the hospital?

Mr. BEST. He was injured. He was severely injured.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was he taken outside and kicked and beaten up?

Mr. BEST. All I know is his own verbal statement to me.

Mr. COSTELLO. You could not see the hospital from your office?

Mr. BEST. Yes, I could; but I could not see inside of the hospital. He was inside of the hospital.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were you facing toward the hospital?

Mr. BEST. From my desk I could see the wing, and I looked over there and I did not see anything.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did see people around, though, did you not?

Mr. BEST. Not on the step nor around the porch; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not stand up at any time to look out?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did you see when you looked out your window?

Mr. BEST. I did not see anything, sir, at the entrance.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you see any Japanese at all anywhere?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes; there were Japanese in every direction, sir. I looked at the porch, the entrance to the hospital, and there was nothing there.

Mr. COSTELLO. But there were some Japanese standing around about the hospital, although they were not on the steps of the building, or the porch of the building.

Mr. BEST. Oh, I would say they were 150 feet from the hospital, all that I saw.

Mr. COSTELLO. How close were they standing to the administration building?

Mr. BEST. Within 2 or 3 feet or leaning up against it, or right against the building.

Mr. COSTELLO. Looking in the windows?

Mr. BEST. Well, they did not disturb us. We have three windows in my office, and they did not—the windows were down about 4 inches, and they did not disturb us in there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were they making any noise?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. No disturbance outside? Nothing to disturb your meeting, then, at all?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. One of the reasons, then, you did not go over to the hospital was due to the fact, you felt, of not having any actual internal security protection in the center at that moment, and that there would be no purpose in your going over to the hospital?

Mr. BEST. That is right. The damage had already been done; there was nothing I wanted to know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You knew that you had no one you could have sent to stop the trouble, if there was trouble there, unless the Japanese would stop it; is that not the situation?

Mr. BEST. As I understand it——

Mr. COSTELLO. When you got the first phone call that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten and that there was trouble in the hospital, you had no one to send to stop this disorder, and that was the reason you asked the Japanese to go over and stop it?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. So the Japanese at that time were the only ones who actually could have stopped that trouble, because you had no police force of any kind available to you to stop a disturbance of that character?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that situation is also true under the present setup of the present security officer system in the center, where you have five or six white personnel and the rest are Japanese; that if the Japanese decide to join the troublemakers, you have no police force of any kind; is that not true?

Mr. BEST. That is the reason we intend to have more Caucasian policemen.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that the same situation in all of the centers?

Mr. BEST. I am not qualified to say about the other centers; I do not know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you ever been in any of the other centers?

Mr. BEST. Yes; I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. In a case of any trouble of that character, where the Japanese police force might join the disturbance, the other centers would be left in the same position of having only three or four white internal security officers; is that not correct?

Mr. BEST. That is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that they would be in a position of not having any police force of any character to call upon during the time of any disturbance?

Mr. BEST. You see, we never have enough Caucasians to put down a disturbance, and when there is a disturbance of that nature, why, the only thing that can be done is to call the Army in.

Mr. COSTELLO. But eliminating the crowd around the administration building and the crowd around the hospital, and you had only a handful of Japanese going in the hospital to beat up Dr. Pedicord, you would not have been able to stop it under those circumstances unless the Japanese police force were willing to do it.

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following the meeting, did you and Mr. Myer go to the hospital to see Dr. Pedicord?

Mr. BEST. Just as soon as we could; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Dr. Hasiba?

Mr. BEST. I know that he is a Japanese doctor; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is he still in the hospital?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. When was he removed from the hospital?

Mr. BEST. I am not sure that he has been on the hospital staff for some time. They only use him in a consulting capacity, as I understand it; the Japanese doctor.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, is he still on the hospital staff?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; only in a consulting capacity.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, he is still there in the same capacity that he always was?

Mr. BEST. No, sir. He has been on the staff regularly assigned. He is not now.

Mr. STRIPLING. When was he removed from a permanent position on the staff?

Mr. BEST. I do not think he has been on the staff since I have been there; I do not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable testimony here, both by Mr. Myer, I believe, and also Dr. Mason, concerning Dr. Hasiba, and in the statement of Mr. Black, which Mr. Myer submitted, he states:

As I left the hospital I met Mr. Best, accompanied by Mr. Myer and Mr. Cozzens, coming to see Dr. Pedicord, and they asked me to go back with them. I returned and was present while Dr. Pedicord repeated to them the narrative he had given me. He reiterated his feeling about Dr. Hasiba and Mr. Myer assured him that Dr. Hasiba would not be permitted to remain on the hospital staff.

Now, following the November 1 incident, the entire Caucasian personnel of doctors were removed from the hospital; were they not, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. That is correct—not all of the staff. We kept the hospital administrator there.

Mr. STRIPLING. I am speaking of the staff of doctors.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether Dr. Hasiba has been removed, as Mr. Myer promised Dr. Pedicord, according to the statement of Mr. Black?

Mr. BEST. I can state that Mr. Hasiba is not on the staff at the present time, and to my knowledge, was not on the staff then. He was used, if I might explain, in a consulting capacity, and was in the center.

Mr. STRIPLING. In the previous paragraph, Mr. Black states:

Back in the office I chatted with the staff members who were in the meeting to find out what the purport was, and then went to the hospital to see Dr. Pedicord. I heard the doctor's version of what had occurred at the hospital. In his remarks, he attributed at least a part of the trouble there to Dr. Hashiba, who, he said, for a long time had been a disturbing element on the hospital staff.

Mr. BEST. That is true.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, during the disturbance on November 1, did you see any of the segregationists with knives, sticks, baseball bats, or any kind of weapon?

Mr. BEST. I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Does your investigation reveal that any were in evidence?

Mr. BEST. It appears that some were in evidence.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are the segregationists permitted to have knives, sticks, baseball bats, and so forth, in their possession?

Mr. BEST. They have baseball bats and they have pocket knives and they have kitchen knives.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are they permitted to keep a kitchen knife on their own person?

Mr. BEST. Oh, no; I would not know about that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Has it ever been reported that a large number of knives were being made by the evacuees, to be kept on their person?

Mr. BEST. I did not hear any of those stories until after this period of time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you believe, now, that they were making knives?

Mr. BEST. Not to keep on their person.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think if you had a sufficient internal police force that you would have been apprised of the fact that they were making knives?

Mr. BEST. I do not think the police force could determine that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Since you have been the director, have you ever searched the quarters of the segregees?

Mr. BEST. Since I have been a director, W. R. A. has made no search. It would take 1,000 men to make a search. We have not done so.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever endeavored to determine how many knives might be in the possession of the segregees?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many clubs and baseball bats, or any other weapons, guns or otherwise?

Mr. BEST. We would have no way of doing it, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You have no way of doing it?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you have not done it?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the man in charge of the blacksmith shop, the Caucasian employee in charge there, ever report to you that the Japanese were making these knives at the blacksmith shop?

Mr. BEST. There never was any report made to me until after this was all over, when I heard some of the stories where they said they were making them at the garage shop. That is all I have ever heard.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether any report was made to Mr. Schmidt or to his predecessor, the internal security officer, regarding that matter?

Mr. BEST. They may have had such a report, but it never reached my desk and I would not know.

Mr. STRIPLING. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, here is a statement dated November 11, 1943, of an interview with J. Davis, machine shop foreman. This statement was submitted to Mr. Meyer.

Sure, they have made hundreds of knives. They spend a lot of time on it. I never saw a machine shop yet where the men who work in it didn't make things in their off-hours or sometimes during regular hours. They get these pieces of broken spring and they make knives and tell you it's for the mess halls. Maybe it is. I don't know. Some of them say they are making personal knives. I saw one making a knife out of a piece of tin that you couldn't even cut bread with. They make them out of everything. One fellow here made a first-class hunting knife. A fellow by the name of Kiyama. A mighty good job.

What action did you take, Mr. Best, or what recommendation did you make to the internal security officer after reading the statement of Mr. Davis, which was taken on November 11, that hundreds of knives had been made by the segregees, and some for their personal use, out of automobile springs?

Mr. BEST. I made no recommendation regarding that, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider that internal security can be maintained if no check is placed upon the segregees and if they are per-

mitted to make hundreds of knives, and you have no knowledge as to whether they have weapons in their possession?

Mr. BEST. There are no segregees outside the fence that have any access to any place whatsoever since November 4.

Mr. STRIPLING. When was this fence built?

Mr. BEST. November 5, it was started and I believe it was practically constructed the night of November 6. It only took them 2 days to build it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the the Army build it?

Mr. BEST. The United States Engineers build all of these.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is a branch of the Army; is it not?

Mr. BEST. The United States Army Engineers.

Mr. STRIPLING. The W. R. A. did not build it, though?

Mr. BEST. We do not build anything—any building or fence.

Mr. STRIPLING. As long as the W. R. A. was in charge, no fence was built, was it; it was only after the Army took over?

Mr. BEST. Oh, no; we ordered the fence built. The fence was built at our direction and our directive.

Mr. STRIPLING. At what date?

Mr. BEST. The order was given November 4 to the San Francisco office.

Mr. STRIPLING. After the Army had come in?

Mr. BEST. The survey was done the afternoon of November 4 on the ground by the United States Army Engineers.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you have any knowledge, Mr. Best, as to whether or not any whisky stills, various apparatus for the distilling of alcohol beverages, have been in operation in the center?

Mr. BEST. At what time, sir?

Mr. STRIPLING. At any time.

Mr. BEST. Prior to November 4, while I had been there I had not heard of any stills.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether any have been discovered since November 4, or prior to November 4?

Mr. BEST. The Army will have to give you that information; I am not permitted to.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you ever make any effort to determine whether there was a short wave sending transmitter in the center?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And what did your investigation show?

Mr. BEST. We arrived on August 1 by car from Denver, and we had a complete monitoring equipment in our car. Mr. Schmidt had got it from the Federal Communications Commission, and immediately on August 1, he started monitoring and reported radio broadcasts. He followed that through until in October he notified the San Francisco office and they sent two men up there at our direction. They were monitoring the broadcast the night I called the Army in.

Mr. STRIPLING. You cannot tell us whether they are still there or not? That is up to the Army?

Mr. BEST. I asked them for that information for my own benefit, and they told me I would have to get it from the Army. Now that is all I know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, one of the chief complaints of the segregees was the hospital administration; is that true? Was that your

understanding, rather? That the administration of the hospital under Dr. Pedicord was very unsatisfactory?

Mr. BEST. From their standpoint.

Mr. STRIPLING. From their standpoint?

Mr. BEST. Yes; right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they demand the dismissal of Dr. Pedicord and the other members of the Caucasian staff?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider that the hospital is run in a very elaborate fashion, under the circumstances?

Mr. BEST. I think the hospital is sufficient for their needs; it is a very good hospital and I might say, in excellent hands.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think it is a little more than would be expected for a hospital?

Mr. BEST. No; I would not say that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I would like to read from the statement which Mr. Myer submitted of Dr. Martin Loebmann, medical officer, made on November 17, 1943.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who is Dr. Loebmann?

Mr. BEST. Dr. Loebmann is one of the Caucasian doctors on the staff at the present time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know how long he has been there?

Mr. BEST. I think probably he was there a couple of weeks before November 1; that is about all. He was a newcomer; he had not been there very long.

Mr. STRIPLING. I quote:

I was surprised when I came here. I expected to find a camp hospital but you can put this one on Fifth Avenue in New York. I am 100 percent sure that the older Japanese people never had such medical attention before. In Akron we were never allowed to change linen every day except in serious cases. Here you have more supplies than any other civilian hospital because, of course, it has been set up by the Army.

But there was always so much wastage. You should see the linen that is used. I have never seen so much except in the Doctors Hospital, which is a swank place in New York City. Just the other day six boxes of Kleenex were issued in a situation where three would have been sufficient.

What is your reaction, as the director of the camp, to a statement by one of the Caucasian doctors of the staff, to that effect?

Mr. BEST. I would say that if the doctor found that to be the case, we would make every attempt to reduce the service to the point of what was necessary, or, if it was poor, we would try to remedy it.

Mr. STRIPLING. According to the statement of Dr. Loebmann, the Japanese were receiving excellent treatment and had no cause for any complaint as to the medical attention they were receiving, even though that was one of their principal complaints.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Your answer is "Yes" to that, is it?

Mr. BEST. I would state the same thing; yes, sir. I did not understand that that was a question.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Best, I would like to ask you about the employees at the center, the Caucasian employees, and get some information from you. I think you know all these men. Probably you may have employed them, or probably they came there before you went to the camp. You have been there all the time these disloyal segregees have been there?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; August 1.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Stubbs?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Stubbs was a gentleman who came there as procurement officer, I believe, in charge of procurement for the center, and he told me when I got there he was sick, when I got there, and was not working. He told me that he became sick and his daughter was working there, and he stated that Dr. Pedicord was treating him, and as soon as he got well he wanted to return to work.

Mr. MUNDT. He voluntarily resigned from the project?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you think, from your observation of Mr. Stubbs, that testimony which he would give to the committee in regard to conditions at Tule Lake would be fairly accurate, unbiased, or would you consider him a badly prejudiced witness or observer?

Mr. BEST. I think probably you should judge that. You have the testimony.

Mr. MUNDT. I never have seen him. I could not judge about the availability of the testimony. You know it.

Mr. BEST. I do not know him very well, sir. He has only been employed, I think—I really believe it, is less than a month, since I have been there, and he only came to me as a sick man, so I could not tell you, only very little about him.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not want to force you to characterize his reliability, unless you know. As I give you these names, you simply say that you have no basis of forming an opinion one way or the other, unless you know otherwise, and that will be perfectly satisfactory, as far as I am concerned. But I would like to have your reaction.

Now, would that be your reaction—that you have no basis for forming an opinion one way or the other as to his reliability, or would you care to express yourself some other way about him?

Mr. BEST. I would be perfectly willing to express myself on anything I know about Mr. Stubbs, or have seen, or heard him say, but I cannot. I think you should do that, sir. I am not in a position to say that.

Mr. MUNDT. Would it be a fair summary of your attitude in regard to Mr. Stubbs, that you have no basis, either for commending or condemning him from the standpoint of being a reliable witness?

Mr. BEST. I would say that I have no basis either way.

Mr. MUNDT. All right. Now, let us discuss Mr. Rhoads. Who is Mr. Rhoads?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Ernest Rhoads was the chief fire protection officer, and I am not sure how long he has been there, but I think he was one of the earlier employees. He has been there a considerable length of time. He was a retired fireman from the Los Angeles Fire Department.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he still there?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he resign voluntarily?

Mr. BEST. He resigned voluntarily, asking me to take his resignation. He brought it to me, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you say from your observation of Mr. Rhoads that any testimony he would give the committee concerning Tule Lake would be reliable, or would it be biased and prejudiced?

Mr. BEST. I am afraid I would have to say the same thing about Mr. Rhoads. You will have to be the best judge of what that would be.

Mr. MUNDT. You would say the same as about Mr. Stubbs?

Mr. BEST. My only contact with him was in the same manner.

Mr. MUNDT. How about Mr. Wilkinson?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Wilkinson I do not know at all. I have never seen the gentleman.

Mr. MUNDT. Was he not an employee at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. Never since I have been there. I do not know the gentleman; I have never seen him.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think he was a farmer.

Mr. MUNDT. He resigned April 23, 1943. That was before you came to Tule Lake, was it?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes; I came August 1, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. How about Mr. Kallam?

Mr. BEST. I believe Mr. Kallam left about August 2.

Mr. MUNDT. And you came when?

Mr. BEST. Or, I mean, November 2. I came there August 1.

Mr. MUNDT. You knew Mr. Kallam?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; since I have been there.

Mr. MUNDT. He is not with the project now?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. He resigned of his own accord, did he?

Mr. BEST. I asked for his resignation.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you care to express any opinion as to the authenticity of any reports he might give concerning conditions at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. I would not know; I would not know.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Leupp?

Mr. BEST. He is the fire-protection officer. At the present time, he is one of the fire chiefs.

Mr. MUNDT. He is at the project now, is he not?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you feel that any evidence he would give the committee concerning activities at Tule Lake would be authentic?

Mr. BEST. I think it should be.

Mr. MUNDT. How about Mr. Warin?

Mr. BEST. I do not know him.

Mr. MUNDT. He might have left before you came. I am trying to find out what his job was. He resigned in March, 1943. That was before you came in.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Gerry?

Mr. BEST. He is now acting procurement officer at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you consider any evidence that he would present to the committee to be reliable?

Mr. BEST. I certainly do.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if you could straighten the committee out a little bit as to the reason why Mr. Gerry apparently had a very short-lived promotion in the civil-service rating, and then had difficulty maintaining that higher rate?

Mr. BEST. I think I can explain it.

Mr. MUNDT. I think it would be helpful to the committee and perhaps to Mr. Gerry to know what that is.

Mr. BEST. You asked me the question and I will be glad to answer it. I know the case completely.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I can ask you specific questions, or, if you prefer, you might cite cases and what happened.

Mr. BEST. Mr. Gerry was one of three in the procurement office at the time I arrived there on August 1. Two others have been terminated at my request in that office.

It was considered by the finance people that Mr. Gerry would be able to carry the office and be procurement officer.

I am the only employment officer on the project.

After this disturbance on November 1, when Mr. Gerry assumed that he was in difficulty with the administration, which was not true—and I do not know the date because it is not dated—papers were put through by the personnel office for a promotion or a raise for Mr. Gerry, one grade.

Never did that reach my desk. Never did I see them until after at least 10 or 12 days after he had received one check at a promoted grade.

Mr. Gerry came to my office after I had refused to sign the promotion. He wanted to know why. And I said I could not promote him until after this investigation was all over; that I did not want it in the papers that he had received a promotion while the investigation was going on. And I asked Mr. Gerry to go back and wait until the investigations were all over and he would be given every consideration, and I assumed that he had done so until I found out that he had wired Mr. Engle.

Mr. MUNDT. Your reason for withholding approval of his promotion was not based, in any part, on any statements he had made about the conditions at Tule Lake, whatever, but rather—

Mr. BEST. Not in the least, and I told him so.

Mr. MUNDT. You felt that it might be misconstrued by the press if he were promoted at that time?

Mr. BEST. It would have been.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he employed there at the present time?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. He is still on the pay roll?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Doing good work?

Mr. BEST. And he has my word that when and if these investigations are completed, his promotion will be given consideration, and he is on the pay roll at the present time, regardless.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Best, it would seem to me that your reasons have been perfectly appropriate for not granting it at that particular time. I am glad to have that explanation.

Mr. BEST. I thought we definitely agreed to it. He felt all right when he went out of my office.

Mr. MUNDT. He might have talked to his wife and she changed his mind. Do you know Dr. Mason?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he at the project now?

Mr. BEST. Is he? No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he voluntarily resign?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you have any comments to make to the committee from the standpoint of how much reliability to place on the testi-

mony he would give concerning activities at Tule Lake during this disturbance?

Mr. BEST. I would think that Dr. Mason's testimony ought to be reliable as to what he saw or what he heard.

Mr. MUNDT. He was in the hospital during the disturbance or during part of it, at any rate.

Mr. BEST. Well, that is what I assumed he was. I did not see him.

Mr. MUNDT. You did not see him at all?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe you stated in response to a question by Congressman Mundt you believe the testimony that Dr. Mason might give the committee would be reliable.

Mr. BEST. I say I think it should be; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You charged Dr. Mason with having misrepresented the facts to the press about Tule Lake at Klamath Falls.

Mr. BEST. According to the telegram that was sent from our office; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You felt the news story that was carried in the Klamath Falls Herald-News, dated November 23, was an erroneous article and did not actually present the true facts regarding the situation at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. I did not assume that until Dr. Pedicord told me they were not true.

Mr. COSTELLO. Referring back to the case of Mr. Gerry, the information we have concerning him is as follows:

May 16, 1943: Appointed as procurement officer, CAF-9, \$3,200, at Tule Lake.

July 1, 1943: Transfer of position and change in title to property and supply officer, CAF-9, \$3,200, Tule Lake.

October 16, 1943: Project requested the promotion of Gerry to position of procurement officer, CAF-11, \$3,800.

October 19, 1943: Washington office approved promotion to CAF-11, \$3,800, provided prior approval of Civil Service Commission could be obtained, as he did not have the necessary length of experience required by the Commission in their Departmental Circular No. 257.

November 29: The following telegram was received from the project:

We have temporarily withheld promotion Benjamin F. Gerry to full grade procurement officer and desire to retain him in acting position since Vreeland already entered on duty in CAF-9 position. Request authority to establish acting procurement officer position at CAF-9, \$3,200.

The following telegram was sent to Hon. Clair Engle by Mr. Gerry:

In October received civil-service classification, paid November 15 accordingly. November 19, project director advised reclassification being rescinded on account of being spokesman and also giving you information Tule Lake meeting. Not on pay roll for December 1. Advise if civil service doesn't have some control of such matters.

Acting upon the teletype from Washington, dated October 19, the project submitted Gerry's name to the Civil Service Commission, requesting that they waive the time requirements in his case. Subsequently, the Commission approved this promotion and the transactions

officer wrote the journal and distributed the copies before Mr. Best had signed it.

Because of Mr. Gerry's actions during the period November 1 through 4, it was seriously doubted by members of the administrative staff whether Gerry would be able to regain the respect of other appointed personnel, and since his attitude has been anything but wholesome, it was not deemed advisable to promote Mr. Gerry at this time. Mr. Gerry should not have received an increase in salary for the period November 1 through 15, as the action was not legal until Mr. Best had signed the journal and the copies of the journal should not have been distributed.

Mr. STRIPLING. Had you finished, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you receive inquiry from the United Aircraft Corporation, East Hartford, Conn., concerning Dr. Mason?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You replied by telegram on the 23d:

Have no police record on John M. Mason, Jr., M. D.

They specifically inquired whether or not he had a police record, did they not?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is your answer to that "Yes"?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You said:

However, misrepresented facts in interview published in Klamath Falls Herald-News concerning trouble at Tule Lake center.

Did they ask you for that information?

Mr. BEST. United Aircraft?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You just added that?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following the discussion at the hospital between you and Mr. Myer, and Dr. Pedicord, I believe you testified that all the Caucasian doctors left the hospital.

Mr. BEST. I have not said that yet, but they did.

Mr. STRIPLING. How about the Caucasian nurses?

Mr. BEST. The nurses, too.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you arrange for them to leave the center?

Mr. BEST. No; they made their own arrangements. They did not leave that day.

Mr. STRIPLING. When did they leave? The following day?

Mr. BEST. I do not know when they left, and I do not think that all of them did go. Dr. Pedicord stayed there that night and the next day he turned his house over to the nurses, and I am not familiar where they went, or how.

Mr. STRIPLING. After the November 1 disturbance, do you know how many Caucasian employees and members of their families left the center?

Mr. BEST. Two, to my knowledge; two families.

Mr. STRIPLING. Two families. From November 1 until November 4, at which time the Army took over the camp, did you consider that the situation was well in hand?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you explain to the committee briefly why you asked the Army to take over the camp?

Mr. BEST. On the 4th?

Mr. STRIPLING. On the 4th.

Mr. BEST. I had published a project order that no more gatherings would be held in the administrative area, the hospital area, or the warehouse area.

That evening, when the group started forming in the warehouse area, coming to the administrative area and the motor pool and later to my home, it was a direct violation of my rules, and I could not control it in any other manner than to call the Army in. That is what they were there for, and I called the Army in.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many people gathered around your home?

Mr. BEST. Well, it depends where I was. In the back yard, watching them come, I saw at least 200.

Mr. STRIPLING. Two hundred. Were the lights on in your home?

Mr. BEST. They were, until I had them put off.

Mr. STRIPLING. You had the lights put off. Did you have the doors locked?

Mr. BEST. Not until after I went in and told them to put the lights off and lock the doors while I was telephoning.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long were the lights off and the door locked?

Mr. BEST. If I might relate a little humor, if you will permit me to, after I went back out, I forgot that I had left my wife there, and she was there for over an hour with the lights off, and she didn't like it. But I forgot her. The lights were off for over an hour. I went outside and I forgot her.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, the committee has here a number of statements, or has read a number of statements that were submitted to the committee by former employees of W. R. A., regarding the wastage of food and the theft of Government property.

I wonder if you, of your own personal knowledge, could outline to the committee any instances of Government property being stolen, or Government property being wasted, at the Tule Lake center?

Mr. BEST. At what time, sir?

Mr. STRIPLING. From the time you were the director, or from August 4.

Mr. BEST. Every effort is being made to not only prevent such loss and wastage, theft, or what not, but we are attempting, and I have been since I have been there, since I came there, attempting to build up a staff wherein there will be no such activities.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Dr. Jacoby the internal security officer at any time while you were at Tule Lake?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; he was the internal security officer when I arrived.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long did he remain in that capacity?

Mr. BEST. He presented his resignation within about 30 days or less, and by reason of some leave he stayed on the pay roll some 2 weeks and went to San Francisco, and in the meantime was transferred.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who took over his position when he left?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Schmidt was there all the time, the national chief, in an acting capacity, over all internal security men who were there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Why was Mr. Schmidt brought out there; because of the fact that these segregees were being brought in there?

Mr. BEST. Yes. And I asked the director to have him detailed there, which he did do.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether any cases of theft had been reported to Dr. Jacoby and no attempt made to administer any justice as the result of these reports?

Mr. BEST. Yes. There were one or two cases since I have been there that were reported.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether the Japanese who were guilty were punished at all, or not?

Mr. BEST. I think I had one hearing.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is an indication here in some of the testimony, but I do not know exactly at which time it took place, when Mr. Cozzens, the area regional director, from San Francisco, was present at Tule Lake.

Mr. BEST. Yes; that was some time previous, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Before you came there, was it?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time when a big chunk of meat, worth about \$11, fell down in front of his feet.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony indicated that Dr. Jacoby did nothing about that particular case; that the man was not punished in any way at all.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. There are two or three other instances of the same sort, but you do not know of any instance taking place while you were project director?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are endeavoring to point out if cases of that character come up at this time, that the culprits would be properly handled and justice administered as it should be?

Mr. BEST. Well, I held court once a week up until the segregation movement got heavy, when we had to cease all of that; but I held court once a week and heard all of the little petty charges myself which, I think, there were only 3 weeks that was followed, and then we got into this segregation, and we never had any more hearings, and they never brought any more cases to me after that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were any part of those charged with offenses before you found guilty?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. I had some of them, several of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. And punishment was meted out?

Mr. BEST. Well, I myself sent two people to Klamath Falls jail, and I don't know, before my time, what other punishment was meted.

Mr. COSTELLO. You believe that failure, prior to your coming to the center, to properly administer justice, may have been one of the incidents that led up to the general trouble on November 1?

Mr. BEST. I would not say so, because I do not think the November 1 trouble had any bearing on the people that were at Tule Lake before I got there.

Mr. COSTELLO. You arrived prior to the segregation movement taking place?

Mr. BEST. Yes. I supervised the segregation at Tule Lake.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not think the laxness of administering justice properly prior to your coming there would have tended to bring about the disregard for your authority therein November?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I do not think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. A certain percentage of those at Tule Lake today have been at Tule Lake quite a long time, have they not?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. About how many?

Mr. BEST. I think around about 7,000 of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. About 50 percent of those in the center are old Tule Lake residents?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask at this point, Mr. Stripling, I believe it was when Mr. Myer was present and speaking about Mr. Gerry and his case, regarding the civil-service classification, that Mr. Myer was going to furnish you with some information regarding it. He was going to look into the matter and obtain all of the facts.

Did you receive any statement from Mr. Myer in that regard? We have one statement from Mr. Myer that he was to furnish for the record, but did you receive any other statements than the statements of the witnesses?

Mr. STRIPLING. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were two or three places in the record where Mr. Myer indicated he was going to furnish the committee with additional information as soon as it was made available to him.

Mr. STRIPLING. We have not received anything.

Mr. COSTELLO. All you received were those statements of the witnesses?

Mr. STRIPLING. Which he submitted at the time he testified.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Best, how many segregees do you think are involved in this so-called ring of Kibei, who are creating the trouble and dissension within the center?

Mr. BEST. In my opinion there are possibly 2,000 of them, and that should be broken down into two categories: a couple or three hundred of them intelligent segregees, and the rest muscle men. I do not believe it would be over 2,000 total.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider that the incident of November 1 was a well-planned and well-organized move?

Mr. BEST. Perfect.

Mr. STRIPLING. What percentage of the population do you consider to be loyal to the United States?

Mr. BEST. That is a question that I cannot answer.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how many of the segregees are there because of family reasons?

Mr. BEST. I cannot give you those figures. There is a varying number by reason of the fact that they come with family groups, and I do not have those figures compiled and cannot give you those figures.

Mr. STRIPLING. Since the Army took over the camp on November 4, does the W. R. A., you, and your staff, still administer the affairs of the camp?

Mr. BEST. I will answer that in this way, and I do not think I am betraying any Army confidence, which I do not want to do. The Army can give you the story.

But according to the memorandum, every person on the W. R. A. staff implements the Army; in other words, we have to carry on under Army orders, if that answers the question.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is sufficient; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, Colonel Austin is the man in charge of the camp?

Mr. BEST. Oh, definitely; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the W. R. A. personnel continue to perform many of the functions through the direction of Colonel Austin?

Mr. BEST. He does that; we just implement the Army.

Mr. COSTELLO. When did you contact the Army to let them know about a possible disturbance that might take place on November 1, or did you notify them at all?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes. About 1 o'clock or thereabouts, and it could have been before 1 or it could have been just after, I talked with the colonel and I told him that we had just been down in the center and we saw the crowds coming, and we notified him and he kept in touch with me.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was before the committee of 17 came in?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you let the members of the committee of 17 know that you had notified the Army?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Referring again to the statement submitted by Mr. Myer regarding Mr. Gerry, I find this:

October 16, 1943: Project requested the promotion of Gerry to position of procurement officer, CAF-11, salary, \$3,800.

What does that mean, "project requested the promotion of Gerry"?

Mr. BEST. I presume that the project requested the Civil Service for the approval of the position. You see, you get approval and then you submit the papers subsequent to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the request went out from Tule Lake to Civil Service for his promotion to this position?

Mr. BEST. I assume that; I do not know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you sign a request of that kind when it went in?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I have not signed anything.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not sign that request? But it came to Civil Service, requesting this promotion, before it went to the W. R. A. national headquarters for his promotion, or whatever it may have been sent.

Mr. BEST. Somebody may have done it. I did not do it, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that apparently the project requested it and the Washington office approved his promotion as of October 19, which was prior to the disturbance.

Do you believe that Mr. Gerry's actions between November 1 and November 4 were such as to cause him to lose respect of the other personnel so his employment in the project would be impaired?

Mr. BEST. There is a very big difference of opinion about that. I would not care to state what the other people feel or would do. That would be up to them.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you would have to pass upon any promotion.

Mr. BEST. That is true. I initiate it and I will pass on it; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you not also have to pass on his employment or discharge from the project?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think you are the proper man, then, to comment whether his actions between November 1 and November 4 were such as to impair his effectiveness as an employee at the project?

Mr. BEST. I think it has impaired Mr. Gerry's effectiveness. He says it has.

Mr. COSTELLO. He himself has made that statement?

Mr. BEST. Yes; and until he gets his status clarified, he says he won't be much good to W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. He is referring to his civil-service status, is he not?

Mr. BEST. No; he is not worrying about the civil-service status; he is worrying about his status with me, he says.

Mr. COSTELLO. He feels that his status with you has been impaired?

Mr. BEST. That is right; that is what he said.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel that it has?

Mr. BEST. No; and I told him it had not. I said, "You go to work." I told you what I had said to him. I told him to go to work and when this thing was all over, then he and I would work out his problem.

Mr. COSTELLO. You personally feel that he can continue to conduct his duties, the duties of his position out there, without any difficulty?

Mr. BEST. If I had not thought so, I would not have had him there that long.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he at the present time a satisfactory employee?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I guess, then, it would not be proper for me to ask what Mr. Myer might have meant, or whoever wrote this, when they made the statement, "because of Mr. Gerry's actions during the period November 1 through 4, it was seriously doubted by members of the administrative staff whether Gerry would be able to regain the respect of other appointed personnel, and since his attitude has been anything but wholesome, it was not deemed advisable to promote Mr. Gerry at this time."

You do not know who the members of the administrative staff are that are referred to where it says, "seriously doubted by members of the administrative staff——"?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. That might refer solely to the Washington administrative staff and not to the project?

Mr. BEST. Well, that is what it does refer to, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Mr. Ralph E. Peck?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider him to be a reliable person?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think charges that he would incorporate in a sworn statement to a congressional committee would be substantially correct?

Mr. BEST. I would think they should be; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you examined the statement which Mr. Peck submitted to a Member of Congress on December 1, 1943?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I have not. I did not know that he had submitted one.

Mr. STRIPLING. I will read you two or three of his charges, and would like to have you give the committee your reaction to them.

Not more than 2 months ago, there were two instances where 7- or 8-pound roasts of beef were placed on Mr. Best's desk with evidence and signed confessions by the culprits, admitting the fact that the meat, bearing a Government stamp, had been stolen. The confessions were in the handwriting of the culprits. No action was taken by the administration, other than to give the thieves a 30-day suspended sentence.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. BEST. It is correct, only so far as there was only one culprit, one young man, and I gave him a 30-day suspended sentence. I withheld his pay and clothing allowance.

Mr. STRIPLING. Here is another charge:

I personally know of an incident where a Japanese evacuee tried to force his way into a white woman's apartment. I personally reported this to the Internal Security Division and Edward H. Borbeck, the internal security officer, who was beaten up by the Japanese mob, has this report in his possession, and this report was made to his superior in a regular form. No action whatsoever was taken by the administration.

Mr. BEST. They did not know who it was. They never caught the boy and they did not have his name, and that is the reason. I know about the case.

Mr. STRIPLING. The next charge is:

During the whole tenure of my administration, I constantly fought against thievery in general, and thievery of food in particular, by the Japanese. I have documental proof on official War Relocation Authority memoranda, addressed to me by my superior, advising me again and again, that I should confine my efforts to mess operations, and leave the stealing and thievery problems to the Internal Security Division.

Do you know that Mr. Peck was so instructed by the administrative division?

Mr. BEST. Not since I have been there, he has not been, I am sure of that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you instruct the chief steward to disregard any thievery and leave it to the internal security?

Mr. BEST. I should say not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you discovered, or have any of the officers or employees discovered food hidden out in various places in the center?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many instances of that kind have been reported to you?

Mr. BEST. Two that Mr. Peck reported to me, and I went with him and we loaded up the merchandise and put it back in the warehouse.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did the merchandise consist of?

Mr. BEST. The merchandise consisted of rice, canned goods, case goods, that they could store in boxes. It was right out in the mess hall. It was not hidden. It was along the walls of the mess hall; coffee, sirup, crackers, things of that kind. It was all food articles.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Peck's sixth charge is:

The pacifistic influence of the sociologists and educational groups within the center, positively dominate the administration. Of this, there is no doubt. Do you know of any pacifists or sociologists who are dominating the administration?

Mr. BEST. On the part of the administration, there is no one dominating me, I assure you of that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are there employees who could be classified as pacifists?

Mr. BEST. I understand there are two.

Mr. STRIPLING. Could you give their names for the record?

Mr. BEST. Rodebush, I believe, is one; and Robbins.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are they still employed at the center?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; employed as school teachers, not as social workers.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Peck's seventh charge is this:

The Caucasian personnel, some 3 months ago, anticipating the very thing that happened on November 1, and on November 4, as well as on subsequent dates, particularly when the project director at last felt it incumbent upon himself to call in the Army for the protection of the white people, petitioned the project director in a very formal and friendly manner to build a fence between the area occupied by the evacuees and that occupied by the Caucasian personnel. The project director, in open staff meeting, ridiculed the idea and called the attention of the workers to the fact that if they confined themselves to the work at hand, they would have little or no time at all to circulate a petition about a fence.

Is he referring to you?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you so instruct the employees in an open staff meeting?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; not in that language, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you state to the committee the language you did employ in advising them of your reaction to that request?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. It was about 2 weeks after I got there, we were trying to establish a definite procedure for segregation, and I told the people that the fence could not be built until a directive was placed with the United States engineers; that we were too busy at the present time to worry about the fence, and let us get the job of segregation done, and we will get the fence afterward.

And I assured them I would present the case to the director, which I did, and the fence has resulted, and I never told them in that language, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. If the fence had been built when they requested it, do you think it would have been possible for the occurrence of November 1 to have happened?

Mr. BEST. Several things would have to enter into it. If it was possible to have built the fence, it would have been possible to build some more barracks for personnel and we could have had more personnel. If the fence had been built with the same amount of personnel, we could not have done the job.

Mr. STRIPLING. I believe you stated to the committee, however, a short while ago, that there could not be a recurrence of the November 1 incident.

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Because of the fence.

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. And therefore, in line with your reasoning, if the fence had been built at the time the Caucasian employees requested it, the incident of November 1 would not have occurred.

Mr. BEST. All right. Now, the inside fence is the perimeter in which the Army patrols. The Army will never leave the inside fence. If we had the fence built at that time, it would have been inside, and they would have been controlling the present outside fence, and our little seven people could never have stopped them from coming through the fence; that is my point.

Mr. STRIPLING. It is only since the November 1 riot incident that you refer to this internal police force as your "little seven people." I mean, you felt, prior to that time, that they were sufficient to cope with the situation.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Best, in feeding the Japanese at the center, do they keep within the normal rationing coupon allotment, similar to what other persons throughout the country have to confine themselves to?

Mr. BEST. It is always less, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. In estimating that, that is simply basing it on the rationed goods that you use in the center, is that correct? The ration is less per person than for other people outside of the centers throughout the country?

Mr. BEST. It is less in the centers than it is outside.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that does not mean that there is a reduction in the amount of food, or anything of that character?

Mr. BEST. The food has to stay within a limit of money expenditure, which we cannot exceed, 45 cents a day.

Mr. COSTELLO. As to the foods that are raised on the various projects themselves, how do you ascertain the cost of those foods?

Mr. BEST. Well, it is the cost of production, and that may bring the cost down.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the wage scale is considered in the cost of those foods; the wage scale that is actually paid the Japanese evacuees?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; the wage scale actually paid is considered in the cost of producing it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether the cost of farm equipment, tractors, and such things of that kind, is included in the cost of food?

Mr. BEST. I am not sure of the cost accounting procedure on that particular item.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one or two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Best, the crowd on November 4 was very much smaller, as I understand it, than the crowd that gathered on November 1?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What was the chief difference between the two groups, aside from the size, in their attitudes and appearance?

Mr. BEST. The crowd on November 4 each had a club, and it was their intent to use it. They were menacing in their attitude. Every time our internal security contacted them, they had a fight. Our internal security met up with this crowd before they got to my house on some five different occasions, in five different spots before they got up there, and they were very menacing.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that it was definitely your opinion that serious damage to property, perhaps, would have resulted, and most likely

personal injury to some of the personnel in the camp, and to yourself, had not the Army been called in on November 4?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you have power of a sitting magistrate there to sentence people?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To county institutions or county jails?

Mr. BEST. County jails; yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. County jails?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How do you get that authority, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. Project administrative instructions allow me to hold trials and hearings for minor infractions. We have civil authorities that we could take them to, to the State authority, State court or Federal court, but these are just for minor project infractions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. This incident on November 1, you said, was well planned and well organized?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you feel it was definitely the purpose on the part of the organizers, the planners, of that thing, to cause some disturbance on that afternoon, November 1?

Mr. BEST. No; I never had the thought that they were to cause a disturbance. The thought was to establish themselves as the reputed leaders of the entire colony. This so-called group used that to establish themselves as the recognized leaders of the entire colony, of which I doubted very seriously they were such.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If the trouble had developed into more serious conditions than it did develop into, do you think that those leaders would have been more sensible in accomplishing their plans?

Mr. BEST. No; I do not know what to say. They were attempting to test out the director. They planned everything they had on testing him out, and with the entire group behind them they were bidding for power and at the same time going to see whether the director could stand up under it or not. That is my opinion, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you referring to Mr. Myer?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one more question. Is there much petty crime in the center there? Would you say that there was more than the ordinary amount that occurs in a normal American city?

Mr. BEST. I would say that it is much less. There is not a lot of petty crime. They do not, apparently, steal from themselves; they steal from the Government.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Has there been much serious crime like, say, robbery or burglary, hold-ups?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Or cutting affrays, or anything of that kind, between the evacuees?

Mr. BEST. We have had one knifing since I have been there, wherein a man defended himself against one of these so-called muscle men, and he cut him up pretty bad.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But, generally speaking, they get along pretty well together?

Mr. BEST. Well, their own police department takes care of that. Their police department is good, so far as it goes, with the Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They will protect one Japanese against the other Japanese?

Mr. BEST. That is correct; they will do that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The police force is good in that respect?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How about these two school teachers who are pacifists? Are they openly preaching pacificism?

Mr. BEST. No; they are not; they are very quiet and they have not openly discussed their program, so they state, and I have never heard it myself.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of course, if that was the only charge you had against those school teachers, it would be questionable whether that would be sufficient for you to discharge them, would it not?

Mr. BEST. I could not discharge them for that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. On that ground alone.

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In that respect, you would be bound by the laws of the State of California, with respect to the discharge of school-teachers?

Mr. BEST. Yes; I could not discharge them for that?

Mr. EBERHARTER. They are under civil service?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are those schools conducted according to the California State law or Federal administrative practice?

Mr. BEST. They have not been accredited by California State law; no, sir. And we do not have any school now, at least, since I have been there, in the summer.

Mr. COSTELLO. The people are not subject to the California jurisdiction at all in view of the fact that it is a Federal project exclusively?

Mr. BEST. Well, I do not know that, but I work very closely with the State Department, I assure you of that.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. You stated that the disturbance on November 1 grew out of the fact that it was a well-planned push for power on the part of this committee of 17.

What would you say was the origin of the disturbance on November 4. What motivated that?

Mr. BEST. I know what it was.

Mr. MUNDT. What was it?

Mr. BEST. We were taking three trucks to Klamath Falls to haul some loyal evacuees out to the farm. There were two carloads coming, and when we got the trucks out of the motor pool they sent word to the colony that we were going to take some more food out of the warehouse. They thought we were going to take some more food out to feed the loyal Japanese, and they tried to stop the trucks. But the trucks were already gone, and they could not find them. That is when they were after me. We know that motive.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you say that both disturbances were incited by the same group of segregees?

Mr. BEST. I know they were.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your experience, Mr. Best, from the standpoint of the value of the Japanese police force when it comes to informing

the administrative personnel of disloyal underground movements among the segregationists?

Mr. BEST. My personal opinion is that you will have 5 men out of 100 that might tell you; the rest of them tell you nothing.

Mr. MUNDT. Pretty low value.

Mr. BEST. That is correct. But we base quite a lot on that small part.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, if I understand it correctly, you feel the Japanese police force does a pretty good job of maintaining order among the Japanese themselves.

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. But it is comparatively worthless from the standpoint of maintaining order between the Caucasians and the Japanese?

Mr. BEST. Right.

Mr. MUNDT. One other question: At the present time, with the Army in charge, what is your status as camp director? Are you accountable to the Army or to Dillon Myer?

Mr. BEST. Directly to the Army. Colonel Austin is my superior officer.

Mr. MUNDT. And they have taken control of the camp?

Mr. BEST. Oh, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. But you are on the W. R. A. pay roll?

Mr. BEST. Well, that is the agreement; that we are carried on the pay roll. Colonel Austin is the commanding officer at the center, and I work for him.

Mr. MUNDT. We had a little résumé from Mr. Myer of a speech he gave the evacuees on November 1. If it is not too much of a strain on your memory, I wonder if you could reconstruct the substance of what you said in your speech to the Japanese on that date.

Mr. BEST. What I said?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. BEST. I can tell you. You just want me to tell you what I said?

Mr. MUNDT. That is correct.

Mr. BEST. I told them, "I have now just concluded a third meeting with a group who represent themselves to be those that represent the wishes of the people of Tule Lake. I say now, and I say the same that I told you the other day, that we will receive through committees any requests for discussion of subjects upon which you are interested. If those problems are presented through a committee, you can get some discussion on the subject and possibly relieve the situation as you anticipate, but we can only do it through committees."

I thanked them for being such an orderly crowd and being held in suspense for such a long period of time, and said "Good afternoon."

Mr. MUNDT. Did either you or Mr. Myer comment on the disturbance at the hospital?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Following your part of the program, the Buddhist or Shinto priest spoke, did he not?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your interpretation of the manner in which he had the crowd bow to the ground before their dispersal?

Mr. BEST. I was looking out one window and I would say one person out of five bowed. As a matter of fact, there were two right square in front of the window that did not even move and did not take their hats off. And I did see, possibly—it would be my opinion that one

out of five did bow, and they turned toward the southwest, and that was where the loud speaker was coming from; that was the direction, those that I saw bowed toward the loud speaker, and then they went home.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you understand Japanese?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your candid opinion as to the reason that those that did bow, went through that ceremony? It obviously was not a salute to the loud speaker; it was something else.

Mr. BEST. All I know is what Dr. Webber, the Caucasian on our staff, stated, that it was respect to the Director; that is the way he interpreted it. It was respect to the speaker.

Mr. MUNDT. A salute to Dillon Myer?

Mr. BEST. Yes; not to the Emperor, I am sure of that, as I remember it.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you think transpired at this conference with the committee of 17 that should have started them off, in the first instance, with beating Dr. Pedicord, and concluding with a salute to Dillon Myer?

Mr. BEST. That would be a matter of opinion; I would not know how to answer that.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the only interpretation you can place on it, or care to place on it, that it was a salute to the Director?

Mr. BEST. It was supposed to be a salute to the Emperor, the way I heard it, but I understood from Dr. Webber that it was more of a tribute to Mr. Myer than it was to the Emperor.

Mr. MUNDT. Who told you it was a salute to the Emperor?

Mr. BEST. Oh, that was just the general assumption among the people that were in the building.

Mr. MUNDT. This priest, whom I call a Shinto priest, though maybe he was not—I don't know—

Mr. BEST. Reverend Kai.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes. Was Reverend Kai one of the committee of 17?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You met with Reverend Kai on previous occasions?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; several times.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your opinion of Reverend Kai? Is he a pretty good coworker with you in trying to establish a good camp?

Mr. BEST. He never was.

Mr. MUNDT. Or did you feel that he was a very undesirable delegate?

Mr. BEST. Very undesirable, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, there is nothing in his background of experience, so far as you are concerned, to lead you to believe that he was giving a salute to Dillon Myer.

Mr. BEST. I would not know that.

Mr. MUNDT. He never really had been a leader, from the standpoint of giving good cooperation?

Mr. BEST. Oh, he was like all people; he swayed.

Mr. MUNDT. He was like all the dissident group, though; was he not?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STRIPLING. Just one more question. Are Japanese-language schools conducted in this center, Mr. Best?

Mr. BEST. Yes. I understand now they are practically closed down again. While this committee, prior to November 4, was in pretty good power, they had a Japanese-language school in pretty near every block. They paid their own teachers and furnished their own supplies, and I understand now, just shortly before I left, that it was practically closed down.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. MUNDT. One more question, Mr. Chairman, and that is about Judo.

How many people at the camp on your staff are engaged in the instructing of Judo on a part-time or full-time basis?

Mr. BEST. We do not have any.

Mr. MUNDT. You do not have any?

Mr. BEST. No. When I came there that was one of the first instructions I had, when this group came from Jerome. They noted the top Judo men arrive and they came to my office the first day and I said, "There is no more Judo, as such, on the project pay roll at Tule Lake," the first day that they got there, the big leaders. And I know them. I know who they are. I knew them the second day after they arrived. And they are not on the W. R. A. pay roll.

Mr. MUNDT. They are not teaching Judo, then?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I wondered. I congratulate you on that point.

Mr. BEST. Thank you.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. That will conclude our hearing.

I appreciate very much, Mr. Best, giving us the first afternoon of the first day of your arrival in Washington, to come before the committee. I am very glad you came down and appreciate very much the information you have given us.

Mr. BEST. I am glad to do it, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That will conclude the hearing and the committee will adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m. the committee adjourned.)

×

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRES USED DURING LEAVE-CLEARANCE REGISTRATION

EXPLANATORY NOTE.—Form DSS-304A was used for all male citizens of Japanese ancestry. Form WRA-126 Rev. was used for all other registrants. Shortly after registration started, the wording of Question 28 on Form 126-Rev. was changed at the Manzanar Center to read as follows:

"Are you sympathetic to the United States of America? Do you agree faithfully to defend the United States from any or all attacks by foreign or domestic forces?"


Somewhat later at all centers except Manzanar, the wording of question 28 on Form WRA-126 Rev. for aliens (but not for female citizens) was changed by directive from the Washington office to read as follows:

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

Eventually all aliens at the Manzanar Center were asked question 28 in the latter form.

DSS Form 304A (1-23-43)

Budget Bureau No. 33XR045-43
Form Approved



(Local Board Date Stamp With Code)

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY

1. -----
(Surname) (English given name) (Japanese given name)
- (a) Alias -----
2. Local selective service board -----
(Number)

(City) (County) (State)
3. Date of birth ----- Place of birth -----
4. Present address -----
(Street) (City) (State)
5. Last two addresses at which you lived 3 months or more (exclude residence at relocation center and at assembly center):
----- From ----- to -----
----- From ----- to -----
6. Sex ----- Height ----- Weight -----
7. Are you a registered voter? ----- Year first registered -----
Where? ----- Party -----
8. Marital status ----- Citizenship of wife ----- Race of wife -----

10121

9. -----
 (Father's name) (Town or ken) (State or country) (Occupation)
 (Birthplace)
10. -----
 (Mother's name) (Town or ken) (State or country) (Occupation)
 (Birthplace)

In items 11 and 12, you need not list relatives other than your parents, your children, your brothers, and sisters. For each person give name; relationship to you (such as father); citizenship; complete address; occupation

11. Relatives in the United States (if in military service, indicate whether a selectee or volunteer) :

- (a) -----
 (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

 (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)
- (b) -----
 (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

 (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)
- (c) -----
 (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

 (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)

(If additional space is necessary, attach sheets)

12. Relatives in Japan (see instruction above item 11) :

- (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

 (Complete address) (Occupation)

 (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

 (Complete address) (Occupation)

13. Education :

- | Name | Place | Years of attendance |
|---|-------|-----------------------|
| -----
(Kindergarten) | ----- | From ----- to ----- |
| -----
(Grade school) | ----- | From ----- to ----- |
| -----
(Japanese language school) | ----- | From ----- to ----- |
| -----
(High school) | ----- | From ----- to ----- |
| -----
(Junior college, college, or university) | ----- | From ----- to ----- |
| -----
(Type of military training, such as R. O. T. C. or Gunji Kyoren) | | (Where and when) |
| -----
(Other schooling) | | (Years of attendance) |

14. Foreign travel (give dates, where, how, for whom, with whom, and reasons therefor) :
- -----

15. Employment (give employers' names and kind of business, addresses, and dates from 1935 to date) :
- -----

16. Religion ----- Membership in religious groups -----

17. Membership in organizations (clubs, societies, associations, etc.). Give name, kind of organization, and dates of membership.
- -----

18. Knowledge of foreign languages (put check mark (V) in proper squares) :

(a) Japanese

(b) Other (Specify) -----

	Good	Fair	Poor
Reading	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Writing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Speaking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Good	Fair	Poor
Reading	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Writing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Speaking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

19. Sports and hobbies -----

20. List five references, other than relatives or former employers, giving address, occupation, and number of years known :

(Name)	(Complete address)	(Occupation)	(Years known)
-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----

21. Have you ever been convicted of a criminal offense (other than a minor traffic violation) ? -----

Offense	When	What court	Sentence
-----	-----	-----	-----

22. Give details on any foreign investments.

(a) Accounts in foreign banks. Amount, \$ -----

Bank ----- Date account opened -----

(b) Investments in foreign companies. Amount, \$ -----

Company ----- Date acquired -----

(c) Do you have a safe-deposit box in a foreign country?

What country? ----- Date acquired -----

Contents -----

23. List contributions you have made to any society, organization, or club :

Organization	Place	Amount	Date
-----	-----	-----	-----

24. List magazines and newspapers to which you have subscribed or have customarily read :

25. To the best of your knowledge, was your birth ever registered with any Japanese governmental agency for the purpose of establishing a claim to Japanese citizenship? -----

(a) If so registered, have you applied for cancelation of such registration? -----

(Yes or no)

When? ----- Where? -----

26. Have you ever applied for repatriation to Japan? -----

27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered? -----

28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization? -----

(Date)

(Signature)

NOTE.—Any person who knowingly and wilfully falsifies or conceals a material fact or makes a false or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States is liable to a fine of not more than \$10,000 or 10 years' imprisonment, or both.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE CLEARANCE

(Short form for persons submitting Selective Service Form DSS 304-A)

1. Name _____
 (Last) (First) (Middle)
 2. Relocation Center address _____
 3. Family No. _____
 4. Name of wife _____
 Names and ages of children _____

List name and address of any other persons wholly or partially dependent on you for support at the time of your evacuation:

Name _____

Address

5. Date previous application for indefinite leave or leave clearance sent to Washington, or date of leave clearance if received _____
6. Names and addresses of not to exceed five references, preferably persons not evacuated: _____

Name _____

Address

7. If employment is desired, but no definite offer has been received, list the kinds of employment desired in order of preference:

First choice

Second choice

Third choice

Will you take employment in any part of the United States?

(Yes)

(No)

Give location preferences

(Date)

(Signature)

Report of Project Internal Security Officer

Recommendation of the Project Director on application

(Project director)

(To be filled out in Washington, office, W. R. A.)

Statement of the Director of the War Relocation Authority:

(Director)

WRA-126, REV.

Budget No. 13-R022-43
Approval expires 7/31/43

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE CLEARANCE

Relocation Center _____

Family No. _____

Center Address _____

1. _____
 (Surname) (English given name) (Japanese given name)
 (a) Alias _____
2. Names and ages of dependents you propose to take with you _____

3. Date of birth_____ Place of birth_____
4. Citizenship _____
5. Last two addresses at which you lived 3 months or more (exclude residence at relocation center and at assembly center) :

----- From----- To-----
 ----- From----- To-----

6. Sex_____ Height_____ Weight_____

7. Are you a registered voter?_____ Year first registered_____

Where?_____ Party_____

8. Marital status_____ Citizenship of spouse_____

Race of spouse_____

9. _____
 _____ Father's name) (Town or ken) (State or country) (Occupation)
 _____ (Birthplace)

10. _____
 _____ Father's name) (Town or ken) (State or country) (Occupation)
 _____ (Birthplace)

In items 11 and 12, you need not list relatives other than your parents, your children, your brothers, and sisters. For each person give name; relationship to you (such as father) ; citizenship; complete address; occupation.

11. Relatives in the United States (if in military service, indicate whether a selectee or volunteer) :

(a) _____
 _____ (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

_____ (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)

(b) _____
 _____ (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

_____ (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)

(b) _____
 _____ (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

_____ (Complete address) (Occupation) (Volunteer or selectee)

(If additional space is necessary, attach sheets)

12. Relatives in Japan (see instruction above item 11) :

(a) _____
 _____ (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

_____ (Complete address) (Occupation)

(b) _____
 _____ (Name) (Relationship to you) (Citizenship)

_____ (Complete address) (Occupation)

13. Education :

Name Place Years of attendance

_____ (Kindergarten) _____ From_____ to_____

_____ (Grade school) _____ From_____ to_____

_____ (Japanese language school) _____ From_____ to_____

_____ (High school) _____ From_____ to_____

_____ (Junior college, college, or university) _____ From_____ to_____

_____ (Type of military training, such as R. O. T. C. or Gunji Kyoren) (Where and when)

_____ (Other schooling) _____ (Years of attendance)

14. Foreign travel (give dates, where, how, for whom, with whom, and reasons therefor) :

15. Employment (give employer's names and kind of business, addresses, and dates from 1935 to date) :

28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization? -----
29. Have you ever worked for or volunteered your services to the Japanese or Spanish Government? ----- If so, indicate which and give date: -----
(Yes) (No)
30. Have you ever registered any of your children with a Japanese or Spanish consul? ----- If so, give name and dates: -----
(Yes) (No)
Names Dates Names Dates
31. Have you ever sent any of your children to Japan? -----
(Yes) (No)
If so, give names and dates: -----
Names Dates Names Dates
32. State any type of leave previously applied for, and indicate whether leave clearance has previously been applied for, giving date and place of application: -----
33. If employment is desired, but no definite offer has been received, list the kinds of employment desired in order of preference:
First choice -----
Second choice -----
Third choice -----
(a) Will you take employment in any part of the United States: -----
(b) Give location preferences -----
(Yes) (No)
(Date) (Signature)

TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF EVACUEES WHO FAILED TO ANSWER TO QUESTION 28
(ON REGISTRATION FORM) IN AFFIRMATIVE

Original nonaffirmative responses to question 28 on DSS Form 304A and WRA Forms 126 revised for persons of Japanese ancestry 17 years of age and older as of September 1943:

Qualified yes	941
No	6,733
Qualified no	1,142
No reply	426
Total nonaffirmative	9,242
Total persons registered	74,466
Percent nonaffirmative of total registered	12

TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO FAILED TO REGISTER AT RELOCATION
CENTERS

In this testimony, Mr. Myer indicated his belief that there were no refusals to register at any of the centers other than Tule Lake. A careful check of the record reveals, however, that a total of 270 persons did refuse to register at the other centers. The following table indicates the number refusing to register at each of the 10 centers:

Number of refusals to register:		Number of refusals to register—Continued.	
Central Utah	234	Minidoka	26
Colorado River	0	Rohwer	0
Gila River	0	Tule Lake	3,218
Granada	1		
Heart Mountain	3		
Jerome	6	Total	3,488
Manzanar	0		

THE PERCENTAGE OF ALIENS AND PERCENTAGE OF CITIZENS IN POPULATION AT TULE LAKE ON DECEMBER 8

Completely accurate records on the citizenship status of the population at Tule Lake are not available at the present time. On the basis of the statistics which are available, however, it appears that approximately 69 percent of the residents of Tule Lake are American citizens and that the remaining 31 percent are aliens.

Number of evacuees on internal security staff at Tule Lake on Nov. 1, 1943

Wardens-----	101
Parole officer-----	1
Secretaries-----	3
Janitor-----	1
Total-----	106

Table showing acreage of crops unharvested at Tule Lake on Oct. 15, 1943

	Acrea		Acrea
Barley-----	566	Cauliflower-----	25
Oats-----	37	Turnips-----	7
Potatoes-----	482	Beets-----	21
Daikon-----	13	Carrots-----	21
Cabbage-----	20	Rutabagas-----	5

INFORMATION REGARDING MRS. VAN BUSKIRK

Mrs. Van Buskirk, who is specifically named in Ralph Peck's affidavit as the person responsible for the statement that the Japanese were "justified in bombing Pearl Harbor," is no longer a member of the staff at the Tule Lake center, and has not been since October 24, 1943.

CLARIFICATION OF THE RECORD REGARDING NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW OF DR. J. T. MASON

In a letter to Mr. Stripling dated December 3, which was read into the record, Dr. Mason denies granting an interview regarding the Tule Lake incident to any newspaperman in Klamath Falls or "in any other town in the West." Mr. Best never claimed that he did. In his telegram to the United Aircraft Corporation, Mr. Best referred merely to an interview which was published in the Klamath Falls Herald and News. Actually, the interview was granted in Cooksville, Tenn., and carried in the Klamath Falls paper as a wire-service story.

LIST OF 69 WITNESSES INTERVIEWED BY W. R. A. IN CONNECTION WITH TULE LAKE INCIDENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

Title or identification

1. Roundabush, Lillie, Teacher.
2. Leuck, George B., Asst. Fire Protection Officer.
3. Cook, Guy W.,* Asst. Principal, jr. high school.
4. Cole, Delbert R., Chief of Internal Security.
5. Miller, William L., Irrigation and Road Engineer.
6. Montgomery, Dorothy,* Asst. Counselor.
7. Davis, James W., Equipment Maintenance Supervisor.
8. Esser, Mrs. Geneva, Elementary school teacher.
9. Leigh, William A., Fiscal Accountant.
10. Muir, Arthur, Acting Fiscal officer.

*Submitted both an ordinary statement and a statement in the form of an affidavit. Since there was not time to have the affidavit-type statements notarized, they are being submitted merely as signed statements.

LIST OF 69 WITNESSES INTERVIEWED BY W. R. A. IN CONNECTION WITH TULE LAKE INCIDENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943—Continued

Title or identification

11. Weber, Mrs. Ella, Wife of W. R. A. Interpreter.
12. Elberson, Mrs. Ruth, Wife of Chief of Community Enterprises.
13. Marks, Dr. H. K., Medical Officer.
14. Barbul, Valeria, Secretary.
15. Johnson, Mrs. Myrtle R., Hospital Dietician.
16. Robinson, Priscilla, Teacher.
17. Burton, Bessie B., Teacher.
18. Rose, Mrs. Emma L., High school teacher.
19. Cheek, Walter R., Music teacher.
20. Hitt, Ernest L., Foreman Mechanic.
21. Green, Mrs. Margaret A., Personnel clerk.
22. Velasquez, Elisa, Teacher.
23. Huycke, Lorne, Chief, Community Activities.
24. Davie, Evelyn J., High school teacher.
25. Lee, Dorothy S., Teacher.
26. Hert, May P., Teacher.
27. Silverthorne, Kent, Project Attorney.
28. Powell, Mrs. Dora, Wife of Motor Pool Dispatcher.
29. Bogorad, Clara, Leave Officer.
30. Hedrick, Melbourne E., Cost Accountant.
31. Hedrick, Mrs. Vlasta, Statistical clerk.
32. Levine, Reuben, Asst. Fiscal Accountant.
33. Fagan, Frank D., Personnel Officer.
34. Spoonemore, Rosemary C., Teacher.
35. Battat, Seemah,* Clerk-stenographer.
36. Durkin, Mary C.,* Teacher.
37. Benz, Clarence J., Sr. Manufacturing Supt.
38. Gerry, Mrs. Margaret, Stenographer.
39. Jenson, Clara M., High school teacher.
40. Barnes, Betty H., Fiscal Accountant.
41. Loebmann, Dr. Martin, Medical Officer.
42. Farrell, Mildred C., Clerk.
43. Light, Emily W., Elementary school teacher.
44. Booker, Guy H., Associate Highway Engineer.
45. Driscoll, Carrie D., Home economics teacher.
46. Schmidt, Willard E., National Chief, Internal Security.
47. Smith, Riley D., Asst. Farm Superintendent.
48. Harkness, Kenneth M., Superintendent of Education.
49. Boatright, Eugene C., High school teacher.
50. Jarrett, William T., Farm Superintendent.
51. Francis, Dr. Marion, Night School Director.
52. Clark, Zell F., High school teacher.
53. Jaderquist, Irene, High school adviser.
54. Robbins, Stella M., High school teacher.
55. Black, Harry L., Asst. Project Director in charge of Community Management.
56. Lowery, J. Sheldon, Evacuee Property Officer.
57. Daggy, Roy M., Construction and Maintenance Foreman.
58. Kirkman, Harry, Jr. Property & Supply Officer, Mess Div.
59. Failing, Chester A., In charge of Motor Pool.
60. Breece, Mrs. Ruth P., High School Teacher.
61. Bergman, P. C., Sanitary Engineer.
62. Folda, Alma K., Chief Nurse.
63. Mahrt, Fenton P., Asst. Chief, Internal Security.
64. Tift, Katharine, Teacher.
65. Silverthorne, Eada,* Teacher.
66. Zimmer, C. E., asst. Project Director.
67. Roper, Otis, Asst. Electrical Engineer.
68. Christensen, Julius P., Supervisor, Irrigation, Drainage and Road Const.
69. Lucas, Margaret M., Secretary.

*Submitted both an ordinary statement and a statement in the form of an affidavit. Since there was not time to have the affidavit-type statements notarized, they are being submitted merely as signed statements.

INTERVIEW WITH MISS ROUDABUSH, SCHOOL TEACHER, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

November first was my first day in the Statistics Office. I had been transferred that day from Housing where I had worked for two months. As I came to the office at 1 o'clock, I saw many people coming toward the Adm. Bldg. There were older people and people with children in the crowd. I also saw a few young men running toward the Motor Pool, which fact surprised me. The only unusual thing that struck me was that in the crowd I saw only one person whom I knew, a h. s. boy, who looked at me without a sign of recognition or of friendliness.

The Caucasians who usually worked in the Ad. Bldg. restlessly moved about all the afternoon for many people milled into and out of our office all afternoon in a restless excited way. Several Internal Security men sat for a while in our office because they didn't want to be conspicuous in the crowd outside. (Our office is strategically located for seeing everything that went on outside.) Yes; I saw one young man press his face against the window to see what was going on inside. Someone reported that Mr. Myer was going to speak to the crowd. Some one opened the window when the loudspeaker was heard and we listened to Mr. Myer's speech and returned to work. There seemed to be more disturbance and jittery actions among the Caucasian staff than appeared necessary or seemly.

Earlier in the afternoon when I discovered that my glasses were at home, I spoke of going for them but Miss Waldron said "No; you stay here, because they are not letting people through the crowd."

Yes; I saw the people bow at the end of the speech. A leader gave a sharp military-like order and the men jerked off their hats. At a second command they bowed rather low. I have seen Japanese bow like that in assent in church service and in other meetings after a speech with which they heartily agreed.

There were all sorts of rumors current the next day and people said and did things which to me seemed silly or cowardly. No; I wasn't afraid. If for no other reason than that I believe we have many more friends among the colonists than there are persons who are dangerous.

Tuesday, I was disgusted with some members of the staff. Mr. Best had called a staff meeting for 4:20 in the hospital, but a large group of the staff called a secret meeting for noontime. (Later I found that they wanted to prepare a set of demands to present to Mr. Best at the P. M. meeting.) A friend came by while we were eating lunch and said we were supposed to go to a meeting at the Rec. Hall at 10 minutes to one. Pearl and I poked our heads in at the door and some one said to Pearl, "Who invited you here? We left at once, not knowing what was going on, but knowing that there was something afoot. About 2:30 or 3:00 a message came to our office saying that Mr. Myer had spoken at this extra meeting (by special request) and that the four o'clock meeting was called off. Then we were angry because we hadn't seen Mr. Myer at all and because we didn't want him to think that the entire staff was as disgruntled and angry and afraid as some appeared to be.

Tuesday and Wednesday and Thursday, the girls came back to type in the office. Yes; Wednesday morning a boy from the colony came in to ask Miss Waldron if the girls might be excused to attend a celebration. At Miss W's question, he said "I don't know much about it, but everybody is supposed to go, I would advise you to let them go." Miss Waldron said, "Of course, they may go if they want to." Then one of the girls said "Do we have to do?" Miss Waldron advised her to go home if she didn't want to go. The girls were out only about 30 or 45 minutes, then returned to work before lunch.

On Thursday night several of the women had brought their sewing to my room for an evening of reading and talk. They started home about 9:00 and I went to the door. We heard motors running and one girl said the tanks were warming up, so there must be trouble of sort." No; I didn't see anyone running. Then a man came by and said that some colonists had been arrested near the Ad. Bldg. He also said that "The Army has taken over." Later, when everyone had gone home and the soldiers had left the neighborhood of our barracks my roommate and I saw some soldiers march a few (8 or 10) colonists men past our barrack toward the warehouses. I thought it was very strange, because Pearl recognized some of the men in the group as wardens.

Yes; the things that happened on Friday gave food for thought. Several people, Caucasians, roamed into the office to express their excess emotion. One man jumped up on a desk, and almost shouted "Now we are safe. The army has taken over." One of the women secretaries said "I'm so happy. I've never been so

happy in my life. The army has taken over." I don't know how anyone else would interpret this. To my part I didn't think it implied a very fine loyal spirit. No; I haven't been afraid.

You asked about housing. The only thing I remember of significance is that one day Ruth, one of the fine evacuee girls who worked with us, came in crying hysterically and threatened to resign. I heard her say, "Nobody is going to talk to me like that. I am going to quit." I didn't know just what happened or what occasioned it but she had been threatened by a young Kibei in the front office. Mr. Huyck was very wise; he took her home in the car. When she came back to work, her task was changed to some work in the back office. She was replaced in the front office by an older man.

LILLIE ROUDABUSH.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. LUECK, ASSISTANT FIRE PROTECTION OFFICER, NOVEMBER 17, 1943

I wasn't here on Monday, November 1st.

On Thursday we had picked up a nurse in Tule Lake, Miss Curran, brought her out and she had dinner with us. We left her between 9:15 and 9:30. I remember we listened to the 9:00 news. Ward A was dark. It was the first time I had ever noticed Ward A being dark. I don't know whether that has any significance or not. We left Miss Curran in Tule Lake. When I came back I spoke to the guard at the gate concerning the number of cars parked outside. I thought there might be trouble, so instead of putting my car in the garage I put it in the military area. I noticed activity around there, so I went home. I remember I said to the guard, "You can't tell what's likely to happen around here." He said, "It's already happened. I didn't hear any shooting. We walked home and I started to read the paper. Mr. Hill called up about that time and wanted to know what the situation was out there. Hill lives at the motor pool. He said he had noticed some activity. About a thousand Japs running around with clubs where he was. That's what he said over the phone. I heard the tanks warming up and the soldiers told us all to go to the military area. I didn't see any Japs around at all. I went over and stood by. That's all I know about it. I will say that the next morning we picked up a slug, over in our warehouse that somebody had shot through the wall. I think Christiansen found that slug in 308 warehouse.

(Answers on questions about Tule Lake Fire Department.)

The fire alarm system which we have is in operation right now. It's okay. No damage of that system was ever reported to me. Mr. Rhoades never showed me any damage although he talked about it once.

In regard to the fire extinguishers, here's the record. In October 1943 we had 1,511 extinguishers, that is the carbon tetrachloride type, on hand. Now, according to Mr. Rhoades I can't check that. There were 17 hundred of these quart size extinguishers when the project began. I would say that we can't lay that loss of extinguishers to the Japanese or any one else in particular. I know for a fact that some of those we had over in the military area were lost right there. Now the Japs couldn't have done that.

I will say that the water-type extinguishers used in the warehouse area got used for playthings and they were always empty. That is the 2 and a half and the 4 gallon type. Sometimes they get those and use them on the chicken farm. Fill them with louse spray. They get all gummed up and you can't use them.

This sand getting in the hydrants happens quite often. Some of it is kid stuff. We have inspectors, a regular system, to go around and check the hydrants and see what shape they are in. These hydrants are in the form of stem pipes with the valves buried under the ground level. A 4-inch pipe sets over that. Now there is a large nut which goes over the pipe to protect the brass that the stem is made of. These nuts get stolen all the time. Now that isn't kid stuff. Somebody with a purpose takes those nuts.

There certainly has been abuse of the equipment by the firemen. I sometimes think it's intentional and sometimes I think they are just trying to be smart. I've never seen more than 2 or 3 Japs that you would make firemen out of. They are just not of the right temperament. You can't make them realize the need for keeping the equipment in tip-top shape all the time. You can't depend on them. If there is a little something broken or something missing they are likely to just hope it will never be missed or never be reported. They don't keep the stuff in good shape. In all the strikes that they have had in camp we have never had the firemen walk out on us. Not once. If I know what I'm

talking about, the planning board told them not to get mixed up in this striking business but to stay on the job all the time. Once we had a little discussion over shoes for firemen and another time on the 12:00 midnight meal. They never left their jobs.

Sure they asked me for pool tables once and once they asked me for athletic equipment. I told them that there was not a chance unless they wanted to buy them themselves. They said, "Well, the Caucasians have them in the recreation hall, why can't we have them here?" I said, "You can buy them and get them that way." They did get ping-pong tables down there and I don't doubt a bit that they went to the social workers about the pool tables, but I never heard anything about it.

There was a change apparent in the men ever since segregation started. Maybe even a little before that. Some of the good boys were going out on work leaves. It seems to me the attitude was different. They got sort of surly. There used to be a bunch of smiles in the morning when you went in but then they got so they had surly looks and they would look at you out of the corner of their eyes. You didn't know whether you wanted to stay there or not. Nothing was ever said, it was just the feeling about the place.

November 4: Thursday nothing happened over in our area. That is over where I live. They weren't a bit interested in us over there.

GEORGE B. LUECK.

STATEMENT OF GUY W. COOK, JUNIOR ASSISTANT PRINCIPAL, HIGH SCHOOL,
NOVEMBER 16, 1943.

November 1: Shortly following my arrival at the administrative office building of the High School, I noticed that there was a group of evacuees assembled at the corner between the High School and the fire station north of the High School block. A young fellow, wearing a knitted stocking cap, seemed to be exhorting the group to proceed toward the administrative area of the project. The group seemed hesitant about following him. He made several starts, followed by a small portion of the assembled group. After about fifteen minutes most of the group followed the leader in the direction of the administrative area.

Between five and ten minutes later Supt. Harkness, Prin. Gunderson, Mrs. Catherine Johnson, Grover Lytle, and I left the High School and drove to the family apartment area where Mrs. Johnson left the car to remain at her home. Harkness, Gunderson, Lytle, and I proceeded by car to the north edge of the apartment area and then west through the military area, and then south to the gate. Harkness parked his car outside the gate. The four of us entered the gate. Harkness and Gunderson proceeded in the general direction of the motor pool. Lytle and I went toward the flagpole, located in front of the administrative building facing the military area. We circulated among the evacuees who were assembled in this area. I tried to observe what was going on. The evacuees in the vicinity of the flag pole seemed quiet, even friendly. Most of them were standing. However, there were some seated on the lawn in a semicircle about 65 feet from and facing the door of the administration building. After some minutes I noticed that a Caucasian member of the staff attempted to leave the vicinity of the steps in front of the building and come toward the place where I was standing. He was stopped and directed to return to the building. This he did. Shortly thereafter a young man told me that I was supposed to be in the administration building. I did not make any move to comply. He repeated his request. Then, two other young fellows told me I should go into the administration building. I did not wish to make an issue of the matter so I proceeded slowly toward the building * * * not directly to the entrance but to the right, keeping in the fringe of the crowd. Several in the group, no doubt thinking I intended to go around the building to the west, told me not to go that way but to go inside. I went to the steps in front of the building and remained there for some time * * * probably twenty or twenty-five minutes. Then I went inside.

I moved about inside the building during the next three hours, talking with people, and going to different windows where I could observe the crowd outside. At different times I carried on conversation with individual evacuees whom I knew. They were friendly. There seemed to be an air of expectancy on the part of some evacuees, an attitude of indifference on the part of very many, and an attitude of curiosity on the part of others. There seemed to be some key folks among the evacuees whose duty it was to see that all Caucasians were assembled in the administration buildings. They were quite insistent on this.

However, individual Caucasian women who insisted were permitted to go to their apartments. One or more returned to the administration buildings later. The crowd was more than ordinarily orderly. I watched sections of the crowd from different windows. Individuals stood for many, many minutes in the same place hardly even turning around.

At the back doors of the administration buildings some of the evacuees seemed a bit impudent. They slammed the doors shut. However, these were opened later * * * whether from the inside or the outside, I do not know.

I saw some canes as well as some soft pine sticks which the evacuees often carry when they go for a walk. They were very few in number so I paid little attention to them.

Late in the afternoon when Dillon S. Myer spoke I was watching the crowd through one of the east windows. When Myer was introduced, or announced, practically all of the men uncovered and remained uncovered during his talk. Mr. R. Best, project director, also spoke briefly. Courteous attention was given to these talks. I recall that Mr. Myer's talk was applauded.

Following two or three short talks by evacuees which probably included interpretations of the talk by the national and project directors, one of the evacuees directed the evacuees in some sort of ceremonial obeisance. I stood about eight feet to the rear of the speaker who stood in the open doorway at the north of the main administration building. Following some directive words, I presume, by the speaker most of the evacuees uncovered and bowed their heads. One fellow just in front of the speaker did not uncover. The speaker reached out in rather a rough and determined manner and knocked the evacuees head-covering off.

At the conclusion of the obeisance, if it were that, the crowd turned quickly, quietly, and orderly and proceeded to the evacuee residence area.

Although my pride was hurt, and I was irritated because of being restricted to the interior of the administrative buildings, there was no time when I felt alarmed for my safety. I did not feel that I was physically in danger.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

Guy W. Cook, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I am an employee of the War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Center, Newell, California.

On the afternoon of November 1, 1943, I proceeded from the administrative offices of the high school plant to the vicinity of the general W. R. A. Administrative buildings, where a large crowd of evacuees was gathered. I walked in among the crowd in front of the main entrance to the Administration Building and stood there for some time waiting to see what was taking place. The people around me appeared to be calm and friendly.

After a short while I moved up to the inner fringe of the crowd and stood watching. A young evacuee then told me that I was supposed to be inside. He repeated this twice in a calm voice and then turned around and paid no more attention to me.

I then started to walk through the inner fringe of the crowd away from the entrance of the Administration Building, whereupon I was approached by two young evacuees, who told me that I had better get inside. None of those who spoke to me acted in the least excited or threatening. I decided, however, that it was best not to make an issue of the matter, and went into the Administration Building.

While in the Administration Building for the balance of the afternoon, I watched the crowd from different parts of the building, and in that way was able to see practically all of the gathering. I did not see any weapons, incendiary materials, or anything else that would indicate that the people were bent on destruction. The great majority of them looked and acted like any crowd of people waiting to hear a speech.

At the conclusion of the speeches they dispersed in an orderly manner.

GUY W. COOK.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of November, 1943.

*Notary Public, in and for the County of Modoc,
State of California.*

TULE LAKE CENTER, CALIFORNIA,
November 8, 1943.

NOVEMBER 4TH INCIDENT

(Report submitted by Delbert R. Cole, Chief of Internal Security)

The following refers to the incident which occurred on the night of November 4, 1943.

On November 1st, the evacuees residing at the Tule Lake Center put on a demonstration in and around the administration buildings. In consequence thereof, Fenton Mahrt, Assistant Chief of Internal Security, and I were placed on guard duty at night.

At 7 P. M., on the night of Thursday, November 4, 1943, Mr. Mahrt and I were on guard duty in the Caucasian civilian residential area. At the time, our custom was to take turns guarding. One would be on guard half of the night (from 7 P. M. to 2 A. M.) and then would turn the watch over to the one who had slept during the first part of the night. The last watch was from 2 A. M. to 7 A. M.

On the night of November 4, 1943, Mr. Mahrt was on the early watch, namely from 7 P. M. to 2 A. M. There were two new Caucasian watchmen working for the Construction company. These watchmen were guarding some new construction in the tent factory area. In order to be sure that these men were all right, Mr. Mahrt made hourly trips to their section.

At about 9 P. M., Mr. Ivan Buell, our watchman at the high-school area, telephoned in and requested some assistance immediately. Mr. Mahrt went down there and was told by Mr. Buell at the high-school area that there were several evacuees in that section, who were armed with clubs.

I instructed Mr. Mahrt to inform Mr. Buell to leave the area. Mr. Mahrt did so, then proceeded to pick up Mr. Lewis (Ted Lewis, Internal Security Officer from Central Utah Relocation Project), and Mr. Edward Borbeck, Internal Security Officer. Upon driving through the warehouse area, these three officers encountered five evacuees armed with clubs. They approached these evacuees and inquired of them as to where they were going. Mr. Mahrt had a baseball bat in his hand and the five evacuees decided to back off. Messrs. Mahrt, Lewis, and Borbeck got back into the car and drove further down into the warehouse area and encountered a road blockade. They proceeded to the Administration building to telephone Mr. Willard E. Schmidt, National Chief of Internal Security, and me (Delbert R. Cole) as to what had occurred. While they were telephoning, a pick-up was driven around the Administration Building area. They began to stop this pick-up, and as they did so, the driver of the pick-up yelled and a great number of evacuees came to his assistance.

The fight started. The evacuees seemed to come from around the administration buildings.

When Mr. Mahrt telephoned me about the road blockade, I received a telephone call from Mr. Best to the effect that there was trouble at the motor pool. I immediately left my home and started for the Administration building. As I neared the Administration Building, in the vicinity of the Leave Building, I heard the evacuee in the pick-up yell for help. I started to run at that time and ran into the office where the telephone operator was working. As I came to the operator's office, Mr. Mahrt ran in the door and told me that the evacuees had Mr. Borbeck down and said, "What are we going to use to fight with?" I told him that we had better grab chairs and run out and see what we could do.

We obtained the chairs, ran out the door with them, and as we ran out the door, the four evacuees who were still on the lawn in front of the Administration Building, ran away. At this time we did not see Mr. Borbeck. He must have been lying in the road behind the rocks that line the walk of the Administration Building. As we turned around to look for him, he (Mr. Borbeck) walked in the door. He came in under his own power, without assistance from anyone. His face was all bloody, and he had a deep cut on the top of his head. He went to the wash room, and we asked Dr. Marks, who was in the building, to examine him.

We left Mr. Borbeck in Dr. Marks' care and ran out to get into our car to search the area for more evacuees. As we got into the car, we heard some yelling in the vicinity of the hospital. Mr. Mahrt, who was driving the car at the time, turned the car around and swung the lights down toward the hospital. Three evacuees then started running toward the car. We immediately jumped out and apprehended these men. As the evacuees came near, one of them made a dive at Mr.

Mahrt, who promptly knocked him flat with a baseball bat. We immediately captured the other two and proceeded with them to the Administration Building where they were turned over to the Army at approximately 10:45 P. M.

At this point the Army had assumed complete control of the situation, so we returned to the side lines as mere watchers.

DELBERT R. COLE,
Chief of Internal Security.

Dictated by Delbert R. Cole on November 8—re—9:30 A. M. Transcribed by Seemah Battat, Secretary to Willard E. Schmidt, National Chief of Internal Security.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. MILLER, IRRIGATION AND ROAD ENGINEER REGARDING
EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was working at the farm and came back to the Center while the assembly was in full swing. The sentry stopped us at the main gate and wouldn't let anybody in.

I heard Mrs. Gerry, employed at the Internal Security Building, phoning her husband, and to other offices in the area, trying to get information.

I saw the crowd of Japanese on the west side of the Administration Building. Occasionally they would move in a mass in one direction or another, as though something distracted their attention. I could see the bowing, but at the distance, approximately 800 feet, I couldn't see what they were doing.

I saw a heavy-set Japanese driving a pick-up, assigned to the Electrical department. He seemed to be a look-out, or communication officer, to watch the military and report to other Japanese. Occasionally he drove within 50 feet of the main gate.

Some Japanese had control of the Motor Pool and lined up several trucks to form a barricade across the road around the Motor Pool, apparently to stop any Caucasians from getting to the main gate. I also saw two Japanese jump on privately owned cars and also W. R. A. cars and tramp the tops in. I could also see them remove caps from the gasoline tanks of two passenger cars, parked near the Motor Pool, about 200 feet from the main gate.

November 4: I live in Tulelake and I wasn't on the Project that night.

Since segregation, the Japanese seemed sullen and surly, and when they showed their passes at the gate they practically insulted both the W. R. A. employees and the soldiers.

W. L. MILLER.

STATEMENT OF DOROTHY MONTGOMERY, ASSISTANT COUNSELOR, NOVEMBER 23, 1943

When the first train arrived from Central Utah, bringing a load almost completely composed of single men, I was working with the housing crew in the High-School area. This was the first night that we had difficulty in housing the incoming evacuees.

The difficulties were:

1. The incoming evacuees (bachelors) wanted to be housed together and not mixed with the old residents.
2. The old residents resented having the new residents housed with them.
3. In more than one instance one group bodily evicted the other from the quarters.

4. The evacuee girls who had been riding the trucks as escorts from the housing area to the homes, did not want to ride with these groups since "they are all Kibei," "they are too fresh," "they don't speak English," etc.

As a result we made many changes in housing assignments and spent several hours longer than usual in completing the housing assignments.

From that time the prevalence of Kibei groups and "Pressure Groups" became more apparent.

Around October 15 a group of 25 to 30 young men came into the welfare office. They gave the impression that they were all Kibei since they spoke in Japanese exclusively except for the leader whose English was very poor. This group was complaining that they had not received their clothing checks from the Gila River Project. At the time of each call they insisted upon seeing the supervisor. They were sent to the agent-cashier since a part of the checks had arrived. They returned to the office at least four times as a group. They said that the Gila Project was four months in arrears on payment of clothing allowances, and they

wanted this project to pay the amount due to them. Although explanations were given repeatedly they were not well satisfied and all of them demanded Public Assistance. They were given appointments for applications as individuals.

This happened immediately after the housing office windows were broken and the office was closed. The young men at the time of one of their calls asked for certain housing equipment. When they were told that such equipment must be secured from the housing office they stated that that office was closed, and asked the reason. Since they were unusually impertinent they were told, "You undoubtedly know more about that than I." They laughed uproariously and left.

Since October 15 the welfare office has had almost 1,000 applications for Public Assistance. A large majority of the applicants are able to work and had requested work prior to application. On the whole the applicants were orderly and quiet while in the office.

The Welfare Department is also responsible for the arrangement of funerals. Immediately after the death of Mr. Kashima, who was killed in the truck accident on the farm, Mr. Harry Ikami, who arranges funerals, went to the home of Mrs. Kashima. He started routine arrangements for the funeral to be held in the regular manner. On the Monday following the public funeral which was held I discussed the matter with him at length. He stated that he and the family had made plans for a small funeral. When their plans were almost complete they were approached by a committee which demanded the public funeral. The widow did not want a public funeral, but matters were taken completely out of the hands of the family as well as of the funeral arranger. Mr. Ikami attended the funeral, which he said lasted longer than the usual funeral.

On Monday, November 1, 1943, I went to work as usual in my office in the colony. The only happening that was not customary was that about 10:00 a. m. my receptionist Larry Kataoka disappeared and did not return to the office during the morning. One of the other workers said Larry had to go away "on business." He did not state the nature of the business.

After lunch I was still in the Administration Building at the time the demonstration began. The first indication that I saw was a group of people coming around both sides of the hospital. They advanced until they were completely surrounding the building. It is impossible for me to estimate the number accurately but there were a lot of people. The evacuee girls who were working in the Welfare Section of the office did not appear to know what was going on but they were frightened and left the building. I do not think that particular group of girls were informed to leave. The group appeared to be a representative group of all ages and included both women and children. As the group gathered close to the building I saw members of my staff who waved to me in their usual friendly manner.

During the entire afternoon I wandered around the building. The crowd as a whole appeared to be quiet and orderly. There were several groups of young men who appeared at times to be giving instructions to persons in the crowd. These were the only persons I noticed who seemed to be acting in a purposive manner. At no times did I personally see any evidence of the rumored incendiary materials; nor did I see any weapons of any sort. I did not attempt to leave the building and saw no evidences of force. After the speeches the crowd dispersed at approximately 5:00 p. m.

The following day the welfare office was open and operating. Several of the workers brought up the matter in discussion with me. Mr. Obayashi, a social worker, with a twinkle in his eye asked me, "Where were you yesterday afternoon, Miss Montgomery?" I replied, "I was in the Administration building. Where were you?"

He then told me that an announcement was made in the mess hall that the Director, Mr. Dillon Myer, was to speak to the colony and that everyone was to come to the administrative area at 1:15. He said that he had heard some vague rumors so he decided to return to the welfare office. He found some of the workers there and advised them that they should leave. He saw that the building was properly locked, and then came to the Administrative Area to find out what was happening. After a short while he became bored and tired and decided to leave. At that time he learned that a large group of young men were guarding the pathways around the hospital. They would not allow him to leave. Mr. Obayashi was very much disturbed over the fact that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten. He said that was an evidence of the unlawful element in the community. He said that from discussions he had heard he did not believe that it had been planned as a part of the afternoon's program but had been the idea of a group of rowdies.

The reactions of other members of the staff were much the same. The only worker with whom the matter was discussed at my volition was Larry Kataoka, the receptionist. It was suggested to him that he should notify the supervisor if it was necessary for him to leave the office for any period of time. His attitude appeared to be very cooperative. He said that he had not planned to be away more than a few minutes getting some supplies. However he was intercepted by a group of young men and was not allowed to return.

On the surface the following days, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, were very quiet in the colony. The administrative staff appeared to be disturbed (i. e., in a dither) over the situation. Since I was not informed of the first staff meeting I did not attend. The second, held Wednesday night, was somewhat more widely publicized and I attended. My own personal reaction was that several of the staff members were on the verge of hysteria. The ground covered in the meeting appeared to be largely expressions of fear and reiteration of demands to know what steps were being taken for the protection of the staff. Mr. Best spoke briefly.

On Thursday evening, November 4, I was in my room when I first heard some trucks race past at high speed toward the colony. Then what sounded like a large group of people ran past the barracks toward the colony. I heard calls between some of them in Japanese. Shortly afterward screams sounded and were closely followed by sirens blowing. I left my room to investigate and saw the tanks and other military equipment in action. The barrack in which I live is directly opposite the Mess Hall. I saw the night baker (evacuee) run from the mess hall toward the road leading into the colony. As he neared the road he was picked up in the spot lights of this tank coming around one of the buildings. The baker was clothed entirely in white, wearing a tall white cap. Both of his hands were above his head and in one hand he was waving a white piece of cloth. The tanks began to fire toward him. They did not hit him and I assumed that they had not meant to do so.

I then walked toward the Administration Building, passing several small groups of Caucasian personnel who were excitedly chattering about the situation. In a few minutes I arrived at the center door at the back of the Administration Building. Just inside the oldest wing of the building a long row of soldiers were standing close together with guns pointed at another line on the other side of the partition. The second line was composed of evacuees. The hands of the evacuees were raised above their heads. Two of them were on the floor propped against desks with hands propped up. Their heads dropped forward, and one of them had a head wound which had been bleeding. These two appeared to be in only a semiconscious state. There was at least one warden in the group.

After several minutes we left the building and for the next several hours wandered around the area. The next morning the director announced that the Army was in charge.

DOROTHY MONTGOMERY.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

Dorothy Montgomery, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I am an employee of the War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Center, Newell, California.

On November 1, 1943, I was in the Administration Building at all times when the crowd of several thousand evacuees was gathered around the building.

I looked at the crowd from various parts of the Administration Building. My impression was that the crowd contained many women and children, and was calm and friendly. Some of the evacuees who work for me were in the crowd, and they spoke to me and waved in their usual friendly manner. At no time was I in the least frightened or fearful of my safety.

I saw no weapons of any kind nor did I see incendiary materials.

DOROTHY MONTGOMERY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ day of November, 1943.

Notary Public in and for the County of Modoc, State of California.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. J. DAVIS, MACHINE SHOP FOREMAN, NOVEMBER 11, 1943

Sure, they have made hundreds of knives. They spend a lot of time on it. I never saw a machine shop yet where the men who work in it didn't make things in their off hours or sometimes during regular hours. They get these pieces of broken spring and they makes knives and tell you it's for the mess halls. Maybe it is. I don't know. Some of them say they are making personal knives. I saw one making a knife out of a piece of tin that you couldn't even cut bread with. They make them out of everything. One fellow here made a first-class hunting knife. A fellow by the name of Kiyama. A mighty good job. They say that people steal the knives out of the mess halls and then they have to make new knives to replace the ones stolen out of the mess. I would say that any estimate of 60 springs broken on cars during the month of December, as was testified, is if anything an underestimate. It's more likely 160, but these springs you have to remember are broken by Caucasians as well as by Japs. With the equipment we have and the roads it's a wonder we don't have more, but it's foolish to say that they break these springs on purpose to get material to make knives out of. As for emery wheels, emery wheels always wear out. I would say that we never had more than 25 emery wheels altogether. Certainly not 50 as was testified, and we do a lot of other work on these emery wheels besides making knives. I asked Internal Security once to do something about the use of the shop after hours and I showed them the condition of the emery wheels but Jacoby told me that there was no possibility of patrolling it. He didn't have enough men. I've kicked fellows out for using the stuff after hours.

I never heard of many motor parts being stolen but a lot of other things get stolen off the cars. The emblems, the rear-view mirrors. Those things like "Dodge" spelled out in chromium plate. Those things get taken and once I know one truck driver shifted the glass from somebody else's car to his which had been broken and once somebody started to take a couple of radios out of a couple of the cars. We stopped that, but I never heard of car parts being taken.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

STATEMENT OF MRS. GENEVA ESSER, ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

I have been here almost six months.

November 1: Before Monday I noticed that my girl, Yuki Imagawa, a Japanese housekeeper, seemed quiet and somewhat disturbed. She was unwilling to speak about the colonists.

One day she said, "The people who stay down in the colony are angry, and say we tell you people too much."

One day she wanted to go home earlier, so that she wouldn't be late to the mess hall. She said, "They would say, 'There goes another plate.'" Said they seemed suspicious of everyone down there. They watched everyone.

Monday afternoon I was ill, but when told about the crowd assembling, I went to the edge of our area to watch. The crowd gathered slowly and steadily without fear of trouble, for they brought their children and babies. A small group of about eight Japanese young men near us seemed to have a great deal of authority and directed people as they pleased. A Caucasian driving his car toward the hospital was head off by at least six Japanese and told to get over and turn around. He did so and drove away in the opposite direction.

I saw no weapons being used from where I was standing, and at no time saw any oil-soaked paper or straw.

Mrs. Pedicord tried to get through the gate between the personnel area and hospital area. About six Japanese tried to stop her, but after a few minutes she drove through, and then they pushed a big truck into the driveway so that no Caucasian could get through there.

The crowd stood around about three or three and a half hours. After the speeches they quietly dispersed and went back to the colony.

I did get through the fence and stood near some soldiers. A truck full of Japanese drove by and waved at the soldiers. I would say it looked like an insult to them.

November 4: Thursday night, about ten minutes to ten, a soldier pounded on our door, and when I opened it he said, "Lady, get your children and go to the military area."

I told our nearest neighbors and carried one of Mrs. Forrest's babies over for her, as her husband was at the farm.

We stayed in the Day Room until after twelve, I believe, and then went to our homes to sleep. It was an exciting night, and I got up almost every hour to look out the window to see if there was any extra happening.

Japanese girls who worked in our office told us that they were afraid to go outside their homes at night. If they talked to Caucasians in front of disloyal Japanese they called them Caucasian lovers, and if they were loyal ones forced to stay here with their parents they called them dogs.

I knew two loyal Americans who were key workers who were afraid to stay in their rooms the night before they left to relocate. They were afraid of their own people. One couple (newlyweds, Japanese) said that they didn't dare speak about Christianity or Caucasians, as the neighbors listened to them, and they were afraid. So they had to turn on their radio and whisper.

I can't think of anything else that I actually saw or heard.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. LEIGH, FISCAL ACCOUNTANT, NOVEMBER 16, 1943

I am one of the oldest persons on this project. I came here in September 1942. I am principal fiscal accountant. I might say that I got along swell with evacuees in this office. I have found them all to be very faithful and very accurate. [Shows a letter from an evacuee young man who worked with him in the office, who is now resettled in a midwestern city. In the letter, the evacuee praises Mr. Leigh for his "understanding and tolerance."] Then there was Hoda Yasuo who was supervisor of the evacuee pay-roll unit. I've always thought a great deal of him. He was very efficient and he worked up a great crew of workers. We've had to get assistance from him in the present emergency because he was the only one who knew certain things about the pay roll. I don't see how we could proceed without Hoda if we are to have evacuee helpers in the office.

November 1: I came back from lunch about a quarter of one. A little later I looked up and there were no evacuees around. Must have been about 1:15. I wondered what had happened. I would only think that they had been tipped off not to come back to work.

This building was surrounded. I should say that it was a very well organized group. There was a tough element near this building. I think from looking at the crowd that they had organized it this way: There was a tough element near the building then women and girls and then another bunch of toughs behind them so that the women and children were in between the two organized bunches of toughs. We were not allowed to go outside the door. We stood in this office at the door most of the time. Once Mr. Breece started to walk to the edge of the lawn and a tough pushed him back, then we told him not to start anything. It seemed wise not to create any incidents under the circumstances. Toughs called him all sorts of names, some bad ones, including -----, ----- Then Donovan and Slattery came through the building and said that they were manhandled at the gate because they were walking toward the office.

The evacuees didn't come inside the building here, and later we closed the doors then we learned of the incidents happening. We could see the army warming up trucks. I remember at the other end of the building when Mr. Myer gave his speech, it amused me because they took off their hats and bowed to Togo, I presume, then the crowd dispersed very peacefully.

During the afternoon I was scared what would happen to Mrs. Leigh. She had gone to the Canteen and found it closed. Two girls there told her to go home and stay there. Other people they brought into the administration building.

That evening we had a meeting in the recreation hall, and appointed a committee. Then we had two meetings on Tuesday with Best and Cozzens and Myer; Myer coming to the recreation hall Tuesday evening. That evening Mr. Best was not allowed to speak. You know how it is. I felt sorry for Mr. Best. Mr. Myer did all the talking. At that meeting I said that we ought to take Mr. Myer and Mr. Best's word for it that protection would be given. After all, they are honorable men. It seemed to me that some of the people on the staff were making a mountain out of a molehill at the time, although they were right in the long run. You see the fence went in. We had sent a petition before this and I felt that I, as a loyal worker of the W. R. A., should leave the matter in their hands since they are honorable men and, besides, it seemed to me that it was better not to talk too much because in this place if you open your mouth it gets right into the colony immediately. They know what goes on up here all the

time. So I took my wife to Klamath Falls on Thursday and left her there and I was glad I did.

November 4: I went to bed at 9:30 on Thursday evening and was awakened by shouts and noises and the large searchlights of the Army going around and around. Someone came by, I think a soldier, and told me to go back or get shot so I went inside my apartment and then came out again and slept the night with Hudson. I didn't see anything that happened. It was out of sight from where I live anyway and I didn't see much on Monday afternoon although I heard the story that trucks had been parked to block all the roads. I spoke to Honda on Tuesday after the happening and he said he didn't know what was up. I would like to repeat that I have no complaints for the way the evacuees work in this office but we had began to lose all our good workers and there were one or two new ones who came in during the last few weeks that you just couldn't tell about. They hadn't been here long enough but I would be glad to be fair with them.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

INTERVIEW WITH ARTHUR MUIR, ACTING FINANCE OFFICER

Events of November 1: I did not really see very much. I was in the front office, there in Mr. Black's office. I helped them put up the public address system, and the fellow who was fixing the wires had a big knife. It was a pocket knife with a long blade such as lots of people carry.

That reminds me, once during the afternoon I saw a boy sitting over between the wings of the Administration Building sort of cutting the grass with a knife.

They were pretty tense moments, and a lot of the people around were scared, I am sure. I was not scared. I did not have any bad contacts with any of the evacuees. The fellow who was putting up the public address system was nice enough, and Black and I did not bother him.

I was over here in my office (meaning the Finance Officer's office) for a while—that must have been earlier in the afternoon—and some groups of evacuees came in the south wing. They walked through there until we locked the door on the inside.

Question: Did any of the evacuees who came by say anything to you?

Answer: No, not to me, but I heard them call Mr. Leigh " * * * " I did not have anything to do with them, but let them go their way. As soon as we latched the door they stopped coming in.

Question: What kind of weapons did you see evacuees carrying during the afternoon?

Answer: Not a thing except the two knives that I told you about. No sticks. But of course I could not see all around the crowd from any place where I was during the afternoon.

Question: Did you see any evacuees carrying straw or anything else?

Answer: No, I did not see any of that, but I did not have any very good view of the crowd. I kept to my own business. I didn't see much.

I wasn't scared. After all, I have seen this sort of thing in Manzanar. You probably know yourself how it is with these Japanese. They get up committees and they come around and crowds collect. This was nothing compared to Manzanar.

Events of November 4: I was coming from the Recreation Hall with another Caucasian somewhere about 9 p. m. I was coming across to my room. About the time we got there we noticed a pick-up running around. I thought I heard some shots, and had the feeling that something was doing.

Just as I was getting in the door of my apartment I saw some evacuees—I would guess about twelve—out here toward the front of the Administration Building. I knew there was trouble going on, but I did not know what was happening.

Then someone came out across the way with a flashlight. He yelled "Here!" I think it must have been Schmidt.

I had seen these fellows. They had sticks. They were pretty long, and they were white. You could see them in the dark. I would not know how long they were.

Then there was some shouting and the crack of fists, or it may have been sticks. I do not know who it was, but I guess Mahrt and Borbeck had come around then.

Somebody was getting into a government car. That must have been Schmidt. I knew it was a government car. I did not see how he got into it. Then there was this pick-up that had been driving around, and it went after him. It chased him over toward the military, then it turned around and came back and started down in front of the Administration Building and got stuck. I guess it got stuck at the big posts down there.

Then everybody disappeared, but Borbeck was there. He was beaten up. We took Borbeck over to Mort Cooke's house, and then I came back here (apparently meaning the Ad Building).

Then the Army was coming in, and I guess the Army cut through in the back. They picked up seventeen of them, and I saw them brought into the Administration Building; and then things began to happen.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ELLA WEBER REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: On Monday right after lunch Mr. Weber and I went to the hospital. We had never seen the hospital before, so Miss Curran was showing us around.

We saw a large crowd coming across the firebreak. Mr. Weber said he might be needed for interpreting at the Administration Building, and went over there.

I was in the operating room with Miss Curran when I heard a crash and angry voices. We started toward the front entrance to the hospital, and we saw that a wooden gate had been broken and was hanging loose. We walked to the front porch.

I saw two men on the ground. One was Dr. Pedicord. Just then the Japanese who had him down got up and walked off and gave a yell. He had a tan stocking cap pulled down over his head. He was fairly thickset. He had been on the ground grappling with Dr. Pedicord.

Miss Curran stepped out to help Dr. Pedicord, and she had no trouble.

After they went into the hospital, Japanese kept coming to the door for prescriptions and seemingly on all sorts of excuses to get inside. Finally a Japanese man came to the front door and stationed two Kibei there and told them not to let anybody in. I talked to them.

When I heard something on the Ad Building loudspeaker I asked them, "What did he say?" They wouldn't tell me.

Then the phone in the front hall rang. We had been told by the Japanese that we must not answer the telephone.

"Why don't you want us to use the telephone?" Miss Curran asked.

"You might tell the Army," one said.

The phone rang again. Mrs. Pedicord, Miss Kiger, Mrs. Smith and myself were there. We decided the phone should be answered. One of the boys said, "No, don't answer it!" He got angry when we asked him, "Who gave orders not to use the telephone?" "The Japanese!" he said angrily.

Miss Kiger answered it. The boy went out and called in Japanese for four or five more guards. Four young men came in and sat around the telephone. The young men wouldn't let anyone in except hospital employees.

November 4: On Thursday night we were at Miss Roudebush's room. About 9:00 we went home. She came with us and stayed a few minutes, then went back.

About 10:15 I heard an incessant roar of motor vehicles. I was just remarking to my husband about what was going on when we heard some shouting. That was about 10:30. I heard not more than two or three shots, then in a few minutes some more.

The first shots seemed to come from the direction of the motor pool. The second shots came from the direction of the staff dining hall. I stepped to the door. We live at 242-1. A man in a Government car was there. When we asked him what had happened, he said, "The Army has taken over. Stay inside!" People were sticking their heads out of windows. A tall man said the Army was told to shoot everything that moves.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

ACCOUNT OF NOVEMBER 1 CROWD, BY MRS. RUTH ELBERSON

About 1:15 on the afternoon of November 1, long lines of evacuees from four to six abreast were seen coming down either side of the center firebreak toward the hospital. One line went on either side of the hospital and the group on the south broke into a run toward the Administration Building. This line passed behind the Administration Building and the line which passed the hospital on the north proceeded past the front of the Administration Building until the two forces joined. The only leader evident was a man in a red shirt carrying a long stick, who gave a few orders to the crowd and formed it in a circle around the Administration Building. The group at first was predominantly masculine. Soon there were many small children and women in the crowd. With the exception of very few individuals, people were relaxed, joking, and talking. The children were playing especially on the grass in front of the Administration Building. It was a pleasant well-mannered crowd.

While the group was forming, 12 to 15 young men entered the Chief Medical Officer's private office, pushed aside another Caucasian doctor and attacked the Chief Medical Officer. According to the other doctor, Dr. Pedicord was beaten about his face and body, and knocked down, and kicked. His attackers were not armed and attempted no conversation. When they had finished they left and Dr. Pedicord sat in his office. While he was bruised, his injuries did not seem to be critical.

By 1:30 Caucasian staff members in the vicinity of the Administration Building were asked to go into the building and not to remain outside. Staff members in the nearby resident area were either asked to remain in the nearby apartments or else to go to the Administration Building. This seems to be true only of those who were outside, and there is no evidence that people who remained in their quarters were all disturbed. Most of the requests were made in a polite and considerate manner although a few excited members of the personnel reported that they were shoved or jostled. The doors of the Administration Building were locked from the outside and no one was allowed to leave with the exception of a few individuals who had left members of their families alone in their rooms and who were provided with evacuee escorts to go after these people and bring them to the Administration Building. One of the teachers who arrived on the scene about 3:00 reported that she was asked if she had left any electrical appliances connected which might be a fire hazard or if she had left children behind her. The inference was that any such situation would be corrected. Several individuals attempted to leave the Administration Building for other purposes.

The Housing Supervisor saw a group of boys standing on his car and attempted to go out in order to move the car. A young man met him at the door and said politely, "Please go back." When the situation was explained, the evacuee promised that the car would not be damaged, and removed the boys who were standing on the top. Later others sat on the car but not one stood on it.

The Medical Social Work Supervisor from the Washington office had come from the hospital to report the situation. When she attempted to return to the hospital she was not allowed to do so. She was rather upset over the situation, but was assured by Mr. Kuratomi that the hospital would be guarded and no one allowed to enter. According to her story, young boys were placed at two of the entrances but the third door was left open. From the Administration Building it was possible to see people going in and out of the door opposite Ward E. She had been assured that nurses and nurses' aides would be allowed to remain at their posts. She attempted several times to phone the hospital without success but was twice able to make connections. One time she spoke to an evacuee nurse who said that she was not allowed to talk about the situation as there was someone there to prevent her. Another time a nurses' aide on the phone reported that she would have to leave the hospital since she was being threatened and forced to join the crowd around the Administration Building which by this time completely filled the firebreak between the Administration Building and the hospital.

Members of the staff reacted in different ways. Between 1:30 and 2:00 soldiers could be seen marching across part of the military area. The evacuees in front of the Administration Building turned to watch the proceeding. From inside the building it was not possible to see where they went but it was reported that they had manned the tanks (when the soldiers were no longer in evidence). The people turned once more to watch the Administration Building. They clustered particularly around the Project Director's office and some of the boys stood with their faces against the windows. The Chief Steward and several young men

who were in the Procurement Office started making rabid remarks about what they would do if they had guns in their hands and what delight they would take in shooting the people down. Even some of the calmer members of the staff talked about the necessity for a show of force, that people should go back to work and not waste government time and money by standing around. Those who were most outspoken seemed to be people who had no understanding of what the situation meant or what had given rise to it.

Late comers to the Administration Building brought the information that people were there because they had been told that Mr. Dillon Myer would address them which was rather clever strategy on the part of the leaders. In the minds of the great majority of evacuees this was not a strike situation but a peaceful answer to a call to attend a speech. However, guards at the edge of the firebreak prevented anyone from leaving the scene. Three trucks were seen loaded with young men and driven toward the colony. Some staff members with families in the resident area beyond the hospital began to be worried for their safety, and some of them phoned their wives to take the children into the military area. Many of the women did not see the necessity for this.

Twice Japanese women entered the Administration Building to use the women's rest room. This brought further remarks from the more hysterical staff members. One of the teachers especially who had been highly excited, whose face was practically green from fright and who had been chattering with anger, was highly indignant. "Why do they have to come in here. Let them go some other place. It's terrible to allow them in here. I'd like to knock one of them down," and so on, until it was suggested that it would be wiser to keep her opinions to herself.

One of the farm supervisors made the rather ridiculous remark, "What do they have to go now for? I'm out with them all day long on the farm and they never have to go there." One of the new members of the Internal Security staff calmed the situation somewhat by explaining that there was no need to create a situation over such a minor issue.

In the Statistician's office a group collected about a vault which had formerly been used by Internal Security and which contained a number of contraband weapons removed from the baggage of evacuees. Jocular plans were devised as to using these weapons in self-defense. There were a great many who feared for their personal safety, although the crowd at no time seemed menacing or unfriendly. A man from Property Control, who had lost two sons in the South Pacific, was especially vehement and profane in his remarks. He was beautifully deflated by a member of the Washington staff, who reminded him very politely that "certain things are better left unsaid."

The doctor who had been present at the incident in the hospital remarked, "I'll not wait on any more Japs medically. You see I am a southerner, and we don't tell things like that. I only hope my wife and children have not started up here. I can do much better elsewhere."

During the afternoon an evacuee girl called the Social Welfare Supervisor. The family was to leave the project the next day and their baggage should have been picked up during this afternoon. The mother was particularly worried, and claimed that she would not leave until she saw that her baggage was collected, an understandable feeling on her part. She was told that since all offices were closed, it was impossible to act on her request immediately, but as soon as this situation was over her baggage would be collected.

Another girl, whose mother was in the hospital, called to obtain a permit to stay with her sick mother, and she was told that the situation in the hospital was not known but that she could herself investigate it.

—Unsigned because of absence from project.

INTERVIEW WITH DOCTOR MARKS, MEDICAL OFFICER, NOVEMBER 19, 1943

November 1. I was here on Monday at the hospital. I got back to the hospital at a quarter of one. There I met Miss Shippis and Doctor Pedicord and went to ward A because we were making a list of patients to be transferred. When I left Miss Shippis I headed toward the main corridor. Then I saw the crowd streaming toward the administration building. I went out to the office and spotted Doctor Pedicord and Doctor Mason standing on the porch of the hospital. We began to discuss this thing. What is the purpose of the crowd? Doctor Pedicord said he had stopped several people from coming in the hospital. He asked

me to see that all doors were locked on ward A because he didn't want people coming in there. On the way to ward A, opposite the corridor leading in from the requisition wing, I saw 5 Japanese coming in. I stepped through the swinging doors and accosted them and asked them to go out the same way they had come in. So they began to talk Japanese back and forth. While my head was turned facing one of them, one of them behind me thrust me out of the way. Then they ran through the doors and toward the main entrance. I went after them. They had quite a lead on me. By the time I got to the vestibule of the main entrance I saw a crowd in front of the hospital entrance, sort of separate apart and there was Pedicord sitting on the ground, sort of groping. I also saw one of them, while he was still there on the ground, punch him and another kicked him on the left side of the face. I went out to help him up. Then I suddenly realized that Miss Curran was along side of me screaming. We helped him up and into his office. We gave him first aid, and I stayed with him the rest of the afternoon. It must have been between 1:00 and 1:30 when I saw him lying on the ground.

It was sometime later, that was a long drawn out afternoon, that there was a commotion in the hallway. I went out and there were several young Japanese with buttons on their lapels, little Japanese flags. There seemed to be a question about telephones. Doctor Hashiba was there and he convinced them to leave. He spoke to them in English, but they spoke only in Japanese. I'm not sure what was up except some question about the phone. They seemed excited and were running up and down the corridors.

On Tuesday morning the nurses reported a definite air of hostility. I noticed one point. When I drove up in a car, Number 600-10, one of the ambulance drivers opened a window and yelled out, "Hey, Marks, did you have the mileage on that car checked?" I went into the hospital and the ambulance driver, in a more respectful manner, told me that the mileage must be checked each morning. Later on I had occasion to pass the ambulance drivers' station. As I passed one man said, "He'd make a good one." I don't know what he meant by that. At noon Miss Folda told me that we could no longer subject her nurses to the hostile attitude. We decided to withdraw entirely so there were no Caucasians in the hospital in the afternoon.

November 4: I was at the Golden Hotel in Tule Lake when I heard that the Army had taken over. I thought it my place to be here and I came back. As I got in I heard that Borbeck had been beaten. I entered the administration building and saw the Japanese lined up and the soldiers with pointed guns facing them. The whole Caucasian medical staff was there and at the request of Captain Archer, was to remain available until further notice.

In general, I would say that there was open hostility. Maybe not exactly hostility, but they sort of resented the administrative detail that was put into effect when we Caucasian doctors came into the picture. I mean that was the Japanese Doctors that were resentful. And as for the Japanese help in the hospital; they don't really understand what hospital department is. The main thing in any hospital is quiet and that was never true of this hospital.

H. K. MARKS, M. D.

On Monday, November 1st, I was sitting at my desk, which faces the accounting offices. I noticed around one o'clock that all the evacuee girls were suddenly picking up their scarfs and gloves and started to leave the building in groups. In a very short space of time the entire office building was emptied of Japanese office workers.

We all looked out of the windows and saw a crowd gathering from all directions. It would be hard for me to estimate the number of Japanese as I didn't have a bird's-eye view of the crowd, but rather chopped-up views from the various windows, and the crowd moved from one part of the buildings to another. I recognized some of the office girls and they seemed to stand apart from the others looking very harmless.

I saw the back doors being locked up and saw that all the doors were being guarded. I didn't see any of them get close to the windows, which were all closed.

I listened to the Japanese and English speeches over the loudspeaker. I was in the wing opposite Mr. Best's office at the time. I heard the closing speech in Japanese and saw all the men stand at attention and then take off their hats and bow in a salute of some kind. The women seemed to stand aside during this ceremony.

I saw no weapons of any kind.

I saw them crowded around and on top of automobiles in back of the Administration building, obviously damaging them.

There was continual motion among the crowd, but on the whole I could hear no conversation from inside. The tension seemed to grow as time went on and nobody seemed to know quite what to expect. There were many women and children in the mob.

On Thursday night, November 4th: I live in 242-2 about two rows of barracks from the motor pool and garage. I was awakened by tanks rolling in. I ran out of my apartment and saw a group of Japanese running out from the motor pool and the garage as they were being routed out by the soldiers. There seemed to be quite a large number of Japanese running from all directions and back toward the colony. I saw one of the Japanese wardens running with his hands up. It was quite obvious that they were up to no good.

[Signed] VALERIA BARBUL.

STATEMENT OF MRS. MYRTLE R. JOHNSON, HOSPITAL DIETITIAN, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4

November 1: I went back to the hospital right after lunch. I went to my office, and my Japanese secretary came in and told me something had happened and to look out the window.

Men, women, and children were walking up from the colony. I thought they might come through the hospital, so I found Dr. Pedicord and told him.

I went into the kitchen, and three big Japanese boys came in for a minute. I then went to my diet kitchen.

I stood and watched the crowd. This is something peculiar. One of my Japanese boys said, "I wouldn't go back to your office. Don't go back to your office. There are a lot of women coming up."

I stayed at the back of the hospital. There I watched the crowd. I was afraid they were going to burn the Ad. Building.

I saw no weapons.

A nurse came through and said, "Our doctor has been beaten." I said, "Not Dr. Pedicord!" She said, "Yes."

We felt bad about this, and it made us a pretty sober crowd. I began to wonder about the girls in my office. I went there and found them a little jittery.

A man had come in and told us not to use the telephones. They rang, but we did not answer.

I heard Mr. Myer and Mr. Best speak, and I was relieved when the crowd dispersed; I waited around to see if I could help Dr. Pedicord.

About 5:30 a fireman came in, and I asked him if I could walk back with him.

I prepare the diets for the infants in the colony. Unfortunately we were out of condensed milk, and it was impossible to get it. People started coming up from the colony, people not like those I had dealt with. Some were belligerent. One man especially was angry, and wanted to know why it hadn't been sent down. He wanted to know who was in charge of distribution.

Another time a group of about six stormed into my office and wanted to know why they weren't getting milk. When I told them to boil the fresh milk they did not like it. Others came in, and I always explained to them.

When my employee told me about the women coming up, I thought it was a group about the milk. We had ordered milk and had received a shipping bill showing it had been shipped on September 15 and had been sidetracked. I always explained in detail and telephoned mess management to ask about it. Most of the mothers had some milk on hand and were just afraid for the future. We did not have any in the hospital, and we had some sick babies. We gave them boiled fresh milk.

Next morning the doctors made their routine calls and then left, and we girls felt a little uneasy. After lunch we held an informal meeting in the head nurse's apartment, and decided we would all go back or none of us. We were willing to go back, but someone, Mr. Cahn, told us not to go back. We told him we were willing, and asked to send a delegation to Dillon Myer to get a direct order.

The head nurse and Mišš Shipps went to see him, but he was in conference and they saw Mr. Black. He apparently saw Mr. Myer and said that because we

were the storm center we should leave. We went to Tule Lake, where we had rooms.

(Mrs. Johnson estimated, off the record, that condensed milk distribution was interrupted for about a week.)

MYRTLE R. JOHNSON.

INTERVIEW WITH PRISCILLA ROBINSON, SCHOOL TEACHER, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

November 1: I was right here in the building on Monday afternoon. Nobody ever told me that I couldn't go out. It was just assumed that we couldn't. They told my mother, who went to the store, to come back over here. They were very polite to her. They wanted to know if there were any children at the house or a stove on at home before they told her to come.

I was in these offices right here and watched the crowd most of the time. I think the crowd was getting a big kick out of seeing us Caucasians in here. They were calm enough, though. It was a gala day for a lot of kids. The people inside were quite excited. Some worried a little but went right on with their work. Some weren't working. There was variety in the attitudes of the staff members. Once I saw some evacuees come through the east door. I don't know how many. They went right on through, and I didn't see them again.

November 4: I heard shouting before they started bringing the tanks in. That was between 9:00 and 10:00. Looking out, I didn't see anything. I live in 305. I saw tanks going down that road. Soldiers asked at each door if there were any Japanese in the apartment. They just said, "Is there anybody in there?" There was some shooting. I saw the baker run out, poor man, with his arms out. The excitement lasted from 10:00 to 1:00.

I saw no weapons on Monday. I just saw one old man with a cane. I saw no knives, and I didn't see any straw, but I did see evacuees inside of and sitting on top of cars parked back of the administration building.

On Tuesday all the girls working in the statistics office left their work and went to the Meiji Setsu ceremony. Miss Waldron told them they could go if they wanted to. An announcement was made to them by a nice looking young man, sort of office worker type. He came in to report that they should go to the celebration. He also said that it would probably be better for them if they did go.

The girls returned to work after the ceremony.

PRISCILLA ROBINSON.

INTERVIEW WITH BESSIE BURTON, SCHOOL TEACHER

I came back to the project on the 24th of September and have been working in the statistics office.

November 1: I went into the office just before 1:00. The girls who were working there, the evacuee girls, had brought their lunches. There were telephone calls for them from the same person. One of them said that they had been told that it wouldn't be healthy for them to stay in the office.

I didn't try to go out. I had heard that people were being sent back in. In the wing there, I guess I just walked around all afternoon and just followed the crowd.

I think there were more young people in the crowd, taken all in all. The kids got little boards and put them on sticks and made little stools and sat on them that way. The crowd was fairly still, but once they began to walk over toward the military when the tanks began to warm up. I guess they thought that would be a show and something to see. Then once I saw them move over toward the motor pool.

I think the crowd was organized. There were men standing around who acted as guards. They didn't have any weapons that I could see, but once I saw a boy carrying a card box of excelsior. He was carrying it under his arm. Maybe he was coming back from the post office with the box, I don't know, but I saw him.

Some of the kids threw the wood which they were sitting on back where they got it after the speeches were made.

Once some women came into our wing, 3 or 4 of them, to go to the rest room. I think there were a half dozen Japanese men who came in with them. They came in and went back out right away.

November 4: I was home and turned the radio off early and was looking out of the window. I saw a group of 5 or 6 young Japs going by. I wasn't surprised as that wasn't too unusual. They were crossing the road back of the recreation

hall going toward the mess hall. I couldn't see them very well. Then I heard voices. I think it was toward the hospital, but I didn't see anything else until they were bringing the Japanese in and when the tanks came in. I was looking at it from apartment 306.

B. B. BURTON.

STATEMENT OF MRS. EMMA L. ROSE, HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was working on a team making a job survey, and I was through except for interviewing division heads. Between 1:15 and 1:30 I saw a large group coming from the warehouse area. Then between the hospital and military area I saw others. I remarked, "Oh, my, it's the whole Project coming."

I saw no men running. We attempted to estimate the crowd. It ran into the thousands.

I was in the Leave Office. Somebody said she thought they were coming to protest against loyal evacuees coming to work on the farm. There were a good many women with children, and some women caught my eye and bowed. I saw three former pupils. One didn't want to see me. One little girl came up. I talked through the window to her—a typical teacher-pupil conversation.

We saw the lantern-faced individual with a stocking cap. I saw the men going into Mr. Best's office.

The man with the red tassel on his cap told a bunch of boys who were booing the soldiers to stop, and they did.

I did not see any clubs. The crowd had a certain coldness, not necessarily ugliness. There is no question that we were prisoners. I went out back and got about 50 feet away when a big burly Japanese said, "More better you go back"—not abusive, but firm. He kept saying, "Better you go back." Soldiers were looking. I didn't want to start an incident. I went back.

Another teacher said, "Let's go to the Ad. Bldg." We went out the front door. A Japanese speaking in English told the crowd to keep its composure, that there was a delay in negotiations.

The tension of the crowd was dropping; some were sitting down. We made our way through the crowd. People in the Ad. building were laughing and talking. I was amused and incredulous when I heard that two women had made their wills. I realized of course that we were in danger.

I was in the first wing when Mr. Myer talked. I watched to see if anybody was going to our apartments. I saw some Japanese going into the Personnel Dining Hall. I thought they went in the kitchen door, but I am not sure.

In the final speech, made by a Japanese, I heard the names Dr. Pedicord and Mr. Peck mentioned in English.

The crowd dispersed in orderly fashion.

November 4: I was in my apartment, 243-3, alone. My roommate, Mrs. Johnson, worked in the hospital and had been in Tule Lake since Tuesday. About 10:15 I heard a rumbling coming at regular intervals. I slipped on a bathrobe and went out. I saw nothing unusual. I went back and threw on a coat.

R. D. Smith came up and said a gang had been trying to break into a warehouse and had beaten up an Internal Security guard. He advised me to get dressed.

It was lighter when I came back. Army jeeps and soldiers came in and everybody started coming out. We were all relieved. I didn't realize until then what a tension we had been under.

I heard a couple of shots, or they might have been blanks or the backfiring of a car. I didn't see any Japanese.

EMMA L. ROSE.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. CHEEK, MUSIC TEACHER, NOVEMBER 17, 1943

I went to Los Angeles and didn't get back until the incident was all over, but maybe I can tell you some background things that will help. There was this dance that was broken up by the Kilbeis. There was a Nisei boy who got mad because they wouldn't let him in the dance so he went and got some Kibei boys to come in and break it up. Girls were afraid to go out at night on account of the Kibei gangs all during October. I remember that Father Dai said it would be best not to have any night social programs because of this fear that the young people had of the Kibei gangs.

On Thursday before the incident I was moving school furniture in the warehouse. There was a new boy, quite a nice fellow, there. I talked to him a little and found him to be a nice fellow, but he wasn't there when I came back. I found out that he had left the crew because he was afraid of being beaten up. They had scared him out. That was the kind of small-scale intimidation that was taking place on the project.

I know there are a lot of kids down there who are under pressure to go to the Japanese-language schools and don't want to go. The young man I took to Los Angeles was living in a block where practically all the people are disloyal. They were glad to see him go and he was glad to get out.

I think one of the places where the bad eggs were put in in force was in the motor pool. These new fellows who were bad eggs have not been cooperative and have got the old fellows who were good intimidated.

R. CHEEK.

INTERVIEW WITH ERNST L. HITT, FOREMAN MECHANIC, NOVEMBER 19, 1943

November 1: I was in the office at the plumbing shop doing a little book work. I was there, I guess, about 1:30, maybe a little later. Four Japanese boys came to the office after me. I refused to come; the reason I wouldn't go along with them was that they wouldn't give me any reason why they wanted me to come. To be frank with you, I told them that I wasn't going to come and shoved me out of the shop. What they said was, "Mr. Hitt," and I don't know how they knew my name because I didn't know who they were, they said, "Mr. Hitt, will you please go to the administration building." I asked them why and they said, "You are wanted in the administration building." They asked them who wanted me and they refused to answer. That was when I threw them out and that was when they said, "Well, we'll get enough men here to take you up." They disappeared but that had convinced me that something was doing. Especially when they told me they would come back in numbers large enough to bring me back. So I get in my car and first I tried to make my way over to where we live, over by the military area, but finding my way blocked in the old military area I made my way all the way back around the hospital and came by the motor pool and parked my car in front of the residence there. At the car I was met by two Japanese boys who seemed to be willing to escort me to the administration building. I went with them and we came to the east door there and I came on in. They didn't say a word to me except when I got out of the car they said, "Will you please go with us to the administration building?"

As soon as I got in the building I telephoned my wife and told her to get out of the grounds by way of the military. About 30 minutes later I got another telephone call from her telling me that she was outside of the area. I, too, saw the Japanese sitting on cars. I was also in the front office when the telephone came through stating that there was trouble at the hospital. There were two Jap boys who went with Mr. Schmidt. I saw them go out when they escorted him over there to the hospital.

I only saw one knife of any size. I felt that I could figure how many people were there and I would say that everybody is more or less underestimating. It was not under ten thousand at the very least. The only knife I saw was one a fellow had sitting down next to wall of the next wing of the administration building. He was sitting in the space between this wing and that wing. He was sitting their whittling. He wasn't flashing the knife at all. I'd say he was a young fellow, but I didn't notice anything special.

Tuesday, November 2, the crew came back to work in the plumbing shop and I must say that most of them apologized for what happened on Monday. The girl who was typing in the office said, "I guess you know the Japanese are going to run the hospital." That was all she said.

On Wednesday, November 3, they had the Emperor's birthday celebration. A bunch down there left to go about 9:00. Just before they left they nailed up two Japanese flags on the doors there. One on our door and one on Mr. Roper's. I think two of my men were implicated in nailing the flag on my door. Roper's secretary came in and told me about the flags. I got up and asked who nailed the flags. That was when two of my men volunteered and said they did. I went out and tore the flag down in their presence and brought it up here and laid it on Mr. Zimmer's desk. There was something painted in Japanese on one of them; I

didn't know what it said. They were home-made flags made out of paper. Maybe about the size of two typewriter sheets of paper. It was two sheets put together. On one there was a rising sun. I think it was sort of orange in color. That was on one white sheet. The sun was about 4 inches in diameter. The other piece of paper was sort of attached to the flag and that was the one that had the writing on it. I don't know whether Mr. Zimmer saw them or not. I was going to show them to Mr. Lewis. I think I put them on his desk but I don't know whether he got them or not. I guess the two fellows from my crew who were standing there when I tore the flags down were about 40 feet away. They didn't say anything I could understand. Just a lot in Japanese. Then the whole bunch of them walked over to celebrate the Emperor's birthday. There weren't any trucks that came and got them.

November 4: I was listening to the 10:00 news when a neighbor, Mrs. Powell, opened the door and told us to get out as quickly as we could. She said trouble was brewing. Then Mrs. Lauritzen, our neighbor on the other side, came over and said that she was going to look for her husband. He was out somewhere. I told her to take my wife and baby, and her baby in her car and go on out to the front gate. I told her that I would get in my car and find her husband. When they were leaving the house I was right behind them. Instead of coming straight on out at the front gate like I told her to she made a left turn at the administration area and then a right turn in front of the administration hall. Afterward she told me she was doing that to try to see her husband and take him out. We passed a number of Japs in front of the administration building. She said later that she thought that they were carrying rocks. I didn't see any rocks. I would say that there were 5 or 6 Japs in that bunch in front of the recreation hall. The soldiers hadn't gotten down there yet. As I was passing the motor pool I didn't see her car. There must have been 50 yards between her car and mine. After she had passed around the corner of the motor pool there was a number of Japs came out of the door of the office of the motor pool. I wouldn't rightly know just how many but I guess maybe there was a dozen or 14. Maybe I was a little scared then, I don't know. At the time I thought there was more than a dozen. I couldn't see them very well anyway. I saw the leader had a club in his hand and he had this club drawn back, more or less running toward my car. I put my hand up to shield my eyes because I expected that the windshield would be broken when he let that club fly. In doing that I cut the car to the right and ran into the fellow. I would say that when I hit him I caught him right about the hips. I don't know how bad it hurt him, if any. I took my car on out the front gate. After I got there I thought of the bonds that we had left in the colony. I got permission from Captain Maples to go back in and get those bonds. He told me that I could go back in at my own risk. Having gotten about half way from the front gate to my home, I heard shots fired. I made my way over to the apartment in the military area. I went into the house and got those bonds. I got back into a W. R. A. car. It was at my house. I cranked it up and about then Mr. Lauritzen came up. At that moment the military and the jeeps were going to all the apartments to see that every one had gotten out. Mr. Lauritzen and I made our way back through the front gate. We stayed just on the outside on the gate until the all clear was given to come back in.

ERNEST L. HITT.

STATEMENT OF MRS. MARGARET A. GREEN, PERSONNEL CLERK

Events of November 4: I was just coming home. I was right there between the garage and the house back of it, up close toward the motor pool. I was with a friend, and Mr. Zimmer said that there were some beatings going on. I guess he meant that Mr. Borbeck had just been beaten.

After he went by some men came by. They were evacuees, and there were about twenty, but I could not see them very well in the dark. As they went by me it was pretty close. I heard one of them say, "Let the lady go." They went right on.

They were carrying sticks which were about a yard long. They looked something like baseball bats, I guess you might say. I did not see anything else. I went right into the apartment and stayed there. I did not hear anything when the Army came in, that I remember. That is all I can say about it, because that is all I saw.

MARGARET A. GREEN.

INTERVIEW WITH MISS VELASQUEZ, SCHOOL TEACHER, NOVEMBER 17, 1943

November 1st: I don't know anything about what happened. I was in the mails and files offices sending out letters. I didn't see anybody with any straw. I didn't see any weapons. I tried to go away from the offices once. It was to register a letter. I was stopped on the way to the Post Office. He said, "You go back to your building." It was a young Japanese. I said, "Why?" He said, "Orders." I said, "From whom?" He said, "Orders." That's all he said. After an hour I tried the other door; I was worried about my mother. Some young man there said he would let me go with an escort to see my mother. My mother is over in the dormitories. I went over with this escort through the crowd. He was very nice. He waited at the door while my mother put her clothes on, and we came back together; that is, from apartment 4033 right through the crowd. Some of the people smiled, and I noticed girls from the kitchen that I knew, but they didn't say anything.

Once in the administration building I saw a Japanese woman come to the bathroom. There were two boys with her. The appointed personnel in the office were not excited. Not around where I was. They were laughing and joking. I didn't hear anybody called any names. After the woman came into the bathroom we closed the door, so nobody could come in. I saw the crowd go, so I left.

November 4: I wasn't here Thursday night, because I was teaching in Klamath Falls. I came back about midnight and left my car outside the gate, because a soldier told us what had happened. He said it was dangerous to walk over to my room, so I asked him how about a jeep. So he took us in jeeps to our rooms. One for my mother and one for me. I was so surprised that anything had happened, as I didn't expect anything. Then, you know, I was so sorry, too, because I would like to have seen it, but I missed it.

I guess I was scared. I must have been, because I took my papers in to the bank in Klamath Falls. I didn't want them on the Project. Yes; I think I was scared. I don't know, but I never had any trouble anywhere with anybody going around with mails and files. I never had an incident.

ELISA VELÁSQUEZ.

NOVEMBER 15, 1943.

Memorandum to: Mr. Edward H. Spicer.

From: Lorne Huycke.

Subject: Project Observations.

In response to your request I am setting forth some of the observations made in my contact with several disturbing developments on the project.

Funeral: On the morning of September 30th I learned that a funeral was to be held for Tetsuo Kashima who had died from injuries received in an accident while en route to the project farm. A committee had requested the use of the outdoor stage for the services but because of the implied nature of the event permission was denied them by the Project Director. It is my understanding that the funeral was intended to be more than just a funeral and that its real purpose was that it should serve as a means of a whipping up antiadministration feeling and at the same time serve to strengthen the following of a certain group seeking to establish power and control over the evacuees and the administration.

Mr. Best asked me to report to him from the vantage point offered by the proximity of the housing office. About 9 a. m., Sept. 30th, I advised him that a group of 25 to 50 evacuees were raking the firebreak opposite Block 18, reportedly in preparation for the funeral. About 10:30 a. m. a group of 25 evacuees brought fresh lumber and erected a platform in the firebreak within view of the housing office. This was reported to Mr. Best.

In the afternoon just before the time set for the funeral which was around 2 o'clock, I believe, I was driving back to the Housing Office down the main firebreak and was diverted by guards at the corner of Block 13 so I had to drive around to the Housing Office in 1308 from another direction. Upon entering the Housing Office I saw evacuees talking to Mrs. Kay Tift who was in charge of Housing records. One of them was dressed in a coat of Army issue. I believe that coats of this type were obtained by evacuees when they were interned at Sand Island. The evacuees soon left the building and Mrs. Tift told me they had requested her to keep the office closed during the funeral to which she agreed, because it was Saturday afternoon and the Housing Office was not open anyway.

I went out the side door of the office and went around to the front to be sure the door was padlocked. While I was taking a sign off the door I observed some commotion in the firebreak opposite the middle of Block 18. I recognized Doug

Cook, Reports Officer, and saw that he was attempting to take some pictures of the funeral. A number of evacuees, possibly 15, ran over to him and in a couple of minutes he was tossed into the air and manhandled.

Feeling that it was my duty to come to his assistance, I started toward the scene of the trouble but by the time I reached building 1804 Mr. Cook had extricated himself from the mob and had reached the Warden's Office at 1808. About this time Dr. Opler came up and we discussed the funeral and the event just described. Apparently the funeral had been progressing without incident until Mr. Cook attempted to take pictures, for Dr. Opler told me that he had been standing near the funeral stand without being bothered.

I then talked to Mr. Cenichiro Nakamura, Manager of Block 25, who was also standing by as an observer. After a few minutes' discussion I suggested to Mr. Nakamura that we walk up to the Wardens' Office and find out what had happened to Mr. Cook. Just as we reached building 1807 a gang of about fifteen or twenty ran over and surrounded us and one of them knocked Mr. Nakamura down. I gathered from the discussion that they were angry with him for walking in my company. They did not molest me in any way. After a few minutes of milling about, Slim Tsuda, Chief Warden, came over and advised me to leave as soon as possible.

I walked slowly toward the Warden's Office and talked to several observers on the way. They were, in most cases, Issei and their remarks were condemnatory of the actions of those conducting the funeral. I stood on the porch of the Warden's Office for a little while and Mr. Nakamura stood for a little while also. One of the guards at the corner wearing an army coat came over and berated Mr. Nakamura in the vilest of Japanese and spat at him.

I went inside the office to talk to Mr. Cole but he had already left with Mr. Cook. I watched the procedure through the window for some time and observed that an evacuee wearing an army coat and a snow cap seemed to be the chief of the guards. His actions and those of many others demonstrated that they were at an extremely high emotional peak. I learned also that the funeral had been conducted this way over the protest of the deceased man's widow.

After watching for awhile I left the Warden's office and returned to the Housing Office. No further incidents occurred while I was there. At the conclusion of the funeral the funeral stand was quickly torn down and removed.

Monday meeting, November 1st: At 12:45 p. m., November 1st, I went to the Housing Office at 1308. A few minutes after my arrival I noticed lines of people starting to walk past the Housing Office down the main firebreak toward the Administration Building. I asked several evacuees who had just entered the office what was taking place and they said that they had been told in the mess halls at noon that Mr. Myer was to address the residents of the project at 1:00 p. m. at the Ad. Building. This story was confirmed by others who were walking up to the Ad. Bldg. I attempted to phone the project director immediately but could not reach him. I finally contacted Mr. Black but he knew nothing of such a meeting. The crowd walking toward the Ad. Building was laughing and joking and seemed to be in a gay mood without the tension that would likely have been in evidence if they had been going toward the Ad. building with any destructive intent. It is my belief that most of them were innocent of the events that followed.

Feeling uneasy about what was taking place I got Mr. Corlies Carter from the high school building who was as ignorant as I as to what was going on, and together we went to the Ad. Building. By the time we arrived there Mr. Best was in his office and seemed to be aware of what was on foot.

By this time the crowd outside the Ad. Building was beginning to form. Some of them started to climb on top of the government car which I had been using and I went out to move it away. An evacuee guard intercepted me and asked me politely to stay in the building. I told him I did not want the car damaged and was going to move it. He said he would take care of those on the car and when he did so I returned to Mr. Black's office. No damage was done to my car except that the gastank cap was taken.

As far as the general crowd was concerned I saw no evidence of malicious intent on their part although they frequently crowded close to the building during early stages of the demonstration, to look through the windows. In each case of crowding evacuee guards ordered them to stand back and the crowd obeyed. I saw no evidence of oil rags or gasoline-soaked straw although I frequently looked out of the windows. I talked to several evacuees whom I knew outside and because of previous acquaintance with them I would say that they had no intention of harming anybody in the Administration Building. However, there

was clear evidence that there were well organized goon squads and I can see that it might have been possible to have invited this crowd to mob violence, but I do not believe that there was convincing evidence that this could have occurred. As far as the goons themselves were concerned, I believe they would have been willing to attack us but I am not at all sure that the crowd would have followed them. I doubt if the crowd would have been willing to risk the gunfire of the Army which was ready to go into action only a few hundred feet away.

At the conclusion of the meeting the "military leaders" of the goon squads gave several commands to the crowd and they bowed in the direction of Mr. Best's office which, for most of them, was in a southeasterly direction. I asked one of the committee members who had been talking to Mr. Best what the purpose of the ceremony might be. He told me promptly that they were paying their respects to the committee and to Mr. Best and to Mr. Myer.

At the command of the military leaders the crowd dismissed quickly and returned to the residential area.

In the early stages of the meeting when truckloads of goons began cruising about I thought it advisable to evacuate the women and children from the "100" area and received Mr. Best's approval through Mr. Black. I telephoned Mr. Cole's apartment for my wife and when she came to the phone I suggested that she and the others who desired to should immediately go to the military area. Subsequently I learned that the goon squads had gone into the No. 300 area and had ordered all occupants to go to the Administration area. If they later went to the No. 100 area I know nothing of this fact.

November 4: On the afternoon of Thursday, November 4, I was down in the project and talked to two members of the Monday Committee. One of them, Andrew Sugimoto, told me that they would have a committee which was selected on a project-wide basis ready to meet with Mr. Best in a couple of days.

While I was at the apartment of one of the language school teachers at 4:00 p. m. two evacuees walked in; one of them was the evacuee to whom I referred in the funeral notes, the one who seemed to be the leader of the guards. The other was the man with the army coat who had talked to Mrs. Tift in the Housing Office on Sept. 30 and whom I also saw at the Ad. Bldg. on Nov. 1. They wanted to know what I was doing in that room, the question being put to Yukio Tanaka, the language school teacher.

I had a meeting at 4 o'clock with the leader of the language schools, Mr. H. Mori, who was also a member of the Monday committee, and with some representatives of Community Activities, and managers for blocks 19 and 20. The meeting concerned the use of 1908 and 2008. The results of the meeting convinced me that I could not make decisions with respects to Community Activities unless they were acceptable to the group of agitators who were attempting to gain control of the project and dictate to the administration. Decisions not acceptable to them therefore could not be carried out because they would have involved bodily harm to members of the Community Activities staff providing the Community Activities staff would have had the courage to carry out my decisions.

I had dinner with Mr. Tanaka in the mess hall at block 27. I returned to his apartment with him after dinner and saw there the evacuee who had been the military leader at the time of the Monday meeting. He spoke cordially. At 7 o'clock I took Mr. Tanaka to a meeting in Ward V where he was to discuss plans for the formation and leadership of Boys' Clubs. This meeting did not have any authorization from the Community Activities section and illustrated again that the Committee had its own ideas about Community Activities.

I returned home at 7:30 P. M. without having seen any evidence of what was to develop two hours later.

At 10:05 p. m. I heard a whistle blow in the military area and went to the door of my apartment. Soldiers were pouring out of barracks and lining up in squads, each carrying his gun. Mrs. Cole came into the apartment and said that her husband said to go to the military area because trouble was brewing.

I need not dwell on later developments except to put down one observation made after some of the evacuees had been rounded up by the soldiers: One of them was the same individual who was the military leader at the Monday meeting and to whom I talked at 7:00 p. m. Thursday night.

STATEMENT OF EVELYN J. DAVIE, HIGH-SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: On Monday I was at my barrack (303-6). A group of us noticed people coming up from the colony. While we were standing there a group of men (Japanese) come up from behind the barracks and one of them ordered us to go to the administration building. When we hesitated he said, "Yes, go on. Go on." When one of the teachers spoke he said, "No questions, no questions." We went to the administration building and waited like the rest. Some times the crowd would look in the windows. I didn't see any weapons. I didn't see any boxes of straw. I heard the speeches going on, but couldn't understand them. I didn't see any Japanese in the building.

November 4: I was home listening to the radio. My room mate, Miss Phillips, came in and said there was something going on. We heard them shooting in the direction of the colony. We saw the staff dining hall baker running toward the colony with his white clothes flying. I didn't see any Japanese running around.

[Signed] EVELYN J. DAVIE.

INTERVIEW WITH MISS LEE, SCHOOL TEACHER

November 1: I came over to the statistician's office where I was working about 1:00 just as the evacuee workers were leaving. I heard one of them say, "Let's be decent and tell Miss Waldron before we go." They told her before they left. I didn't try to get out. Once two evacuee men came through and looked in the office to see if any evacuees were still in the building. They sort of peeked around to check up, I think. They came in also on Wednesday morning to do the same thing. Check up and see whether all evacuees were going to the Emperor's birthday.

I talked to a Lieutenant who was in our wing of the building on Monday. He looked out toward his car which was parked outside and said that they had let the air out of his tires. He said he would have gone out to his car but that he thought that he might be stopped and then he would be the cause of a rumpus and he didn't want anything to start in that way.

I hate to say this because I'm not too sure but I saw a young man with boxes. I thought the box was filled with straw and inflammable material. He was in the court between the two wings of the administration building. He was carrying a brown carton and the lid was propped back. Maybe it was filled with scrap paper. I don't know. He was just walking across the court diagonally and that's all he did. I didn't see him again. He wasn't any where near any of the buildings.

The evacuees were going over by the leave office and getting pieces of wood. Blocks of wood which they would sit down on. After the thing was all over they picked up the wood and threw it into the stack again, by the leave office.

I could see the crowd between the administration building and the Army. I could also see the crowd through the window between the two wings. That was where mostly the mothers and children were, between the two wings of the administration building.

I hadn't been bothered by any Japanese. I had a Japanese woman helping me and she didn't go to the Wednesday meeting. She wasn't concerned at all. She just went on working.

I have a car and may I should tell you that the two windshield wipers were taken off of it and that a gas cap was gone. Question: When was this damage done to your car? Answer: Oh, I noticed that the gas cap was gone Sunday night before the incident and I noticed that the two wipers were gone on Monday morning.

[Signed] DOROTHY S. LEE.

INTERVIEW WITH MISS HERT, SCHOOL TEACHER NOVEMBER 17, 1943

November 1: I was in the leave office and so I had a grandstand seat all afternoon. I could see in all directions. I saw the crowd gathering. The evacuee

girls who were working in the leave office hid at first and then they decided that it would be safer if they went out and mingled with the crowd so they did that. First they came over to Fagan's office and we told them to stay away from the windows. Then everybody decided that it would be safer if they went out. I knew they were afraid for themselves and to be seen in the office. I found a note from Amy Sakuma, one of the girls who didn't come up in the crowd. She had eaten her lunch there. She told me that her mother said if anybody came up to get them she would go to bed and would tell them that she was sick. She told us that later. She had written the note in answer to another one. I can't remember all of it but it was something like this. "I don't know about the fish story. They use Gestapo methods." Then there was some strange word and the respect they had to show for whatever this was.

I saw two pieces of iron pipe. Mrs. Rose was standing right by me. There was one fellow, a young fellow, who had two pieces carrying them around. They were aluminum. Maybe there was something on the end of it. Like the faucet carried by two different fellows. I saw the same things after that. They carried off the wood at the end of the leave office and used that to sit on. I saw one sixth grade boy, the son of Reverend Sasaki, who had a sharpened stick which he stuck under his sweater. Then there were two young fellows who sat outside the leave office talking. From what I could hear one was in favor of some sort of action that afternoon. The other one kept saying, "You know we don't have a chance." I don't know what it was that the other one wanted.

The only other talk I heard was between the leaders. I think they were holding down the crowd. There was a young fellow with a blue cap making motions and haranguing the people and another fellow with a felt hat. It seemed to me that they got unanimous attention from the groups. This was just when the crowd was coming. The area was not half filled up when the fellow of the blue cap commenced talking. Then some more came down pretty fast and they were instructed to keep on their side of the building. The only other things I saw were a man with a couple of slingshots around his neck and then the people with the sticks of wood from the wood pile. I didn't see any destruction of property of any kind, although one fellow motioned as though he was going to throw something in through the window.

(Could have been any of the other women—probably Mrs. Carsley.)

I heard all the speeches and could see from the front window of the leave office. There were 2 speakers after Mr. Myer and Mr. Best. The crowd was quiet but there was a little applause and I felt that the crowd was not too well pleased. Maybe they were disappointed. I thought that they bowed pretty well, that is 100%, when they were told to. It looked like a whole sea of heads bowed.

November 4: I went to bed early. When I was awakened I thought it was a fire. I had heard some trucks running around when I went to sleep. I got up a little before a quarter of ten. It was in the teachers' barracks. The first thing I noticed was the tanks coming hunting for the Japanese who were heading for the warehouse. Then I saw the cook running out with his arms extended, running for the colony.

I might have been the arch pessimist among the school teachers. As Vice Principal, I was the only one that thought the school wouldn't start on time. I just had a personal feeling about it. Something in the atmosphere and then the contact that I had with the children in the 6th grade classes and the feeling that I got through them as to how their parents were feeling. There was a lot of little things that I couldn't put my finger on. I remember the girl who was going on the *Gripsholm*. She didn't tell us she was going and then just before she left she barely said good-bye to somebody in the room. I remember the girl who was going on the *Gripsholm*. She didn't tell us she was going and then just before she left she barely said good-bye to somebody in the room. I remember the other girls said, "I wouldn't say goodbye either. I wouldn't tell anybody if I were going back." I should say that there was a feeling around that was harder than it was even after registration.

MAY P. HERT.

STATEMENT BY KENT SILVERTHORNE

NOVEMBER 22, 1943.

Monday, November 1st at approximately 1:15 p. m., I walked from my office in the Leave Building to the main Administration Building. As I walked down the hall at the back of the building I saw a number of young evacuee men coming

toward the canteen from the east side of the hospital. Some were running on the road in front of the mess hall, toward the motor pool.

I returned to my office in the Leave Building and by that time could see a group of young men being directed by leaders to go around the area in which the Administration Buildings are situated. Other groups were walking up in a leisurely manner. These groups for the most part were made up of older men and women and children.

Shortly after a crowd of some three or four thousand had gathered in the administrative area, some young men erected a public address system at the door of Mr. Black's Office. I then saw a group of men (later identified as the "committee") admitted through Mr. Black's Office into the office of Mr. Best. Negotiations went on for some two and a half or three hours during which time the crowd waited patiently. After the first hour or so many people in the crowd were sitting on the grass or squatting on the ground conversing. I saw no sign whatsoever of any expressions of ill will on the faces of the people in the crowd. In fact, they were, for the most part, talking and smiling in little groups, as would be expected in any sociable gathering. Three evacuee men came into my office during the course of the afternoon and obtained my help with business matters.

After looking at the crowd from various parts of the building I continued with some work that I wished to get finished.

My Secretary, Miss Seemah Battat, went through the crowd of evacuees on two occasions, from my office to the Administration Building. She was not threatened, molested, or even particularly noticed. My wife, and another lady went through the crowd at the back of the Leave Building to our apartment some two hundred yards distant. She stayed there some fifteen or twenty minutes and returned through the crowd to the Leave Building. When she reached the outer edge of the crowd on her way to the apartment a young evacuee man stepped up and asked her to go back please. When she told him she was going to the rest room he let her pass. The other people paid no particular attention to her.

When Mr. Myer finally appeared at the door of Mr. Black's Office to address the crowd, the people took their hats off in a very respectful manner. When he finished his talk they applauded. They likewise applauded at the conclusion of Mr. Best's short talk. One of the evacuee committee members then spoke at some length in Japanese. At the conclusion of the speaking on an order being given in Japanese many of the people in the crowd doffed their hats and made a slight bow. They did not face in any particular direction, other than that they were facing the Administration Building where the speakers were standing.

I looked at the crowd at various times in the course of the afternoon, but at no time did I see any evidence of weapons of any kind or incendiary materials of any kind. With the exception of the young men who preceded the main body of people, I saw nothing that distinguished this crowd from any other group of people waiting to hear a speech.

At no time did I entertain fears for my safety, and that night my wife and I slept peacefully with unlocked doors in our apartment adjoining the colony.

KENT SILVERTHORNE.

INTERVIEW WITH MRS. POWELL, NOVEMBER 16, 1943

November 1: I was over in the residential area west of the hospital when I saw the crowd coming this way on Monday afternoon. There were people walking with children. Nothing like a demonstration. The only unusual thing that I saw was east of the apartments a couple of Japanese walked up and down the fence all afternoon. They didn't come inside at all, although I think they called to my maid and scared her. She went inside and stayed there because she was scared.

I didn't see anything that was around the warehouse in our area. There were Caucasian workers who worked there all afternoon. There were two or more of them, and I saw them getting ready to move the building. Putting skids under it. I didn't have the slightest fear all afternoon. In fact, I went back to the laundry room and finished my laundry. My grandson, who is staying with us, Jerry, was around during the afternoon, and I sent him over to the military with Mrs. Hitt. We were told to go over there. Let me think who told me that. Mr. Heick called Mrs. Heick and said that there were orders to go in to the military area. I went over for a while and then came back.

I never saw any Japanese in our area. The only ones I saw were some that I asked what was going on, as they went by, and they didn't seem to know. One

woman in our area got her car all ready to leave in. She filled it up with water and was all ready to go. I guess you drew a blank when you asked me to tell you anything. I wasn't excited. Once I went to Cole's telephone and called back to the leave office to find out what was going on there. I was told that they had set up loud-speakers and that they were in Mr. Best's office negotiating and that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten.

My maid told me that an announcement had been made in Japanese in the mess hall, and that she didn't understand it. She and all her family speak English and didn't know what was going on. The father came by during the afternoon and told her not to leave our apartment; that was all he said to her. The maid was rather frightened and sort of agitated in her behavior and speech. She said she was frightened by not going outdoors all afternoon. She was frightened by the activities she said were going on down in the colony at nights. She said she was afraid to go out at nights. This maid said that they would make it particularly hard for her because she didn't know Japanese. They wanted her to go to Japanese school, and she didn't want to go. She said that she would have had to go back to first grade in Japanese school. She said it wasn't compulsory. I forget the word she used; maybe it was "require," but her mother thought that maybe she had better go. It seemed to me that it was a family affair discussed and decided upon in the family. I know my maid didn't know what was going on Monday afternoon.

I was not here on November 2 and 3, but I was on November 4th. I was in our apartment. I went over to the military area, because I was told to go by the Army shortly after 10:00. I stayed there until midnight and heard shooting. There were three shots. The army didn't tell us anything. I only heard a young boy say that somebody was being beaten up in the administration area.

I should say it was all very uneventful. I didn't seem to have any excitement. My husband kept saying there would be trouble. I don't remember the date when he first said this, and he didn't tell me until a week later what had happened at the motor pool on the Sunday before that Monday when the incident happened. I know my maid had been afraid ever since segregation began, because she said that dances were being broken up.

DORA POWELL.

INTERVIEW WITH MISS CLARA BOGORAD

I have been leave officer since November 1st and from March 16th to July 1st, assistant officer, from July 1st to November 1st, assistant placement officer.

On November 1st, at 1:00, I was at my desk in the leave office. I happened to look out the window soon after and what I saw was a steady stream of people just beginning to come, in groups of 4 to 5, from around both wings of the hospital. They seemed to converge on the administration building and the leave office. Miss Watson came in from lunch and said she noticed that all evacuee help were being dismissed from the administration building. I looked around and made a mental note, for the first time, that all of our staff had not returned from their lunch in the colony, except 4 file girls, of Mr. Fagan's staff. Not knowing what the crowd was there for I asked Mr. Silverthorne, the Project Attorney, if he would be so good as to go over to the administration building and find out. He went over and on his way back I saw him greeting Mr. Myer who was with Mr. Best and someone else I can't remember. They were entering the administration building by the door to Mr. Black's office. The next thing I was conscious of was more and more people coming up and what I noticed now seemed to be some young Kibei boys close off ordering the crowd as to where they should go. Out of the back window of the leave office I could see tanks being warmed up, the soldiers moving about in full gear and at the sentry gate, which is Post 4, Colonel Austin and his staff stationed. In his company were Captain Maples, Captain Archer, Lieutenant Doran, and Major Phelps and so on. The line of people around the fence closest to the Military area at the sentry Post, booed and hooted the Military's preparations, but they were stopped rather quickly by what apparently were young men, with some older leaders, who ordered them away from the fence and back to the administrative building. By this time, Mr. Fagan's 4 file girls were sitting on the floor of the leave office huddled around the stove and they were obviously keeping away from the windows because they were afraid to be seen inside. It was suggested to them that they could leave if they were worried and perhaps it would be best for them to join the crowd. They then seemed to just vanish into thin air outside.

One elderly and, as I remember, rather small Japanese man came into the building apparently to conduct business with Evacuee Property. He wanted to see Ed. Shimizu who works with Evacuee Property. Of course, Mr. Shimizu was not there. The old man asked us if we thought he ought to stay in the building. He could see out the back window toward the military area. He looked at the tanks and machine guns then he said he thought he had better stay in the leave building. He imitated machine-guns very much the way any child would and was obviously joking. Shortly after, he left to stand on the steps of the building. We could, from the other side of the leave office, watch them put up the loud speaker. I remember noticing how quiet the crowd was. Looking out the side window I saw a carriage with a little infant in it. There was a 2-year-old playing under the window too, and families and a mixed crowd seemed to be the nature of the group.

Mr. Kirkman called me and suggested I warn the people in my building not to leave. I joked with him and passed it off and said it didn't seem very dangerous to me and that I didn't think the situation was quite that bad. Later he phoned in that Doctor Pedicord had been hurt and he warned me again not to leave. I passed the news around to my fellow prisoners. Mrs. Silverthorne, who had been in our office, had gone home while the negotiations were delayed by the incident at the hospital. She had decided that she might as well go off. When she returned she said she met with no difficulty in going through the crowd over to her home. About 3:30, Miss Seemah Battat and Miss Rose and a teacher whose name I can't remember, and myself, went over to the administration building. We encountered no interference in going from the leave office to the administration building. The crowd around the building seemed to take orders from a boy in a knitted stocking cap who stood in Mr. Black's doorway near the loud-speaker installations. When the kids giving orders wanted to know what to say, they always went to him.

I also saw them load 3 trucks with young men. They put as many young men on a stake truck as it would hold and then they raced back around the west wing of the hospital and disappeared behind the buildings. I saw people going to the hospital after the Doctor Pedicord incident. It seems to me I saw a woman who I thought was Miss Shipps escorted over. Mrs. Huike called our office asking for her husband. I said he could be located in Mr. Black's office.

Shortly after I arrived at the administration building I went to Mr. Zimmer's office and talked to Mr. Frank Smith who was there. He and Mr. Zimmer advised me not to attempt to go back to the leave office, so I remained in the administration building. There was one little scene when a Japanese woman came to the administration building to go to the bathroom. She was followed by a Japanese youth and a younger woman. They insolently questioned one of the teachers near the door to the lavatory, as to whether or not the Japanese woman was inside. When the older Japanese woman reappeared the youth and younger woman spoke to her in Japanese, in what sounded like very angry tones. I didn't see any knives nor any sticks nor any straw around the building, nor any oil-soaked rags. Mr. Cox's car was badly damaged, especially top of it, which was ridged and dented as though an army had walked over it. Men, women,¹ and children sat both inside and outside of staff cars parked alongside the administration building, with no regard for the fact that the cars were either private or Government property. I felt, at the time, that it was inevitable that the cars be damaged and thought something should have been done to put a stop to it immediately.

I remember that among the people who were directing the mob and giving them orders as to where to stand, were two boys in red sweaters. They were among the group who took their orders from the stocking-capped boys standing in Mr. Black's doorway.

On Thursday night I was at home with Miss Lucas, Lieutenant Doran, and Mr. Kirkman. The Lieutenant said he had some very good candy back in his quarters and he went to get it. Five minutes later he was back without the candy but with his gun and gas mask and ammunition belt. He told us the soldiers were on an alert and said we could go to his quarters, then he left. I remember I had just finished changing from my house-coat into outdoor clothes when he came back with a message that we had to vacate our quarters immediately. We went over to his quarters where we were joined by Mr. and Mrs. Lowery, their daughter, and Mr. Guy Cook and his son. After the all-clear, I came to the administration building and saw some Japanese boys lined up in the office service room. They were 15 or 16 with hands up over their heads and

about 6 soldiers with Tommy-guns trained on them. I was looking for Mr. Kirkman's son who had been out delivering oil with young Jack Best and Jack Zimmer. We found him at Mr. Zimmer's. Mr. Kirkman's son had the handle to the base ball bat that Fenton Mahrt had used, to defend himself against the Japanese. People passed in the corridors and then they marched 5 Japanese boys down to Mr. Best's office. One may have been hurt because he had his hand clasped over the top of his head, the others holding their arms straight up.

The morning of the Meiji Setsu celebration only one of our staff came to work and she stayed all morning. Her name is Amy Sakuma. As a matter of fact, we told her she could go but she stayed all that morning. Since Thursday night she has called Mr. Fagan and asked when she can come back to work. She is only 18 and is here much against her will because her family stayed here. The rest of the office staff didn't come at all.

CLARA BOGORAD.

INTERVIEW WITH MELBOURNE HEDRICK

I came to the project as statistical clerk and held that position from May to October 1943. Since October 1st my position has been that of cost accountant.

In regard to my timekeeper staff, the new people who came in after segregation didn't seem to work quite as well as the old staff. I should say they didn't seem to have as much initiative.

On September 30th I was at the high-school auditorium checking the baggage of the newcomers. That evening the last train came in from Topaz. I was standing in the doorway of the high-school building when I noticed about 20 young fellows had built a bonfire near the high-school auditorium. They threw in a couple of benches that were placed along the side of the building. The bonfire was on the colony side of the main building; that is, in front of it. The old men near the crowd seemed to stand back in order to get out of the way and not be involved in the incident. One of the boys had a bright cloth standard, the colors being blue and gold, as I remember. Then I went back to my work and didn't see the rest of it.

On November 1st, at 1:00, I saw people coming toward the Administration building. It was a mixed crowd and in no particular hurry. Later, when they surrounded the building, I tried to go out the back door, but a man visiting the Project, I believe he is a farmer in the vicinity by the name of Wilkinson, told me that I couldn't get out. On his advice I didn't try. I remember Wilkinson was very angry because some boys had told him to get out of his car as he was just about to drive off. When he resisted they began to lift up the car at one end. Their question was, "Do you want to have it go the rest of the way?" Of course, that got him out of his car. Later, when in the north wing of the building, as I was looking out a window, a couple of Japs called me vile names, one of which was "white trash." As to the crowd, the young fellows were in close to the building, and others, about 6,000 of them, in a solid mass behind. At the end of the speeches in Japanese, which I didn't understand, there were three orders. I saw one of the boys in the crowd get his hat knocked off when he failed to remove it after one of the orders. Then the crowd dispersed.

On the morning of the Meiji Setsu celebration at about 9:30 the boy who helps me with the inventory told me that he didn't dare stay here that morning. Later the same day when he returned from the services he said, "I don't care for a lot of things that are going on down in the colony but I don't dare oppose their orders or I wouldn't be here talking to you."

On Thursday night I was home at about 10:00 or 10:30 when someone knocked at the door. When I opened it there was a bayonet in my face and the soldier said, "Get ready to go. There's no time to lose, the Japs are on a rampage." We were sent to the military zone and while there was some excitement no one was frightened. People were kidding about the fence they didn't get. I worked with Jimmy Inishi, that is his name, I think, and he is at warehouse 350. When it comes to business he doesn't let a nail go out without having someone signing for it. I also worked with K. Ishihara, and I saw him on Saturday, but he hasn't been able to come up to work since. These boys are all right.

MELBOURNE E. HEDRICK.

INTERVIEW WITH MRS. VLASTA HEDRICK

I am statistical clerk here and I have held that job since October 1st. I came here last May, however, and from May to October I was assistant fiscal accounting clerk. I have always worked with good evacuee helpers, but Caucasians on the staff were beginning to notice trouble brewing recently. This seemed to occur when certain newcomers came into the Project around October.

I know my Japanese maid was a very trustworthy person. I remember now that she used to worry when my little boy, aged 6, didn't get back from the Carr school on time. She didn't even call on Monday afternoon, November 1st. My evacuee workers in this office invited me to their mess halls and I certainly didn't like the food served, and I'm not for them either. I wouldn't want to eat their gooney, rotten stuff anyway. Some of these girls in this office were key workers and were kept here after segregation to finish up the work. Others were loyal but they were staying here for various reasons. I do know that they were afraid to go out at night, and I've heard some tell me so. Whenever you did anything for these kids they seemed to appreciate it a great deal. This was even after segregation. On Monday, November 1st, I didn't now anything was going to happen. All of a sudden I saw everyone running to the windows about 1:00 that afternoon. I went too. There was one line of evacuees, a mixed crowd, coming toward the administration building. They surrounded the building. Various people tried to go out the doors but were pushed back. One man, Mr. Breece was almost pushed over. He went to talk to some Caucasians over at the leave office but the Japanese boys wouldn't let him proceed. I also saw one lady try to get out the back door, but they wouldn't let her. Untrue to some other reports I have heard or unlike those reports, the crowd was very quiet. Almost too quiet for such a large crowd. They didn't roar and I just wonder if a crowd of Caucasians would have been so quiet. They only cheered after the speeches. Some of the boys looked in the windows. I gave one young fellow in the telephone office a dirty look and he walked away. I didn't see any clubs. When you ask me if I saw any knives, all I can remember is that I think I saw a few knives like butcher knives. I saw a truck come up opposite the north wing of the Administration building, load up with young fellows and drive off past the west wing of the hospital. Then I saw a truck come back empty. After the final speech the people bowed and I saw one young man get his hat knocked off by another fellow, when the first one didn't remove it. Someone said, "That meant a bow to the Emperor." I saw this from the window in Miss Lucas's office. Then they all left in very short order.

The next day one of the girls in the office wanted to know if I or any of the office staff were scared Monday. She said she had been very frightened and had stayed down in the colony. Her name is Kawai. On Wednesday, when they made them go to the Emperor's birthday celebration in the fire break, she didn't want to go and she said so, but she went because she said if she didn't she'd be in trouble. She was here in this project because her father was in an internment camp and her family had special permission to remain until he arrived.

After the meeting with Mr. Myer when the appointed personnel went over there, one young disagreeable fellow who was a newcomer in the office and the Project, asked those people returning from the meeting, "How did the meeting come off?" He meant this sarcastically and I believe he was rather a sneaky person. His name is Iwao.

Then this same fellow asked me on Tuesday morning when I got to work "Where were you Monday afternoon?" His next question was, "Did you work hard?" He was just being sarcastic so I said, "We just killed ourselves working." He went away laughing.

On Thursday night I don't think I saw anything. We were just evacuated from the residential area by the Army.

(Signed) (Mrs.) VLASTA HEDRICK,
Statistical Clerk.

INTERVIEW ON NOVEMBER 16 WITH REUBEN LEVINE, ASSISTANT FISCAL ACCOUNTANT

I have only been on the Project for a few months, so there isn't much in the background that I can talk about.

On Monday, November 1, I noticed that the evacuee help left about fifteen minutes earlier for lunch, and never came back to this particular office. After lunch I was at my desk when someone remarked to me that some Japanese were coming this way. They seemed to be coming toward the building from all directions. The vanguard seemed to be young men. No one here appeared to know what was up.

I went to the front of the Administration Building and stood there with several other people, trying to find out what was going on. Along the front of the crowd at the Administration Building where I stood around 1:10 or 1:15 o'clock there appeared to be a group of young men who controlled that portion of the crowd.

After the crowd was massed, some lay on the grass, others stood around, and they ordered people here and there. I stood there for a little while, then came back to the office. About a half hour later I went out to the front door again and stood there with some others. It must have been about 1:45. A few minutes later Mr. Breece, who was temporarily assisting in our office at that time, passed us to go out into the crowd. I suppose he wanted to talk to someone in the Japanese group, but he didn't get any further than the fringe of the crowd in front of the building, where he was stopped by two or three young hoodlums who told him to get back. One of them, a tall fellow, wore a skating cap; but he was not the only one. There were several barking orders to that crowd. They called Breece pretty filthy names, and pushed him and roughed him up. He started to resist, but seemed confused and hesitant, and finally he just came back.

I then came inside and walked around to one of the east entrances—the one nearest my office—and looking through the window I saw a couple of young Japanese hammering at the door. I'm not sure, but I think that they were nailing the door up.

From that point on until the meeting broke up I just waited for developments. I did some work, but it was hard to under the circumstances.

Another incident I noticed in the north wing of the Administration Building, looking out from the farm office window, was that two or possibly three trucks came into the crowd, and the leader on each truck—the fellow sitting with the driver—appeared to call for volunteers from the crowd. Within a few minutes each truck was loaded with about 20 or 30 young Japanese. They took a position just outside the group that was standing close to the Administration Building. When the trucks were loaded they went out toward the colony, and that's all as far as that was concerned.

In the afternoon somebody spread the report that the Japanese committee had presented certain demands. The one I heard especially was that "if Caucasian personnel was not removed from the hospital immediately, all of them, this committee would not be responsible for what happened to the people inside."

That evening there appeared to be a great deal of apprehension among the Caucasian personnel that I spoke to. As to what provisions were being made for their protection, neither I nor my wife had been here very long, but we assumed that sufficient plans had been worked out to quell any further disturbances that might occur.

The following two days there was a good deal of tension in the offices. My wife told me that when she had occasion to assign any tasks to the evacuees there (in Mail and Files) they appeared not to hear—suggesting passive resistance. This wasn't true in this office, because they seemed to go about their business in here.

On the day that we had our meeting with Mr. Myer, one of the evacuees here by the name of Iwac (that's his first name—he was a new accounting clerk), his last name is ——. Well, as soon as I came back to the office after that meeting, about 4:00 p. m., he approached me and said, "Well, how was the meeting?" with a silly grin. It sounded to me as if he was being sarcastic. I replied, "Okay," and dismissed it with that.

On Thursday, November 4, I heard a shot—just one. I was in my quarters. I was looking out when the soldiers came by in tanks and jeeps. They told us to go to the front gate if we didn't want to get hurt. However, we didn't go.

I asked one of the soldiers if this was an official order—trying to find out what we were supposed to do.

He said, "Do you hear the shooting?"

Several others there stayed, so we stayed too.

REUBEN LEVINE.

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK D. FAGAN, PERSONNEL OFFICER, TULE LAKE CENTER, W. R. A.

I have been in the Project for 18 months as Placement Officer. The title of Acting Personnel Officer is just a few days old. In answer to your questions as to what I observed concerning the recent incidents I can tell you the following stories.

At 2:00 Monday, November 1, comes the first affair. I phoned the office and Smith suggested that I leave by way of the back gate. I took my car and went to back gate at the opposite end of the Project and found it locked. A soldier was on regular guard duty. Within 10 minutes of my arrival a truck load of young Japanese boys came up in a stake truck. The soldier asked me what to do. The Japanese boys said to him that they had come to guard the gate and see that no one came in or left. The boys didn't say a single word to me. Within about 15 minutes 2 more truck loads arrived, making 3 trucks in all. I judged that there were about 15 fellows on the back of each truck. They ran one of the trucks back against the gate to prevent any one from leaving and during this time, also, not one word was said to me. They ran the truck up apparently to keep me from going out the gate. Soon after the arrival of the first truck a jeep arrived and saw what was happening and they got in touch with headquarters. It took about 15 minutes for an Army truck of 6 men with Tommy Guns to arrive. They were ordered to the tower and soon after their arrival an officer arrived in a jeep. In the meantime the Japanese boys had sat on the ground. They were all there and under the aim of the tommy gunners. The Colonel who had arrived asked the tommy gunners if they were ready and then opened the gate. The truck was pushed away from the gate by the soldiers. Then I went, with 2 soldiers, to my car, which was about 20 feet away. No person on the ground did anything. I drove the car out of the gate and drove to the front of the Project area where I remained until the November 1st meeting was over. Incidentally, Mr. Rhoades says his car was robbed of a pair of binoculars. I think it is interesting to note that my car was in the same shed, wide open, and wasn't damaged or touched or tampered with or even entered, from appearances.

The other incident I could report refers to the day of the public funeral. There was something that day. I was working in my office in the afternoon and decided to start back from this office in the colony to the leave office. I drove toward the firebreak since I wanted to see what was going on and I was met at the firebreak road by a rough looking bunch of 8 or 10 fellows. I say rough looking because they looked like Kibei boys and didn't seem the least bit friendly. They didn't speak much English but simply said that I couldn't go through because there was a dead man over there, indicating the firebreak. I drove to the cross road below and was about to drive out into the firebreak again when I was stopped for the second time. This second bunch wanted me to go back and as a matter of fact, to back my car out—not to go forward. Their command was, "You back up and don't drive your car ahead." That is the day Mr. Cook reported he was bothered at the funeral. These boys were not wardens. There were no wardens present and the young toughs were dressed up in dark clothes suitable for a funeral gathering.

Then as to Thursday night. I live in the barracks next door to Mr. Best's home and I saw some of what happened out of the corner window facing to the front of the Administration building. The first thing I saw was a pick-up come down the road. I had seen that car chase another auto in the direction of the military zone and then, as I say, it came down the road and swung down in the direction of Mr. Best's home, parking midway between the Administration Building and Mr. Best's. Some kind of a scrap was obviously going on. I saw a flashlight. I couldn't, from where I was looking, see Mr. Borbeck, but I did hear shouting as I remember it, especially from the motor pool across the way. Then I saw boys running from the motor pool across Mr. Best's lawn and it seemed every one of them had a stick about 3 feet long. Mr. Borbeck was later carried into our apartment after he was washed up and then taken across to the

Government dispensary in the military zone after Doctor Mason gave him first aid. When I saw him he was stunned and he staggered. I didn't see much else of all this because I kept the window closed and turned down the lights. I went across to the Administration building after Borbeck left and stayed about an hour. I saw them bring in 8 or 10 young fellows. The first 3 had been fighting with the men from Internal Security. One had a bleeding hand. The rest they brought in 1 or 2 at a time and there were 3 wardens in that group. They also brought in 4 girls who proved to be night workers. Mr. Muir spoke to one of them asking her why she thought the boys had done this or something to that effect. She was pretty nasty and I believe her answer was, "I don't blame those boys for doing that with all the rotten food and everything they are getting." The only other things I heard about Thursday night were only hearsay. Bob Hill, one of the firemen, said he outran a bunch on Thursday night. (The question went back to the other observations concerning the Monday incident.) "Oh, yes; I forgot to say that on Monday the girls called from the leave office. I was in the Placement office. There were 4 file girls here, all new ones and very good workers and they were in this leave-office building. They wanted to know what to do and I advised them not to put themselves under suspicion by staying in the building, but to go out and lose themselves in the crowd. My assistant up at placement, also told me that an announcement had been made in the mess hall. This announcement spoke of a march on the Administration Building. I seem to remember that word. I didn't hear from him of any speech to be given by Mr. Dillon Myer. Then on Monday when I saw everyone marching on the Administration building I called Mr. Best. I was probably the first person out in the colony to notice this and when Miss Lucas, his secretary, answered the phone I instructed her to get word to him. She said he was over at another building, I think the personnel mess, but I told her to tell him that everyone seemed to be walking toward the Administration building. My own staff of girls were at the placement office at 1:00 and when I got there at 1:05 I instructed my assistant to let them go. I think they left to hear the negotiations, more out of curiosity, because my office has a really good staff. They are good workers and I don't know, they may be part of families where the older ones think differently, but these young ones work quite well. As a matter of fact, I never noticed any difference between my new office staff and the old one. The only difference I noticed was that some of the people who came to the counter to see about jobs acted rather fresh. It seemed they were mainly younger men applying for work. Not all were antagonistic but some of these younger men were. For example, they accused my assistant, Shig Yumane, of not being a good Japanese because he wouldn't just get jobs for them and violate my regulations. These boys felt they weren't getting any consideration. Shig is not a segreguee but is here with his wife, who is a TB case, for 6 months, and he is the best man I ever had. There was a general feeling that too many school kids were working and some of these fellows would say they should be taken off the pay roll. Actually, up to the time of the Monday incident, I had put on approximately 1,200 people from other projects, and didn't favor the Tule people, who they claimed were being given all the jobs. There was one minor episode about 10 days before the Monday episode. A young evacuee asked one of these file girls down here to show him the record of someone else, that is the employment record. He was somewhat threatening so one girl came to me and I said they were confidential and that we wouldn't show them any more than we would show someone else his employment record. He said, "Who's talking to you. I didn't ask you any questions. I don't know why you should butt in." He held a request for a social-service grant in his hand. I grabbed it to get his name and I reported his name to the Welfare Office and to Mr. Cole of the Internal Security. Later when I checked on who he was, since I was told that he threatened to have me fired, I learned that he was a former fisherman who came from the Manzanar Project. On this occasion he was accompanied by 8 fellows and after I took his name they refused to go. My assistant informed me that they threatened to stay until 5:00 to get me and told them that I probably wouldn't be back and they shouldn't wait because there was going to be staff party after hours. This Manzanar fellow talked to Mr. Best and Mrs. Thelma Davis in the Administration Building and I think he suggested that they have me fired.

FRANK D. FAGAN.

INTERVIEW WITH ROSEMARY SPOONEMORE, SCHOOL TEACHER, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

I came back to the project the last week in September. I was teaching summer school and I was interviewing people with the medical social workers to find out who was qualified for pullmans in the transfer.

On Sunday, a week before the happening, a girl that I knew in the colony came up to see me in the afternoon. She said that she thought a general strike was to be called on Monday. That was the Monday before the thing happened. Well, nothing happened on the other Monday so I guess I forgot all about it. This girl had been an assistant of mine during summer school. I remember we talked over the farm strike and she said that she thought it was foolish and it should be up to them to harvest the crop. I remember I asked her about the people's attitude. Why they were striking. She said that in her block there were many who were afraid. She told me that she always took her shower before dark. That there were a certain group that she was afraid of and she wouldn't go out after dark if she could help it.

Then she said that there had been some petitions going around and that was all she knew and that there were some meetings but no one in her block has taken any responsibility for the meetings. That makes me think that that was what the girls in the statistical office where I was working on Monday, November 1, were talking about. I heard one of them say, "What did your block decide? Another one said, "Did you have yours?" They were apparently talking about meetings that had been held over the week end. I don't know whether they were Saturday night or Sunday but maybe they were deciding about this incident on Monday afternoon.

November 1: I was working in the statistical office on Monday afternoon. I was in there about 1:00. Suddenly they were beginning to call over the telephone; calling for girls who worked in the office. They were telling them to leave. At least 3 received telephone calls. I had noticed that the girls acted disturbed. They had brought their lunches and had eaten them in the administration building. One of them said before they left, "I'm very sorry that the girls have to go but I guess they had better." They didn't leave in a group but in bunches of 2 or 3.

I was all over the place during the afternoon. I tried to work but I couldn't work. I stayed in the administration building, mostly in our wing, and didn't come up here to the north wing. I didn't go out but my roommate tried to leave. She had come late. She had come through the crowd and then after she got in she tried to go out. I saw the door pushed against her and she was told to stay in there. Some men came by and told us that Smith, the painter, had tried to leave and they had manhandled him quite a bit.

A group of evacuees forced their way into the front door sometime during the afternoon. Two women had to go to the rest rooms and two men forced their way in. After that incident the door was locked and no more came in. I saw Mr. Smith with a Japanese escort going to the hospital. They went out the east door and later on he came back alone.

The one thing I saw was a man with something long wrapped in a newspaper in his back pocket. I think it was about 9 inches long and kind of flatish. It filled up his whole pocket. A friend of mine saw some fellow carrying some straw in his hand but I didn't see that.

My car was parked out back of the administration building and it wasn't touched at any time, except on Halloween. The thing that I noticed then were spots of oil on the fenders. That was after Halloween and before Halloween, too. But I don't know. I wondered about that. I thought it was strange.

I heard the speeches from the statistics office. I was listening pretty closely and I noticed that there was some applause at the end of Mr. Myer's speech and then maybe about the same amount of applause after the Japanese speeches but I'm not sure about that. Then there was a curt order and everybody snapped to attention. Then some, but not all, took off their caps and some bowed. Maybe about two-thirds of them and they were all bowing toward the speaker, that is toward the front of the administration building. I heard some people say that they turned when they bowed that isn't so. They just stood where they were and some of them bowed toward the speaker.

Wednesday night there was a meeting in the recreation hall. One last meeting asking Mr. Best to do something. I don't know much about that but I do

remember the incident of the outside light on the laundry room. I had tried to turn it on and found out that the globe was burned out so there wasn't any light on the outside. When I reached up to turn it on I heard some one in there and steps coming closer. Then about 5 feet away I saw a girl standing in there with an iron. That was about 10:30 at night. I walked on but I wondered why she should be there at that hour. Well, of course, there were evacuees in the personnel area before Wednesday although there weren't many after Monday.

I would say that I was feeling jittery on Monday, but by Wednesday I said to myself, "If I'm really jittery, I ought to get out of here, but since I'm not getting out I guess I'm not jittery." But I never went out alone after dark between Monday and Thursday, but I had been feeling that way along with others for sometime because there had been prowlers in that neighborhood from the middle of October. This was reported to the Internal Security and they told us not to worry that it was just peeping toms. Some people hadn't been pulling their shades down and they told us to pull our shades down. One night I was coming home from Spanish lesson and about 9:30 I was sitting in a girl's room. Someone turned the knob of the apartment and then scampered off down the barracks. You could hear the feet running. This was reported on the 23rd of October but was just laughed at by Internal Security.

November 4: I was in bed reading and then I heard some shouting and the moving of tanks. About 10:20 I opened the door to see what was going on. I didn't see anything except the tanks coming in and the personnel cook running down the road.

ROSEMARY C. SPOONMORE.

INTERVIEW WITH SEEMAH BATTAT, CLERK-STENOGRAPHER

At 1:15 on November 1st I noticed groups coming toward the administration building. Since people coming this way at that time was not an unusual sight I dismissed it. Later, however, I saw them coming more steadily toward the building. I was in the leave office and I left it to go to the west wing of the administration building after the crowd assembled. In making this move I was not molested in any way and I heard no abusive language as I moved through the crowd. I went back to the leave office. After a couple of hours, while the conference was in progress, I thought I could be of some assistance and went back to the administration building. At this time the doctors were sitting around. I was, of course, very anxious about Doctor Pedicord and I inquired about him. The doctors told me to be careful and I replied that I had come through the crowd with nothing unorthodox happening. In the administration building I took one telephone call for Mr. Best and we held up a paper offering relief for Miss Lucas. I took over the recording of the conference. I might say that I saw no weapons of any kind in the crowd, no boxes of straw or oil-soaked rags and no knives.

There were no evacuees who returned to the leave office after lunch and I was there from at least 1:10 up to the time I went over to the administration building. I remember one evacuee coming in to transact some business and I helped him fill out a report, TFR 500. This is a report for the Treasury Department in which all forms Property are registered. In answer to your question, this man did not kid or joke in the least but just transacted his business and seemed very calm about it. In looking out the window of the leave office I saw one person who seemed to be motioning the people away from the Military. I can't identify him, but I saw no unpleasantness nor did I see him talking to groups. People were just posted around as it were. To me, by reason of the fact that it was a mixed group, it seemed that the people were here to listen to the Director talk (Dillon S. Myer). Of course, the situation had great potentialities. Later I heard the rumor of boxes of straw employed to burn up this place, but I observed none of this, nor did I see weapons or pieces of pipe.

In answer to your question about Mr. Kuratomi, the impression I got was that he was a very arrogant, forceful, and probably bad-tempered fellow. Yet none of the Japanese on the committee stood or walked around or moved out of their seats during the conference.

In answer to your question about the child who was burned, I did not hear the uncle of the child speak or in any way describe the case. Rather, the case was only mentioned along in the other list of demands. No; there was no description of the child's accident. As to Thursday night, I wasn't even here.

SEEMAH BATTAT.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

Seemah Battat, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I am an employee of the War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Center, Newell, California.

During the early afternoon of November 1, 1943, I was working in my office in the Leave Office building. I was there when a large crowd of evacuees gathered around the Administration Building.

The Leave Office Building is about 60 feet from the main administration building. The area between the two buildings was packed with evacuees when I decided to go to the Administration Building to the rest room. I pushed through the crowd without any difficulty and in about ten minutes came back through the crowd to my office.

Later, thinking that my services might be needed in reporting the committee meeting in Mr. Best's office, I again went through the crowd between the two buildings and into the Administration Building, where I spent the balance of the afternoon taking shorthand notes of the meeting.

At no time was I molested or threatened, and at no time did I see any weapons or incendiary materials in the hands of the evacuees.

SEEMAH BATTAT.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of November 1943.

Notary Public in and for County of Modoc, State of California.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

Mary C. Durkin, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I am an employee of the War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Center, Newell, California.

I was standing between the administration building and the Co-op, at about 12:45 p. m., November 1, 1943, when I noticed groups of young men going up the road toward the Motor Pool. I then saw larger numbers coming toward the administration building and in this group were included old men, women, and children. I also noticed at this time that the evacuee office employees were coming out of the administration building with their coats on. I went into the administration building and watched the crowd gather. A number of my pupils in the crowd waved to me and spoke, and the parents of some of them nodded in greeting.

I watched the crowd from various parts of the administration building. As far as I could determine they were calm and friendly. I saw young men who seemed to be active in keeping the crowd together and I particularly noticed a woman dressed in gray knit skirt, short black plush coat, and bright blue scarf on her head, who appeared to be quite active. An elderly Japanese woman came into the building to the rest room, and the lady described above, ordered some young men to come with her to bring the old lady out. This group insisted on going in to get the old lady. This was the only evidence I saw of any force of intimidation.

I saw several parts of the crowd, but at no time did I see any knives or other weapons nor did I see any incendiary materials in the hands of the people or around the buildings.

MARY C. DURKIN,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of November 1943.

Notary Public in and for County of Modoc, State of California.

INTERVIEW WITH MARY DURKIN

Since segregation I have been aware of a lack of friendliness among the colonists that I chance to meet in the stores and on the way to the school. When I came to the project in August 1942, I was impressed by the spirit of cordiality

toward our administrative staff. The spirit was evidenced by the greetings we received from total strangers we met as we walked through the colony. Often we were stopped and asked whether we had come here of our own volition. When the people realized that the teaching staff had chosen to come to Tule Lake to teach the children of these residents, they expressed their gratitude quite openly and repeated acts of thoughtfulness. I do not wish to imply that there was evidence of ill-feeling in the attitude of the people with whom I came into contact, merely a lack of the former warmth.

From October 13 through October 15, Mrs. Irene Jaderquist and I took a census of children whose parents wished to send them to American schools which we were planning to open November 1. Mrs. Jaderquist is the vocational guidance counselor for the high school here on the project. As principal of the Elementary school I was interested not only in the number of children for whom we must plan, but also in the attitude of the block managers and of the parents we might meet. We saw no evidence of a lack of cooperation on the part of the block managers even though we were asking them to undertake additional work at a time when they were extremely busy, in organizing the necessary activities of their blocks. All the block managers spoke of the need for getting school started. Many parents approved us and asked that we get school started as soon as possible, as they did not wish their children to have so much idle time. One block manager showed us the room they were using for Japanese school. He remarked that 300 children used that room during the day. They came in groups for one hour's training in the Japanese language. The boys were to do their own janitor work.

The response to the census was very encouraging. Approximately 1,300 children were enrolled in our elementary schools. We do not yet have the figures on the number of children who entered the project that did not sign up for school. However, we felt that the percentage of enrollment was encouragingly high in proportion to the number of children in the colony. We found only two parents who said they would not send their children to American schools. This, of course, was before the Japanese schools were well organized.

The high-school students that we met in the colony seemed quite concerned that the start of school was being delayed. I think if we could have started school immediately, much of a constructive nature could have been done. These newcomers, no doubt, had a sense of insecurity that might account for their lack of friendliness toward us. They did not know us nor our attitude toward them. As an example of a change in attitude on the part of the colony, I might quote an incident that would not have occurred before segregation.

Mr. Douglas Cook was planning to leave the project November 5. The secretaries who worked in his office and the editor of the paper wished to give him a farewell party. The girls came to me and asked if they might give it in my apartment as they would not dare to invite Caucasians to a party in the colony. They were girls who had been residents of Tule Lake since evacuation, and expressed their inability to understand the change in attitude toward the administrative staff. Formerly we had both visited the colonists in their homes and entertained in ours. I gave them permission to have the party in my apartment and the girls made quite sure that no notice of the party would go into the Tulean Dispatch.

Mr. Jack Frost told me of an incident which should change the attitude on the part of the colonists. He had many friends in the colony whom he visited quite often. One family asked him not to return again to their home as the people of the block had told them not to allow Caucasian visitors to call. He was told that if he did not keep Mr. Frost out, they would throw him out.

On the afternoon of November 1, I started toward the high-school building at about 12:45. As I was leaving the administration area I noticed a large crowd of colonists coming through the hospital area. I realized that people did not come in such large groups normally, so I turned back to the administration building to find out what might be the trouble. I met the girls from the administration building leaving with their coats on. As I stood on the steps of the administration building, I noticed a large group of young men running in a close formation toward the motor pool. I then went into the administration building which I did not leave until around five o'clock. During this time I watched the crowd almost continually from windows and doorways of different parts of the building. I saw several of the school children who called to me and waved. Some parents whom I had met last year nodded to me but none spoke in the friendly manner in which we normally greeted each other. The children seemed to have the spirit of holiday as they rolled on the grass enjoying the

lawn in front of the administration building, I saw no evidence of weapons of any kind, nor did I see any boxes or bags that might have contained straw. I did see groups of people entering and leaving the Personnel Mess and one of the warehouses whose doorway could be seen from the administration building.

During the afternoon of November 1, I saw several young men move about the crowd speaking to them at times quite heatedly, but always in Japanese so that I do not know what they were saying. I was present when a woman in a gray knit skirt and short black plush coat demanded entrance to the administration building to bring out a Japanese woman who had been admitted to go to the rest room. She was accompanied by several young Japanese boys. This woman apparently was a leader in the group. I probably would not recognize her again unless she were wearing the same clothes.

On Tuesday, November 2, the girls at my office seemed anxious to discuss the incident of Monday afternoon. As I was speaking to them about it, three boys who were swampers for the high school came into the room. The girls immediately became absorbed in other tasks and showed that they did not wish to talk in front of these boys. When the boys left, I asked them for a reason for their attitude. They said they did not know the boys and would be afraid to express their opinion in front of them. The girls seemed to be easily frightened by such things as the boys whispering behind their hands, or even by their silence.

On Wednesday morning the girls asked us if they might not go to the celebration in honor of the Emperor, which they had been told to attend. I told them the choice was up to them. They might go, but they would be docked for the time that they had lost. The girls decided they had better go, as they did not wish to be seen in the building during the celebration. The girls left the building at 10 o'clock and were back at their desks working at 10:25.

Thursday, November 4, I was in my room when I suddenly became aware of tanks rolling. I ran out to see what might be happening. Probably two dozen boys were running from the motor pool and passed my barrack toward the village. They all had their hands above their heads.* I did not recognize any of the persons I saw, and have no knowledge of who the leaders might have been.

[Signed] MARY C. DURKIN.

STATEMENT OF CLARENCE J. BENZ, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND
NOVEMBER 4, 1943

I have been here since September 4, 1942. At that time I was assigned to the High School as Supervisor of Industrial and Vocational Education.

Due to a strike at the Furniture Factory in September and October of 1942, I was transferred on Oct. 22nd, 1942 to the Industrial Division and have been in charge of the Furniture Factory ever since. The title at that time was Associate Manufacturing Superintendent, and later, with the reorganization in July 1943, it became Senior Manufacturing Superintendent. There has never been any trouble with the evacuee workers in the Furniture Factory since I have been in charge.

About a week before the November 1st incident, we reported to the Internal Security that a window had been broken in warehouse #353 at the factory. After checking the warehouse, we found nothing missing.

During the segregation program I was running two shifts at the Tent Factory, cutting the crating material and making boxes for the segregants. I asked several evacuees working in the Furniture Factory to take over the responsibility of handling this job. They seemed disinterested and did not want to have anything to do with it. Some suggested that the job be given to Toshiaki (Sam) Yokota, one of the factory workers. I asked Sam and he took over. He did a fine job and is still here on the Project.

I have it from my Caucasian foreman that he heard one of the factory workers say the following, "Many of the young men who are causing all this trouble haven't any responsibilities, and if they were married and had some responsibilities they wouldn't be getting into trouble." This was said about two or three weeks before November 1st.

About the 23rd of October I noticed a strange group of boys go into the shop. Upon inquiry they told me they wanted to operate the power machines. I told them we did not permit outsiders to come in and use the machines. All but one

* I noticed a warden running and two wardens in a car.

of the boys left, and he told me that he was permitted to use the machines at the other center and consequently he was going to do it here. I told him that he wasn't at the other center now, but that he was at Tule Lake Center and we did things different here, especially in the Furniture Factory. He became very insolent and the both of us entered into a heated argument. During the argument he said, "That's the trouble with you Americans, you think you're running this camp." I informed him that I was running the Furniture Factory and would continue to do so as long as I remained here. He yelled something in Japanese and I was suddenly surrounded by about a dozen strange evacuees. The argument continued with some swearing when suddenly one of the Jap boys in the crowd said, "Lets cut out the swearing. They didn't teach me that when I went to school." The statement struck me as being very funny at that critical time and I turned around to the group and smiled. I believe that was the turning point of this situation and one of the boys in the group told the insolent lad to take his wood and leave the shop. Nothing more was said and the entire group left the shop.

November 1, 1943: On Monday, about 12:40 p. m., I went down to the Furniture Factory with Mr. Asa Thompson to get some boards for the personnel mess hall. On the way down we noticed some Japanese coming up from the colony almost in single file, or in two or threes. What struck me was that there were more coming up toward the Administration Building than the usual number of office employees.

As we were in the factory, some of the boys returned to work—about six of them. While going from warehouse #353 to the shop, I noticed that the crowd coming up from the colony was getting larger. The factory boys asked if they could go up to see what all the commotion was about. I believe it was Sam Yokota who asked this. I gave them permission, and he said, "We'll be back," as if he didn't know what it was all about or how long it would be.

Mr. Thompson and I went over to the shop to cut the boards and while we were there, two strange men came in, looked around and then left the shop. They were men in their forties I would say. This was not unusual because we always have people looking in, so I paid little attention to it.

Then about 1:10 p. m. we came back to the Personal Mess Hall to nail up the boards. By now I noticed a very large crowd around the Administration Building, with still more Japanese coming up from the colony.

As we stepped out of the car, three or four young Japanese appeared and told us we were wanted in the Ad Building. He simply said, "You are wanted over in the Ad Building." I asked him who wanted us, and he said again, "You are supposed to go to the Ad Building immediately." He then stood in my way, and I told him I had some work to do at that time, and whoever wanted me would have to wait until I was finished.

I brushed past him to go into the mess hall, and then Mr. Thompson made a statement about going to the Recreation Hall for a hammer, and he started in that direction. I saw him pushed back by one or two of this group. Mr. Thompson then came over to me and said, "I think we had better go over to the Ad Building." I picked up the boards and went through the crowd with him, to the Administration Building. I was confined in the Ad Building with other Caucasians until the crowd on the outside departed. The crowd dispersed about 4:45 p. m.

There was nothing inside the Ad Building for me to do so I decided to go out of the side door facing the Leave Office and go over to my office to do some work. I saw quite a crowd there as I walked out. A Japanese said, "Well come on ahead." He was not necessarily threatening, but I figured that discretion was the better part of valor, so I stepped back inside the Ad Building.

I did not see anyone destroy any property. I went out afterward and saw some of the damage done to the cars of Mr. Failing, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Gerry. I saw one flat tire on someone's car. I did not see any oil-soaked rags, straw, knives, or clubs. I spent most of the afternoon in and around Mr. Zimmer's office.

While I could not accurately estimate the crowd, it looked to me to be about five or six thousand, though I could not see all of them from where I was.

On the morning of the 1st of November, about 10:30 a. m., a telephone call came in the office for my secretary. Her name is Sakae Kudo. It was her sister calling, and I am told that her sister is the secretary to a block manager. My secretary was in the Administration Building on an errand at the time, so I answered the phone. The party asked for Sakae and I said she was not there. I was told to tell her that her sister had called. Later, when my secretary called her sister, I heard her say over the phone, "What's doing?" or some-

thing like that; "Is there any news?" She also asked her sister if there had been any mail.

This girl has a brother in the service and she told me about a month ago that she wanted him to get a furlough and come to Tule Lake hoping that he would talk to her parents and see if they could leave Tule Lake and go to some other center.

I was present when Dr. Mason came into the Administration Building (Nov. 1st) and asked for someone to assist Dr. Pedicord who had been beaten up in the hospital. It was then I was told that the Japanese crowd would not permit any Caucasian to leave the Administration Building.

I noticed that when Mr. Myers finished talking to the Japanese, some in the crowd started to leave, but stopped when a Japanese talk or interpretation was given. After the Japanese translation was given, there was another movement to leave. Then someone talking Japanese into the loudspeaker system issued orders in a crisp sort of military commanding tone. After one Japanese statement, the Japanese removed their hats, after the second Japanese statement they bowed their heads. The crowd broke up after that and went on down to the colony. The boys at the Furniture Factory did not return to work that afternoon. On Tuesday, the following day, they went right on working as if nothing happened. Nothing was said or discussed in my presence the following three days.

November 4th, 1943: Thursday night, the 4th, I was at the Recreation Hall until about 10:15 p. m. As we left the hall I heard the motors of the tanks and cars; it sounded as though the tanks were in motion. We remarked at that time that something had happened and the tanks were moving in. A few moments later I saw some Japanese boys running down the road toward the hospital—about six or eight of them. Then I saw the tanks and armored cars moving about. Shortly after that the soldiers came, searching about the living quarters and asking if there were any Japanese around. I went over to the Administration Building where I heard Mr. Best say words to the effect that the Army wanted all the people to go back to their apartments and stay inside.

I saw the baker of the Personnel Mess Hall, an evacuee, running down the road toward the colony, dressed in his white hat, jacket, and apron, holding a white towel in each hand. He was yelling loudly as an army car played a searchlight on him as he ran.

Of course I heard some shots, and when my roommate (Mr. J. Rose) came in, he told me he had seen Mr. Borbeck come into the Administration Building all covered with blood. Mr. Rose stated that Mr. Borbeck was beaten up pretty badly.

(Signed) CLARENCE J. BENZ.

STATEMENT OF MRS. MARGARET GERRY, STENOGRAPHER FOR INTERNAL SECURITY,
REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was at the Internal Security Office at the gate on Monday afternoon, November 1. Shortly after 1:00 o'clock one guard noticed a crowd gathering before the Administration Building. Mr. Schmidt was in the office, and went down to the Ad Building.

A half hour later the Army had armored cars well-manned, and soldiers were on the alert around the fence and at the gate. Their cars were parked in the entrance of the gate. Mr. Gerry told me on the phone that I should stay where I was. He said that they were imprisoned in the Ad Building. Ordinary visitors from outside collected at the gate. Some would stay a while and then leave.

Mr. George Smith, Fagan, Mrs. Harkness, Mr. Harkness for a time, then Mr. Gunderson were at the gate. Mr. Harkness walked unmolested to the Administration Building. Some women with children went out the back gate by the military post and came around to our gate.

Mr. Harkness called me and asked to have the school bus routed to his house, where the children would be safe.

I was outside most of the time, except on phone calls. The crowd seemed very sheeplike. When one group moved to one wing all moved, and when another group moved from back to front door all moved. I didn't see any pushing.

Two or three Japanese in a panel truck drove back and forth, and a heavy-set man beside the driver practically sneered at the Army. They drove back and forth at least a dozen times. The crowd was moving around some—not a lot.

There weren't many cars parked in front of the Administration Building, I recall, and I saw no one climbing on any cars. I saw no individuals directing the crowd. From where I was it was just a crowd, with no individuals standing out. One group of men was standing in front of the post office—five or six. Trucks were pushed across the roadway by the motor pool so no cars could get by. I could not tell if the men by the post office were young or old.

I could not hear the speeches over the loud speaker. I was inside working when someone said, "They're all leaving." I called Mr. Gerry to see if he could get out. No Japanese came to the gatehouse. I was too far away to see any sticks and clubs if there were any.

Monday night me stayed at Klamath Falls, Tuesday at Tulelake, and Wednesday and Thursday at Klamath Falls. We were off the Project every night from Monday to Friday. Our apartment was 110-1, the one farthest in the corner next to the military area, with nothing between us and the Japanese except a dark firebreak. We were isolated and almost alone, since others had moved out.

November 4: Thursday night we left the Project after dinner, at 7:00 or 7:15, and didn't know anything had happened until we returned the next morning.

MRS. MARGARET GERRY.

STATEMENT OF CLARA JENSON, HIGH-SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was working in the Leave Office. I came back from lunch and talked to Mrs. Silverthorne awhile. We saw the crowd coming. It did not look like a desperate crowd. They were not excited.

I went around the Leave Office building looking at the crowd from each window. I saw no clubs or pipes or boxes. A few old men had canes. A boy was boosted to the roof to install the loudspeaker and sat there all afternoon.

I was not excited. I worked off and on during the afternoon. I didn't think of going out.

After Mr. Myer's talk the crowd started to disperse, and evidently someone called them back because they stopped.

There were many women with baby carriages. The first thing the boy said over the loudspeaker was that there had been an incident at the hospital. I did not notice any reaction to this in the crowd. When Mr. Myer spoke nearly everybody who had a hat took it off. I made a special effort to look for weapons, because one of the women in the office thought she saw some. I noticed Miss Battat go over the other building. She was not molested. Mrs. Silverthorne went to her home and back. The crowd dispersed after making a little bow.

November 4: On Thursday night I was getting ready for bed when the girl in the adjoining room said, "What's the excitement?"

We stepped out as the tanks went by. I went back and got a coat. We started for the Administration Building when we heard a half dozen shots from the administration area. We saw some boys with flashlights. They turned out to be soldiers.

Twice within the past 4 weeks when I passed the administration area caught a group of boys were there and they gave me the Bronx cheer. This was unusual.

CLARA M. JENSON.

STATEMENT OF BETTY H. BARNES, FISCAL ACCOUNTANT, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: On Monday, while we were looking out the window of the main wing, Mr. Breece, who had been inside, made an attempt to go out to see Mr. Cook who was nearer the crowd. He said something to us about going to see Mr. Cook.

He was just outside the door by the telephone booth when a young man, supposedly a ringleader, said something to Mr. Breece and then shoved him back three times on the shoulder. The last time was pretty hard. Without saying anything Mr. Breece walked back into the building.

In the first wing we saw a Japanese boy come by the windows and kind of sneer. I saw no weapons of any sort. I didn't see any one carrying a box. The personnel took it very calmly with one or two exceptions. One woman was concerned about her children, who were at home.

I heard snatches of the Japanese speeches, but from the main wing where we were we could not hear the speeches.

I saw none of the boys and girls from our office in the crowd. I saw six or eight boys on top of one car—I think it was a private car—at the rear of the Administration Building.

On Tuesday the Japanese office workers got together in one corner of the wing for a few minutes. There seemed to be tension. They seemed nervous and a little uneasy. At a certain time on Wednesday the same as on Monday they all got up and walked out.

November 4: On Thursday night I was home, at 305-5, and around 10:15 or 10:30 I heard noise and commotion.

I went outside and saw tanks, soldiers, and floodlights. I saw soldiers go into the mess hall. I heard shouts or commands of something that sounded like "Halt!" I heard two shots from the direction of the colony. I didn't see any Japanese that night.

BETTY HAGEN BARNES.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. MARTIN LOEBMANN, MEDICAL OFFICER, NOVEMBER 17, 1943

I was hired by Dr. Thompson on the 8th of October. I have been a physician in the hospital here at Tule Lake since then. I was here on Monday afternoon. I went to my room and to look for my mail on the way. As I tried to leave the administration building by way of the east door I encountered a man at the door and 5 or 6 male evacuees. They didn't know anything, but it seemed best for me not to go out. I was in the North wing of the administration building and I could see the crowd all afternoon, standing around not doing anything. It seemed to me they were mostly youngsters between the wings and older people on the sides. Early in the afternoon Doctor Mason and Miss Shippis came over and told me about Doctor Pedicord's beating. They said they wanted some help.

While I was standing in the middle wing some women came into the bathroom. One woman said that a Japanese woman had gone to the bathroom and hadn't been back yet. There was some excitement over this and some more came in but it died down.

I should say that the crowd was maybe 3 thousand or 4 thousand. I saw some small sticks in the hands of the people in the crowd. I saw no knives.

I felt some tension two or three days prior in the hospital. I remember particularly Saturday and Sunday. On Friday I performed an operation and the Japanese doctors were very nice because they wanted to know about it. But I remember the behavior of the doctors while I was sitting in the X-ray room. The younger doctors ordinarily said good morning but on Saturday and Sunday they didn't even look at me. I thought at the time that this was tied to the curtailment of activities of the Japanese doctors which had been going on. Doctor Hashiba was the same as ever during this period but I noticed it especially in connection with Susuki.

My ward is obstetrics and gynecology. When I came in on Tuesday morning, a girl, who was usually in charge, was talking near the others and she was talking in Japanese. It was the first time she had ever talked in Japanese in my presence. She usually said that her Japanese was too bad even to permit her to act as an interpreter for other people, but that morning, on Tuesday, she was speaking in Japanese. I went into my office in Ward E opposite Mrs. Smith's office. After lunch I remember speaking to her and saying it was so quiet. Nobody around. Then I learned that there was a meeting with Mr. Myer for the staff after going to the Ad. Building.

Tuesday marked the end of activities at the hospital for the Caucasian staff. At the end of the meeting I met Miss Folda and she said she had been told that we shouldn't go back. We didn't go over any more after Tuesday afternoon.

November 4: I was sitting in my room reading a book about 8:30 or 9:00. I heard some Japanese voices and I imagined that something was going on. After Monday you would imagine that. I turned off the light and looked out and could see nothing definite. After a few minutes the voices came nearer to my room and I stepped outside. While I was standing there a man that I saw very definitely came by with a big club. Then there were 5 or 6 other men from the other side running from the gate down toward the administration building. They paid no attention to me. I heard a whistle and then some motors going and then the tanks coming in and it was obvious to me that the show was on. As I was standing before the barracks, Mr. Muir said, "Come on over. Doctor

Mason is here with an injured man." I went over and saw that Dr. Mason already plastered up the man and we, with Mr. Cook, took him over to the military infirmary. It was Mr. Borbeck. Upon return there were 15 or 20 evacuees that they picked up here in the administration area. I attended the evacuees who had lacerations, one possible fracture, no internal bleeding. The stout man, whom they call the leader, had many bruises and lacerations but no serious wounds.

General background: In the hospital there was a definite sort of sabotage. In spite of scarcity of films in the country they would take X-rays every week of the same tubercular case. That is something that is only done by research workers, not in the regular treatment of TB. There had to be a change in that sort of thing and there were similar cases. A baby with infection would be X-rayed, the X-ray being of no possible use, and the doctors giving aspirin to patients. In the hospital, a private one in Akron, it was not so well equipped as this one. Doctor Pedicord tried to stop this extravagance. He was a little rough perhaps. I would call him a Prussian type. I can say this, that the change of policy didn't do any harm to any patients. Everything continued to be done for patients that should be done.

I didn't look over the child who died, the one who was scalded. I refrained from treating her because that was not my services and of course I was new here and I didn't want to do anything wrong. I don't know any more about that case.

I was surprised when I came here. I expected to find a camp hospital but you can put this one on 5th avenue in New York. I am one hundred percent sure that the older Japanese people never had such medical attention before.¹ In Akron we were never allowed to change linen every day, except in serious cases. Here you have more supplies than any other civilian hospital because, of course, it has been set up by the Army. As to Doctor Hashiba. He is a good doctor always ready and willing but I should say that he was a little too active. For example, an old man came in with a pain in the belly, the sort of thing that comes from too much digitalis. Doctor Hashiba decided he had acute abdomen and wanted to operate. It was hard to explain to Doctor Hashiba that it was just a heart condition and an overdose of digitalis. Then there was another patient with a hemorrhage in the brain. Doctor Hashiba wanted to open it. That was useless in such a case. Doctor Hashiba is as what I would describe as too active for a surgeon. My impression is that he is politically clever and there is no doubt that he is looked up to by others in the colony. There is also no doubt that he is a good doctor in most ways.

But there was always so much wastage. You should see the linen that is used. I have never seen so much except in the Doctors Hospital which is a swank place in New York City. Just the other day 6 boxes of Kleenex were issued in a situation where 3 would have been sufficient. The patients were always grateful to me. I never had trouble of any kind. Working in the obstetrics ward the women always asked, "Won't you deliver me? Are you going to deliver me?" I think they had a preference to deliverance by Caucasians.

On Monday afternoon I felt definitely that it was a tense situation. I've been through such things before. During the last war riots in Germany. Nobody here has experienced these things. To me it was a very familiar situation. I didn't think it was bad enough to call in the Army at that time. The crowd was partly hostile. I felt that the younger people were definitely hostile and that the older people were the ones who were standing and talking without that same air of hostility.

MARTIN LOEBMANN.

STATEMENT OF MRS. MILDRED FARRELL, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4

November 1: I live at 302-3. I have been working on a job survey for the Placement Office.

I walked into the office about 1:30, and there were two girls and two boys in there. Others outside were in lines.

"What, nobody here to work?"

There was only silence.

"What are people doing outside?"

¹ Wartime measure.

One of the girls said, "They don't want us here. It isn't safe. I'm going home."

Huycke and Mrs. Corlis left hurriedly. I wanted to run, but I managed to maintain my dignity and walked to the Leave Office. I didn't feel very comfortable, I wondered why I didn't get tripped or hit.

They were walking fast and determinedly. Nobody touched me or stopped me.

I stayed in the Leave Building the rest of the afternoon, and worked. I had a pretty good scare, and I typed to keep busy.

The Army was running around getting ready. Miss Hert, a teacher, was standing by the window and said she saw a couple of pieces of pipe. I got up and looked, but I couldn't see any pipe. I didn't look very hard. I felt there were people to attend to those things and the rest of us should attend to our knitting.

November 4: On Thursday night I went to bed early because the oil stove in our apartment (302-3, near the warehouse area) was not working. I heard some commotion, but I didn't go out until I was sure everything was all right.

MILDRED C. FARRELL.

STATEMENT OF EMILY W. LIGHT

Monday afternoon: On Monday afternoon I left my room about three o'clock. As I did so I was surprised to see so many people gathered in the area between the administration building and the hospital. As I walked toward the co-op I passed some one I recognized and asked him what was happening. His answer was to the effect that a play-by-play broadcast was being made of a meeting some committee was having with Mr. Best and Mr. Myer. He seemed very indifferent and unconcerned, as I recall, and went on his way. At the time I thought he and his friend were probably returning to their homes—apparently not the least bit interested in the results of the meeting. From what what I have heard, he probably did not return home—at least, not right away.

As I went on my way, a young fellow approached me and asked if I worked here. When I answered yes he said that I had better go into the administration building—that the other members of the staff were in there. I mentioned I was planning to go to the store. He said it was closed. I said, too, that I had wanted to see some one in the high school. He said that the person I wanted to see was probably in the administration building along with the others. All in all, our conversation was very pleasantly carried on. The boy's tone didn't even seem to have firmness in it—as the way I have just repeated our conversation might seem to indicate. He asked me if I had anything burning in my room—anything like a hotplate, for instance, that might cause damage if left connected. I remember having thought this was done in a very considerate manner.

As we continued on our way toward the administration building, a remark was made in Japanese by a bystander. I thought that this was made about me and looked toward the group, feeling, for a second, a little bit embarrassed. As the group acknowledged my glance I thought how mistaken I was to have thought they were talking about me—at least, if they were, it was not in the derogatory manner I had at first thought.

My "escort" was soft-spoken and very courteous as he took me right up to the door of the administration building. At one time the thought did flash through my mind, "What would have happened if I just hadn't gone with him?" My thought was one more of amusement than anything else. That I should be alarmed in any way at all had never occurred to me. There was nothing in my "escort's" manner nor the action of those we passed that gave me any cause for fear. In fact, quite the reverse was true.

Once inside the building I went into the wing nearest the hospital. From that time until the close of the meeting I was where I could see the crowd from one window or another. At all times, it appeared to be an orderly and well-behaved group. Whenever I saw any of the Evacuees, even those I knew slightly, I found them willing to recognize me and doing so in a very natural, friendly way. I wasn't struck by this until I heard fear expressed by several staff members. Then it was that I thought: "Those people would not be recognizing me if there were too much tension in that crowd." This plus my confidence in those I knew outside made me feel that those inside had no basis for their fears.

During the meeting, the Evacuees stood in groups chatting with one another and seemingly not at all tense—or even too much interested in what was going on.

In fact, they seemed a bit bored. When I heard about the mess hall announcement that made the people come up, I could readily understand their feeling this way. Most of those people had probably come at one and I would say that Mr. Myer spoke at four or after. The interpreter for W. R. A. told me later that the Evacuee spokesman every now and then would have to say words like these to the people: "What's the matter? Quit looking over at the hospital or the army (as the case was). Can't you stick with us?" All this as if he were quite annoyed that the crowd wasn't more interested than it was in what the committee was doing.

Finally Mr. Myer spoke. It was my feeling that he did an excellent job and I admired his calmness and assurance as he spoke. It struck, too, that the crowd received him well. The applause was not as great after his speech as it was after the interpreter had told them what he had said. The people applauded Mr. Myer's speech and turned to go as if satisfied that the meeting was over. The interpreter began so they turned to hear him and the applause was greater, as I recall, than before—and naturally so because more people were then able to understand what Mr. Myer had said. Once more I noticed that they turned to go when Mr. Best's voice was heard. They stopped to listen. It happened that I could not hear Mr. Best very well but, as I remember, the applause was good—and the same was true after the interpreter told them what Mr. Best had said. Then followed one part of the meeting that I definitely did not like. The people had turned once more to go home when a voice boomed out something in Japanese which, of course, I did not understand. I was told later that it was a command to bow to the Emperor. At that time I did not like one bit the tone of that voice nor the way the commands seemed to be "barked out." My thought was "Good lands. Now what?" or words of like nature.

As the crowd finally left I thought how orderly it was—a big crowd dispersing as quietly as that struck me as quite unusual. My only fear of the whole afternoon came as I watched the people passing the military, going toward the small space between the hospital and the fence. Previously one of the M. P.'s had told me of the "nice, new guns" which had just been issued them. He told, too, of how "tricky and sure" they were. I hoped as I saw the crowd disperse that none of the M. P.'s "standing by" would get itchy fingers as they handled those "nice, new guns" and also that none of the Evacuees would do anything at all that could possibly be interpreted as cause for itchy fingers to function in such a situation.

Before closing my account of this meeting, I would like to add a word or two in answer to the widespread reports that weapons of all sorts were to be seen carried by the Evacuees. I saw only one ironwood cane which was carried by an older man and some sticks in the hands of a small group of children about six or seven years old. The sticks looked like garden stakes which the children could easily have picked up while the meeting was in process. Such were the only "weapons" I saw.

Thursday evening: Thursday evening a few of us happened to be in one of the rooms in 305 when a girl came and told us the sirens were going and the tanks were rolling. We could hardly believe this but it wasn't long before we realized that such was the case.

We soon saw four tanks, as I recall, coming around the corner near the guard tower and heading past us toward the village. They were anything but a "pretty sight" as they passed us full tilt with machine guns and soldiers all set. My fear—and a big one it was, too—was for those who were innocent and might get caught in whatever was going on. Even though I had felt for some time that there should be "segregation among the segregees" I was anxious that the innocent should not be harmed in any way (if this was at all possible) while the troublemakers were being rounded up.

I had this fear again as we saw five or six soldiers crouching over their cocked guns entering our kitchen. "How," I thought, "would they know that our baker had a right to be working there and at that hour?" Hearing a shot fired at that time didn't help matters any, either. We also saw several soldiers piling into the co-op to search there for whoever they might see.

Events happened in quick succession. I'm not sure how accurate I can be in recording just when certain things happened. All I can do is record what I saw and heard and also my thoughts in connection with these happenings. During the course of the evening I heard three or four shots fired. How many more shots there were, there seems no way of telling. We also heard many gruff cries of "Hands up!" as evacuees were lined up against the administration building with the soldiers in front of them. At another time we saw a group of five or six evacuees taken toward the administration building with soldiers pointing guns

in their backs. Perhaps you have to accept such events as part of the picture when the army takes over—in fact such things seem inevitable in such a situation—but it is not a pleasant sight to witness.

In the group being taken to the administration building were some of the wardens. Several people watching what was going on expressed the thought that the wardens were turning on the W. R. A. after all—and here was the proof. Earlier in the evening when I first looked out to see what was going on I had seen a warden's patrol car going up towards the guard tower near our barracks. In it was a warden I thought I knew although I couldn't see well enough to be sure. Anyhow, the one I felt he was is someone in whom I have much confidence. In a second or two I realized the tanks were turning the corner to come down the same road up which he went. What would happen to the warden as he met up with them? There was no way of knowing at that time but I really was fearful of the results. As I saw the wardens in the group taken over to the administration building my thoughts were somewhat the same—that it was too bad if performing their duty meant that those wardens would have to go through such an awful experience.

Later on an army vehicle of some kind stopped beyond the end of our barracks. There was a good deal of talking between the soldiers in it. Their utterances sounded as if they weren't at all sure just what to do next. After discussing things in a rather excited fashion they came in our direction—with that seemingly inevitable crouch and with their guns pointing forward. One group went along the barracks across from us, the other group went along our barracks. Pointing his gun at us, one of the M. P.'s said excitedly, "Any Japs in there?" This question was apparently asked of all they saw in our row of barracks, at least. Finding none of the people for whom they were looking the M. P.'s piled back into their car and went on their way.

When the excitement and confusion had died down except for one tank patrolling along between the warehouses just south of us one of the girls went with me to my room. When she was ready to leave I left with her to walk to her room. As we neared the end of our barracks, three M. P.'s standing there suddenly became alert. I called hello to get their attention and let them know what we were doing. Two of the M. P.'s became at ease and came over to speak to us. Not so with the third. He evidently was still dubious of what we had to say and as he approached he was pointing his gun right at the girl with me. He almost brushed her face with it as he finally decided there was no need for it and was lifting it to his shoulder. Fortunately, nothing more serious happened. When the three understood that all I wanted was to see that the girl reached home all right, they took her with them and I returned to my room.

During the evening there were many expressions on the part of the staff members (who were onlookers just as I was) which revealed one of two things—either how they actually felt towards the Evacuees (and some of their attitudes were quite vicious) or how hysterical they could get in such circumstances. The concern, for the most part, seemed to be for our safety from "those Japs" who were at last getting "exactly what they deserved." Although I had realized for some time, as many of us had, that some of the Evacuees—a handful more or less—were definitely out to cause trouble, I was not willing to condemn all of the people because of the deeds of a few. Neither was I anxious to see the majority suffer needlessly for these few. Such is bound to be the case, though, when a wholesale round-up such as this one seemed at the time to be takes place. My concern was for the innocent people who might get caught in such an incident and also for all those who must have been worried as the tanks rolled down into the village with the guns pointing right at them. I certainly wouldn't have liked it myself, I know. And knowing that the M. P.'s—those in the guard towers, at least—had recently been given orders to shoot whenever it seemed necessary, didn't help the situation any.

Such thoughts as these were shared by others I feel sure but, because they are different from the majority of opinions expressed Thursday evening and since, I have taken the trouble to give them in some detail. I hope that I have not taken too much time doing so, but I am not willing to have myself counted as a part of the group that has made such utterances.

My fears—and that I had Thursday evening—were not for myself but for the great majority of Evacuees who I feel are wholly innocent of any part in the plan or plans to upset Tule Lake as it has been upset in the past two weeks or more.

EMILY U. LIGHT.

STATEMENT OF GUY H. BOOKER, ASSOCIATE HIGHWAY ENGINEER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was working in the Engineering Office, outside the Project. It is the old Contractors' Office. About 1:30 Bergman came in and asked if my wife and two children were all right. He said there was quite a crowd of Japanese over here, and that the Japanese tried to stop him. I immediately drove to the entrance gate and found it blocked by a scout car with machine guns mounted.

I asked Lt. Bryant if I could pass through and go to the Caucasian residence section. He said that he would rather not pass me through, but that a detail of forty MP's were guarding the Caucasian section near the hospital and Army area. A few minutes later word was passed through to me that my wife had been checked out of the area in a car. We observed things from the gate.

I and Mr. Gifford took cars and went to the Carr School and picked up staff school children and took them to Mr. Harkness' residence.

I saw not a single disturbance except a line of trucks at the motor pool blocking off the road.

Lt. Bryant drove in in a jeep to see if man and wife in car surrounded by Japanese were all right. He returned.

I saw no weapons. Except for the machine guns and the alertness of the Army it looked just like a big gathering.

The principal of the Carr School had already heard of the incident, and he was preparing to take care of the Newell children all night if necessary.

November 4: Mrs. Booker left in the afternoon for Canada because of her mother's death. I was listening to the Richfield news. I thought I heard three shots. I stepped to the door of the apartment, and I thought it might be a storm coming up.

When I got to the door I saw soldiers lined up against the barbed wire fence, looking into our area, and I knew there was some activity. An officer came to the door and advised me to take the children into the military area.

I got the children out of bed and took them into the old Orderly Room. At midnight we were just starting to put the children to bed when Col. Austin phoned that we could return to the apartments.

I have a boy 6 and a girl 12, so I didn't make any effort to find out what was going on. The Army chaplain was in charge. I never saw a Japanese that night.

GUY H. BOOKER.

STATEMENT OF MRS. CARRIE DRISCOLL, HOME ECONOMICS TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I had been working with the boys inspecting freight that came with the segregees. On Monday we were through work early. I went over to another teacher's room to see about something, and noticed the crowd. Miss Eidi and I came over to the Administration Building to see if our checks were here. Miss Eidi said it had been announced that Dillon Myer would speak to the colonists and we thought we would go over and see what he talked about.

When we got over by the canteen we saw the crowd was mostly on the northeast side of the Administration Building. When we started to go around the canteen a big, tall, young man told us that the personnel were in the Ad. Building. He didn't tell us to go there. We still didn't know what was going on.

Miss Eidi said we had better go back to our barracks. About that time another Japanese boy came up to us and told us to go into the Ad. Bldg. We saw that one door was blocked, and started to walk around the building. They saw us and told us to go in the other back door.

After I'd come in I decided to see if I could go back. I opened the door and a young man stuck his head in sullenly and said, "I'm sorry, but you can't go out." I told him nobody told me to come here. I just came after my mail and was ready to go back. That was all there was to it. He kept saying he was sorry, and I insisted. I started to put my foot in the door and he started pushing, so I knew I couldn't get out.

We watched around from inside the building. I saw no weapons. From the front door I saw several want to come for a drink or to go to the rest room. One little old lady who looked like a grandmother came in. She had no sooner gotten in than a half dozen Japanese boys and a woman came in after her, chattering in Japanese.

They allowed two or three boys and the woman to come in. They didn't find her right away. I didn't see any others in the building.

I didn't see any weapons in the crowd.

The fellow spoke over the loudspeaker in Japanese. Some took off their hats and bowed and left very quietly.

November 4: On Thursday night we were in our room. We had our radios on, I and the lady in the adjoining apartment thought we heard sirens. We went out to see what the excitement was. We saw tanks and soldiers. The soldiers went down through the barracks, flashing their searchlights. A tower light was playing around the motor pool. I heard a few shots. They seemed to be from the direction of the colony. We didn't know what was going on except for lights flashing and excitement.

One noon after the MP's had left the tent factory—We always got warm by the stove before we left. All the help were Japanese. A truck drove away with some boxes of freight. People in the office said they thought it was funny the man left without the MP's or War Relocation Authority representative. One boy said, "The Army is getting as bad as the War Relocation Authority." I said, "Perhaps he's a new driver." I started for home and could see the truck driving down to the colony.

I reported to Mr. Wiese, but I couldn't find him. Two MP's came along, and they said they would tell Sergeant Monk, who was in charge of the freight unloading and inspection. I talked to him next day, and he said he went down in a jeep but could find nothing wrong.

Two or three weeks before a Japanese man had come to Miss Zink's apartment in Barrack 301 and said he was cold and wanted to get warm. There were two teachers, so they let him come in. He said he was new around here, but he wore a worker's badge. They asked him questions and he left soon.

Miss Burton saw someone looking into Miss Jones' apartment window and one night near Halloween somebody ran by Miss Burton's apartment and opened the door and ran. Miss Battat reported a man came to her apartment, and all these things made some of the teachers nervous.

CARRIE D. DRISCOLL.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,
TULE LAKE CENTER,
Newell, Calif., November 4, 1943.

CASE A-7

After the incident of November 1, 1943, all members of the Internal Security Division put in more than the usual amount of overtime work in their particular function. The men were assigned to particular and strategic points about the Center. The tactical distribution of personnel was:

Delbert R. Cole: Acting Chief, Tule Lake, 8:00 a. m. to 5:30 p. m. Regular tour of duty; night shift from 7:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m., in residential area (A. P.) east of the military compound.

Fenton Mabrt: Internal Security Officer, Tule Lake. Had identically the same shift and work hours as Acting Chief Cole.

Edward Borbeck: Associate Chief, Tule Lake Night Shift from 7:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m. in and about the Administration buildings and around the residential area (A. P.) near the administration area.

C. L. Payne: Internal Security Officer, Tule Lake. Had identically the same shift and work hours as Associate Chief Borbeck.

During the night, all of the above men were to "ring in" every half hour to the War Relocation Authority switchboard operator, who in turn would transfer the call to Sergeant of the Guard and Officer of the Day at the military. It was arranged with the military that if calls did not come through within five minutes of the prescribed time, that the Officer of the Day was to investigate the situation. He was advised always of the name of the person in charge of the Center, where he could be reached, and always know where to get in touch with me. (W. E. Schmidt). I always told the WRA switchboard operator where I was, also.

Theodore Lewis: Chief of Internal Security from the Topaz Center (assigned), 6:00 a. m. to 8:00 p. m., general Center surveillance.

Ivan Buell: Guard, Tule Lake, 4:00 p. m. to 12:00 midnight, High School area.

Myron Murdoff: Guard, Tule Lake, 4:00 p. m. to 12:00 midnight, High School area.

Orville Dalton: Guard, Tule Lake, 4:00 p. m. to 8:00 a. m., Western farm area and farm mess hall.

Willard B. Schmitt: National Chief of Internal Security, 6:00 a. m. to at least 2:30 a. m., general surveillance and coordination.

After the night of November 1, 1943, Mr. Edward Borbeck informed me (Schmidt) that the half-hour ring time just barely gave time to make the rounds, and suggested that the ring time be every hour. This was arranged.

The patrol area of Cole and Mahrt was strategically located from the standpoint of general camp surveillance, as it bordered on a firebreak and road between the A. P. residential and administrative area; and the living quarters of the evacuee colonists. Background lights afford a view of the area, so that no person or group of persons could get through without being seen. It had been previously arranged with Mr. Best, Project Director, and Lt. Col. Austin (November 1, 1943) that no unauthorized group or unknown group would be allowed to reach a strategic location. Immediate notification by any Internal Security member to Mr. Best was arranged for his participation and action; if Mr. Best could not be reached, I or any member of the Internal Security Division could call in the Army.

At about 9:10 p. m., November 4, 1943 (this time is corroborated by Seymour Cahn, Acting Assistant Project Director at Tule Lake; Ray Best, Project Director at Tule Lake; Pete Zimmer, Assistant Project Director at Tule Lake; William T. Jarrett, Farm Supervisor at Tule Lake). Mr. William T. Jarrett, Farm Supervisor, informed me (Schmidt) that just previously he had been to the motor pool to get three trucks, and had been refused service by all members (evacuees) in the motor pool building at that time.

Mr. Jarrett stated that a person (evacuee) known as "Sleepy," spoke to the rest of the evacuees in Japanese when he (Jarrett) asked for the truck, and from then on they (evacuees employed in motor pool) ignored him and would not even talk.

At the point where Mr. Jarrett was informing me of this action, Mr. Pete Zimmer, Assistant Project Director in Charge of Operations, came up; and also Edward Borbeck, Associate Chief of Internal Security. I suggested that we go to the motor pool and get the keys and take the trucks. We (Zimmer, Jarrett, Borbeck, and Schmidt) did this and were met by a sullen group of evacuees at the motor pool. Jarrett obtained the keys himself and went on about his job.

Immediately after this incident I told Borbeck to go and stay with the W. R. A. switchboard operator (till he heard further from me) as I anticipated possible trouble as a result of taking the trucks; further told him that I was going to request further duty of Chief Lewis to augment force of Cole and Mahrt, inform them of the situation and report also the incident to the Sergeant of the Guard.

Right after I went to the room of Chief Lewis, woke him up and assigned him to augment Cole and Mahrt, informed him of the motor-pool incident and the anticipated trouble that might ensue.

At the military I informed the Sergeant of the Guard, and I was made aware of the fact that they were "on their toes."

From the Sergeant of the Guard, I went to a certain building within the military compound and contacted Mr. A. H. Brodie and J. K. Corbin, of the Federal Communications Commission, Custom House, San Francisco, California, who were in the process of conducting a broadcasting investigation initiated by me. (See for reference Tule Lake Case A-S.) Mr. Corbin was making recordings of the broadcasting and Mr. Brodie was out employing the use of a directional finder.

At about 9:25 p. m., November 4, 1943, the music of a Japanese modern type stopped. As this was an unusual time for the stopping of this music, I told Mr. Corbin to be sure and stick to it, as we could anticipate trouble; that I was going to go to the home of Mr. Best for discussion. As I left the military area, I told a soldier on guard in front of the Officer of the Day headquarters to inform the Sergeant of the Guard to get ready for trouble, as probably a formal request for the army to move in would be coming directly upon my contact with the Project Director.

As I left the military compound and was about 75 yards from that entrance (I was driving a car) another car approached me, stopped in the middle of the

road in front of me and shone a spotlight on me. At this point I thought it was a military patrol car that had been notified by radio (the military at Tule Lake has several such cars) of the possible trouble, and was making a routine check. I got out of my car and went over to the stopping car (could not see persons in it as I approached against the headlights) to confer. When I got alongside of the car, an evacuee jumped off the rear end. It was a Project pick-up car that was assigned to the electrical division. He jumped off the rear and on the opposite side from me, and he went to the rear of my car.

The driver of the car I recognized as one of our wardens named Tom Yoshio Kobayashi. Kobayashi asked me what the hell I was doing, and I asked him who the hell wanted to know and why. I went to the rear of my car (not wanting to have anyone behind me) and saw to it that the whole group (of about 4) were in front of me. Kobayashi informed me that he knew about the trucks being taken, and that he, as a leader, and his gang were going to see to it that the trucks were not going to leave the Project; that he represented the people of the Center and that they were going to give us a lot of trouble.

I had forceful physical contact with two members of the group and forced my way back to my car and proceeded to the residence of R. R. Best, the Project Director, about 100 yards further along. I stopped my car and started to hurriedly to get to the rear door. My car was near Mr. Best's house. I saw about 30 to 40 persons that were evacuees, nearly all of them whom were armed with yellow-colored clubs about 2½ to 3 feet long, that appeared to be round (They could have been baseball bats, though they did not appear to be so large around.) This group was between the living quarters and the post-office building, on both sides of Best's home. They were hiding in the shadows, evidently waiting for orders.

I was attacked by a group of these persons. I thought this group was comprised of 5 persons, but was informed by Pete Zimmer, Assistant Project Director, that it was 8. After a brief interlude of rather forceful physical contact, and seeing that it would be impossible for me to gain entrance to the house, I got away from the group (tore right arm of one person and left arm of another from their shoulder sockets, and screams of the victims caused a short interval of dismay and activity of the attacking group) ran to my car, and headed back to the military to request them to come in and take over. I heard some of the group of Japanese around the Best household say "Get Best!" "Take Best!"

The same car that stopped me previously tried to run into my car, but I outmaneuvered him and was successful in reaching the entrance gate to the Army, where I told four soldiers there that I was pursued by a car of rioting Japanese, that they had been chasing me, and to take what action they saw fit, as I was calling in the Army. I went to the guards around the Officer of the Day headquarters and told them to tell the Officer of the Day or the Sergeant of the Guard to take over the camp as previously planned. About five minutes later I got to the quarters of Lt. Col. Austin, who had just been advised by Project Director Best that the Army was to take over.

Soon after that I was confined to the Headquarters Building, on orders from an Army lieutenant, name unknown. I was allowed to return to the Center after prisoners were apprehended and the line cutting the center was established by the military.

It might be well to mention, at this time, the significance of the obtaining and removal of the truck toward bringing this trouble to a head. About a week previously, some twenty (20) tons of food was taken, through regular channels, from the warehouse, to be used in the feeding of loyal evacuees from other centers who had been obtained to harvest the farm crop. An allegedly representative group of the Tuleans said they did not want to harvest the crop and, as a matter of fact, refused to harvest it. This food was removed from the Center by various members of the appointed personnel, participating in the work group. When the trucks were obtained at the first of the incident, members of the motor pool warned the troublesome group about the possibility of more food removal. The activity of the troublesome group indicated a well organized, planned, and tactical operation. Many of the members of the motor pool were known to have taken an active part in the physical violence that ensued.

WILLARD E. SCHMIDT,
National Chief of Internal Security.

STATEMENT OF R. D. SMITH, ASSISTANT FARM SUPERINTENDENT SINCE JULY 10, 1943,
REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1, AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

The crew I had direct charge of never quit work all through this recent trouble. They were not on strike, and even on Monday, November 1, they were working. This was a crew of 150, working on livestock. I have been called all sorts of names including "Jap-lover," but the only trouble I have ever had was with Caucasians. Yes; you can quote that for the record, because I have heard so many false statements given around here, and it would be good to have a few people tell what they really think once in a while.

November 1. As I say, my crew worked in the forenoon. After lunch I was delayed about a half hour in the warehouse, and came back to my office in the Administration Building about 1:30, I think it was. I parked my car in the usual place, that is, in the parking lot close to the Personnel Canteen.

I noticed groups from the colony gathering around this building, and I asked about two or three boys I knew who did not happen to be in my crew what the occasion was for the gathering. One of the fellows is named Bob, and he is one of the agricultural accountants. He was standing nearby, and his only reply was, "I don't know." All this gave me the impression that many people were not on the inside of this deal. I honestly do not think my own crew knew about it. Those boys I did address apparently were in a good humor.

I came on in to my desk, and I could see crowds gathering thicker. After I looked over my papers I was going to go back to the car and drive out to the poultry farm. At the door of the Ad. Bldg. at the rear I was met by four or five fellows I did not know, who stopped me. I explained to them that I wanted to get out to the farm, and that I did not care for the particular festivities which were about to take place. Their spokesman was insistent, though in a fairly nice way, saying that if I did this I would only create trouble trying to go through that crowd.

Back inside I saw some boys who evidently were leaders standing on the guard rail out there and holding their hands high, giving hand signals to the crowd. These were not just simple gestures of direction, but rather some evidently prearranged as a type of signalling device. I went to the other end of the building to watch them, and in my meanderings saw Miss Shipps come to the door trying to keep curious women from going outside. I did the same thing, and tried to keep them from standing out on the front porch where the telephone booth is. I even closed the door and locked it, since a bunch of rowdy young boys had been going into the telephone booth and had made the operators inside pretty nervous.

I remember Mr. Brece came through, and he told a group about his experiences, which I overheard.

The boys outside the door were obviously roughnecks. Later six or seven of them came in and wanted to arrange for women outside to go to the restroom. It was at this time that I had the door locked and watched them out of the telephone office window.

Neither they nor anyone in the crowd, however, had any weapons or gave any indications of attempting to burn any of the buildings, either at that time or later in the day.

When I returned to my office in the new wing of the building I looked out at the row of cars in the parking lot. I could not see my own car too well because it was way down at the other end. But men and boys were standing on the tops and hoods of the automobiles closed up. They seemed to be fooling with the accessories. I did notice that about six stood on Mr. Kallam's car at one time, and I know his car top was caved in. Later I saw they had torn off the ring horn of the steering wheel, made of bakelite. I do not know, but as he told me later, they had stolen tools from his car. I also know Mr. Gerry's car was considerably damaged, but my own was not. They disturbed some papers that were in my car, but took nothing, and my own tool kit was intact.

A few boys were standing at each door. They were the ones who escorted some women back into the south wing of the Ad. Bldg. At one point a few came in and swaggered up and down the hall, and people stood to one side when they passed.

Out in the crowd there were women and children—I believe I saw fifty or more of them.

My wife was over at the base hospital when Dr. Pedicord was injured. She went to a telephone and called me, but she did not witness the event. She merely said that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten up by some Japanese. I was worried because that building is a firetrap, but on reflection, common sense told me that they would not burn that building with all their own people in it.

After the phone call I tried to report the incident to Internal Security, but they had already heard.

At the end the crowd bowed and dispersed.

After Monday my men continued to work. One of the days they were denied the use of automobiles (after Monday), so I hauled about fifty out to work in my car. Later we got the trucks back.

It was Tuesday that I noticed them acting as if they were afraid. They gathered in little knots to discuss something. I decided not to interfere or ask questions, but I did feel that their reaction was one of fear.

November 4: Thursday night I was in bed when I heard someone screaming. It was a male voice coming from the neighborhood of Best's quarters. I am not sure what words I actually heard in all this, but it seems to me the cry was, "What did you hit me for?"

I hurriedly dressed, putting my clothes on over my pajamas, and went in the direction from which the noise was coming. Apparently the men had dispersed, and I met Mr. Zimmer at the back door of the Ad. Bldg. on his way over to quiet his wife's nerves. He brought her over to the Ad. Bldg. later.

I went on, stepping in the shadows, in the direction of the apartments and the motor pool. I then crossed over to my own apartment in the first row—it is 242.

There I could see about fifty men with what seemed to be packhandles or bats in their hands, gathering in small knots of three or four. At my own apartment the porch light was on, and as I went over to the door and stood under the light I happened to meet eight or ten young fellows with clubs or bats going in the direction of the motor pool and coming, I believe, from the area around the Personnel Mess. I was caught right in the center of the group.

I said, "Hello, boys," and although they seemed very excited one managed to answer, "Hello" rather affably.

They continued toward the parking lot, going in little groups and continuing in what seemed the direction of the post office or perhaps Mr. Best's quarters.

About ten minutes later the Army came in.

I had gone inside and found my wife not the least interested in what was going on, but engrossed in a very interesting story she was reading.

The Army boys searched in the apartment area, and women soon gathered in the alley between the barracks. Of course the Army advised them to get inside, since, as they put it, there might be shooting.

I also saw the baker come out of the Personnel Mess in his white costume and carrying something white in his hands. He was running and seemed terribly frightened, and the searchlight was on him.

The women who were outside when the Army came around searching were, as I remember, Mr. Jarrett's wife, some of the teaching staff; and in the general confusion I also met Mr. Bens and Mr. Rhoads outside.

I should add that during all this excitement we had two night watchmen on at the poultry farm who, again, apparently knew nothing of the trouble and who reported at six or seven o'clock the next morning.

In answer to your questions, I did hear blanks fired, but I do not think they were real bullets.

There was one incident which has been reported falsely, I think, on the basis of someone's misquoting me. I had told my crew during the strike that since they were not on strike and since the livestock needed feed they should ask the farm committee or somehow try to make arrangements for getting feed to the stock.

These boys never had any contact with the loyal Japanese sent in from other centers to harvest the crops, but one night about five or six of them went off from the livestock farm over to the crop area with the intention of bringing back barley for feed. Apparently they were not seen by the radio car, but were later stopped by someone. (I asked whether this was the group met by Mr. Willard Schmidt and Mr. S. Cahn. He replied that this was probably the same group, and that his suggestion to them was to get feed by negotiations with the farm committee earlier in the strike. M. K. O.)

(I asked about the newspaper accounts in regard to the overweight hogs on the farm. He replied that there was apparently some oversight and lack of judicious planning on the part of Mr. Kallam, but that he presumed stories about hogs laid out in trenches may have emanated from Mr. Wilkinson at some such locale as the local road houses, Bill Siegler's, etc. Smith put this down as, sensation-seeking. M. K. O.)

RILEY D. SMITH.

REPORT OF KENNETH M. HARKNESS, SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION

In commenting on noticeable changes in the attitudes of the evacuees following segregation, I have noticed two in particular. First, on the part of the newcomers, with whom I have not become acquainted, there has been an evidence of coldness, in some cases almost to the extent of being termed arrogant sullenness. Since coming to the center in June 1942 it has been my custom to greet all persons whom I meet. Those who have been in the camp always greet me cordially, calling me by name. The newcomers, on the other hand generally avert their eyes or stare insolently when spoken to.

Second, I have noted a marked tendency to "soldier" on the job. Evacuee workers have been coming to work later and leaving earlier than ever and seem to take the attitude that only a "sucker" will work hard. This attitude has not been shown by the ones who had been employed by the education section prior to segregation, but by the new additions to the staff.

One one occasion when it was necessary to move the school supplies from one warehouse to another, I observed a total disrespect for property on the part of the swampers. Textbooks were deliberately abused and many articles stolen.

On the afternoon of the demonstration I was at my office in the administration wing of the new high-school plant when I saw the delegation shaping up near the No. 1 Fire Station. I immediately called Mr. Best's office to report and instructed his secretary to relay the message to Mr. Best immediately. I watched the group pass and then told my secretary, Mrs. Catharine Johnson, that I had better take her to her apartment because her small children were there in the company of a young Japanese-American maid. I took her in my car and after dropping her off at her apartment, drove to Mr. Gunderson's apartment so that he might inform his wife of the demonstration, after which I drove along the company street west of the army quarters and out the front gate, parking my car outside the fence. I then watched the crowd assemble around the administration buildings.

When a phone message came to the front gate from the administration building informing us that the appointed staff was being held in the building, I suggested to Mr. Booker, who was also at the front gate, that we go in in case they needed any help. Mr. Booker said that he preferred to stay at the gate so I went in by myself. Some of those at the administration building looked at me rather surlily as I passed through the crowd and some remarks were made in Japanese but no one attempted to stop or molest me in any way.

I remained in the north wing of the administration until the crowd had been dismissed. Part of the time I was within earshot of the conference between Mr. Meyer and the evacuee committee.

To me the crowd outside seemed to be largely composed of people who were merely interested in the happenings. There were many mingling in the crowd who seem to be more or less hostile and keeping the crowd together. Later the clerical workers in my office informed me that all evacuees had been invited to come to the administration building after lunch to hear Mr. Myer speak. When the crowd had assembled they were not permitted to leave again.

During the time of the demonstration I did not notice that any of the people assembled had any weapons of any kind in their possession unless one could call the little sticks, that evacuees always carry with them when hiking, weapons. One gets so accustomed to seeing the Japanese with walking sticks that he might not notice anything unusual even though the people did have clubs in their hands.

I live off the project and was totally unaware of the Thursday night incident until I heard of it over the radio the following morning.

The day following the Thursday incident it was necessary for me to go to my office in the restricted area. While I was in that area with a military escort there was some shooting in the adjacent firebreak. The guards told us that an evacuee had started to come into the area and they had shot to warn him after ordering him to halt, an order which he ignored. Whether or not he was coming to the building in an attempt to molest me, I cannot say.

[Signed] K. M. HARKNESS.

STATEMENT OF EUGENE BOATRIGHT, HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943.

November 1: I had been assigned to help with the inventory, and Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hedrick, and I had started for a warehouse. As we got outside we looked down and saw the crowd coming. One man said, "What does this mean?"

We stood by the car. We stood there a while and others joined us. Someone called from a door that we shouldn't be standing around like that, so we came back into the Ad. Bldg. We spent the rest of the afternoon in the building.

I saw a nurse standing in the outside door. She backed up and said they wouldn't let her leave. I made no effort to leave.

I saw no knives or clubs or other weapons. I saw no boxes. I knew the Army was standing by, and I was not alarmed.

It seemed as though the crowd was pleased with Mr. Myer, because they applauded. They called for Mr. Best and applauded him.

One of the Japanese boys who was helping us on the inventory told us the crowd was intended to impress the authorities as much as possible; that if the committee came alone they would not get anywhere. He expressed the opinion that the majority of the Japanese were under the power of a few leaders.

November 4: Thursday night I was out working at the potato house and did not get back until about 12. Through soldiers stationed at the potato house I heard about the Army's taking over.

I worked through the segregation program and had friendly relations entirely with the Japanese.

E. C. BOATRIGHT.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. WILLIAM T. JARRETT, FARM SUPERINTENDENT,
NOVEMBER 19, 1943

November 1: I wasn't here. There were 40 men came in Sunday night from Topaz to work at the farm. I was busy with them. They didn't know what was going on over here. But I came back to the project about 2:30 Monday afternoon and the M. P. stopped me at the gate. I stayed there. I suppose I could have walked on in but I didn't. I could see the crowd and it looked to me as if 30 or 40 were running back and forth. I saw a barricade of a line of trucks at the motor pool. There were about 12 trucks lined up in a straight line from the military fence clear across the south side of the motor pool, across the road and in front of the motor pool building and the service station. There were some Japanese on top of some of the trucks, maybe 6 or 8. I couldn't see the office of the motor pool very well. The only other thing I saw were 2 or 3 trucks of Japanese which pulled off once down in the colony. I could hear the cheering somewhere around the administration building and that is all I could hear. I didn't see anything else at the motor pool.

There wasn't nothing happened Tuesday or Wednesday that I know about. I had most of the trucks out on the farm already and didn't have to get them out of the motor pool.

November 4: I just pulled out when the thing happened. I went to Klamath to get additional people to work out on the farm. I was after 3 cargo trucks and they wouldn't give me the keys at the motor pool. I went up for the trucks at 8:15 p. m. and presented a requisition for them at the window for the 3 cargoes. There was 4 Japanese in the little office. Nobody came up to the window. After waiting 5 minutes another Japanese boy came into the office. He looked at the requisition, turned around and jabbered something in Japanese to the other 4 boys. He didn't offer to give the keys to me and said that the dispatcher would have to issue those. I waited 3 or 4 minutes. I asked who the dispatcher was. There was no reply. I asked when the dispatcher would be back. There was no reply, so then I went out and looked up Mr. Zimmer and then I went over to the motor pool with Mr. Zimmer and Schmidt and Borbeck. We all went over to the motor pool. The internal security fellows stood on the outside and Mr. Zimmer and I presented the requisition through the window again. There was still no reply or response so Mr. Zimmer told me to go

in and get the keys. He went in with me, the dispatcher was sitting there all the time. A boy named Charley was fussing around with his desk. They said nothing in English. As soon as I got the keys I got the trucks and I didn't get back to the project until 1:30 or a quarter of 2.

One of the boys that was picked up by the military, when they had them in the administration building after the Army came in, was one of the boys who looked at the tickets at the motor pool.

W. T. JARRETT.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS OF MARION FRANCIS OF EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1, 1943, AS SEEN FROM THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING

Immediately after lunch I started down to the high-school area, to which my office had been moved a few weeks before. Crowds were beginning to stream up from the colony area. Realizing that something unusual was about to happen, I turned back toward the Administration Building.

Several squads of young evacuee men were running in the general direction of the motor pool. I remarked to my companion that it looked as if the boys were making for the trucks.

In the Administrating Building evacuee office girls were hurriedly getting into their coats. One girl said, "It's a general strike!" Another exclaimed excitedly, "Hurry! The boys phoned up—we all must leave right away!" I saw one young man urging several stenographers to hurry, and hustling them out of the back door.

The crowd increased until it stretched solidly from the Administration Building to the hospital and on over to the warehouses. There were also many people at the rear of the Administration Building and along the administrative barrack side. The focal point was the office adjoining Mr. Bests. That office has its own outside door. An evacuee group installed a public address system there while the crowd waited.

I watched appointed personnel herded into the back doors of the Administration Building, without ceremony, by evacuees. The doors were closed early in the afternoon. Someone said that the door to the new wing was nailed shut. I saw, later, that the door to the middle wing was latched on the outside and barricaded with three large refuse cans.

I spent a short time in the Mail and Files Office, watching the crowd and, from the window nearest the teletype office, the soldiers readying the tanks.

Someone said that front door was still open. I went to that entrance and out onto the porch. I stood there for a very considerable time, with several other people, while the loudspeaker arrangements were being completed and the committee began its conversation with the director *et al*.

Children were playing on the lawn, and many evacuees were lounging about there, awaiting developments. Others, however, were aggressively watchful of the Ad Building and any Caucasians in sight. Some of the young men had sticks in their hands.

Someone on the porch said that Mr. Breece had been shoved and threatened and ordered into the building. A moment later I saw him coming toward the porch. Another member of the appointed personnel, whose identity I do not now remember, was with him. The two walked too slowly to suit some of the young men in the crowd, who spoke rudely to them and swore. This Mr. Breece and all the other appointed personnel present ignored. Meantime Mr. Slattery and Mr. Donovan stood on the lawn, just off the porch. They maintained that position for a long time without molestation. They stood quietly, ignoring the hostile elements of the crowd.

The preparations of the military claimed more and more attention from the people, until practically all those in the lawn area turned their backs on the building to watch the Army. Soon, however, young men passed through the crowd shouting what sounded like an order, and the crowd swung around, as if in response, to face the building again. After that few of them turned their heads toward the M. P. post.

Presently an Issei man on my own pay roll (Nobujiro Nakamura) came up to the telephone booth on the front porch and attempted to place a call. A young evacuee whom I would guess to be a Hawaiian Kibei came after him, hauled him out of the booth, demanded to know where he was phoning and why, cuffed him and hustled him back into the crowd, using vile language.

A Caucasian man whom I did not know told me that he had tried to phone from the booth to make train reservations, and had been prevented, by evacuees, from doing so.

Some time later an Issei woman came toward the porch. She looked around uncertainly and seemed to be in some distress. It seemed likely that she was looking for one of the children who had been playing around. Mrs. Jaderquist, standing on the porch beside me, asked her if she had lost someone. She said, "No, I want to go to the toilet."

Being near the door, I said, "I'll take you," and led her to the women's restroom in the middle wing, where I left her. On the way back to the front porch I stopped to speak to someone in Mail and Files. While there I noticed some of the girls look up, startled, and heard one say: "Japanese! What are they doing here!"

I looked up and saw the same young evacuee who had pulled Mr. Nakamura out of the telephone booth walking through the wing, followed by three other evacuees—two young men and a woman in or near middle age. Feeling that I knew what they were up to I followed them into the middle wing. I waited while they went its length searching. They demanded of people standing around there whether there was a Japanese woman in there. Someone said, "I think one went into the women's room." The file of Japanese, always led by the same young man, went looking for the women's room. They found the men's room first, and went into it. A moment later they came out, and the leader went next door into the women's room. I followed him in.

Two Caucasian women were in the outer room—one just stepping through the connecting door. She had apparently halted in surprise and resentment at seeing the evacuee men there. I moved over beside her, so that together we blocked the door to the inner room.

The other Caucasian woman, Mrs. Carsley, said, "You can't come in here! It's the women's restroom!" The evacuee demanded to know if there was a Japanese woman inside. Mrs. Carsley said, "Maybe there is. You'll have to wait!"

We backed the young man out of the women's room by walking forward toward him. When he was through the outer door of the room I closed it behind me and kept my hand on the knob. He finally backed out into the passageway and waited until the Issei woman came out. Then he and the others hustled her outdoors, pushing and berating her. The Japanese woman was especially vehement. (Mrs. Jaderquist told me later that the Japanese women had reported to the young man that the older woman had come into the Ad Building.)

It was the definite impression of several of us standing around the porch that this young man was a lieutenant with a definite station to guard. He stood on the steps or raised ground by the fishpond, and kept an aggressive lookout. His hair looked to me slightly wavy. He wore a royal blue sport jacket, and blue jeans. The woman who tipped him off wore a short black plus coat and had a royal blue veil tied around her head. Someone said later that she wore a gray knitted skirt, but I am not sure of that since I was trying to fix her face in my mind.

According to Mrs. Jaderquist, some Caucasian men in the doorway had told the evacuees who entered to find the Issei woman that they could not come in; but the evacuees paid no attention. After they had entered, there was a movement of a dozen or more boys toward the front entrance. Mrs. Jaderquist said to them: "There's no need to get excited! She's only going to the toilet." The group hesitated, then fell back; but in view of the incident it was decided to close the front door. (Throughout this paragraph I have been quoting Mrs. Jaderquist, in order to run out this episode. Her own account can be secured at first hand.)

I returned to the new wing. From there I watched the crowd close to the windows and stretching away to the hospital. The general demeanor of the people seemed to me quiet and patient. Some looked worried or apprehensive. Most were obviously simply awaiting developments. (Later we heard that they had been called out by unauthorized announcement in all messhalls that Director Myer would speak to them.) However, several truckloads of young men circulated about, sometimes shouting what seemed to be orders to the people. Word circulated among the appointed personnel that among other commands was the direction to pay no attention to the Army. I don't know whether that was a guess, or a translation by one of two appointed personnel in the Ad Building who understood Japanese.

The young men in trucks and some on foot were noisy and aggressive. As the afternoon wore on tension increased. Young men passed back and forth beside the windows, looking in and jeering. Their manner was beyond question hostile and insolent, and some of them appeared to be on the verge of breaking out into some small demonstration of their own. Some of us had been sitting for some time before an open window, because the building was so hot and close. We finally turned our backs to the window to discourage any outbreak of rudeness from the young evacuees moving back and forth on that side of the building.

About that time word came that Dr. Pedicord had been beaten; later, that the warehouses were being looted. I know nothing of either of those matters at first hand; nor of the rumors that the evacuees were prepared to burn the building if necessary to secure their demands.

Someone said that the Personnel Mess and Recreation Hall had been broken into. I went into the corridor connecting the middle and new wings. From the windows there I saw crowds around the back doors of Dining Hall and Rec. Building. I saw people near those buildings handing out what it seemed likely were food supplies, sandwiches, etc.

I missed hearing Mr. Myer's speech, but returned to the new wing in time to hear Mr. Best. When he spoke I was in the stenographers' office adjoining. I stayed there through what was reported to be Kuratomi's translation, which was given undramatically; and through the closing address by Kai, which was delivered with much fire and authority. He struck me as a born demagogue.

In closing he evidently ordered the people to bare their heads and bow. This they did as if in automatic obedience to authority. My impression was definitely that the bow was not to the WRA and Project directors, as has been suggested, but had a nationalistic significance. I had heard Kai say "Tojo" just before closing. (That, of course, may be a Japanese word as well as a name.) I did not hear "Hirohito," as some people have reported doing; but my attention was fixed more intently on the evacuees than on Kai's words, which I could not understand.

The people turned immediately, on being dismissed, and started back toward the colony at a brisk rate for such a dense crowd. My feeling was that the majority of those present were relieved at being released from a situation which at any moment might have taken a disastrous turn, and were anxious to get away as quickly as possible.

Among the appointed personnel I saw the complete range of reactions from strongly expressed desire for revenge to light dismissal of the whole situation as of no importance. Three people told me they were frightened, but gave no other particular indication of fear that I saw. Most of the appointed personnel seemed simply waiting, like the crowd outside, for developments in the front office. Some deeply resented the situation. Others seemed apathetic. The realization seemed to be general that an ill-advised move on the part of any Caucasian might have the most deplorable consequences for many innocent people on the Project and for American soldiers abroad. It seemed to me that so far as retaliatory or provocative demeanor and actions went the appointed personnel showed a most unusual and considered restraint.

MARION FRANCIS.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS OF MARION FRANCIS OF EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1943, AS SEEN FROM 204-2 AND THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING

Around 10 p. m. on November 4th I thought I heard shouting; but since evacuees at the motor pool have not infrequently been noisy, I paid no attention. The commotion increased, above the sound of the radio, which we had just turned on for the "Richfield Reporter." I opened the door and looked out.

Figures were jostling and running around the end of the barrack between the Project Director's house and my barrack. I could see that they carried sticks and clubs. I heard a yell. Then someone cried out, as if in pain, "Why did you do that to me?" Someone else called out, "I didn't do nothin'!" They sounded like evacuees.

The gang broke and ran around the road end of my barrack (204). I closed the door, my roommate and I snapped off the lights, and I looked out of the bathroom window, which faces the Administration building.

The gang was still moving around the road end of 204, although some seemed to be struggling at the barrack's end. I could judge of that only by the sounds, as the boiler room cut off my view. Perhaps a dozen other evacuees were silhouetted against lights from the Administration building as they ran across the lawn. My impression was that they all carried sticks or ball bats.

Some of them huddled at the corner of the Ad Building, looking back toward the end of my barrack. I wondered if they were going to fire the Ad building, or if they were trying to hide in its shadow. In a moment they broke away and ran past my window in the general direction of the warehouses.

I began to dress hastily, but went back to the bathroom window a couple of times to see what was happening. I saw someone who I told my roommate looked like Borbeck stagger in through the front door, alone.

Before I was dressed Miss Clark, who also lives in 204, came to the door and said: "The Army's taken over!"

A few minutes later I went outside. The Army was getting ready to move, and I watched for a few minutes while the tanks warmed up, etc. But a strong and bitterly cold wind was blowing, and I went to the Administration Building for shelter. On the porch I saw large drops of fresh blood making a trail into the Administration Building.

Mrs. Kimmer, her son, and two other boys came out of the building just then, and a moment later I realized that Mrs. Boltz, the telephone operator, was standing on the porch. There was also a man there, whose name I do not know. I asked who had been hurt, but before anyone answered a car drove up with two evacuees, who jumped out, started toward the building, and then, seeing the group on the porch, hesitated. Their machine was a Project coupe—transferred from the C. C. C. or the Army, was my guess from what appeared, in that light, to be the drab color.

Someone said, "They must be wardens." But they were not in uniform, and, looking for their armbands, I saw that they had none.

The three boys started down, curiously, to meet them. Mrs. Zimmer called them back. Then, since they didn't come, she followed them, afraid that something might happen to them. I went with her, feeling that the more of us there were to face the evacuees the less likely they would be to make trouble.

My recollection is that someone asked them, "Are you wardens?" and they said, "Yes". Mrs. Zimmer said something like, "Don't go over to the motor pool, there's trouble there". The boys said, "The Army's taken over."

The two evacuees seemed confused. They looked at each other, mumbled something, jumped into the car and drove away quickly.

A short time later the first two prisoners were brought in through the front door and taken to the Mail and Files Office. A little later still a string of prisoners was brought in through a rear door. That brought the number to something over a dozen. A couple were bleeding from head wounds. They sat on the floor. The others stood. All were kept under military guard, with their hands in the air. Four evacuee girls were brought in. They said they had been working in another wing. Mr. Muir asked them for their names and addresses, and promised that they would be seen safely home. Another prisoner was added to the group—a fat man who shook his head as if dazed, but almost at once began to study a paper which he took from a notebook in his pocket.

Meantime, according to what I was told later, residents of 204 and the other barracks in that section were taken over to the military area, for safety, by soldiers; made a thorough search of the barracks around there for any evacuees who might have darted in to hide.

When told that things were quiet again, I returned to my room.

MARION FRANCIS.

STATEMENT OF MISS ZELL F. CLARK, HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: On Monday afternoon, when I returned to Mr. Smith's office in the 2nd wing, I think, a telephone call was received, I think, by Mrs. Waldron, asking the girls to leave. The girls started leaving.

I went home to 204 to tell my father not to walk down to the colony, as he sometimes did to get magazines.

As I was coming back, there were some men, but no thick crowd. Then I noticed a group of boys running down toward the hospital. The crowd was gathering all this time.

I met Mr. Schmidt, and he said to go on and do work the same. I was in Mr. Smith's office opposite the loudspeaker. I glanced at the crowd once in a while. The children didn't seem very happy.

A Japanese man came into the hall while the crowd was gathering and asked for someone to talk to. We directed him to Mr. Best's office. He was fairly tall

and under middle age. I saw them on the roof stringing the wires for the loud-speaker.

They evidently had a line of guards between the two barracks 204 and 203 (between the Ad. Bldg. and Mr. Best's house. Mrs. Boatwright tried to go to her own house in 203, so she visited my father. He tried to talk them into letting her go into her own room, and finally, after talking to other men, they let her go in. She did a lot of her own talking. They told my father to go back into the house. He stayed outside for fifteen minutes and then went in of his own accord.

November 4: I was writing some letters about 10 o'clock when we heard some Japanese voices, and when they got closer I looked out the door. I saw about a half dozen boys in their teens. They had sticks. I grabbed a coat and flashlight and a frying pan and went out, because I thought they were chasing a Nisei boy.

Internal Security men lived near us, and I thought they would be out guarding. I saw some men standing there and went over. Mr. Best said the Army had taken over. I went back to get my father, and we stood looking at the Army making ready to come in. I saw men standing on the porch of the Ad. Bldg.

I didn't have any feeling of fear. We didn't know what the condition was, and thought we could help.

While we were at the Ad. Bldg. porch two Japanese drove up in a car and said they were wardens and wondered what was going on. Someone told them they had better go home as fast as possible.

I went home to get my father, but he was not there. I found out later that he had walked toward the motor pool. The Army then started a thorough search with lights and men. They said, "Any Japs, lady?" I told them I had been out, and asked them to search, which they did quietly.

I found my father then. We went into the ad building where several others were waiting, and Mr. Best told us we had better go home. We thought they were going to try to get some information from the prisoners, and we went home.

ZELL F. CLARK.

STATEMENT OF IRENE JADERQUIST, GIRLS' ADVISOR (HIGH SCHOOL), REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1, 1943: When I started for school after 1 o'clock the Japanese were already coming up from the colony.

Miss Durkin said to me, "Are you going to school? If you are, Mr. Opler will drive us down in his car."

I decided to go to the Administration Building.

Japanese stenographers were coming out. I heard one say they had been telephoned to leave.

Men came around the hospital, running toward the motor pool—more than thirty. Some were walking.

We came into the Ad Building as the crowd assembled. Someone came in and said they weren't allowing anyone to leave the building. The whole place was surrounded. The crowd included women and children. When I stood at the main door to the Ad. Building I saw children playing on the grass.

One woman in black plush coat, gray skirt, who looked as if she was of the better class, seemed to be in charge of some boys. She came into the Ad. Building with some boys to get a Japanese woman who had come in to go to the lavatory.

I saw no weapons of any kind. I thought that some of the crowd looked tired, patient, and bewildered.

Young men were riding around in trucks. I saw some people who tried to go away, but someone issued what was apparently an order in Japanese over the mike and those who were starting to leave turned back. They had been up here at least a half hour and were getting tired. I was getting tired and wanted to go, but I say the back door barricaded with three garbage cans.

Miss Velasquez told me that she asked them if she could get her mother. Some boys escorted her and brought them both back. Later Miss Robinson's mother came in. She had gone to the canteen and had met some Japanese, and they brought her in.

I was in this (the new) wing when Mr. Best was talking. I didn't hear Mr. Myer talk, but I heard the interpreter, and he spoke in a calm voice. I heard Mr. Best.

Someonesaid the Japanese men took off their hats and bowed their heads while Mr. Myer was speaking, and also while the interpreter of Mr. Myer's speech was speaking. They bowed and removed their hats at the end, apparently in response to Japanese command.

November 4, 1943: Thursday night I was at home in barrack 204-2. My roommate, Mrs. Francis, said she saw someone staggering into the front of the Ad. Bldg.

I heard running feet and went to the door, but saw nothing. Miss Clark came in a few minutes later. She said, "I saw Mr. Best, and he told me the Army is in charge."

Mrs. Francis went out. I dressed and came over to the Ad. Bldg. to see what I could see. I was standing in the front porch with Mrs. Francis, Mrs. Zimmer and son, and another boy.

Mr. Mahrt came in with a Japanese with his hands up. Very soon a half dozen others were brought in by soldiers. Then they brought in a few more.

A night crew of Japanese girls was brought over from the Statistician's Office. Mr. Muir took their names; said they would be taken home; told them not to worry.

Someone said the barracks had been inspected, and it was safe to go home.

I noticed that afternoon at high school our stenographers seemed rather tense and all got together in one of the offices with no Caucasians and seemed to be holding a session. This was unusual. It might have indicated that something was brewing.

I asked one of our office girls what they had said in her mess hall on Monday. She reported they were told that everyone who could walk should come, to show that all were behind the demands which were to be made of Mr. Myer.

When the high school was moved from the barracks (Ward 7) to the new building, about September 30, the swampers threw books and cases on the floor, stole hats.

The new high-school building was broken into about September 25, and staples and other equipment was stolen.

IRENE JÄDERQUIST.

STATEMENT OF STELLA ROBBINS, HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1, 1943: I had been working on the freight trucks, delivering seg-regees' furniture. Mr. McKeever said we didn't have to come back in the afternoon, as there was going to be a meeting of Japanese. I thought it was to be a meeting of those only in the test factory area.

As I walked down toward the high school to do some work after lunch, I found no one there except the Japanese janitor. That puzzled me, and I wondered if there was a meeting I was supposed to attend.

As I started back, a Japanese man came along and said: "I want to find Dr. Mason. Where is the hospital?" I told him I was going that way. As we walked along, he said, "Where are all the people going?" I said that I had heard that Mr. Myer was going to speak. At the hospital I pointed out the clinic door. He stopped to speak to a group of Japanese near door.

As I came toward the Ad. Bldg. there was a group of boys on cars at the rear of the building. As I made my way through the crowd I said, "Excuse me," in Japanese, and the people smiled and let me pass.

I saw no weapons among the crowd. Three Japanese high-school boys were sitting against one door, so I went to the other one. One of the boys said, "Get up. She wants to go in." But I was on my way to the other door.

At this door a man seemed to be fixing it with a lock or something, and putting waste-paper boxes against it. He told me to go to the other door. I went back to the other door, and the boys let me in.

I found the personnel inside quite excited. Mrs. Adams and Mrs. Lawhead came in and said they had been forced to come to the Ad. Bldg. I said I still didn't think that we were being held by force, and that I was going back to the high school and work.

As I tried to open the door I found a piece like a little screendoor screen jammed against the door. I pushed hard and it opened a little, and the man who had been fixing the other door said, "You better stay inside. Don't come out." He said it as if he meant it. He was middle-aged and short, and wore old-looking khaki clothes. He looked somewhat like a man who had been working on the freight trucks. I am learning Japanese, and I found all the drivers helpful, but one man, the one this man might be, was the only person who was not friendly.

Somebody said they saw a Japanese carrying a box of soaked straw. Someone else, Miss Roudebush, I think, looked and said it was just a little box that they probably got at the post office.

November 4: We worked on the trucks again after having not worked since Monday. Everybody seemed to be trying hard to be friendly. Thursday night I was in an apartment next to mine when we heard the sirens. We saw the cook running and heard a shot. We had seen them go into the kitchen and had seen the cook come up.

Some soldiers in a tank wanted to know if we wanted to go out. We said no, and stayed where we were.

STELLA M. ROBBINS.

NOVEMBER 15, 1943.

Memorandum to: Mr. Edward H. Spicer.

From: Harry L. Black.

Subject: Requested Reports.

In accordance with your request of this date, my statements are herewith transmitted covering the following topics:

1. Farm Situation.
2. Public Funeral.
3. Events of November 1.
4. Events of November 4.

Farm situation: Since the operation of the farm is mainly the responsibility of the Operations Division, matters concerned with it have had little occasion to come to my attention. Through participation in conferences I had been made casually aware of developments as they took place, and, to a degree, administration plans to overcome the work stoppage and to get the crops harvested.

On two occasions I visited the colony in the vicinity of the farm headquarters where workers reported to take the trucks to the farm. These visits took place after the work stoppage, and in each instance a large number of workers from all parts of the colony had congregated there, some in expectation of going to work, but in each instance it was concluded that they would not go to the farm that day, and the men stood about in small groups both inside the office and on the grounds about the office. I was told that on one occasion Mr. Zimmer had been there to talk to the workers and on the other occasion Mr. Kallam had been there.

Public funeral: This occurrence took place while I was in Portland, and I know nothing of the details except by hearsay.

Events of November 1: The first intimation I had of any unusual happenings on November 1st came in the form of a telephone call from Mr. Huycke who was down in the Center, telling me that a large number of people had gathered and were gathering from all over the colony and making their way toward the administrative area. I looked out of the window and saw considerable numbers of evacuees, including men and women, and children of all ages and both sexes, moving slowly, singly, and in groups toward the administration building from both sides of the hospital. The numbers grew rapidly and soon the administrative building was surrounded by evacuees.

My office at that time was office #2, opposite that of the Project Director. From that office is the only door used as an exit outside from the west end of the north wing of the Administration building. Between Office #2 and Office #1 is a small office used by the secretarial staff serving both offices. Miss Lucas, Secretary to Mr. Best, and my secretary, Mrs. Krauskopf, were on duty throughout the afternoon.

Shortly after the crowd began to gather Mr. Best, accompanied by Mr. Myer, came in and entered Mr. Best's office. Mr. Best had told me that a meeting had been arranged for Mr. Myer to receive an evacuee committee on Tuesday afternoon, November 2, but I was aware of no meeting scheduled for Monday afternoon.

In the course of a few minutes people gathered so fast and in such numbers that the outdoor area about the offices was densely packed. It extended around both sides of the leave office opposite and in the area between the two wings of the administration building. Evacuee employees had asked whether they should stay inside at their work or join the people outside, and I gave instructions through appointive supervisors that all evacuees in the Community Management Division should be told to join the crowd outside if they wished to do so.

As the crowd gathered the outside door to my office was closed. Finally someone knocked on the door and I opened it. An evacuee entered (just one), whom I later identified as Tokio Yamane. I had observed that he seemed to be a sort of major domo marshalling the crowd, yelling sharp orders in Japanese, and

giving directions to individuals and groups of "runners" who dashed off on any errand he appeared to assign to them.

Yamane asked me if Mr. Best and Mr. Myer were in the office. I conducted him to their office and heard him say that a committee had come to confer with them. They directed that the committee be shown in. Yamane went back to the outside door, and directly a large number of "committee members" tramped through my office, through the secretarial office, and packed into the Director's office. I assisted in bringing extra chairs that were needed. I recognized several who had attended a meeting in Mr. Best's office previously, but know the names of only Father Kai and George Kuratomi.

When the group was seated in Mr. Best's office I went back to my own office. I had observed that Mr. Zimmer and Mr. Cahn and Mr. Schmidt were among the staff in the meeting, and I felt that it would be well for me not to join. The outside door to my office remained open. After the committee had gone through no other Japanese remained in the office proper, though Yamane remained standing in the door facing the crowd outside. A number of evacuees were crowded up onto the step, and from time to time one or two others stood with Yamane in the door.

After the Committee had gathered in Mr. Best's office there was a movement in the crowd and I saw a group coming with a microphone and amplifiers and other equipment for a public-address system. I knew that they were looking for some place to set it up, and I went to the door and motioned them in to point out to them the electric outlet in the wall of my office near the door. The technicians immediately went to work to set up the P. A. system and test it. When that was done, one or two of the P. A. crew remained in my office. I gave no invitation to them to come in, but my pointing out the electrical outlet indicated that I had no objections.

Throughout the afternoon I moved in and out of the office as my duties required, and when I had no business outside (meaning in other offices of the building, and not out of doors) I remained in the office and attended to work at my desk. This included the drafting of a number of memoranda and letters, which I was glad to be able to do, partly to get the work done and partly to convey an attitude of "business as usual," which I thought would have a helpful effect both on the evacuees and on staff members who came and went between Miss Lucas' office and other offices.

Within a few minutes after the session in Mr. Best's office had begun, a report came to me that there had been a disturbance at the hospital and that Dr. Pedicord had been badly beaten. Through the windows I could see a large group of people about the hospital with a denser group nearest the door. I called Mr. Best in the meeting by phone in the Welfare office so that I would not be overheard by the evacuees. I reported to him what I had heard about Dr. Pedicord. I held the phone while he addressed the committee to the effect that he had had a report that there had been a disturbance at the hospital and that Dr. Pedicord had been injured. He went on to say that the meeting would progress no further until he had assurances from the committee and from the outside that the situation at the hospital was in hand.

Later I made a second report to Mr. Best by phone that order had not been restored at the hospital, that Japanese who had no connection with the hospital were entering and leaving at will, that they were running through the wards and generally disrupting the routine of the hospital. Thereupon it was arranged for Mr. Schmidt to go with representatives of the group to the hospital, and they later came back and stated that everything was under control. Even later I saw from the window individuals and groups going in and coming out at the hospital entrance opposite Ward E. I had been told that Dr. Pedicord had received first aid attention in his office and that he was remaining there. He had not been put to bed.

Some time later Lieutenant Colonel Austen called for Mr. Best. Miss Lucas answered and later called me to the phone at her desk to talk to the Colonel. Others with whom the Colonel would have talked were in the conference. Colonel Austen told me that his officers and men were prepared to move, but wanted to be sure that they would not move unless necessary. I told him about the meeting going on. He asked about the appearance of the crowd outside, and I replied that no one appeared to be excited. I had been told that the crowd assembled here by an announcement made in the mess halls at lunchtime that Director Myer would speak to them at the administration building during the afternoon, and most of the crowd seemed merely to be waiting for the speech. There was low conversation, and a good deal of craning of necks to see what was going on. We were mainly anxious that no circumstance would occur to

start a disturbance which might possibly spread throughout the crowd. Apparently, under the direction of Yamane, there was a large number of older boys and young men who were of a temper to be officious. They rounded up the crowd on the outskirts to keep them in a close-packed group, with no stragglers wandering away.

I described this scene to the Colonel. He said he only wanted to keep in touch. He said that he was stationed at Post 4, opposite the leave office, and that he spent a good deal of time up the roadway so as to have a view of the crowd and the office door. He could hear the public address system. He asked how we expected to get word to him the quickest if soldiers were needed, and I arranged with him to sound off an alarm over the microphone.

Colonel Austen called a second time later for further report, and for the purpose of keeping in touch. A later time I tried to call him by phone and learned that it would take much too much time to try to give him an alarm by phone. I had determined, in case of need, to shout the alarm into the microphone, but felt that there was only the remotest prospect that it would be necessary.

As the committee meeting lengthened, people outside the door grew tired of standing, and seven or eight eased themselves into my office. Some stood in the corner by the door, and three or four squatted or sat on the floor with their backs against the wall. From their appearance I would judge that their main thought was the wish that the meeting would come to an end.

As the meeting progressed, several members of the appointive staff left own offices to gather in the hall of this wing, in Miss Lucas' office, and in the Welfare office adjoining Mr. Best's. They chattered and gossipped, but on the whole seemed calm enough with one or two exceptions. One exception was Miss Shipps, a member of Dr. Pedicord's staff, who at one time insisted that the Army be called in for the protection of Dr. Pedicord and others of his staff who remained at the hospital. I tried to calm her down and told her that our main anxiety was, for the moment, to prevent an incident which would cause the Army to be called in.

At last the meeting broke up. I heard that Mr. Myer had agreed to give a talk to the people outside because they had come in all innocence and evident good will to hear a speech from him, and were themselves the victims of a hoax announcement, as well as he.

Mr. Myer was introduced by one of the committee (Kuratomi, I think). While Mr. Myer spoke, other members of the committee, mingled with members of the appointive staff, stood in the background, and the mixed group extended into the secretarial office, and on into the hall and the Welfare office. Following Mr. Myer, Mr. Best made a short talk over the P. A. system. Then Kuratomi gave a report of the meeting in Japanese, and he was followed by Father Kai. At the conclusion of Father Kai's speech, some of the crowd bowed, and all quickly dispersed and made their way back to the residential section.

The boys in charge of the P. A. system quickly dismantled it and moved out. I went out to the roadway where I saw Col. Austen standing, briefly reviewed what had happened, and told him that Dr. Weber's interpretation of Father Kai's final words was that they should go home and be good.

Back in the office I chatted a bit with staff members who were in the meeting to find out what the purport was, and then went to the hospital to see Dr. Pedicord. I heard the doctor's version of what had occurred at the hospital. In his remarks, he attributed at least a part of the trouble there to Dr. Hashiba, who, he said, for a long time had been a disturbing element on the hospital staff.

As I left the hospital I met Mr. Best, accompanied by Mr. Myer and Mr. Cozzens, coming to see Dr. Pedicord, and they asked me to go back with them. I returned and I was present while Dr. Pedicord repeated to them the narrative he had given me. He reiterated his feeling about Dr. Hashiba, and Mr. Myer assured him that Dr. Hashiba would not be permitted to remain on the hospital staff.

It was after six o'clock when we returned from the hospital and went to mess.

Events on November 4: As I started to evening mess between 6:00 p. m. and 6:15 p. m., November 4, Mr. Best introduced me to Mr. Vic Bourne, United Press correspondent. Mr. Best told me that Mr. Bourne would remain on the project for the night and he had been assigned by Personnel Housing to occupy a third bed in 204-1 where Mr. Franks and I were housed. I asked Mr. Bourne to go to mess with us, and after dinner, I took him into the Personnel Recreation Hall and introduced him to Mr. Thompson. I had further work to do at the office,

and I thought he might spend the time there until I was free to go to the room with him.

As I started to leave the office, Mr. Jarrett, a farm supervisor, came to me and said that he was trying to get a number of trucks dispatched from the motor pool to go to Klamath Falls to bring back a group of evacuee workers for the farm as they arrived there from some relocation center. No appointive supervisor was at the motor pool, and none of the evacuees there would help him to get the trucks out. As I started to the motor pool with Mr. Jarrett, we met Mr. Zimmer, Chief of Operations, and told him of Mr. Jarrett's trouble. I went back to the recreation hall to locate Mr. Bourne, and found that he had already left. Then I went to my room and found him and Mr. Franks already there. I knew that Mr. Zimmer, Mr. Cahn, and Mr. Best had been out during the evening, because I saw their car parked out on the line, with headlights on and off at different times. However, it did not occur to me that any untoward happenings were in the making.

In our room, Mr. Bourne told us (Mr. Franks and me) of the meetings he had had with Center officials and about some of the news stories he had got and sent to United Press. He asked if I would mind giving him some of the background, historical and social, which lay behind the circumstance and temper of this community to enhance his understanding of the November 1 meeting between the "committee" and Mr. Myer.

We conversed for a long time, and the talk was finally interrupted by the roar of motorized equipment. My first mental calculation was that something had happened to cause the Director to call in the Army. My second guess was that it would not be a good thing for the U. P. reporter to get his information from me. Mr. Bourne asked if we often had this terrible uproar in the middle of the night, and I told him that it was frequently necessary for the Army troops to hold drills and practices and maneuvers at night in order that they might be properly trained for any emergency.

We stepped outside and saw the jeeps and command cars and tanks, various vehicles accompanied by small details of troops forming a continuous line on the southwest side of the administrative, right along the boundary fence. We moved up to the front of the Post Office to watch what was going on, and presently the whole line of vehicles and troops moved down in its sweep across the administrative area and on toward the hospital and the high school.

We came between buildings 203 and 204 and noted that our door at 204-1 was open. In the bright light I saw a soldier with rifle and fixed bayonet at "guard" standing at our door. Trying to keep up the idea of "maneuvers" I pointed it out to Bourne, and remarked that I thought it was excellent training for the soldiers, so that they would know just what to do in case of the "real thing." We followed the line of troops down to the administrative offices and turned in the door which leads to the Mails & Files office. Here we saw two soldiers with tommy guns at the "ready" standing in the hall guarding a number of evacuees who had been rounded up in the mail room. The illusion of "maneuvers" was no longer tenable, and Bourne began immediately to clamor to get to a telephone. I had to tell him that the Army was in now, and when the Army comes in, the Commanding Officer was in charge, and there wasn't a chance to use a phone without his permission. While we were in the hall, three more evacuees were brought in the door we entered, escorted by soldiers and deposited in the mail room with the others. A minute later Internal Security Officer Mahrt, armed with the club end of a baseball bat, brought in another evacuee, a member of the Wardens' force, and sent him into the mail room. The warden sat down at a desk, pulled a notebook from his pocket and began to look at it. I called to Mahrt to get the book, and just then Captain Maples, armed with a tommy gun, came in, called the arrested warden to the door, took the notebooks from the Warden's pocket and flipped it to Mahrt. Bourne meantime had disappeared. He earlier had used the booth phone to make a long-distance call, and I thought he was trying to do so again. So I told Mahrt, who went to the phone booth and dragged Bourne out in a business-like fashion. After Bourne was out of the booth, I told him again about trying to get a call out without Col. Austen's O. K., and vouched for him to Mahrt, who released him.

About that time, Mr. Best made a loud announcement in the hall that everyone should go to their quarters and keep out of the way. So I took Bourne by the arm and escorted him back to our room.

Mr. Franks was already undressed. I undressed immediately to go to bed, and Bourne put on his pajamas and sat on the bed. While we were rehashing

our experience, a knock came at the door and Mortimer Cooke asked Mr. Bourne to meet with Mr. Best and Col. Austen in Mr. Best's office. Excitedly he hauled on his suit over his pajamas, his shoes without socks, grabbed his coat and left. A few minutes later he came back and said that Colonel Austen had authorized the public statement that the Army had moved in and that any further news release must come from the headquarters of the Ninth Service Command at Fort Douglas, Utah.

He asked how he could get a car to take him to Tule Lake to use a phone to get his news out. I told him that no official cars were available. Since the news had been released as it had been, there was no reason why it should not be communicated to his office. Finally Mr. Franks volunteered to help him get a car and make the trip to Tule Lake with him, and they left. I overheard them when they came in about two o'clock, but I was not thoroughly aroused. I slept soundly until morning.

HARRY L. BLACK.

Signed, November 22, 1943.

STATEMENT OF J. S. LOWERY, EVACUEE PROPERTY OFFICER, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

Monday, November 1: About 1:30 in the afternoon we noticed a string of young Japanese going around the southeast end of the hospital and heading toward the Caucasian housing quarter. After watching them for a minute or so I started to the Administration Building thinking that I could see where they were going. At this time I was in the Leave Building just north of the Administration Building. Before I could go more than 15 feet I saw the Japanese come out in the open space north of the Post Office and take possession of several automobiles there. I also noticed that Mr. Cole, the chief of the Internal Security Division, and Mr. Mahrt, one of the deputies, and another man that I did not identify were going toward the front gate at the time and that they were waved back by the Japanese, but I was too far away to hear any orders given them.

Mr. Kent Silverthorne, Mr. Clarence Benz, and I were the only men that had offices in the Leave Building, and as there were a number of women in it I turned back and stayed there. The women, as I recall them, were: Mrs. J. S. Lowery, Mrs. Kent Silverthorne, Miss Pearl Watson, Miss Seemah Battat, Miss Clara Bogorad, Miss May Hert, Miss Clara Jensen, Mrs. Emma Rose, Mrs. Pearl Carsley, Mrs. Mildred Farrell, Miss Dorothy Phillips, Mrs. Ruth Breece, Miss Zell Clark, and Miss Florence Aurnheimer. There were also three Japanese stenographers and one Japanese man. Mr. Benz had not returned to his office, so Mr. Silverthorne and I were the only men present.

As I turned back to the door of the League Office, I noticed the Japanese coming around the north end of the hospital. I felt no great concern for our safety, and my chief concern was to see that the women were not alarmed by the throng. The leaders who went around the south side of the Administration Building were young, probably in their early twenties, with few exceptions, appeared to be somewhat excited and knew where they were going and what they were supposed to do. The group that came around the north end of the hospital were older men with a large percent of women and children and young girls.

The three Japanese girls that were in the Leave Building were very much frightened and went in my office and crouched down on the floor so that would hide them from the view of anyone looking in the windows. The Japanese man had come in to see Mr. Silverthorne on some legal matters and did not show much concern but finally decided to go outside and mingle with the crowd. We later got the three girls outside through the front door when the crowd was milling around.

We had strong 2" x 4" bars which we put across the two back doors, but we only had the regular lock on the double door in the front of the building which we fastened after possibly ten or fifteen minutes, although no one in our group showed any signs of alarm and we were just using good sense. The crowd was orderly and paid no attention to us, and I went into my office and went through a pile of correspondence that had come in late in the morning. This took me probably an hour, although I did stop several times to go to the front door to see what was going on there. Mr. Silverthorne worked pretty steadily, as did practically all of the women during this time. The military became quite active after the first few minutes and removed the canvas covers from the tanks, etc.

During the first hour the Japanese installed a public-address system on top of the Administration Building, and it was during the early part of this time that

several of the Japanese came out of the Administration Building, shouldered their way through the crowd and headed for the hospital. I have been told that Wilfred Schmidt, Internal Security, was with them, although I did not see him. A few minutes later we were informed by the Japanese spokesman that the negotiations were postponed for a few minutes because there had been an incident at the hospital (referring to the beating up of Dr. Reese Pedicord, although we did not know it at that time) and that they would keep us posted.

The young Japanese kept some of their men posted between our building and the military area, which is about 200 feet north of it, to keep their people from getting too close to the military area, and every little while they had to order some of their people, who wanted to see the tanks and scout cars, back. I saw no clubs or long knives, although some of the little boys were carving some of the sticks in the wood pile with their pocket knives. Two of the Japanese, who appeared to be about twenty years old, were discussing the soldiers, and one of them made the statement that they would not have a chance, while the other said he was not so sure. I was sure that this had no relation to the present demonstration, as there were too many women and children present, but that they were talking about some future action.

The crowd remained standing very quietly until about 4:00 p. m., when we sensed that the conference was over. Mr. Dillon S. Myer made a short address, saying that the WRA had met with the committee, that the committee had made some suggestions, some requests and some demands; that the WRA refused to consider demands but would investigate the suggestions and requests, and if they were justified they would be acted on. He certainly said in a nice way that we did not consider demands from them and that he did not consider the committee as representing the majority of the residents. The Japanese men removed their hats when Mr. Myer started speaking.

This was followed by a ten- to fifteen-minutes talk by one of the Japanese, in Japanese. Minor applause followed both of these talks. Mr. Ray Best, Project Director, made a short talk saying he would gladly talk over any problems with them at any time. Several Japanese made short talks and the crowd started to disperse when one of the Japanese with a stocking cap on grabbed the mike and again called them to order. A sharp order, and they all stood at attention; on the next order they all uncovered their heads but one man who was standing near the speaker, and the speaker grabbed his hat from his head and violently threw it on the ground. Another order, and they all bowed very low. They were then dismissed, and in less than five minutes there was not a single Japanese in the area near the Administration Building. I was within thirty feet of the speakers. The crowd stood very quietly from about 1:30 to about 4:30.

I had been told on numerous occasions by different evacuees that there would be lots of trouble at Tule Lake after. The first train arrived from Jerome. One was from a woman who was going to leave on the next to the last train from Tule Lake. She said, "I want to leave quick. Many bad people are coming in. They will take down the American flag and put up the Japanese flag. They are bullies."

Others said that the good people here could not control the bad people and were afraid to try because they did not know whom to trust and were afraid they would get "beat up".

Thursday, November 4: About 9:30 p. m. I stepped out of my apartment and noticed considerable activity at the military warehouse which was less than 200 feet away. Soldiers were hurrying in and out and an army truck was at the door. I watched them for several minutes and then went back in my apartment.

About fifteen minutes later Sergeant Walters rapped at my door and wanted to know if we knew there was an alert on. He said he had just set a machine gun at the north end of our barrack and another one at the gate to the colonist area; that most of the Caucasian personnel had gone to the military area and that we could go to the orderly room where it would be warm if we so desired. I asked him if that was a military order, and he said no, but the room was available if we were nervous.

My fifteen-year-old daughter Margaret had retired and was sleeping, but I had her get up and dress. I stepped out the back door, which is nearest the colony, and found no excitement whatever, and decided we would stay home but be ready to move the two hundred feet if necessary. About five minutes later Sergeant Walters called and said we had better go over right away.

We found the following civilians there: Miss Margaret Lucas, Miss Clara Bogorad, Mr. Kirkman, and four men from the contractor's crew. Mr. Guy Cook and his son arrived shortly after.

The soldiers near us were guarding the warehouse and formed the second line; the first line being some 100 yards nearer the colony. Aside from the numerous officers coming and going there was no activity where we were. After we had been there possibly forty-five minutes we heard one shot from the direction of the colony, but it was far away. About this time I noticed a number of military vehicles in the colony which were circulating through them, but were too far away to see what they were doing. About midnight two runners came from headquarters with the message that civilians could return to their quarters.

J. SHELDON LOWERY.

INTERVIEW WITH ROY M. DAGGY, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

I have been around just five weeks as Foreman in Construction and Maintenance. Some of the Japanese boys on the crew were very good at their work but they seemed to let down and others who were average just kept on about average.

November 1st: At about 1:30 people were going up to the administration building. I was met outside my apartment (302-7) by an evacuee who asked me to follow him over to the administration building right away. It sounded like a command more or less. I said I'd go as soon as the rest of the people in those apartments went over and then I saw several others around the area being told the same thing. They took all us folks over to the administration building and the crowd was around it. It seemed as if all the Japanese people were stationed around talking and moving around in little groups. I saw about two fellows who it seemed had short pieces of pipe. A few looked into the building through the windows. I didn't see any knives and I don't remember seeing clubs. I did notice, afterwards, that they stood on hoods and tops of cars but I saw no other damage to the cars. The one thing I noticed was evacuees going in and out of the personnel mess and they seemed to come out the kitchen door chewing food. I saw women and children in the crowd and they moved around a little. Some were laughing and just a few kids were playing.

Tuesday morning the whole crew returned to work. They seemed quieter. I saw a couple pieces of paper with Japanese writing on it read and passed around. They didn't seem to talk so much to me but talked to each other in Japanese.

Thursday night I was at 302-7. I was supposed to go to work that night but I had resigned that afternoon so I didn't go to work Thursday night. I was a little bit afraid. There were too many evacuees out at night, too late in the administration area. There seemed more after Monday. Well, I was just around the quarters and I heard some man hollering "Help." I then heard the Army moving in and heard a few shots and saw a few people running toward the colony from the #300 barracks and warehouse area. About 6 or 7 of them. I figured that the least people who were out with the Army at work, the better. I was really relieved when the Army came in and after they were in the Construction Superintendent, Mr. Donovan, asked me to withdraw my resignation, which I did.

ROY M. DAGGY.

STATEMENT OF HARRY KIRKMAN, JUNIOR PROPERTY AND SUPPLY OFFICER, MESS DIVISION, REGARDING EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I went down after lunch to open the warehouses so the Japanese could get in. All my crew were there at the time.

I had an appointment with Mr. Peck at 1 o'clock at the Ad. Bldg. I was with him 20 or 25 minutes and then started to return to the warehouse area. I saw what appeared to be a concerted effort to stop us from leaving. Young Japanese were spaced about every ten feet around the rear of the Ad. Bldg. I made no attempt to leave, and returned to the Ad. Bldg. to stay until we were released.

Anthony Smith, a painter, tried to leave, but he did not get any further than outside one of the rear doors. They told him not to leave.

During the afternoon demonstration George Furuka, my senior warehouseman, and five boys continued to work and delivered food to the colony in a normal way.

An elderly Japanese was trying to order lumber on a long-distance call from the phone booth on the porch of the entrance to the Ad. Bldg. We could hear him talking about lumber. Some young Japanese got wind of it and pulled him out.

All afternoon I saw only one of my mess department employees in the crowd, and that was at the very outset of the afternoon. He was just looking around and laughing.

I walked around the Ad. Bldg. and did not hear any Japanese on the outside use any vile language.

I was in Harry Black's office when they put up the loudspeaker. They seemed to be well organized.

At the start the boys seemed to be placed around the building, but after a while they seemed to melt into the crowd. I saw no weapons or anybody carrying boxes. Perhaps I am not observant, but I didn't see any.

Most of the staff took it very calmly. A lot of the crowd were standing around like they were waiting for the show to start. The crowd was intent when anyone spoke. I noticed grown kids sitting on cars parked at the rear of the Ad. Bldg. Later I saw Mr. Gerry's car and the top was dented in, where they had sat on it. I pushed up the top from inside and it snapped back into place. On the windshield somebody had scratched with a rock or pumice, "For Sale Cheap." The left door handle would not work from outside.

On Wednesday I asked the boys at the time they were getting ready to go down, "What's this, another one?" They said, "Oh, no. Just stay away from the open-air stage." Some of the boys were wearing sweatshirts with a red ball on the front and sunrays going out from it. This was the first time I had seen these, and I have not seen any since. I noticed it on one boy particularly, by the name of Tanimoto, who was one of four brothers who were kind of hard-headed and who had been sent to the isolation camp—the CCC camp.

One boy, Osama Kobayashi, came to me who said: "There may be some Japanese in the colony who don't like you. If any of them threaten you come and tell me and we will fix them." That was all he said.

Between Monday and Thursday the boys seemed friendlier, more willing and cooperative, if anything.

November 4: Lt. Frank Doran and I were at the apartment of Miss Lucas and Miss Bogorad. Lt. Doran left about 9:45 to get a box of candy at his quarters. In about five minutes he came back with his gas mask and guns and said there was an alert and told us to go to his quarters. We said we would stay where we were since we had the Army to protect us. A few minutes later he returned and said forcibly to go to the military area. This impressed us more with the seriousness of the situation, and we went.

We saw tanks moving down to the village, and other activity. We heard shots from the direction of the colony.

On Friday we had no Japanese help in the warehouse area. Friday, Saturday and Sunday were three rather hard days. We had to load trucks and distribute the food ourselves. We had a convoy in charge of Lt. Hagen. His boys helped us. We made two trips to the mess halls on Friday, although we didn't get to all kitchens.

On the first trip I made, at mess hall 11 or 12, one of the Japanese cooks, a big Japanese, became angry when he saw the suet we were delivering, because he thought it was part of the meat ration. He threw the suet into the street, narrowly missing Lt. Hagen. Another kitchen helper picked it up and took it back into the kitchen.

There was not any other incident, although the Japanese ran frightened when the convoy appeared. After the first day they were not alarmed at all by the convoy.

The morning, I think it was Tuesday, that the Japanese came to work there had to be a clearance from Internal Security. I had a list of twenty-four names, of former workers. The Internal Security cut eleven off. Of those eleven one was under eighteen, one had agitated against working in the butcher shop. Mr. Foss and Mr. Hoover gave me the name and I turned it over to Internal Security. The other nine had I. S. records. In the afternoon Mr. Mahrt of I. S. came down to the warehouse and gave us a clearance on ten men and took eleven back to the village. Three hadn't been cleared. We understood that these ten plus fifteen additional men cleared by the I. S. were to return to work the next morning. They didn't show up then or since.

We arranged for the head timekeeper to contact the three evacuee mess supervisors in the colony and have them contact the various mess halls for feed and supply requirements which would be left at the timekeeper's office for Lt. Hagen to pick up daily and deliver to Mr. Bello, an associate project steward. When the Japanese workers didn't show up we were given the help of a few soldiers who helped in the butcher shop, loaded trucks and drove trucks on the

food convoys to the colony. The butchering was done by Mr. Foss and Mr. Hoover.

A group of about sixty soldiers, including some who had been helping, started work on November 18. We had twelve full carloads of food and nine less-than-carload lots piled up on the siding. These soldiers, part of a company brought in from Fort Lewis, are unloading these cars and in other ways getting the food warehoused and delivery system back to normal.

With the exception of Mr. Foss and Mr. Hoover who are doing the butchering, all the food warehousing, shipments and delivering are done by the soldiers. After we received a block managers' count of 15,413 population, which we knew was too high, we started sending the same amount of food to each mess hall.

H. KIRKMAN.

INTERVIEW WITH CHESTER A. FAILING

I have been in charge of the motor pool since July 23, 1942. I could see for several days before November 1 that certain people in the colony were putting pressure on the boys working in the motor pool.

November 1: I was busy working on monthly reports that I had been working on for a few days. Mr. Powell was down at the motor pool and could tell you what went on down there. I was kept pretty busy with these reports, signing and checking the time slips. I know the boys working for me were doing their best, and I can't pick out any who themselves would cause any trouble. Several came to me earlier complaining of pressure and saying that they couldn't do the job the way I wanted it done and maybe should be reassigned. But the motor-pool boys worked hard and I can't complain. I explained to them that that's the way I felt and I controlled the working pretty much that way, not expecting too much under the circumstances. On Monday when the crowd came I kept right on working at my desk and the crowd didn't bother me a bit. The only thing I saw were some boxes some of the fellows had under their arms. I saw a few flat boxes. This was on the other side of the south wing of the administration building. I remember Mr. Powell came in. He said there were some Japanese boys in my car, and when I looked I say 4 or 5 of them. It looked to me like they might do some damage, and I had locked the car up, so I went into the front office and reported it. One man of the negotiating committee, about 33 or 34 years old, in a white coat and dark trousers, came out and stopped the boys. Later, when I checked, there was no real damage to the car. They had taken off the windshield wipers and bent the handles a little and they had pried up a sort of hole on the side ventilator to get their hand in to open the door. But it wasn't serious and when the ventilator is closed it's covered up and no air gets in. They also bent the aerial, but so little I could bend it back myself, and there was nothing else. They didn't even take the tools out of the glove case, and I had some pretty valuable tools in there which was really what I was most concerned about.

In the crowd I saw no knives, clubs, pieces of pipe, or anything like that. The crowd was mixed and all ages were represented. I imagine about 5% were women and children. They didn't seem to be doing any damage and they stood pretty quiet all through.

I was told that they had taken a line of trucks and blocked the area between the post office and the fence and had strung some trucks on the east side of the administration building, but that's all I noticed.

Tuesday the boys came back to work and they were just about the same. Thursday a couple of the boys from the motor pool told me they didn't feel they could go on working because they didn't think they could do the job the way I wanted it done. I said, "Well, then, do the job the best you can." I met the same 2 boys later, on the way up from the motor pool to this building and again they asked me. They said they wanted to drive a truck rather than stay right in the motor pool. Now one of them is back at the job and another is anxious to return. I have 5 back working down there with me. I don't know anything about getting back those trucks Thursday night, but Pete Zimmer said he got the keys and gave them to Huck Schmidt, and I think Jarrat was in on it, too.

CHESTER A. FAILING.

STATEMENT OF MRS. RUTH P. BREECE, HIGH-SCHOOL TEACHER, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND NOVEMBER 4, 1943

November 1: I was in the Leave Building Monday afternoon.

I have lived in the Far East most of my life. I wasn't particularly upset, because the crowd was about as orderly as any I had ever seen. I had no fear. My theory was just to go ahead with my work.

I didn't like the appearance of what I saw. I thought it was out of order for them to come up here; that the crowd was definitely *anti* whatever they were against.

I have heard stories of what people saw, but I didn't see any. I didn't look out the window much because I didn't want to give them the satisfaction of showing we were upset.

Three or four office girls seemed alarmed, and they got down between the desks and crept to the back of the room. They were badly frightened. Later they crept back and said they thought they would be safer outside. They went out and sort of rushed into the crowd to lose themselves. I don't think they knew ahead of time. They didn't mention hearing anything about the meeting. Most of the women in the room were quite calm.

I heard the speeches, and while I don't understand Japanese I gathered that they seemed pleased at what was said, the way they bowed. I thought it was better not to try to force my way out. I saw several on top of cars. They were not engaging in any destructive activities. I made a point of not looking out too much.

November 4: I had a feeling that there were a great number of undesirable young men in small groups wandering around the Administration area. A friend said to me at noon that she had never seen so many unpleasant or evil faces. There were undesirable groups.

When I left the house (near motor pool) at noon, I noticed five men standing to right of motor pool, and there was something in their attitude, as if they were plotting. I spoke of it to Miss Philipps, a friend. During the afternoon we saw more of these groups going either to the post office or the motor pool, which I understood later was their rendezvous.

I saw the man who was talking to the other men at the motor pool walking with some other men toward the colony with empty wooden boxes in their hands, orange crates or something. I wondered aloud to Miss Philipps if they didn't have something in mind. They stopped and started a little fire near the warehouse area. We watched them for a while. The man I noticed was heavy-set, wearing kahki trousers and sweater to match. I have been in the Orient when things were plotting and brewing, and I notice such things.

I was at home Thursday evening, and I heard the cars moving back and forth. There seemed to be furious activity. Mr. Hill, who lives in the same barrack, said he heard it, too.

I was writing letters. About 10 o'clock, I think, I heard the commotion. I turned out the light because they seemed to be rather near our house. I looked out the window toward the west and saw Mr. Hill outside without his hat and coat. I thought I would step to the door and speak to him. He was nowhere to be seen.

Just then about five Japanese came tearing around the house with long stout sticks or clubs, and I started to close the door as they came by. Mr. Hill said he thought they were after him, and ran into his house. I didn't see them all, but they seemed to all be wearing raincoats. I thought at the time it might be some sort of disguise. Their faces looked strained.

I waited about ten minutes, and then opened the door again and found Mr. and Mrs. Hill at their door. They insisted that we, Mrs. Kallam and myself, stay in their house that night. He didn't think it would be safe to go back to my apartment. Against my will I stayed.

Looking out the window we saw a number of Japanese run toward the colony. In a few moments we saw the soldiers, and they began firing at the fleeing Japanese. The other women thought they saw a Japanese man walk past the house, but I didn't see him.

Mr. Hill is on the fire staff and has a telephone. Somebody called him twice. During the night he had a call from the Japanese at the fire station, asking him if he wanted them to come up if there was a fire up here.

RUTH P. BREECE.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. BERGMAN, SANITARY ENGINEER, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

At 1:00 I was down at the plumbing shop, 348, making a report on materials needed for Mr. Slattery. I was supposed to take the report up to him at 1:00. My office is funny down there. The electrical office is on the other side and we have one phone between the two offices. About 1:00 the Japanese electrical foreman came over and wanted to know if I would answer the phone. He said he was going to a party. I told him "Uh Huh" and took off for the office on the hill, to take the report up. As I came to the motor pool I saw a couple hundred Japs lined up. They hollered to me to stop so I ducked around them, gunned the car down to the floor boards and right up the hill with my report. When I was coming back I saw the crowd and wondered what the hell all the excitement was and came back down to see. Well, I got stopped at the gate between the motor pool and the fence. There was this line of Japs, 2 hundred of them, then they had lined up trucks end to end, maybe about 8 trucks, across the road there in front of the service station and the motor-pool building over to the building on the other side of the service station. They stopped me all right this time and I sat out there all afternoon square behind 3 machine guns. I thought it was a wonderful position.

The crowd down there was running this way and that and milling around like a bunch of sheep. That fat cop was riding around in a pick-up all over the place. Once about two-thirds of them moved over to the motor pool and climbed all over the cars again and they swarmed back down again and milled around somewhere else. I guess a few of them had sticks and bars and things like that. When I first came up to the motor pool there was about 2 hundred of them lined up. They are sort of dumb bastards, these Japs and they wouldn't have enough sense to line off a place on the other side of the motor pool. That's how I ducked around them. Those guys looked just threatening enough to me so that I didn't want to stop anyway. All they said to me before I ducked around the side of the building was "Stop."

I guess it was just after I left the plumbing shop that they came and got Hitts. The Japs came and got him and put him in the administration building. You can figure that that's what they were going to do to me and and that's why that Jap electrician wanted me to hang around there and answer the phone but the way I figure it when a Jap tells you anything out of the way, do the opposite.

P. C. BERGMAN.

STATEMENT OF MISS ALMA K. FOLDA, CHIEF NURSE, REGARDING EVENTS OF
NOVEMBER 1 AND 4

November 1: Monday morning there was an unsettled air to the hospital. I had intended to go to church that morning at 10 in the colony—Catholic church services. I didn't think things were quite right in the hospital, but there was nothing definite—just an air, the attitude of the people.

After we came back from lunch there was considerable going back and forth in the hospital of people not working there. When I was making rounds in the wards I noticed people coming up from the colony. Then I went back to the front office, and there were boys, sometimes alone, some in groups of two or three, going in and out of the front door, apparently with no business. It was not a visiting day.

From my office facing the administration area I watched the crowds gathering around the Administration Building.

There were two or three boys standing in front of the hospital entrance who seemed to be waiting for a signal or for other people. Very quickly they gathered, between ten and twelve boys eighteen to twenty-five years of age, and then came up the front steps, pushed the screen which Dr. Mason was holding, came right in and walked down to the partition in the main hallway.

Then there was scuffling in the hall, which I didn't see—no cries or shouts. They they lent in a group, went down the front steps, paused in front of the steps, and Miss Curran went down the steps and returned with Dr. Perdicord, walking up the steps.

Then I saw what he needed, and made rounds of the hospital, checking the nurses' stations, several times during the afternoon.

We were refused the use of all the telephones in the hospital by Japanese boys posted by them. Also all the doors were guarded. We were told that these boys

were all right to take care of those doors by Mr. Schmidt when he came over with a Japanese man.

After he left the building the Japanese people, as far as I know, put the restrictions on the phone. I didn't know they had beaten Dr. Pedicord until I saw him being brought in. They must have carried him out and, from the looks of his clothes, put him on the ground.

Dr. Akimotsu and Dr. Suzuki, who were to be transferred to other centers and who are gone now, dressed up in their white hospital suits, although they had not been on the active hospital list for several days or weeks.

Only two Japanese nurses' aides asked me as I went through the halls on my rounds if Dr. Pedicord was hurt seriously. There was very little conversation among any of the people. People seemed to be wondering what was going to happen. Hospital workers were at the windows watching the crowd around the Administration Building.

I have the feeling that the attack on Dr. Pedicord was premeditated, that the boys going through the halls were sizing up the lay of the land while the group was gathering at the entrance.

On Tuesday morning several Japanese nurses' aides passed comments that they were surprised we were back on the job. They seemed definitely surprised.

At noon when we went back there was a marked silence and derisive attitude. Nobody spoke as we passed them along the hall, which was not at all usual on the part of the many that we met.

We came over to the staff meeting in the Recreation Hall, and we didn't go back to the hospital. Dr. Pedicord said he didn't think Caucasian nurses should be in the hospital if the doctors weren't. Doctors' activity was limited Tuesday.

TULE LAKE CENTER.
Newell, California.

NOVEMBER 4TH INCIDENT

(Report submitted by Fenton Mahrt, Assistant Chief of Internal Security)

The following refers to the incident of November 4th. At 7 P. M., on Thursday, November 4, 1943, I (Fenton Mahrt) was placed on guard duty at the Caucasian residential area, located east of the military area. My job was to patrol this area and to report to the military headquarters every half hour. I was to also check the guards at the tent factory every hour.

At about 8:45 P. M. on November 4th, I received a telephone call from a guard by the name of Ivan Buell, who was guarding the high-school area. Mr. Buell told me that he would like to have someone come down immediately, as the evacuees were packing off the lumber. Upon arriving at this area, there were several wardens in the vicinity assisting Mr. Buell to chase the evacuees back down in the colony.

As I drove around the high-school area, I saw approximately eight evacuees with clubs standing along the fence east of the warehouse district. I then informed Mr. Buell that for his own safety, he had better go to the administration building and stay there for the time being.

Upon going back into the warehouse district, I saw several squads of evacuees with clubs located at various points. I then came to the administration building, picked up Edward Borbeck,¹ Internal Security Officer, at Tule Lake Project, and Ted Lewis,² Internal Security Officer from the Central Utah Reclamation Project, and proceeded back to the warehouse district, pointing out the different groups standing around with clubs to Mr. Borbeck and Mr. Lewis. We then went to the home of Delbert R. Cole, Chief of Internal Security (123-2), at approximately 9:00 P. M. He was informed of these different squads of evacuees and of what they were doing. Mr. Cole told us to continue patrolling, but not to get into any trouble or take any chances. Mr. Cole also stated that he would contact Mr. Willard E. Schmidt, the National Chief of Internal Security, and find out what action was to be taken.

We then proceeded back to the warehouse district, where we were stopped by a Chevrolet pick-up with 5 evacuees in it. They wanted to know what our names

¹ Edward Borbeck is of the Tule Lake Internal Security Division.

² Ted Lewis is of the Topaz Internal Security Division.

were and what business we had in that vicinity at that time. The driver of this pick-up was Tom "Yoshio" Kobayashi, who, at that time, was a member of the wardens' police department.

We asked Mr. Kobayashi why he was not performing his official duty as a warden, instead of hauling a group of the goon squad around the camp. Kobayashi stated that he was forced to do this. The evacuees refused to let us go at this time, so we decided that the only thing to do was to get out of our car and fight it out, so that we might eventually get back to the administration building. When the evacuees saw that we had called their bluff, they pulled their car out of our way and let us go about our business.

Mr. Borbeck, Mr. Lewis, and myself then drove immediately to the administration building and called the Chief of Internal Security, Mr. Cole, who at that time was at his residence at 123-2. We related our experience to Mr. Cole, who told us to wait at his home or at the administration building and that he would contact Mr. Schmidt, the National Chief of Internal Security. Mr. Schmidt in turn contacted Mr. Best, the Project Director, who at this time was at his home. Mr. Best then immediately notified Colonel Austin, Commanding Officer of the military unit.

We then heard a car out in front of the administration building, so Mr. Borbeck, Internal Security Officer, Mr. Lewis, Internal Security Officer, and I went out in front to see what the commotion was about. We found the same pick-up driven by Tom Yoshio Kobayashi and his four strong-arm men, who were in the pick-up with him. We stopped the evacuees and asked them what business they had up in this vicinity. We ordered the evacuees to get out of the truck. Tom Yoshio Kobayashi let out a weird yell, similar to that of a coyote, to notify the goon squad, members of which were hidden around the various buildings, to come to their aid. We were then attacked by approximately 20 evacuees, who were armed with clubs and swords shaped from wood of a kendo nature.

We fought for approximately five minutes, the Internal Security Officers having no weapons with which to protect themselves. After fighting for some time, I saw Mr. Borbeck, Internal Security Officer, trip over a large rock that was along the side of the roadway, and when he fell, three evacuees armed with clubs jumped on him, beating him about the face and legs with their clubs. At this time I was unable to reach him or to give him any assistance because about 10 members of the goon squad, armed with clubs, were between us.

One member of this squad wore eyeglasses. Being aware of an opportunity to hurt one of the evacuees, I gave him a stiff right in the eye, breaking his glasses and cutting his face. One evacuee kicked me in the back while another one grabbed me by the throat. By some miracle, I squirmed away from the evacuees, ran into the administration building, grabbed a chair, and at this time Mr. Cole, Chief of Internal Security, came up and also grabbed a chair and we ran back out to assist Mr. Borbeck. We found that Mr. Borbeck had already come into the administration building. He was cut about the face very badly. When Mr. Cole and I went back out, armed with chairs, to fight the evacuees, the goon squad commenced to run. We went back into the administration building and at this time the Army went into action.

We then went out the back door of the administration building. I had in my possession a very good baseball bat. Three members of the goon squad came running up from the hospital, which is located about 200 yards east of the administration building. The evacuees probably thought we were part of their gang. However, when they came close enough to recognize us, they knew that a mistake had been made.

One of the evacuees made a flying tackle at me. I side-stepped and brought the baseball bat down across his head with terrific force. He hit the dirt, lay there quivering for a few minutes, then shook his head and got up on his hands and knees. Mr. Lewis, Internal Security Officer, hit one evacuee on the head. The evacuee went down, but regained his feet immediately. I then swung the bat viciously at his head and dropped him to the ground.

The other member of the evacuee gang, seeing that they were fighting a losing battle, started to run. He also was hit by a Mr. Payne, Internal Security Officer, and dropped to the ground. We then lifted the evacuees to their feet, then half carrying them to the administration building, we turned them over to Captain Mount Archer, of the Army. This was at approximately 10:45 P. M.

In cooperation with the Intelligence Unit of the Army, headed by Captain Mount Archer, members of the evacuee group were questioned for names of members of their organization, resulting in the following list of names which were submitted to Officer Fenton Mahrt by Tom "Yoshio" Kobayashi, who

admitted that he was the leader of this particular riot, which was held on Thursday, November 4, 1943:

Tomita	2804-A.
Shimio	2804-A.
Shimomura	2804-A.
Yoshido	4402-E.
Yabumoto, Kyoemon	4302-E.
Yusaku, Hibino	4314-D.
Oki, Kakuma	4313-C.
Takeo, Matsui	4306-A.
Mabeyiro, Makasura	4305-C.
Akiyama, Masao	Works at 46 mess hall, Badge #4388.
Yamasaki, Meniichi	4305-E.
Kunagai, Kazao	4301-E.
Yoida, Miyo	Address unknown.
Last name not known—	
Yoshi	5911-E.
Jimmy	5911-E.
Matsumura, George	7112-C.
Mory, Caldyeh	1613.
Inoue,	1613.
Miyashi, Yoshida	1613.
Shimonishi,	67-4-D.
Matsuda,	72 block.
Matsuda,	71 block.
Kosama, Bud*	
Yokotoku,	5911-D (Knotty door).
Nakano,	71-2-A.
Inoue and Nissimi	{ 2513-D.
	{ 2513-D.
Katazuma, Rin	4101-DE.
Ninamiya,	2105-A.
Matumura, Joe	7112-CD.
Kanaoka, "Doc"	Block 42.
Takat	Block 42.
Nogawa,	71-1-A.
	5911-A.
	3513-C (3513-C).
Sakamoto,	3513.

It is suggested that the above names and addresses be checked against the records of the Housing Division.

* Star indicates those definitely known to be ringleaders.

FENTON MAHRT,
Assistant Chief of Internal Security.

Dictated by Fenton Mahrt on November 8, 1943, 9:00 A. M. Transcribed by Seemah Battat, Secretary to Willard Schmidt, on November 8, 1943.

NOVEMBER 15, 1943.

Memorandum to: Edward H. Spicer.

From: Katharine Tift.

Subject: Observation, as requested, of recent events.

I. Experiences in Housing Office.

II. The Funeral.

III. November First meeting.

IV. Thursday Night.

I. When the Housing Office was located in the North East wing of the High School Building, very few incidents occurred which were unpleasant. The most striking one took place when an evacuee (Mr. Esser has the name) threatened to kill one of our colonist workers when she did not give him the service (housing assignment) which he wanted. The girl, Mrs. Ruth Ichikawa, was upset and quite frightened.

Our experience in meeting the incoming trainloads was pleasant on the whole. When the whole groups of bachelors come in from Central Utah and from Jerome,

as groups, they were noisy and rude perhaps, but their whole attitude was care-free nonchalance, not sullen determination.

When Housing Office was moved to 1308, after the last incoming train movement, more rudeness from the bachelor boys was immediately apparent. For the great part, this rudeness came from the bachelor men who wanted to get out of the recreation halls to which they were temporarily assigned. "You can't treat us like animals—putting us in barns like this," was one familiar type of complaint. The boys were ganged together in these recreation halls for about three weeks before our housing staff was able to assign empty apartments to them. At one time a young man slapped one of our office receptionists in the face, saying, "This is old Japan," or words to that effect, when explaining his actions to Mr. Huycke later.

As for myself, my contacts with all the colonists who come to our office were either pleasant or quite ordinary. Many of the boys who came in were on the defensive and were demanding, but I had no occasion to feel that their attitudes warranted my taking down their names.

II. The Funeral: The funeral for the farm worker killed by the truck accident was held just beyond the outdoor stage and took place from about 2:00 to 3:00 P. M. The platform faced east, and as the platform was east to us we could not see the stage where the actual funeral ceremony took place. However, we could see, from the Housing Office, the crowds gathering and the type of crowd which attended.

It was, for the most part, a group of adults, mostly men. There were many young boys who were apparently running the program. At about 2:15 P. M., a young man came in and in a very excited tone of voice told us to stop work. He spoke entirely in Japanese and the Japanese girls (5-7) who were in the office with me translated the words. He said he wanted us to stop work; turn off any radios or noisemakers, not answer the phone, etc. The girls told him that our office was closed to the public, and that we were doing no business at that time.

Later, Mr. Huycke came to the office and sauntered down to where the crowd was gathered. He has a story to tell of various incidents which took place nearer the funeral. After the ceremony was over, the same young man in an army uniform told us we could commence our work again. He was very pleasant, though very determined as he had been the first time.

III. November First Meeting: At about 1:05 P. M., I was bicycling back to 1308 on this afternoon, and I saw by the Firemen's barracks, a crowd of 20-30 boys (young men) talking together and looking across at another crowd, just across the firebreak near 713. Looking toward the east along the main firebreak, I saw two other groups of men gathered—one in front of Block 12 and the other from farther along the firebreak beyond Block 12. Whistles blew from different places and in orderly fashion the groups started walking in the direction of the hospital. Looking back as I rode along, I saw these groups converging in the hospital area and other stragglers were running to join them. Looking ahead, whole processions of colonists, including mothers with baby buggies, little children, etc. came marching down from various roads running north and south, into the main firebreak, turning and all walking toward the hospital.

At the Housing Office only one Japanese girl was there, Namiko Yamada. I asked some bystanders what was up and they said that Dillon Myers was going to speak. Namiko said she would like to go too, but when we stopped by her home on the way to the Ad Building her mother wouldn't let her go. So I bicycled back to the Ad Building alone, almost getting caught in the great swarm of colonists who were walking toward the Ad Building via south of the hospital.

I went into the Ad Building out of curiosity, before most of the colonists had arrived in the administration area. During most of that afternoon while we were in the Ad Building I sat at a typewriter in the Procurement Office looking at the Japanese children playing on the lawn in front, and at the boys who were guarding the front door. I could recognize the boys who were there, I am sure, if I saw them again. Most of the folks in that particular part of the front yard which was in my line of vision weren't even interested in what was going on. The people were laughing and visiting, and the kids pulled grass and had grass fights, etc. I saw five Kibei rush into the Ad Building to bring out the old lady who came in to use the ladies' toilet.

When the speeches were being delivered, I went to the Social Welfare Office and took down Mr. Myer's speech and Mr. Best's in shorthand.

IV. Thursday night: At about 10:30 P. M. Yvonne Astur (Dorothy Phillips) came into my room, 304-4, to tell me there was "excitement going on." We saw

tanks and armored cars go by, and saw the soldiers stop the cook who was evidently scared and was running toward the colony, his white apron and tea towels flapping. Later I saw, from my front porch, some of our internal security men stop a government car and shout to the men inside to hold their hands up (that occurred just east of the dining hall, on the road). I stayed in my room all the time except for the few minutes I crossed our driveway to go over to Priscilla Robinson's room with B. Burton, who was going to sleep with Priscilla that night.

Respectfully submitted.

KATHARINE TIFT.

STATEMENT OF EADA SILVERTHORNE, TEACHER

November 1: I returned to the office in the Leave Building after lunch on Monday the 1st and went to work at my desk. The first I was conscious of anything happening was when I got up to go over to the Administration Building, probably about 1:30. There were quite a few people outside and I wondered who was leaving the Project to attract such a crowd. I immediately realized it was something special rather than someone leaving. Instead of going on over to the Administration Building, I joined others at the windows and watched the people gather.

The people were concentrating around the Administration Building but there were a lot all around the Leave Building. On the north side of the Leave Building people were watching the preparations of the military with great interest. Once, while watching this crowd on the north side, I saw a young man come around and give some directions of some kind and a good portion of the crowd turned and worked over more toward the Administration Building.

I suppose it must have been about 3 o'clock when I decided to go home. One of the girls in the office decided to go with me. We went out the back door and started home. As we got to the edge of the crowd a young fellow stepped up in front of us and asked us to please stay in the building. I told him I was going to the rest room and since it was so crowded thru the other way to the Administration Building, I was going home. He made some little remark in Japanese, shrugged his shoulders and stepped away. We went on unmolested. After about 20 minutes we returned. I had my dog with me and several times going and coming various people called to the dog; and a couple of times they patted her. The people, other than the one young man, paid no attention to us at all.

We went back into the office and continued to watch and listen. The crowd outside was very quiet and patient, made up of young and old men and women and children. As the afternoon wore on some boys about 10 or 11 started tapping on the windows. They would knock against the glass—peer in and duck down when I would look at them. Finally, I went over and stood by the window where they couldn't see me. The next time they knocked, I knocked back at them. They grinned and that finished their game.

Once during the afternoon, I heard someone mention having seen some pointed sticks. Miss Jensen and I went to the windows looking especially for sticks or weapons. We saw none at all.

I was never conscious of anyone in the Leave Building being frightened. Some went on with their work and those watching seemed to be curious and interested. I never saw anything in the whole incident to make me feel afraid.

[Signed] EADA SILVERTHORNE.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

Eada Silverthorne, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I am an employee of the War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Center, Newell, California.

On the afternoon of November 1, 1943, I was working in the Leave Office building, which is located some 60 or 70 feet from the main administration building, and facing the door into Mr. Black's office in the administration building.

Around 1:00 P. M. I noticed large numbers of evacuees coming from the colony and gathering around the administration buildings. In a half hour's time after the first groups appeared the whole area around and between the buildings was

packed with men, women, and children. Shortly after the crowd arrived a committee of evacuees entered the administration building through the door of Mr. Black's office. In the meantime evacuees were busy setting up a loud speaker system.

In the Leave Office building, which was surrounded on all sides, none of the appointed personnel appeared to be at all excited or frightened. Some went on with their work and others stood at the doors and windows watching the crowd. During this waiting period, while the committee was negotiating, several evacuees came into the office from the crowd for the transaction of routine business with the Legal Division and the Evacuee Property Section.

When the crowd had been there for some two hours I decided to go to my apartment. I walked out the door, through the crowd and went home. On the outskirts of the crowd a young man asked me to please go back inside. I explained the nature of my errand and he let me proceed. About twenty minutes later I came back to the office again going through the crowd. I was not threatened in any way, and was at no time afraid.

I watched the crowd on and off all afternoon, but at no time did I see any weapons or incendiary materials.

When the committee finished its negotiations, Mr. Myer and Mr. Best appeared at the door of Mr. Black's office and spoke to the crowd. When they completed their talks they were applauded by the crowd. After translations and speeches in Japanese the crowd went back to the colony.

EADA SILVERTHORNE.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of November 1943.

[SEAL]

Notary Public in for the County of Modoc, State of California.

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Modoc, ss:

C. E. Zimmer, being first duly sworn on oath, says:

I understand that Noble C. Wilkinson, a former employee of the War Relocation Authority, testified before the California State Senate Committee on Japanese Resettlement in California that Japanese butchers had threatened C. E. Zimmer, Assistant Project Director, Ralph B. Peck, Project Steward, and himself, with knives.

I wish to state that I have never been threatened with a knife by anyone in all the time I have been at the Tule Lake Project.

[Signed] C. E. ZIMMER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of November 1943.

[SEAL]

Notary Public in and for the County of Modoc, State of California.

INTERVIEW WITH OTIS ROPER, ASSISTANT ELECTRICAL ENGINEER, NOVEMBER 18, 1943

I wasn't here on Monday or Thursday as I live off the project. I was here on Wednesday, Tuesday, and Thursday during the daytime. I handle a small crew of evacuees and keep them busy. They didn't say anything on Tuesday. I think that there is one boy in the electrical crew, a very good man, who was probably involved in this thing. He is on the pay roll as an electrician's helper but he is actually in charge of a crew and was a key man in the organization right up until this think happened. He is Nisei but he is the michievous type. He is a pleasant fellow and not vicious, but he is the one who told Bergman that he was going to a party Monday afternoon and wanted Bergman to stay around to answer the phone. He never gave me any trouble although a couple of nights before this happened he asked me for permission to keep the truck in the colony at night to answer trouble calls. This permission, fortunately, was denied him.

You know, two of the electrical department's cars were involved in this thing. The pick-up was used on Thursday, and Monday they had my panel truck but they got both of these after they were turned in at the motor pool. They were taken out by the wardens. This boy reported to me on Tuesday morning that the pick-up had been used the night before and had been driven 46 miles. He also reported that a warden had been seen using it. It was the first time in months that it had been driven by anybody outside of the electrical department because

they knew over at the motor pool that I didn't want our trucks used by other people since I wanted to leave some supplies in them. I called Mr. Failing on Tuesday morning and told him to take steps not to let this happen again. That was when he checked and found that the warden had been using it.

On Thursday night they had the pick-up and it was the big fat warden who was driving it.

I suppose you know that my crew has been back for 2 half days since the last trouble. They all came back except Fu, that is the boy I've been telling you about, Fusao Utsurosi, and three other new men. I said that Fu had some explaining to do. The office girl said that his father had made him do it. His father was interned. This boy signed No, No, to questions 27 and 28. He was the only one in my old crew who answered no. I understand that the committee has since ordered these men not to come back to work. Several want to come back, I have heard, but it isn't safe to do so.

OTIS ROPER.

INTERVIEW WITH JULIUS P. CHRISTENSEN

I have been supervisor of Irrigation Construction and in charge of drainage and roads since June 1942. When you asked me whether I noticed any difference in the farm workers before or after segregation all I can say is that there wasn't too much change in the farmers. They were just a different group of people but they were pretty much the same. Just a lot of different kind of individuals. The point is that this farm trouble is not new. There has always been trouble on the farm. It was always one of the sore spots here. When you ask me why that was, the answer is that just about all the difficulty grew out of the method of management. I don't care what color people are they react the same way when rubbed the wrong way. The farm workers would ask me to do various things for them. I would tell them that they would have to take it up with Mr. Kallan, they would throw up their hands and say, "You get nothing but broken promises from him."

About pressure groups, I don't remember having any such groups in the construction department except last spring when two of the Engineers had an argument about building the high-school building. Harry Katysuma had been assigned the gym. Richard Fujioka the other building, but Harry thought he should be boss and attempted to run Richard off. Richard came to me and asked me to stay out of it that he wanted to handle it in his own way, and he did, and won the fight.

I don't know much about recent pressure groups except during segregation a man came to me that said he was from Jerome and that he had been in charge of heavy equipment there and would like to have a job for him and his crew. From his talk with me he let me know that he wanted to be boss and I told him that I had a man in charge of the equipment and that if he wanted to work he would have to do what he was told to do. He then told me that when the big boss got here he was quite sure that things would change. The answer that I gave him was that I would be boss as long as I was here. He left and has never been back.

Then, during segregation, when the trains came in from Jerome I remember some of those boys talking the same way. They spoke of the time when the big boss would come. I don't quite remember the name they referred to, but this Jerome man who came in to run my crew, also said, "Well, we'll change this when the boss come." I, of course, told him that I ran the heavy equipment. All through this recent period my foreman has been scared. I see him on the job and he is still that way.

November 1: I was in the heavy-equipment shop and I came up here to see what was going on. There was a crowd. I sat in the same office with Mr. Failing and saw them take off gas caps and they put sand in the tanks too. The only other thing I saw was twisted windshield wipers. The crowd was mixed with women and children on the north side of the building. They didn't have any weapons. I did see a couple of short canes about two and a half feet long. I didn't see any inflammable material like straw or soaked rags and I remember that I looked for this sort of thing after they removed the gas caps because I thought there might be some intention to start a fire. It was a quiet crowd. They even kept their kids quiet and they looked very serious. At the end they all removed their hats and faced south. They bowed and I am sure the direction they faced in was south.

Tuesday part of the crew came back and they worked all right.

On Thursday night I was right here on the project asleep in my own bed when someone came to the door and hollered. I thought to myself, "Go to hell," but my wife thought differently, so I got up and went to the door and said, "What's up?" to the soldier there. He said that the Captain had told us to go to the military zone and I said it was okay if the Captain said so. There was nothing else that night except that I lost some sleep.

(Signed) JULIUS P. CHRISTENSEN.

INTERVIEW WITH MARGARET LUCAS, SECRETARY

November 1: I was in Mr. Best's office. I was there for about 3 hours during the afternoon. The address system was set up after the committee came in. Shortly before 1:00 Mr. Fagan called me and said that a group from the motor pool were coming down to the office. Maybe there were 25 coming down. There had been 25 here in the morning, and when they came in it didn't alarm me. The warden said that they were boys from the motor pool who were too young to drive and they were coming in to see Mr. Best about that. Around 1:00 o'clock Mr. Harkness called and said that there was a large group of people forming at the high-school area and heading toward the administration area. Thinking that Mr. Best was having lunch, I went to the Dining Room to tell him.¹ People were already gathering between the Dining Room and the Administration Building. I went through the crowd and back again and wasn't bothered. Soon after I was back in the office the committee came in, and I went in and took notes until Seemah came in to relieve me shortly after 4:00 o'clock. I walked through the Administration Building. I saw no evacuees in the Administration Building. There was quite a large number of appointive personnel in my office. During the meeting with the committee, while I was taking notes, Kuratomi was sitting down. It didn't seem to me there was any difference in the attitude of the committee than at other meetings. When the uncle of the baby who had died came in and gave his speech regarding the baby's death, after he had finished the group said, "yes, yes," "that's right," and words to that effect. Rev. Kai's tone sounded angry but he talked only in Japanese. After it was all over and Kuratomi and Kai gave their last speeches, Kai told them to go home. Some bent low and then the whole crowd dispersed quietly and quickly. When the hospital incident was announced before the meeting had begun (we were just getting their names when the call came from the hospital), Kuratomi remarked he didn't know that was happening and sent some boys over there to stop it.

November 4: I live near the military area. A Lt. came to the door and told us there was an alert and that we should go over to the military area. Some went to the military day room. I was in the Supply Officer's quarters, as well as a few other people from our barracks. I called Mr. Best. I didn't know what had happened.

Thursday, the 4th, was the last time the Japanese came in to get the transcript of the October 26th meeting. They had come in 3 or 4 times requesting it. Three came in on Thursday for them. Kuratomi and Hayashi and one whose name I don't know. The evacuee secretary had asked for the notes previously or that I help her transcribe hers because she hadn't gotten it. The last time they were very emphatic about the necessity of having them. No, I wasn't really alarmed, but I felt that they really *did* want them.

There was one meeting prior to the October 26 meeting that was recorded, but the notes have not been transcribed. It was supposedly a farm group to make arrangements for a committee to have a meeting to discuss the farm situation.

There was a group of about five who came in for conferences with the Colonel after the military took over. Kuratomi, Sugimoto, and Tsuda were always there. They, themselves, or rather Tsuda, called by telephone for some of the meetings.

(Signed) MARGARET M. LUCAS.

¹ Mr. Best and Mr. Myer were in the office when I returned.

FACTS REGARDING REDUCTION IN HOSPITAL STAFF

According to Mr. Stripling, Dr. Pedicord testified before the State Senate Committee in California that he had reduced the number of persons on the hospital staff at Tule Lake from 867 to 240. Mr. Myer volunteered to supply the actual figures for the record. A check with the project indicates that at the time when Dr. Pedicord assumed his duties at the Tule Lake Center, there were approximately 680 persons on the hospital staff and that by November 1, the hospital staff had been reduced to 227.

FACTS REGARDING ALLEGED TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS AT THE TULE LAKE CENTER

A recheck with the project indicates that the War Relocation Authority has never had any evidence of traffic in drugs at the Tule Lake Center.

CURRENT REGULATIONS OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY REGARDING JUDO INSTRUCTION

Prior to June 15, 1943, the policies of WRA regarding judo instructions were determined by the individual project directors. On that date, the Director laid down definite limitations regarding the number of instructors in judo and other Japanese-style activities in the following memorandum:

"To: All Project Directors:

"In line with its primary object of restoring evacuees to their normal place in American community life, WRA is giving active sponsorship and support at the centers to American-type activities.

"While there is no intention to restrict voluntary participation of residents in Japanese-style games, sports, and cultural activities of a nonpolitical nature, WRA can give very limited support to these activities. Therefore, no more than one paid evacuee instructor shall be permitted for each Japanese-style activity for which paid leadership seems essential. Where projects are divided into two or more camps, the upper limit should be one person per activity in each camp. Other leadership, as desired, should be obtained on a volunteer basis.

"Among the activities covered by this memorandum are judo, sumo, kendo, goh, shogi, shibai, shigin, utai, odori, shakuhachi, and all others primarily Japanese in character. For purposes of this directive, making of artificial flowers need not be regarded as a Japanese-style activity, although flower arrangement should be included in that category.

"It is recommended that personnel changes be discussed fully with evacuee staff members before reassignments are made, and that positions be abolished only as suitable assignments to other positions become possible.

"Within thirty days we would like a further report from your project showing that reduction in this type of assignment has been achieved in accordance with this directive. This should include job titles and brief job descriptions for all positions in the direction or operation of Japanese-style activities which continue in effect as of the date on which your report is filed."

FUNDS EXPENDED FOR JUDO INSTRUCTION AT RELOCATION CENTERS

From the beginning of the WRA program through December 31, 1943, the War Relocation Authority has spent a total of \$7,674.56 for judo instruction at all 10 relocation centers. This is an average of \$767.46 per relocation center.

LIST OF SECOND-HAND TRACTORS PURCHASED BY WRA FOR USE AT TULE LAKE

Type	Model	Where purchased	Price	Expenditures for repairs
International...	TD 35.....	Cornell Tractor Co., Salinas, California.	\$2, 200	No repairs.
International...	TD 40 rebuilt.....	Thompson Morton Co., Stockton, California.	2, 500	No repairs.
International...	TD 40.....	Farmers Equipment Co., Holtville, California.	1, 850	Repairs \$620.
International...	TD 35 Blue Ribbon, rebuilt.	Cornell Tractor Co., Salinas, California.	2, 475	No repairs.
International...	TD 40.....	Farmers Implement Co., Salinas, California.	1, 800	Repairs \$650.
Caterpillar.....	RD 6.....	Cornell Tractor Co., Salinas, California.	3, 150	Used very little when purchased, no repairs.
Caterpillar.....	50, with dozer.....	Purchased by OEM.....	(1)	
International...	TD 6, almost new.	Toshio Santo, Visalia, California.....	1, 350	No repairs.

¹ Not available.


COPY OF A TELETYPE FROM TULE LAKE CENTER REGARDING THE FEEDING OF HOGS.

According to C. E. Zimmer, Chief of Agriculture, and Riley D. Smith, Livestock Supervisor, the hogs on the hog farm were never fed turkeys, lard, or hams. In general the feed was refuse or garbage from the project mess halls. There was never any practice of feeding fresh lettuce to hogs. Leaves and trimmings from the packing house would be used for this purpose but the quantity of lettuce in this form was negligible.

INFORMATION REGARDING ALLEGED STRIKE OF OFFICE EMPLOYEES

Project Director Ray Best indicates that there never has been any strike of evacuee employees in the administrative offices at the Tule Lake Center since the time when he entered on duty in the project. The War Relocation Authority has no evidence that such a strike has ever occurred at any time.

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